Oman as Iran’s Trojan Horse in the GCC

Prince Turki al-Faisal addressing the Manama Dialogue

Oman is emerging as Iran’s Trojan Horse trying to destroy the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) from within.

Sultan Qaboos bin Said, the monarch of Oman since 1970, reportedly played a key role in facilitating the secret U.S.-Iran talks leading up to the November 24 “historic” nuclear deal, according to The Associated Press.

Oman is isolated from much of the rest of the Arabian Peninsula by a formidable mountain range, while Iran is just across the narrow Strait of Hormuz, a critical waterway for global oil shipments that has at times raised tensions between the U.S. and Iran.

As early as 2009, according to Wikileaks, the sultanate offered to arrange talks between the U.S. and Iran – which hadn’t had diplomatic relations for 30 years – on condition that they were kept quiet. But it was reportedly the hostage crisis of three American “hikers” that brought him into a mediating role between the two sides and helped win the release of the three Americans, who were arrested and accused of spying while hiking along the Iran-Iraq border.

With that success in his pocket, Sultan Qaboos offered to facilitate a U.S.-Iran rapprochement, the AP reports. In March, U.S. and Iranian officials met in Oman, Secretary of State John Kerry followed up in May, and the talks took on a momentum of their own after Hassan Rouhani replaced Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Iran’s June elections.

Sultan Qaboos wasn’t in front of the cameras in Geneva, but a news report in the Saudi daily al-Hayat this morning speaks of “fears within the GCC of Iranian-Omani efforts to break up” the six-member club grouping Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Oman.

Oman and Saudi Arabia bickered publicly over the GCC’s future last week at the three-day Manama Dialogue in Bahrain, a forum on Middle East security.

A much-anticipated Gulf union is inevitable and will happen because people in the region are keen on it, Prince Turki al-Faisal, Saudi Arabia’s former Intelligence Chief who also served as ambassador in both the United States and United Kingdom, told the conference.

He was commenting on remarks made Saturday by Yusuf bin Alawi bin Abdullah, the Omani foreign minister, who said his country rejected the Gulf union and would pull out of the club if the union were approved.

“Everyone has the right to express their opinions,” Prince Turki retorted. “However, this will not prevent the union from happening. Oman can join it then or later, or not at all,” he said.

On the nuclear talks in Geneva last month between the 5+1 world powers and Iran, Prince Turki said they lacked a “very important factor” – namely, the participation of Iran’s Gulf neighbors.

“I don’t know the reasons for that… because eventually we are the ones that will be affected by anything -- a military event or a nuclear leak or any earthquake that may hit the [nuclear] sites in Iran,” he remarked.

“No doubt we are now facing a big smile from the Iranian leadership in the way they are dealing with the Gulf.”

Prince Turki added: “Iran must take concrete measures before we can judge whether it is going forward with a smile, or simply showing its teeth.”

Prince Turki said television and radio stations in Iran are targeting the Gulf Arabs with inflammatory broadcasts tackling “sensitive issues in our Arab world.”

Addressing Iran, he said: “Why don’t you close them down and show us your good intentions? Show us you are serious about this real, wide smile you are showing us.”

The six GCC partners hold their annual year-end summit in Kuwait, tomorrow, Tuesday.

Ghassan Charbel, editor-in-chief of al-Hayat, has this word today to tell tomorrow’s summiteers:

The region is unlike the one that existed three years ago.

Governments are confused. Armies are anxious. Borders are violated or about to be…

Iraq’s disintegration is an undeniable fact. The dismemberment of Yemen is flagrant. What looked like a Syrian intifada turned out to be a sectarian war feeding tension into the neighbors’ arteries.

Lebanon’s institutions are in a coma and its doors are open to refugees and fire. Libya, which spent four decades under one leader, today terrorizes its people, neighbors and the world. From Yemen to Tunisia, al-Qaeda and its ilk are omnipresent…

Today’s world is much more dangerous than the world that witnessed the birth of the GCC in 1981.

Bar Israel, four key regional states will play a dominant role in this difficult phase depending on their respective internal stability, resources and alliances.

They are Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Iran and Turkey.

GCC leaders who meet in Kuwait tomorrow are aware of the magnitude of the threats to stability and roles. They know the importance of adapting to change.

Oman’s attitude clearly unveiled that the Gulf union’s journey won’t be trouble-free.

But sensitivities should not forestall attempts to reconcile views of the various GCC member states on how to handle this phase of containing risks and assigning roles.  

Why should Saudi Arabia feel anxious and lonely?

This is my paraphrasing of the weekly think piece penned in Arabic by Saudi mass media celebrity Jamal Khashoggi for pan-Arab daily al-Hayat

Saeed al-Wahhabi is a young Saudi writer with a blunt and concise style of expressing himself in writing.

After the Saudis were crammed all day long with news analyses of the nuclear deal between the 5+1 world powers and Iran, he encapsulated the general Saudi mood last Sunday night with a tweet saying, “No doubt, Saudi Arabia feels lonely tonight.”

Yes, it was a tough night.

Until an official (Saudi) statement cautiously welcoming the agreement was released, the ghosts and illusions of threats and isolation made the rounds.

At the same time, analysts were piling up the jitters: “Iran is the region’s policeman” and “As customary, the United States double-crosses her allies and lets them down.”

In context, I personally told Agence France-Presse (AFP) Iran softened her nuclear ambitions in order to win hegemony over the region.

But the public’s anxiety and dejected feeling were unwarranted. The agreement reached in Geneva last Sunday is natural and a commonplace occurrence in history, which should rid the region from the specter of war that has been hovering in its skies for over a decade.

When serving as Saudi ambassador to the United States, Prince Turki al-Faisal coined a brief answer explaining Saudi Arabia’s position on Iran’s nuclear program. This was because he would be asked about the subject each time he held a stateside press conference or met with U.S. officials.

Prince Turki’s cliché answer went like this: “We live today between two nightmares. The first is Iran making a nuclear bomb. The other is Israel blitzing Iran’s nuclear facilities and dragging the region into a war of unknown scope and outcome.”

The new Iran deal dispels our bad dreams – at least during its six-month timeframe when Tehran will freeze its progress towards a possible nuclear bomb and Israel won’t launch a preventive strike against Iran to prevent it from obtaining nuclear weapons.

There is also a chance of the November 24 interim agreement making a permanent check on Iran’s nuclear ambitions and bringing permanent peace to the region.

What should be a matter of concern for us Saudis are the state of “anxiety and apprehension” and the case of “going to bed (if at all) feeling lonely” as Wahhabi suggested in his tweet.

Abdullah al-Askar, who heads the foreign relations committee in the Shura (Consultative) Council, said, “Denizens of the region won’t be getting much shut-eye.”

Such negative reactions are a source of concern for the express and endemic lack of confidence in our ability to cope with overdue change in the region.

I put forward that this is because:

• We got “used” to being dependent on the U.S. as a strategic ally that will invariably lend us a hand in times of crises.
• We realized the region started to wobble and lose its balance after the fall of Iraq and Saddam Hussein (and this is not to bemoan the loss of the man or his regime)
• Then came Turkey’s rise as a regional power, Egypt’s eclipse for internal reasons associated with the Arab Spring, and Pakistan’s hibernation after the wounds it sustained post 9/11 and its mini civil war with the Taliban.

It can be argued that Saudi Arabia stand alone in facing up to Iran and her regional ambitions. That’s despite the kingdom having common interests with Turkey and Qatar for instance in the Syria war, and with the UAE, Kuwait and Qatar in Bahrain’s turmoil.

Nonetheless, there is no united front or agreement to confront Iran. All the countries I mentioned now and earlier have links and interests with Iran. But they all lack a common strategic agenda for action on the Syria front. This has allowed the Syrian regime and its Iranian backer to score victories over opposition forces.

The November 24 agreement did not give Iran a free hand in the region. But her hands were not exactly tied behind her back before the agreement.

Proof is Tehran’s unchallenged military intervention in Syria.

Iran is thus aware the West is not particularly interested in what she is doing in Yemen or in Bahrain so long as the IAEA inspectors are going about their jobs freely and the enrichment of uranium is not exceeding the agreed level.

Iran will thus enhance its activities in places like Yemen and Bahrain in order to test her new relations with the West.

Saudi Arabia would have to face this alone, but not necessarily. She still has common interests with regional heavyweights.

But a restructuring of Saudi Arabia’s defense policy is imperative – starting with an acknowledgement that reliance on the United States is unhealthy.

The fact America turned her back on us was not a whimsical Obama move. It was a well thought out U.S. policy resulting from ongoing changes in America’s priorities.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia would thus have to redraw the map of her regional alliances. Turkey is key. Her leaders want special relations with the kingdom.

But Egypt is yet to come back from the wilderness. The most that can be heard from Cairo is, “We support all what you do” – except that Cairo did nothing for Syria.

Pakistan too needs a friend’s help to make up with the Taliban, allowing the Pakistani army to resume its national duties.

It will also be necessary to open channels of communication with Iran, even while the confrontation persists. Tehran repeats every five minutes that it wants good relations with the kingdom. Let’s take after the Iranians’ diligence and hear what they have to say.

The region’s problems are many. They multiply when neglected but they can be solved. The region also harbors allies and friends of ours. We don’t have to feel lonely after that dreary Sunday.

Arabs & Israel feel shortchanged by ‘Great Satan’

America's Obama Obama and Iran's Rouhani (from algemeiner.com)

Led by Saudi Arabia, Arab governments are dumbstruck by Iran’s nuclear deal with world powers and the Islamic Republic’s acceptance on the global stage.

Not so Israel, which calls the deal a “mistake,” and not so the overwhelming majority of political analysts and commentators in the Arab media.

Fahmi Howeidi, dean of these Arab public opinion-shapers, concludes his think piece today for Aljazeera TV news portal with a sentence saying: “The long and short of the new balance of power in the Arab world is this: Iran tops the list of winners but there is no mention of the Arabs anywhere.”

Tariq Alhomayed, writing today for Asharq Alawsat, the Saudi newspaper of records of which he was editor-in-chief, believes “the deal with Iran is more treacherous than 9/11.”

U.S. President Barack Obama overnight defended the deal between Iran and world powers on Tehran's nuclear program.

The six-month interim deal struck in Geneva on Sunday saw Iran agree to curb some of its nuclear activities in return for sanctions relief.

The accord has been generally welcomed but Israel's prime minister called it "a historic mistake".

The West has long suspected Iran's uranium enrichment program is geared towards making a weapon, but Tehran insists it only wants nuclear energy.

The UN, U.S. and European Union had imposed a raft of sanctions on Tehran.

"Huge challenges remain, but we cannot close the door on diplomacy, and we cannot rule out peaceful solutions to the world's problems," the BBC quoted Obama as saying during an event in San Francisco.

"We cannot commit ourselves to an endless cycle of violence, and tough talk and bluster may be the easy thing to do politically, but it's not the right thing for our security."

Earlier, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced an Israeli team led by national security adviser Yossi Cohen would travel to Washington for talks on the deal.

"This accord must bring about one outcome: the dismantling of Iran's military nuclear capability," he said.

Israel has not ruled out taking military action to stop Iran developing the capability of a nuclear bomb.

Saudi Arabia -- Iran's regional counterweight -- cautiously welcomed the deal yesterday.

Under the deal which will last six months, Iran would receive some $7bn in "limited, temporary, targeted, and reversible [sanctions] relief" while a permanent agreement is sought.

Key points of the deal include:

• Iran will stop enriching uranium beyond 5% and "neutralize" its stockpile of uranium enriched beyond this point
• Iran will give greater access to inspectors including daily access at Natanz and Fordo -- two of Iran’s key nuclear sites
• There will be no further development of the Arak plant, which it is believed could produce plutonium
• In return, there will be no new nuclear-related sanctions for six months if Iran sticks by the accord
• Some sanctions will be suspended on trading in gold and precious metals, on Iran's car-making sector and its petrochemical exports
• Frozen oil sale assets will be transferred in installments, bringing in some $4.2bn of extra revenue.

Howeidi, in his piece today for Aljazeera quotes unnamed Iranian experts as telling him:

• The deal recognizes Iran as a regional nuclear power with the right to continue its uranium enrichment program for peaceful purposes
• The Iranians and Americans rushed the deal through to sidestep adverse pressure by Israel, France and some Gulf Arab lobbyists
• The Iranian-American understandings go beyond the nuclear program and the easing of economic sanctions. “The most important understanding is over Iran’s participation in the fight against terrorism in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Afghanistan”
• The deal allows Iran to receive some $7 billion in sanctions relief; about $1.5 billion of the frozen assets were promptly released to Tehran “by Asian banks in South Korea, Malaysia and Indonesia as early as last Sunday morning”
• Shell, which was complying with the sanctions, was the first oil major to resume work in Iran.

Howeidi sums up the most important features of the agreement between the 5+1 world powers and Iran as follows:

1. It seems a new axis is taking shape in the region comprising Iran and Russia, the two countries that played a key role in aborting an American military strike against Syria.
2. The U.S. will henceforth “rely on Iran and Turkey to keep the peace in the region now that Egypt has lost its standing in the Arab world.” Iran is on the ground in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon and to some degree in Yemen, where it is supporting the Houthis. Turkey on the other hand has its role in Syria, Iraq and the Caucasus in Central Asia. Ankara also has its strong economic ties with many Arab countries.
3. There are still question marks over a sectarian war between the Sunnis and Shiites in the Arab world, over Iran’s support of the Islamic movements in Palestine and Lebanon and over future links between Cairo and Tehran.
4. Israel is in a win-win situation. Syria’s chemical weapons are being buried and checks on Iran’s nuclear ambitions are being put in place.
5. Iran’s clout in the Gulf, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon is on the ascendancy. The Gulf, which usually banks on the U.S. is now less prone to challenge Iran. That’s particularly true of Saudi Arabia, which lost its gamble on America’s air strike on Syrian regime forces and on mobilizing Sunni forces against Tehran.
6. “The long and short of the new balance of power in the Arab world is this: Iran tops the list of winners but there is no mention of the Arabs anywhere.”

In the view of Saudi journalist Tariq Alhomayed, “fallouts of the deal on the region – specifically on Saudi Arabia and its Gulf Arab partners – will prove more treacherous than the consequences of the 9/11 terrorist outrage that pummeled the United States in 2001.

“I am not dramatizing. It is not so because the Obama Administration sold the region down the river or that the administration turned its back on its historic partnership with Gulfite Arabs.

Many forget that America betrayed Israel, her sacred cow in the region.

Alhomayed says Iran’s chief objective since the days of the late Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlevi was to become the “region’s policeman.”

The Islamic Republic will eventually rid itself of all economic sanctions and achieve its primary objective of creating nuclear weapons “much as India and Pakistan did under Bill Clinton, another Democratic Party president.” 

The state of play in Syria today

Iran Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and the Grand Imam of al-Azhar Ahmad al-Tayyib

“Syria was not drowning in her blood yet. She was being swept by peaceful protests suggesting an Arab Spring wind was blowing in her direction,” Ghassan Charbel, editor-in-chief of pan-Arab al-Hayat, comments today.

He carries on:

Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei received an Arab guest. The conversation centered on Syria.

A conclusive sentence by the host summarized the position: “The choice is obvious in Syria. She can be like she used to be or she won’t be anyone’s at all.”

I met Khamenei’s Arab visitor in Cairo. He was trying to explain to me why Lebanese Hezbollah crossed the border to join the fighting in Syria.

He said, “All sides have laid their cards on the table. From hereon, makeup and facelifts are good-for-nothing. We are in the throes a Sunni-Shiite conflict. The struggle taking place in and over Syria will determine future balances in the region.”

A few hours earlier, I had called on Sheikh Ahmad al-Tayyib, the Grand Imam of al-Azhar. I saw him worrying lest the conflict in Syria turns sectarian. He felt bitter about Hezbollah hurling itself into the Syria war and tarnishing its image as a party solely devoted to standing up to Israel.

The Grand Imam of al-Azhar does not reproach Hezbollah only.

He did not get convincing answers from one of his visitors named Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

The dialogue last February was frank and transparent. The Grand Imam of al-Azhar quizzed his visitor about Iran’s position vis-à-vis Bahrain and the three UAE islands.

He also asked him about Iran’s role in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Yemen. And he did not hesitate to ask Ahmadinejad about the Sunnis’ circumstances in Iran itself.

Ahmadinejad answered the tough questions by encapsulating the Iranian stance in one sentence: “Resistance to the usurper Zionist entity.”

The tiff did not go unnoticed.

The gravity of the conflict in Syria has forced all countries concerned to outpace diplomatic phraseology and lay bare their true positions.

President Mohamed Morsi, who at one point fancied courting Iran and Russia to carve out a Syria peace role for Egypt, buried the idea after Hezbollah’s plunge. He also hardened his position against the regime and went overboard.

The ongoing bloodbath in Syria changed the images of countries and their roles. It unmasked the depth of their contradictory feelings, their conflicting policies and their old and new fears.

The perception of Iran forging ahead under the banner of bravado and resistance hit a brick wall of Sunni resentment across the region. Tehran’s immersion in the Syria crisis lost Iran her aura and image.

At the same time, the axis of resistance lost its sole Sunni interface, Hamas. The Hamas movement in turn repositioned itself in its natural camp.

Overt interference in Syria dramatically changed Hezbollah’s footing. Having said it was joining a life-or-death battle in Syria, the party is now on the first line of engagement with the Sunnis of Syria, Lebanon and the region.

Hezbollah’s venture accelerated the cracks in Lebanon’s state institutions, coupled the “Lebanese arena” with the “Syrian arena” and added new injuries to historic wounds.

There are those who believe Lebanon will suffer from the logic “it is either ours or no one else’s.” This means bringing the temple down if you can’t make it solely yours.

The battle for Qusayr thrust the region into a situation where governments have to be in sync with inflamed passions on their street.

Decisions taken at the Doha meeting show the conflict has reached the point of no return.

Measures by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) partners targeting Hezbollah loyalists and financiers sent an unmistakable signal. The battle in Syria has turned regional and international.

Russia’s behavior is in step with “Syria can be like she used to be or she won’t be anyone’s at all.”

Still dithering and fearful of Jabhat al-Nusra and its sisters, America has been whitewashed to accept arming the opposition.

The Syrian regime opted too soon for “Syria can be like she used to be or she won’t be anyone’s at all.”

For hardliners in the opposition, “Syria can be like we wish her to be or she won’t be anyone’s at all.”

A battle as vitriolic internally, regionally and internationally threatens to pulverize Syria and ravage the weak neighboring milieus.

No one country can endure this level of risks and this number of risk-takers.

“ضربنى وبكى سبقنى وأشتكى”

"He hit me and cried and ran and complained first"

Assad being interviewed for Al-Manar TV

The first thing that sprung to my mind on reading Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s remark about Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia having sent in “100,000 Arab and foreign terrorists” to Syria to fight his regime was the old Arab adage “ضربنى وبكى سبقنى وأشتكى” -- or “He hit me and cried and ran  and complained first.”

His remark comes in a television interview to be aired this evening on Al-Manar, the television channel of Iran’s Lebanese Hezbollah militia, which has thousands of men fighting alongside his troops across Syria. No less than 7,000 of them are taking part in the regime offensive on the rebel-held town of Qusayr.

Assad makes no mention in the interview of their number or the total of other Shiite fighters from Iran, Iraq, Yemen and Lebanon helping him crush the Syrian opposition. Nor does he speak of Russian advisors or of Iranian arms supplies, logistical support and funding to his government.

In excerpts from the interview published by Lebanon's al-Akhbar newspaper, which speaks for the Iran-Syria-Hezbollah alliance, Assad is quoted as saying: "The Syrian army has scored major victories against armed rebels on the ground and the balance of power is now with the Syrian army."

He admits Syria and Hezbollah are co-operating, being "part of the same Axis (of Resistance in tandem with Iran).”

"Hezbollah fighters are deployed along the Lebanon-Syria borders but the Syrian army is the one fighting and leading operations against the armed gangs. This will continue until the terrorist groups are crushed", al-Akhbar quotes him as saying.

Assad is also quoted as saying Syria has received the first shipment of the advanced Russian S-300 air defense system “and the rest of the shipment will follow shortly.”

Delivery of the S-300s raises fears of tension with Israel, as Assad is also reported to have threatened to respond directly if Israel launches any further airstrikes on Syria.

He also said, “The Syrian government will not stand in the way of any Syrian groups that want to wage a war of resistance to liberate the Golan."

On the proposed Geneva-2 talks with the opposition, Assad is quoted as telling Al-Manar the Damascus government would attend in principle but doubts the meeting will yield results.

The unmaking of the Arab world

Fahmi Howeidi is a leading Egyptian political and social scholar and author, and one of the Arab world’s most prominent columnists. Following is my abridgment of his syndicated think piece this week:

There is a sort of overlap in tuning in on the revolution and the government in Egypt.

That’s caused either by incessant media campaigns denigrating the revolution in the public eye or by the torrent of government crises news, which make people lose sight of the revolution’s achievements.

In effect, the Egypt revolution ended a reign of corruption and tyranny and returned the country to its people. It brought a Pharaonic era to a close, restored civil liberties, ended minority rule and empowered the masses to have the final say on their government.

But why did Egypt’s post-revolution administration stumble?

One explanation is that decade-long tyranny not only destroyed Egypt’s political and economic present, but its future as well.

The other explanation is the preclusion of all and sundry from Egyptian politics save for a restricted group of loyalists handpicked by the former president.

As a result, the political class was neither coached in managing state affairs nor shown the ropes of state administration.

This political class was also shut out from any communal endeavor to promote the national interest through state institutions.

Egypt’s post-revolution administration crisis can thus be blamed on a host of factors, including:

• The classic tension that dawns each time a revolution brings down a regime and tries to replace it
• The heavy legacy left by the deposed regime, such as the ruination of politics, the economy, state institutions and society.
• Mismanagement of state affairs by President Mohamed Morsi and his team and their reneging of election promises.
• Immaturity of opposition figures
• The tug-of-war among some nationalist camp components
• Lawlessness, which also undermines economic activity
• External pressures.

Everyone in Egypt is now aware that although it made good progress over the years in running its own business, the Muslim Brotherhood did not make the grade in reigning over and managing society.

That is the root cause of the current crisis, which led to the political stalemate in Egypt.

Overcoming the political deadlock requires a lot of wisdom, courage and foresight, all of which seem lacking – at least for the foreseeable future.

(2)

In the case of all four or five Arab Spring countries, revolt proved much more profound and far-reaching than actual or prospective regime change.

The new manifestations that are kept in the public eye day and night by the media touch only the surface of the spirit of rebellion, which drove ordinary citizens to protest loudly against oppression, corruption and social injustice.

The discrepancy made me distinguish between what I call the “tumultuous spring” and the “silent” variety.

“Tumultuous spring” came out in the open and called for regime change in some countries.

By contrast, the “silent spring” chose to express itself calmly through the social media.

Its aim is regime reform, but not regime change. It falls in the category of “reformist spring” as opposed to “revolutionary spring.”

The open letter calling for reform, which Saudi cleric Salman al-Odah posted last month on Facebook and Twitter falls in the latter category. Odah specifically called for ending the practice of media control, information censorship and the release of political prisoners.

Other reformists made similar appeals elsewhere in the Gulf.

(3)

From this perspective, I believe the pan-Arab nation is meanwhile facing an existential impasse that needs addressing.

While historic change looms on the horizon, a vacuum hangs on the Arab arena.

Observers fail to spot a leader or a plan the Arabs can rally around or defend.

When focusing on the Arab arena, all they spot are three endeavors: the Turks are expanding economically, the Iranian politically and the Israelis through land grabs to build settlements.

Moreover, changes on the ground suggest the region’s maps are being reconfigured and a new Sykes-Picot Agreement is being contemplated.

The pointers:

• Iraq faces partition after having been steamrolled by the United States invasion. Iraqi Kurdistan has almost seceded, and nothing keeps the lid on its independence other than the absence of a public declaration of self-determination preceded by a ban on hoisting the Iraqi national flag on its territory. A forceful call is also being made to divide Iraq into three regions – one for Kurds, another for Shiites and the third for Sunnis.
• Syria is poised to follow suit, especially that its regime seems on its last legs so far. Should the Assad regime fall, contingency plans are already in place to declare an Alawite state along the country’s coastline. In anticipation, Syria’s central bank reserves have reportedly been moved to Latakia, whose seaport and airport are being upgraded.
• The side-effects of the Syrian regime’s collapse would allow for (a) a shift in the balance of power in Lebanon at Hezbollah’s expense (b) a shot in the arm to the Sunni uprising in Iraq (c) a rekindling of the Kurdish issue, which explains Turkey’s recent preemptive peace deal with PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, and (d) rethinking and re-planning in Tehran, particularly that a blitz by Israel on its nuclear facilities is not off the table yet.
• The Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza Strip remain in limbo and the risks of a third Intifada erupting mount.
• Sudan’s South has broken away from its North.
• In Yemen, calls are growing louder all the time for the secession of the South.
• Morocco is grappling with the Tamazight movement’s political demands shortly after recognizing the Tamazight language in its new constitution.
• Over and above the widening schism between its Sunnis and Shiites, the Arab world finds itself riven by rifts between the Salafi movement and Ennahda Movement in Tunisia, between Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and between Salafis and seculars in Algeria.

These are ample indicators of how the Arab world is liable to break up. The process of restructuring it is quietly moving ahead while it remains unfazed or unaware. 

Syria: Hezbollah defending “Iran’s 35th province”

File photos of Hojjatoleslam Mehdi Taeb (top) and parading Hezbollah fighters 

The Syrian opposition’s break with the Islamic Republic of Iran and its Lebanese cat’s-paw Hezbollah is total and has come into the open.

The Syrian National Coalition of Revolutionary and Opposition Forces posted a statement on its Facebook page overnight accusing Iran and Hezbollah of waging open war on the Syrian people.

The statement said in part, “The direct involvement of Iran-backed Hezbollah forces in the killings, crimes and attacks on Syrians—under the pretext of defending the Assad regime – has been well documented since the beginning of the Syrian revolution.

“On top of that came fresh declarations by Iranian leaders, which can only be described as insolent meddling in the Syrian people’s affairs. The patronizing pronouncements amount to a declaration of open war on the Syrian people, such as the call for a rapid deployment force specialized in urban warfare to support the Assad regime.

“Iran and its lackey Hezbollah’s involvement in Syrian affairs, and their flagrant aggression against Syria’s people and national sovereignty are inadmissible and violate international law.

“The Syrian National Coalition strongly condemns repeated attacks on Syrian territory by Hezbollah fighters. The attacks are driven by Iranian declarations that smack of hateful colonial undertones. They expose the Iranians’ loss of political rationale and their advocacy of ideological rubbish.”

According to the Syrian opposition, fighting began on Saturday as Hezbollah fighters, in control of eight Syrian border villages, tried to move into three adjacent ones -- Burhanieh, Abu Houri and Safarja -- in the Qusayr region of Homs held by Syrian Free Army (FSA) forces.

Regime helicopters fired rockets at rebel positions to support the advancing Hezbollah unit, which included pro-Assad militiamen recruited from the villages it controls, residents said.

"The Hezbollah force moved on foot and was supported by multiple rocket launchers. The FSA had to call in two tanks that had been captured from Assad’s army to repel the attack," Hadi al-Abdallah of the Syrian Revolution General Commission told Reuters by phone.

FSA spokesman Louay al-Miqdad called the Hezbollah operation an "unprecedented invasion", according to Beirut’s independent daily an-Nahar.

"Hezbollah's invasion is the first of its kind in terms of organization, planning and coordination with the Syrian regime's air force," Miqdad was quoted as saying.

An unnamed Hezbollah spokesman confirmed three Shiite deaths, but without saying whether they belong to the group.

AFP news agency quoted the spokesman as saying the dead fighters had been acting "in self-defense.”

Several Syrian rebels were also killed in the clashes, which came days after a senior commander of Iran's Revolutionary Guards was killed travelling from Syria to Lebanon.

The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights said Revolutionary Guards commanding officer Hassan Shateri was ambushed and killed by rebels while heading to Beirut from Damascus (see my February 14 post, “Iran point man killed heading from Syria to Lebanon).

Shateri was a veteran of the 1980s Iran-Iraq war, and served in Afghanistan before going to Lebanon, where he posed as “Hessam Khoshnevis,” head of an Iranian agency set up to help rebuild Hezbollah-controlled areas devastated by the 2006 war with Israel.

On the eve of Shateri’s burial last Friday in his hometown of Semnan, some 150 kilometers east of Tehran, Hojjatoleslam Mehdi Taeb, a senior cleric from supreme leader Ali Khamenei’s inner circle, said Syria is so strategic to the Islamic Republic that it is considered as Iran's 35th province, and that losing Syria would result in losing Tehran.

He told university student members of the Basij militia: “Syria is the 35th province [of Iran] and a strategic province for us. If the enemy attacks us and wants to appropriate either Syria or Khuzestan [in western Iran], the priority is that we keep Syria.... If we keep Syria, we can get Khuzestan back too. But if we lose Syria, we cannot keep Tehran."

Taeb – head of the Ammar strategic base, which is focused on cyber war and soft war -- also pointed to the Islamic Republic's support of Syrian militias through Iranian advisors inside the country.

He explained, “Syria had an army, but did not have the ability to manage a war inside Syria’s cities. It is for this reason the Iranian government suggested that, to manage an urban war you must form a Basij…The Syrian Basij was formed with 60,000  [members] of the Party of God (Hezbollah), who took over the war on the streets from the army."

Two Lebanese columnists, writing today for an-Nahar, slam both Hojjatoleslam Taeb and Hezbollah.

Rajeh el-Khoury says, “Blatant Iranian interference in Syria comes after a series of complicities in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, the UAE and at the side of Yemen’s Houthis. They also come after a long history of threats and claims to the right of being the region’s éminence grise at the price of poisoning intra-Muslim relations and mobilizing Sunnis to confront Shiites in the 35^th province.”

Ali Hamadeh believes the “inevitable consequence” of Hezbollah’s “diabolic” and “criminal” involvement in the killing of Syrians will be to bring the conflict to the “heart of Lebanon” at the cost of innocent Lebanese lives.

A propos Iran, the U.S. and Saudi foreign policy

U.S. and Iran footballers: A lesson for politicians?

Saudi foreign policy has to grapple with two key problems à propos change in the region and the world order.

One is Iran, which is not exactly a new problem. The other is the Obama Administration forging ahead with its strategic pivot from the Middle East to East Asia.

Saudi academician and writer Khalid al-Dakheel, in his weekly column today for the Saudi-owned pan-Arab daily al-Hayat, believes the two problems have taken new dimensions.

He explains:

After gaining a foothold in Bilad al-Sham through its alliance with the Syrian regime, Iran proceeded to plant Hezbollah as its military arm in Lebanon.

Ironically, this was done under the smokescreen of “resistance” (to Israel) and a Saudi-Syrian “understanding” on Lebanon.

Having then bagged Iraq from U.S. occupation forces and enthroned its surrogates in Baghdad, Iran is now out defending the Syrian regime and striving to be the paramount power in the Gulf as a step to expand its influence throughout the Arab Mashreq.

Iran’s aim is to be the nation-state of the region’s Shiites and to be recognized as such by Washington.

To realize this dream, after ensnaring Syria and Iraq, Iran has to face the bigger challenge posed by Saudi Arabia and Egypt – more so Saudi Arabia because it is the Gulf’s richest country, sits on Iraq’s doorstep and is home to Islam’s two holiest mosques (al-Masjid al-Haram in Mecca and al-Masjid al-Nabawi in Medina).

Iran is aware that undermining Saudi Arabia is a tall order: the ethnic, sectarian and historical impediments are simply formidable and countless. That’s why Tehran chose instead to surround the kingdom with Iranian clients and hotbeds of unrest – northward in Iraq, southward in Yemen and eastward in Bahrain and Kuwait.

Egypt is as impregnable as Saudi Arabia, except that Egypt lies further away geographically and is currently beset with political and economic problems. This explains why Iran is trying to lure Egypt away from the Gulf with promises of financial aid and a collaborative solution for Syria.

With the Syrian regime now on its last legs, Iran can recognize the expiry of its sell by date, cut its losses and facilitate the transfer of power in Damascus. Or, it can continue backing the regime at the price of walking away with no more than a piece of a fragmented Syria.

Iran’s predicament is also the region’s. Therein lies the future significance of Saudi foreign policy and Washington’s pivoting from the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific region.

President Barack Obama’s pivot toward the Asia-Pacific region is all about China.

While the U.S. was off fighting its wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, China’s amazing growth and the promise of its huge and expanding market turned the Asia-Pacific region into the global economy’s center of gravity.

A report last November by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) expects the United States to cede its place as the world’s largest economy to China as early as 2016.

Washington is equally concerned by China more than doubling its declared military spending from 2006 to 2012, roughly in keeping with economic growth.

There are two unmistakable signs Obama is forging ahead with steps to pivot U.S. foreign policy from the Middle East to Asia.

One is his perseverance in “leading from behind” on Syria. The other is keeping his “extended hand” to Iran.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, who served as U.S. National Security Advisor under President Jimmy Carter, says the U.S. can deter and contain a nuclear Iran, such as it is still deterring North Korea from using its nuclear weapons against South Korea and Japan.

Also, confirmation of Chuck Hagel, Obama’s pick for defense secretary, remains blocked because he is soft on Iran and previously called for talks between Washington and Tehran without preconditions.

It seems America’s strategic shift to Southeast Asia, the accumulation of Arab crises and the Arab’s impotence in solving albeit one of them are pushing many Americans to support a political deal with Iran.

Strangely, all U.S. talk of such an understanding with Tehran makes no mention of Saudi Arabia.

So how would Saudi Arabia react? Could it face such an eventuality with its same old foreign policy tools and premises?

Saudi foreign policy needs to update its perceptions and tools to match up with America’s strategic rebalancing, Iran’s agenda and the current winds thrashing the Arab world, not to mention the sea changes in Saudi society, the region and the world order.

Can the foreign policy adopted at the height of the Cold War by King Saud and King Faisal, God bless their souls, remain unchanged after 50 years?

Clearly, the policy that failed in Iraq and Syria, was half-successful in Yemen and Bahrain and missed setting up stable and enduring alliances in the region needs reappraisal and revision.