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Showing posts with label Ali Khamenei. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Ali Khamenei. Show all posts

Monday, 24 June 2013

The state of play in Syria today

Iran Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the Grand Imam of al-Azhar Ahmad al-Tayyib

“Syria was not drowning in her blood yet. She was being swept by peaceful protests suggesting an Arab Spring wind was blowing in her direction,” Ghassan Charbel, editor-in-chief of pan-Arab al-Hayat, comments today.
He carries on:
Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei received an Arab guest. The conversation centered on Syria.
A conclusive sentence by the host summarized the position: “The choice is obvious in Syria. She can be like she used to be or she won’t be anyone’s at all.”
I met Khamenei’s Arab visitor in Cairo. He was trying to explain to me why Lebanese Hezbollah crossed the border to join the fighting in Syria.
He said, “All sides have laid their cards on the table. From hereon, makeup and facelifts are good-for-nothing. We are in the throes a Sunni-Shiite conflict. The struggle taking place in and over Syria will determine future balances in the region.”
A few hours earlier, I had called on Sheikh Ahmad al-Tayyib, the Grand Imam of al-Azhar. I saw him worrying lest the conflict in Syria turns sectarian. He felt bitter about Hezbollah hurling itself into the Syria war and tarnishing its image as a party solely devoted to standing up to Israel.
The Grand Imam of al-Azhar does not reproach Hezbollah only.
He did not get convincing answers from one of his visitors named Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
The dialogue last February was frank and transparent. The Grand Imam of al-Azhar quizzed his visitor about Iran’s position vis-à-vis Bahrain and the three UAE islands.
He also asked him about Iran’s role in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen. And he did not hesitate to ask Ahmadinejad about the Sunnis’ circumstances in Iran itself.
Ahmadinejad answered the tough questions by encapsulating the Iranian stance in one sentence: “Resistance to the usurper Zionist entity.”
The tiff did not go unnoticed.
The gravity of the conflict in Syria has forced all countries concerned to outpace diplomatic phraseology and lay bare their true positions.
President Mohamed Morsi, who at one point fancied courting Iran and Russia to carve out a Syria peace role for Egypt, buried the idea after Hezbollah’s plunge. He also hardened his position against the regime and went overboard.
The ongoing bloodbath in Syria changed the images of countries and their roles. It unmasked the depth of their contradictory feelings, their conflicting policies and their old and new fears.
The perception of Iran forging ahead under the banner of bravado and resistance hit a brick wall of Sunni resentment across the region. Tehran’s immersion in the Syria crisis lost Iran her aura and image.
At the same time, the axis of resistance lost its sole Sunni interface, Hamas. The Hamas movement in turn repositioned itself in its natural camp.
Overt interference in Syria dramatically changed Hezbollah’s footing. Having said it was joining a life-or-death battle in Syria, the party is now on the first line of engagement with the Sunnis of Syria, Lebanon and the region.
Hezbollah’s venture accelerated the cracks in Lebanon’s state institutions, coupled the “Lebanese arena” with the “Syrian arena” and added new injuries to historic wounds.
There are those who believe Lebanon will suffer from the logic “it is either ours or no one else’s.” This means bringing the temple down if you can’t make it solely yours.
The battle for Qusayr thrust the region into a situation where governments have to be in sync with inflamed passions on their street.
Decisions taken at the Doha meeting show the conflict has reached the point of no return.
Measures by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) partners targeting Hezbollah loyalists and financiers sent an unmistakable signal. The battle in Syria has turned regional and international.
Russia’s behavior is in step with “Syria can be like she used to be or she won’t be anyone’s at all.”
Still dithering and fearful of Jabhat al-Nusra and its sisters, America has been whitewashed to accept arming the opposition.
The Syrian regime opted too soon for “Syria can be like she used to be or she won’t be anyone’s at all.”
For hardliners in the opposition, “Syria can be like we wish her to be or she won’t be anyone’s at all.”
A battle as vitriolic internally, regionally and internationally threatens to pulverize Syria and ravage the weak neighboring milieus.
No one country can endure this level of risks and this number of risk-takers.

Monday, 17 June 2013

Rohani, the guardian jurist and Iran’s key



Two days before winning Iran's presidential vote earlier this week, reformist-backed cleric Hassan Rohani gave a glimpse of his plans if elected.
Here are some of his salient remarks:
  • Decisions on major foreign policy issues constitutionally require the support of the supreme leader... If elected, I expect to receive the same support and trust from the supreme leader on initiatives and measures I adopt to advance our foreign policy agenda.
  • Nuclear weapons have no role in Iran’s national security doctrine, and therefore Iran has nothing to conceal. But in order to move towards the resolution of Iran’s nuclear dossier, we need to build both domestic consensus and global convergence and understanding through dialogue… The P5+1 can be one channel for such negotiations, provided that they are prepared to be a vehicle for understanding and resolution of the issue rather than a tool for procrastination and political blackmail.
  • In my view, and in order to find a fair and generally agreed solution, Iran can play a mediatory role between the Syrian government and those in the opposition who strive for democracy and good governance… The year 2014 is very important, as President Assad’s term of office expires. A genuine election, free from foreign intervention and subversion, and the establishment of an elected government could restore stability and security in Syria.
  • If elected, improving and expanding relations with neighboring countries at all levels is a major priority in my future administration. Iran shares borders with fifteen countries over land and sea. All of them are important for us. On your question regarding Saudi Arabia, I plan to reverse the recently exacerbated [and] unfortunate rivalry between the two countries into mutual respect and mutually beneficial arrangements and cooperation to enhance security and restore stability in the region.
  • If elected, I will do my best to secure the release of those who have been incarcerated following the regrettable events of 2009. I know that the constitutional powers of the president in Iran do not extend to the areas outside the realm of the executive branch of the system. However, I am quite optimistic that I can muster the necessary domestic consensus to improve the present situation of Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karrubi.
  • The Iran–US relationship is a complex and difficult issue. A bitter history, filled with mistrust and animosity, marks this relationship. It has become a chronic wound whose healing is difficult but possible, provided that good faith and mutual respect prevail…

Ghassan Charbel, editor-in-chief of pan-Arab al-Hayat, writes in Arabic today of “Rohani, the Guardian Jurist and the Key.” In his view:
Hassan Rohani did well to have chosen the image of a key to symbolize his presidential campaign. The doors are shut and the horizon is blocked.
He perhaps wanted the symbol to rekindle the optimism of the generation of young Iranians who no more suffice with blowing the coals of the Islamic Revolution and denouncing Great Satan.
Caution – and lots of it -- is imperative when writing about Iran.
The Persian carpet of democracy was diligently woven under the cloak of the Guardian Jurist. The carpet knots are so fine that they block out yarns and threads. Islamic Revolution institutions tolerate differences in detail, not in substance.
Suppression of the Green Movement was emphatic. Iran’s spring was nipped in the bud before spring winds uprooted others.
Hassan Rohani is a legitimate son of the Iranian revolution.
He joined Khomeini as he prepared his homecoming to overthrown the Shah’s regime.
He explored the Islamic Republic’s corridors of power in parliament, in councils and in the army, information and national security dossiers.
He knitted a strong relationship with Hashemi Rafsanjani and won the confidence of Mohammad Khatami who chose him as his chief nuclear negotiator with the West.
Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s two terms of office were long and taxing.
True, they secured Iran “conquests” in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.
Equally true, they ended as they did, with economic sanctions squeezing Iran financially, the national currency falling to record lows, unemployment soaring to new highs, confrontations escalating and isolation mounting.
Rohani, as the regime’s scion, is aware the president is not the policy-maker on nuclear and foreign policy matters.
The tenet is unambiguous: the key sits in the Guardian Jurist’s drawer.
There is no point describing the economic situation. The Internet is replete with figures of losses. Tension with the West is evident. Iran has to pump huge amounts of cash to allow its ally in Damascus to soldier on with the war. The fact Hezbollah joined the fray adds to the political and economic burdens.
Iran looks like having rushed into a life-or-death battle, risking all its credit.
None of the aforesaid is blown out of proportion. Iran’s isolation is blatant.
The Sunni-Shiite rift risks cordoning off Iran with walls and fences. Some believe Iran expanded more than its economy could afford, mirroring the mistake committed by the now-defunct Soviet Union.
The triumph at the ballot box of a president with the attributes of rationality, realism and moderation undoubtedly polished the regime’s image, which was badly tarnished by its plunge into the Syria war.
Rohani knows this and is aware of what the regime did to Khatami, and to Rafsanjani before him.
But the situation today is more intricate and threatening.
Iran was never as cut off as it is today. Continuing to tread the current path is fraught with security, political and economic risks. And reneging previous commitments could mean drinking a second poisoned chalice, if not more.
Faced with this grim reality, Hassan Rohani chose the image of a key to symbolize his presidential campaign. He fought the presidential battle and came out on top in the first round. The remarks he made to Iranian TV after his victory confirm his intentions; “It was the triumph of wisdom, moderation, growth and awareness over extremism and fanaticism.”
He dwelt on hope and new openings, except that the test won’t be long in coming.
Can the Iranian president use the key or is he simply the senior employee in the Guardian Jurist’s office?
Did the Guardian Jurist admit the regime needs to open a window or will the hardliners quickly remind Rohani doors can’t be opened except with the Guardian Jurist’s key?
We have to wait to witness Rohani’s style, the key’s fate and the new demarcation lines between the hardliners and the temple guards.
But the dark clouds gathering over the region might not afford Rohani the luxury of a calm search for the key and the opportunity to use his mandate.
We could awaken one day to the heat of a major wildfire.

Thursday, 2 May 2013

Iran: "Ahmadinejad arrested, quizzed and released”


Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad appears to have been arrested and held for questioning for seven hours this week by order of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.
Ahmadinejad was quizzed about his campaign to promote his favored candidate in the much-anticipated June 14 election of the Islamic Republic’s seventh president.
I have collated these two reports, one detailing news of his arrest and questioning and the other shedding light on Ahmadinejad’s campaign for his chosen successor.
The arrest
By Reza Kahlili, writing for World Net Daily (WND) under the title “Iran source: President Ahmadinejad arrested”:
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad was arrested and held for seven hours Monday and warned to keep his mouth shut about matters detrimental to the Islamic regime before he was released, according to a source within the Revolutionary Guard’s intelligence unit.
After his visit to Tehran’s 26th international book fair Monday (April 29), the source said the head of Ahmadinejad’s security team informed the Iranian president that he had been asked to appear at the supreme leader’s office for an urgent matter.
On the way to the meeting, contact between the security team within the president’s convoy was disconnected while three other cars joined the convoy, instructing the lead car to take a different direction. Ahmadinejad, instead of being taken to the supreme leader’s office, was taken to a secret location in one of the buildings belonging to the Foreign Ministry, which is under the control of the Revolutionary Guards’ intelligence unit.
As soon as Ahmadinejad exited the car, he and his security team were involved in an altercation with Guards’ members in which his team was disarmed and communications equipment confiscated. Ahmadinejad was then forced to enter an office belonging to Hossein Taeb, the head of the Guards’ intelligence, located underneath the building.
As this was happening, the source said, hundreds of other Guards’ members from the intelligence unit sought out Ahmadinejad’s associates throughout Tehran and questioned them on the existence of documents detrimental to the regime.
Ahmadinejad was questioned for hours in a meeting with Taeb; Asghar Hejazi, the head of intelligence at the supreme leader’s office; Mojtaba Khamenei, the supreme leader’s son; and Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejei, the attorney general. He was warned to back down from his claims against regime officials and given an ultimatum. The source added that Ahmadinejad was released back to his security team at 11:45 p.m. Monday, Tehran time.
Earlier, the regime’s media outlet Baztab reported that with just days remaining for the registration of presidential candidates, Ahmadinejad warned associates that if his hand-picked candidate to succeed him, a close confidant and a top adviser, Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei, was rejected as a candidate, then he would reveal tapes that will show the regime defrauded the voters in the 2009 presidential election.
One tape reportedly quotes officials as telling Ahmadinejad in 2009 that they will announce his total winning tally as 24 million votes where the real number was 16 million. In the same tape, Ahmadinejad insisted that the officials not do that. The Baztab site was immediately taken down by the regime’s security forces and is still offline.
Millions of Iranians took to the streets after the 2009 election results were reported, calling Ahmadinejad’s 62 percent tally of voters a fraud and demanding a free election. Thousands were arrested, with many tortured and executed. Ahmadinejad’s opponents, Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, have been under house arrest ever since.
Under the constitution of the Islamic Republic, the 12-member Guardian Council decides the eligibility of who can run for office in the country, and anyone with any history of opposing the regime is barred from participation. The council is made up of six Islamic faqihs (experts in Islamic law) appointed by the supreme leader and six jurists nominated by the head of the Judiciary (who is himself appointed by the supreme leader), and then approved by parliament.
Ahmadinejad had previously warned that he would release documents not only on high-ranking Guards officers but also on leading members of parliament and the Justice Department that prove financial fraud.
The source added that it will be interesting to see if Ahmadinejad takes the warning or if he creates more problems with the regime, but one thing is sure: He could end up dead if he doesn’t.
The public relations office of the Iranian president subsequently issued a press release rejecting the existence of such a tape that points to fraud in the 2009 elections. In its release, it stated that publishing such news, by the regime’s media Baztab, is only with the intention of creating instability before the upcoming elections.
The UK DailyMail reporting on this WND story added that U.S. and British diplomats in the area are said to be aware of the reports and are viewing them “with interest.”
“It is potentially of considerable significance given the on-going internal political struggles as the election approaches,” one diplomatic source said.
The campaign
By Saeed Kamali Dehghan, writing for The Guardian of May 1 under the title “Who’s afraid of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad”:
As the countdown begins for elections that will usher in Iran's first new president in eight years, all eyes are still on Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the unpredictable and mercurial man who looks unlikely to go quietly.
Shortly after the 14 June poll, he will have to relinquish his office in Tehran's Pastor street and hand over the keys to his successor. Given the tight timetable for Iranian elections, it is almost impossible to guess who that person will be.
With just six weeks to go, registrations for presidential candidates are only due next week. A number of hopefuls have already announced plans to run but their candidacies will not be valid until the powerful Guardian Council vets their competence and loyalty to the Islamic republic. In 2009, out of 476 registered nominees, only four candidates were allowed to stand – two of them, Mir Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karroubi, are under house arrest for refusing to accept the results and for alleging fraud.
The final list of this year's candidates is expected on 23 May and a three-week campaign period will follow.
Despite this, Ahmadinejad has embarked on an extensive schedule of provincial visits in what is suspected to be part of an election strategy designed to promote his favoured candidate. On Wednesday, he was visiting Rasht, the capital of northwestern Gilan province, situated on the coast of the Caspian Sea. At the weekend, he went to Tabriz in the East Azerbaijan province. Previously, he visited a number of other provinces, such as Isfahan, Khuzestan and Semnan. He is not alone; other nominees are following his footsteps.
Under Iranian law, the president cannot run for a third term but all the signs indicate that the 57-year-old Ahmadinejad, a relatively young politician in the Iranian hierarchy, has no plans for retirement. On the contrary, he is accused of planning a Putin/Medvedev-style reshuffle by grooming his chief of staff and close confidant, Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei.
In the eyes of loyalists to the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, today's Ahmadinejad bears no resemblance to the young revolutionary and later Tehran mayor who rose to become president in 2005. Back then, he quickly became the ayatollah's protégé, enjoying an unprecedented influence over Iranian politics. Now, Ahmadinejad is at odds with his erstwhile patrons in the Revolutionary Guards and widely seen as a lame duck.
Ahmadinejad has fallen foul of the loyalists because of his unwavering support for Mashaei, who is accused of leading a deviant current in the inner circle of the president, loathed for their advocacy of greater cultural openness and nationalism.
Many are already counting down Ahmadinejad's dying days in office, believing they are his final days in power. Others think he still has a chance and, in case Mashaei is disqualified from running, is issuing challenges to the establishment by threatening to go out all guns blazing and pulling down the edifice of the political system that championed him.
But who is afraid of Ahmadinejad? In February, the president played a secretly filmed tape in the Iranian parliament - to the astonishment of millions of Iranians listening on national radio - that revealed the speaker's brother was allegedly trading on his sibling's influence for financial gain.
Many fear that the president's team have many more secret tapes and videos that could pose serious challenges to the Islamic republic; others say that is a bluff. "They have installed hidden cameras, listening devices in order to collect information and release them in public," Mohammed Ali Montazeri, a judicial official, warned this week.
Baztab, a conservative news website critical of the government, said in a report that Ahmadinejad was rumored to possess a tape that shows he received a phone call from the authorities right after the 2009 elections telling him they planned to announce that he had won millions more votes than the real tally. This was denied by the president's office this week and Baztab was taken offline on Wednesday.
"There are things to say..." Ahmadinejad said on a recent visit to the holy city of Qom, promising to reveal them at a future date. The president's menacing language has infuriated his rivals and, as elections approach, everyone is watching for any unexpected movements that may embarrass the supreme leader.

Friday, 26 April 2013

Iran’s Shiite counterattack… from Syria to Iraq


From top clockwise, Lebanon's Nasrallah with Iran's Khamenei, Iraq's Maliki and Syria'sAssad

Shiite powerhouse Iran seems to have drawn the battle lines for Shiite-Sunni warfare in Lebanon, Syria and Iraq -- a total area of 634,000 square kilometers with an overall population of 58 million.
Syria’s minority Alawite sect — an offshoot of Shiite Islam — dominates Bashar al-Assad’s regime while the rebels fighting to overthrow the Syrian president are mostly from the Sunni majority.
Assad's major allies – Iran, its Lebanese Hezbollah cat’s-paw and Tehran’s Iraqi surrogate Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki -- are all Shiite.
Iran
Closely allied with Damascus since the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war, Tehran remains Assad's main political and diplomatic backer, arms supplier and financier.
Iranian advisers help man Assad’s war room and Iranian Revolutionary Guards are present in Syria in numbers ranging into the hundreds, though exact figures cannot be determined.
Last January 48 Iranians held hostage by rebel fighters in Syria were released in exchange for 2,130 prisoners held by the Syrian authorities.
The Syrian opposition said the 48 Iranians captured in August 2012 were members of the Revolutionary Guards on their way to join pro-Assad forces. Iran said they were simple pilgrims on their way to the Shiite shrine of Sayyeda Zeinab in southern Damascus.

Shiite fighters from Iran, Lebanon and Iraq are now deployed in the Syrian capital’s Sayyeda Zeinab neighborhood.
Ten weeks ago Iran’s point man in Lebanon and Syria was ambushed and killed by Syrian opposition forces while travelling overland to Beirut from Damascus.
The semiofficial Fars news agency identified the slain Revolutionary Guards commanding officer as Hassan Shateri. In Lebanon, Shateri was posing as “Hessam Khoshnevis,” head of an Iranian agency set up to help rebuild Hezbollah-controlled areas devastated by the 2006 war with Israel (see my February 14 post).
More recently, Iran and Hezbollah built a 50,000-strong “People’s Army” of Syrian militiamen to bolster Assad’s depleted regular army.
Hezbollah
Hezbollah is now playing a more deepening and barefaced role in the Syria war just across the Lebanese border.
Assad warplanes this week provided Hezbollah fighters with aerial cover to help them advance near the strategic town of al-Qusayr in Homs province.
The border region near Homs on the Syria side is strategic because it links Damascus with the coastal enclave that is the heartland of Syria's Alawites and is also home to the country's two main seaports, Latakia and Tartus.
The battle for al-Qusayr has inflamed tensions in Lebanon, where two Sunni clerics this week called for volunteers to head to Syria and defend the oppressed in al-Qusayr and Homs. 
Iraq
In Iraq this week, the killings of scores of Sunni protesters by forces of the Shiite-dominated Baghdad government have raised fears of a return to all-out sectarian war.
The trouble began on Tuesday when the army stormed an encampment in the village of Hawija, where Sunnis had been holding protests since late December, leaving dozens dead and injured.
That incident set off a wave of revenge attacks that hit five different Sunni-majority provinces, killing dozens more people and culminating with Sunni gunmen taking control of the town of Sulaiman Bek in Salahuddin province, north of Baghdad, on Wednesday.
The violence is the deadliest so far linked to demonstrations that erupted some four months ago in Sunni areas of the Shiite-majority country.
The Sunni protesters have called for the resignation of Shiite Prime Minister Maliki and railed against the alleged targeting of their community by the authorities.
“The Sunni uprising, having now turned violent, represents a significant challenge to Maliki, whose consolidation of power over the security forces and the judiciary, and his targeting of high-level Sunni leaders for arrest, has raised alarms among world powers,” according to The New York Times.
“Mr. Maliki has presided over an unwieldy power-sharing government, which nominally gives prominent roles to Sunnis but in reality has resulted in political stasis, and he has signaled in recent months that he would prefer to move to a majority government, dominated almost solely by Shiites. On Tuesday, two Sunni ministers quit to protest the raid in Hawija, and the largest bloc of Sunni lawmakers suspended participation in Parliament.
“Mr. Maliki made no public comments on the situation Wednesday, but on Tuesday, after being pressed by American officials and the United Nations, he said he would open an investigation into the events in Hawija, and promised to hold military officers accountable for any mistakes.
“The deteriorating situation in Iraq highlights the sectarian tensions that have risen across the region, particularly amid the raging civil war in Syria…
“In Iraq, the central government has aligned with the Syrian government and its greatest ally, Iran, while Sunnis here have sided with the rebels, and they now appear to be emboldened by the events in Syria to challenge their own government.
“The sectarian fissure is evident in the rhetoric of the Sunni rebellion here [in Iraq]: militants over the last few days have referred to Iraq’s army as a force loyal to Iran, while many Shiites here have cast the formerly peaceful Sunni protesters as Muslim extremists beholden to al-Qaeda…”
John Drake, an Iraq specialist with risk consulting firm AKE Group, was quoted this week saying “the fact that this is a predominantly Shiite government and it's predominantly Shiite security forces opening fire on predominantly Sunni individuals (civilians or militants) is going to have an impact on sectarian relations and could prompt a rise in sectarian violence as a result."
Enclave
Lebanese political analyst Elie Chalhoub, writing for the Beirut daily al-Akhbar, which is close to the Syria-Hezbollah-Iran-Iraq alignment, says official opinion in Baghdad is divided.
Political sources close to the Maliki government suspect outside forces –“including Syrian armed gangs and regional forces” -- are trying to exploit the Hawija events to help carve up a Sunni enclave in Iraq.
Military sources on the other hand blame the violence on “measures taken by Iraqi army units along the border with Syria in the last 10 days. Let’s not forget Hawija, on the Iraqi side of the border, sits opposite Deir Ezzor, which is Jabhat al-Nusra’s nerve center.
“Iraqi forces succeeded, to a large extent, in tightening the noose on Takfiri groups that sneak fighters and arms into Syria from Iraq.”
Clarion
Walid Choucair, pan-Arab daily al-Hayat’s Beirut bureau chief, today blames turmoil in the region on “The clarion call by Iran to shore up Assad.”
The Syria crisis, he explains, “has entered a new phase of intense Iranian involvement.”
The reason is Tehran cannot continue seeing its regional cards come under threat as they are in Syria, Iraq, the Gulf and Yemen.
It is no coincidence, says Choucair, that most live events in the region bear Iran’s signature. For example:
  • “Hezbollah’s overt and unabashed participation in fighting alongside Syrian regime troops to recapture territory from opposition forces as deep inside Syria as Homs.”
  • “Execution by Maliki, Tehran’s favorite point man in Baghdad, of his threat to crack down on opponents and tribesmen who have been challenging his policies for months in al-Anbar province, and by ordering the army to bomb protesters west of Kirkuk and then in Baghdad.”
  • “Assad’s warning that terrorism will come back to haunt the West and his latest pep talk to a visiting deputation of regime loyalists from Lebanon (see my post, “Assad on Black Sunday...”).
  • Release of a photo showing Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei receiving Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. The still aims to tell Lebanese Shiites that Hezbollah’s deepening involvement in Syria has the blessing of Vali e-faqih (or Guardian Jurist).

Counterattack
Also writing for al-Hayat in the same vein -- under the title, “The counterattack… from Syria to Iraq” – is Zuhair Qusaybati.
“Any parallel,” he wonders, “between the Iraqi army’s storming of the Sunni protesters’ encampment in Hawija and the joint campaign by Hezbollah and Syrian regime forces on the rebel-held area of al-Qusayr?”
Yes, says Qusaybati.
The similitude is that Tehran’s allies in Iraq and Syria “are implementing what can be described as an Iranian counterattack” in anticipation of “the grand bargain” between the United States and the Islamic Republic over the latter’s nuclear program.
America suffices with watching for the time being. It is hedging its bets on Iran drowning in quagmires of religious and sectarian wars.
Bane
Jordanian-Palestinian writer Yasser Zaatra, in a think piece for Aljazeera portal, speaks of Iran becoming a bane to Shiite Arabs.
Initially, he says, Iran leaders described the uprising in Tunisia and Egypt as an “Islamic revival.” They changed their minds when the Arab Spring reached Syria.
Zaatra says most Shiite Arabs subscribed to Tehran’s immoral stand, causing a serious sectarian split in the region – whether in places like the Gulf and Lebanon, where Shiites are in the minority, or in predominantly Shiite countries such as Iraq and Bahrain.
Iran’s mobilization of Shiite Arabs against the majority Sunnis in Syria triggered an unprecedented backlash among the historically tolerant Sunnis of the Arab and Islamic worlds, according to Zaatra.
The cause of this sectarian polarization is chiefly Syria and what happened earlier, when Iran put Iraq under its thumb and dictated a sectarian agenda on Iraq’s new Shiite rulers – who incidentally “entered Baghdad riding U.S. tanks.”
Shiite Arabs – whether in Iraq, Lebanon or the Gulf -- have no interest in a confrontation with their neighbors or fellow citizens and vice-versa. Ethnic and sectarian wars leave no winners, Zaatra remarks.
“The arrogance of power has got to the Iranian leaders’ heads. It made them lose sight of the true balance of power in the Islamic world, where Shiites are in a minority of only about 10 percent – and a lower percentage in the Arab world…”

Wednesday, 10 October 2012

Swap on the cards: Iraq-Maliki for Syria-Assad

Maliki (top) and Assad in meetings with Khamenei

Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is playing his regional trump card: Iraq to replace Syria and Iraq’s powerful Shiite Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki to supersede Syria’s embattled Alawite President Bashar al-Assad.
Tehran’s theocratic government and Baghdad’s Shiite-dominated leadership have been moving closer all the time. And both share a similar interest in supporting Damascus.
Iraq abstained from a 2011 Arab League vote to suspend Syria’s membership. It is now quietly shipping crucial fuel oil supplies to Assad’s regime.
Iraq has also been laundering money for the Islamic Republic to help it overcome sanctions and ferry weapons and fighters to the Assad government.
Since it promised to ask Syria-bound airplanes passing through its airspace to land for random inspections after Washington said they could be ferrying arms to Damascus, Baghdad searched one cargo plane only.
At the same time, an agreement between senior Iraqi and Iranian officials allowed Tehran to make larger and more systematic transfers of weapons and fighters to Syria overland via Iraq.
Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad will be travelling to Baghdad shortly to confer with Maliki.
Maliki, who is in Moscow on a working visit to consolidate political, economic and defense ties and discuss developments in Syria, meets later today with Russian President Vladimir Putin.
A joint statement issued after Maliki’s talks on Tuesday with his counterpart Dmitry Medvedev said more than $4.2 billion in arms deals were agreed between the two sides as part of a tighter military cooperation plan.
Moscow will supply 30 Mil Mi-28NE night/all-weather capable attack helicopters, and 50 Pantsir-S1 gun-missile short-range air defense systems. The contracts are among the biggest ever signed between Iraq and Russia.
Further discussions were also said to be underway for Iraq’s eventual acquisition of a large group of MiG-29 fighters and helicopters along with heavy weaponry.
Russian arms industry analyst Russian Pukhov of the Center for Analysis of Strategy and Technologies, a Moscow-based think tank, tells Novosti the deal showed Baghdad's desire to break Washington's monopoly of arms supplies to Iraq.
"It's clear that America's influence on Iraq has been excessive. The Shiite government of this country is starting to conduct itself more independently of Washington, and more looking toward Iran," he said.
Russia is seeking to take its ties with Iraq to a new level and win almost certain support for its position on Syria.
Baghdad needs Moscow’s help in defense and military areas and needs arms to “defend itself and fight terrorism,” Maliki said in the Russian Foreign Ministry mansion on Monday.
Tariq Alhomayed, editor-in-chief of the leading Saudi daily Asharq Alawsat, believes Maliki aspires to be Assad’s “substitute” in the region.
Alhomayed explains in today’s leader:
The Iraqi premier’s visit to Russia and his signing of a large arms deal with Moscow evoke ruminations to ponder as to strategic choices and regional power balances, chiefly as regards Syria
Maliki is obviously trying to reconcile the irreconcilable. He is after simultaneous alliances with Tehran, Washington and Moscow, something no one was able to do in the region.
Turkey’s zero-problems foreign policy finds Ankara today immersed in the region’s problems. Independently of policy, problems pop up even when you ignore them. And they will drown you if you don’t tackle them properly.
A huge Russian arms deal won’t rebuild the Iraqi army, not when the U.S. continues to train and equip the Iraqi military.
It is an open secret that Moscow’s chief arms clients are either isolated Arab regimes, or ones trying to blackmail the U.S. and Europe for political gain.
If Iraq wanted to be an active Arab power player supportive of democracy and stability, why do a deal with Moscow, chief spoiler of a UN Security Council solution for Syria?
All evidence suggests Maliki yearns for superseding Assad. He is reassuring Moscow that it has a client ready to buy Russian weapons at present.
What Iraq has done is simply gift the Russians an alternative to Assad’s regime. Moscow can now claim it is far from being isolated in the Arab world.
Maliki hankers after superseding Assad in the region, albeit rolled out in new packaging. The new packaging will prove faulty nevertheless, for how can Maliki square the Tehran-Washington-Moscow circle or forge exceptional ties with his fellow-Arab countries?
Maliki’s wish to serve in Assad’s stead in the region transpires from his own remarks – that Baghdad needs Moscow’s help “to fight terrorism.”
Russia has been regurgitating “to fight terrorism” since the outbreak of the Syrian Revolution.
With the Russians taking “terrorists” to mean “Sunnites,” Maliki comes along to seek their cooperation in fighting them.
No need to think long and hard: Maliki aspires to supplant Assad in the region as the protector of its minorities and all the rest.