Why should Saudi Arabia feel anxious and lonely?

This is my paraphrasing of the weekly think piece penned in Arabic by Saudi mass media celebrity Jamal Khashoggi for pan-Arab daily al-Hayat

Saeed al-Wahhabi is a young Saudi writer with a blunt and concise style of expressing himself in writing.

After the Saudis were crammed all day long with news analyses of the nuclear deal between the 5+1 world powers and Iran, he encapsulated the general Saudi mood last Sunday night with a tweet saying, “No doubt, Saudi Arabia feels lonely tonight.”

Yes, it was a tough night.

Until an official (Saudi) statement cautiously welcoming the agreement was released, the ghosts and illusions of threats and isolation made the rounds.

At the same time, analysts were piling up the jitters: “Iran is the region’s policeman” and “As customary, the United States double-crosses her allies and lets them down.”

In context, I personally told Agence France-Presse (AFP) Iran softened her nuclear ambitions in order to win hegemony over the region.

But the public’s anxiety and dejected feeling were unwarranted. The agreement reached in Geneva last Sunday is natural and a commonplace occurrence in history, which should rid the region from the specter of war that has been hovering in its skies for over a decade.

When serving as Saudi ambassador to the United States, Prince Turki al-Faisal coined a brief answer explaining Saudi Arabia’s position on Iran’s nuclear program. This was because he would be asked about the subject each time he held a stateside press conference or met with U.S. officials.

Prince Turki’s cliché answer went like this: “We live today between two nightmares. The first is Iran making a nuclear bomb. The other is Israel blitzing Iran’s nuclear facilities and dragging the region into a war of unknown scope and outcome.”

The new Iran deal dispels our bad dreams – at least during its six-month timeframe when Tehran will freeze its progress towards a possible nuclear bomb and Israel won’t launch a preventive strike against Iran to prevent it from obtaining nuclear weapons.

There is also a chance of the November 24 interim agreement making a permanent check on Iran’s nuclear ambitions and bringing permanent peace to the region.

What should be a matter of concern for us Saudis are the state of “anxiety and apprehension” and the case of “going to bed (if at all) feeling lonely” as Wahhabi suggested in his tweet.

Abdullah al-Askar, who heads the foreign relations committee in the Shura (Consultative) Council, said, “Denizens of the region won’t be getting much shut-eye.”

Such negative reactions are a source of concern for the express and endemic lack of confidence in our ability to cope with overdue change in the region.

I put forward that this is because:

• We got “used” to being dependent on the U.S. as a strategic ally that will invariably lend us a hand in times of crises.
• We realized the region started to wobble and lose its balance after the fall of Iraq and Saddam Hussein (and this is not to bemoan the loss of the man or his regime)
• Then came Turkey’s rise as a regional power, Egypt’s eclipse for internal reasons associated with the Arab Spring, and Pakistan’s hibernation after the wounds it sustained post 9/11 and its mini civil war with the Taliban.

It can be argued that Saudi Arabia stand alone in facing up to Iran and her regional ambitions. That’s despite the kingdom having common interests with Turkey and Qatar for instance in the Syria war, and with the UAE, Kuwait and Qatar in Bahrain’s turmoil.

Nonetheless, there is no united front or agreement to confront Iran. All the countries I mentioned now and earlier have links and interests with Iran. But they all lack a common strategic agenda for action on the Syria front. This has allowed the Syrian regime and its Iranian backer to score victories over opposition forces.

The November 24 agreement did not give Iran a free hand in the region. But her hands were not exactly tied behind her back before the agreement.

Proof is Tehran’s unchallenged military intervention in Syria.

Iran is thus aware the West is not particularly interested in what she is doing in Yemen or in Bahrain so long as the IAEA inspectors are going about their jobs freely and the enrichment of uranium is not exceeding the agreed level.

Iran will thus enhance its activities in places like Yemen and Bahrain in order to test her new relations with the West.

Saudi Arabia would have to face this alone, but not necessarily. She still has common interests with regional heavyweights.

But a restructuring of Saudi Arabia’s defense policy is imperative – starting with an acknowledgement that reliance on the United States is unhealthy.

The fact America turned her back on us was not a whimsical Obama move. It was a well thought out U.S. policy resulting from ongoing changes in America’s priorities.

The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia would thus have to redraw the map of her regional alliances. Turkey is key. Her leaders want special relations with the kingdom.

But Egypt is yet to come back from the wilderness. The most that can be heard from Cairo is, “We support all what you do” – except that Cairo did nothing for Syria.

Pakistan too needs a friend’s help to make up with the Taliban, allowing the Pakistani army to resume its national duties.

It will also be necessary to open channels of communication with Iran, even while the confrontation persists. Tehran repeats every five minutes that it wants good relations with the kingdom. Let’s take after the Iranians’ diligence and hear what they have to say.

The region’s problems are many. They multiply when neglected but they can be solved. The region also harbors allies and friends of ours. We don’t have to feel lonely after that dreary Sunday.

Arabs & Israel feel shortchanged by ‘Great Satan’

America's Obama Obama and Iran's Rouhani (from algemeiner.com)

Led by Saudi Arabia, Arab governments are dumbstruck by Iran’s nuclear deal with world powers and the Islamic Republic’s acceptance on the global stage.

Not so Israel, which calls the deal a “mistake,” and not so the overwhelming majority of political analysts and commentators in the Arab media.

Fahmi Howeidi, dean of these Arab public opinion-shapers, concludes his think piece today for Aljazeera TV news portal with a sentence saying: “The long and short of the new balance of power in the Arab world is this: Iran tops the list of winners but there is no mention of the Arabs anywhere.”

Tariq Alhomayed, writing today for Asharq Alawsat, the Saudi newspaper of records of which he was editor-in-chief, believes “the deal with Iran is more treacherous than 9/11.”

U.S. President Barack Obama overnight defended the deal between Iran and world powers on Tehran's nuclear program.

The six-month interim deal struck in Geneva on Sunday saw Iran agree to curb some of its nuclear activities in return for sanctions relief.

The accord has been generally welcomed but Israel's prime minister called it "a historic mistake".

The West has long suspected Iran's uranium enrichment program is geared towards making a weapon, but Tehran insists it only wants nuclear energy.

The UN, U.S. and European Union had imposed a raft of sanctions on Tehran.

"Huge challenges remain, but we cannot close the door on diplomacy, and we cannot rule out peaceful solutions to the world's problems," the BBC quoted Obama as saying during an event in San Francisco.

"We cannot commit ourselves to an endless cycle of violence, and tough talk and bluster may be the easy thing to do politically, but it's not the right thing for our security."

Earlier, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced an Israeli team led by national security adviser Yossi Cohen would travel to Washington for talks on the deal.

"This accord must bring about one outcome: the dismantling of Iran's military nuclear capability," he said.

Israel has not ruled out taking military action to stop Iran developing the capability of a nuclear bomb.

Saudi Arabia -- Iran's regional counterweight -- cautiously welcomed the deal yesterday.

Under the deal which will last six months, Iran would receive some $7bn in "limited, temporary, targeted, and reversible [sanctions] relief" while a permanent agreement is sought.

Key points of the deal include:

• Iran will stop enriching uranium beyond 5% and "neutralize" its stockpile of uranium enriched beyond this point
• Iran will give greater access to inspectors including daily access at Natanz and Fordo -- two of Iran’s key nuclear sites
• There will be no further development of the Arak plant, which it is believed could produce plutonium
• In return, there will be no new nuclear-related sanctions for six months if Iran sticks by the accord
• Some sanctions will be suspended on trading in gold and precious metals, on Iran's car-making sector and its petrochemical exports
• Frozen oil sale assets will be transferred in installments, bringing in some $4.2bn of extra revenue.

Howeidi, in his piece today for Aljazeera quotes unnamed Iranian experts as telling him:

• The deal recognizes Iran as a regional nuclear power with the right to continue its uranium enrichment program for peaceful purposes
• The Iranians and Americans rushed the deal through to sidestep adverse pressure by Israel, France and some Gulf Arab lobbyists
• The Iranian-American understandings go beyond the nuclear program and the easing of economic sanctions. “The most important understanding is over Iran’s participation in the fight against terrorism in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Afghanistan”
• The deal allows Iran to receive some $7 billion in sanctions relief; about $1.5 billion of the frozen assets were promptly released to Tehran “by Asian banks in South Korea, Malaysia and Indonesia as early as last Sunday morning”
• Shell, which was complying with the sanctions, was the first oil major to resume work in Iran.

Howeidi sums up the most important features of the agreement between the 5+1 world powers and Iran as follows:

1. It seems a new axis is taking shape in the region comprising Iran and Russia, the two countries that played a key role in aborting an American military strike against Syria.
2. The U.S. will henceforth “rely on Iran and Turkey to keep the peace in the region now that Egypt has lost its standing in the Arab world.” Iran is on the ground in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon and to some degree in Yemen, where it is supporting the Houthis. Turkey on the other hand has its role in Syria, Iraq and the Caucasus in Central Asia. Ankara also has its strong economic ties with many Arab countries.
3. There are still question marks over a sectarian war between the Sunnis and Shiites in the Arab world, over Iran’s support of the Islamic movements in Palestine and Lebanon and over future links between Cairo and Tehran.
4. Israel is in a win-win situation. Syria’s chemical weapons are being buried and checks on Iran’s nuclear ambitions are being put in place.
5. Iran’s clout in the Gulf, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon is on the ascendancy. The Gulf, which usually banks on the U.S. is now less prone to challenge Iran. That’s particularly true of Saudi Arabia, which lost its gamble on America’s air strike on Syrian regime forces and on mobilizing Sunni forces against Tehran.
6. “The long and short of the new balance of power in the Arab world is this: Iran tops the list of winners but there is no mention of the Arabs anywhere.”

In the view of Saudi journalist Tariq Alhomayed, “fallouts of the deal on the region – specifically on Saudi Arabia and its Gulf Arab partners – will prove more treacherous than the consequences of the 9/11 terrorist outrage that pummeled the United States in 2001.

“I am not dramatizing. It is not so because the Obama Administration sold the region down the river or that the administration turned its back on its historic partnership with Gulfite Arabs.

Many forget that America betrayed Israel, her sacred cow in the region.

Alhomayed says Iran’s chief objective since the days of the late Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlevi was to become the “region’s policeman.”

The Islamic Republic will eventually rid itself of all economic sanctions and achieve its primary objective of creating nuclear weapons “much as India and Pakistan did under Bill Clinton, another Democratic Party president.” 

Adawiya afterthoughts of a young Muslim Brother

Habiba's last photo (posted on Facebook by Mohamed Osama)

By Jamal Khashoggi, Saudi Arabia’s authoritative political analyst and author, writing today for pan-Arab al-Hayat

In front of me is a picture of Habiba Ahmed Abd Elaziz, an ambitious young woman primed for a bright future.

She was known as a serious journalist from an early age and was well versed in Arabic and English.

All this came to an abrupt end in Cairo last Wednesday, when Habiba was felled by a deadly bullet at one of the entrances to the Rabaa al-Adawiya protest camp.

Search the social media for her last poignant picture showing a militant believer sitting resolutely while being surrounded by debris and destruction and engulfed in tear gas.

All men had gone their way while she stayed put doing what she was asked to do.

In her right hand is a small tin bowl she was using to bank a metal drum. Her ration is a bottle of water.

A hijab covering her head is wrapped around her shoulders.

The gas mask she held to cover her nose and mouth did not fend off the bullet that took her away in the springtime of life.

Who fired the bullet is immaterial.

It was most probably an Egyptian policeman or a sniper hiding on a nearby rooftop and rejoicing at killing “the other Egyptians” he hates and perceives as enemies.

I wouldn’t go into blaming the army, state security and the police.

Like their Arab counterparts, that’s what they have been training to do for decades – namely, to protect the regime and the state. Their mantra is to secure the state at any cost.

“The regime, the state, the leader” is what Egyptian media outlets are now trumpeting – much as they were doing on June 6, 1967. No freedom or dignity to freedom’s enemies, not even to a co-citizen, a cousin or schoolmate.

But I do blame, and call for holding to account, the Muslim Brotherhood leaders for promoting the illusion of steadfastness at the sit-ins in Nahda Square and Rabaa al-Adawiya as a means of political pressure.

They managed the sit-ins lightly and with total disregard for the blood of believers in the cause.

Martyrdom is a duty in defense of justice, but not to improve bargaining positions or score political gains.

Habiba and thousands of other victims were promised total victory the next day. They say victory is an hour’s patience away. That’s what they were promised.

They gave them the instructions: You build a berm; you bring some water and vinegar to treat tear-gas sufferers; you, Habiba, forewarn your brethren by banging this metal drum.

Even a 10-year-old would have expected the crackdown on the protest camps and that casualties would be in the hundreds. Watching the talkshows on Egypt’s official and “private” TV news channels for one hour would have sufficed to realize the buzzword was “terror and terrorist.”

And everyone, the 10-year-old included, knew the terrorist would be killed.

So what happened in the early hours of Black Wednesday was not surprising. No Brotherhood leader ought to come forward and accuse the army or police of treachery. He was told of their intent to take decisive action.

How many times did Brotherhood leaders say, “We should not be drawn into the (army and police’s) violence arena”? But Brotherhood leaders were nevertheless drawn into the arena, where they lost their trump card, namely: demands, competitiveness and politics.

The Brotherhood will henceforward be capitalizing on its victims.

It will use thousands of casualty images showing men and women in the springtime of life, elders with piety manifest on their faces and veiled women to appear as the scapegoat and win the battle for public opinion.

But it will be a losing battle. The gory images will only elicit verbal condemnations and suppressed anger from those who lost loves ones.

The January 25 revolution is over. Its most important values – freedom, dignity and the right to life – have fallen by the wayside. The majority cannot bear freedom abuses so long as their own freedom is not stake. The majority is unmoved by the sight of martyrs when they belong to the other side.

There is one advantage though in reviewing images of the dead, which is accountability.

This has more to do with self-accountability than with holding the army and police accountable.

A courageous young man from Rabaa al-Adawiya has to come forward and declare openly, “We don’t need salutes to the martyrs or acclaim for a couple ascending to paradise. Ours was an absurd battle that we could have avoided.”

Let someone come forward and enumerate the Brotherhood’s losses since holding the reins in Egypt 18 months ago.

It lost sitting at the helm after winning what it described as a divine mandate to move forward society and the nation.

It lost a massive segment of Egyptian society.

It lost its nationalist orientation and replaced its moderate jurisprudence by a narrow-minded one, which it cajoled for electioneering purposes.

It lost martyrs. It lost its revolution allies. And it lost its regional relationships.

Told by his leaders that the Brotherhood was brought down by innumerable conspiracies, I can imagine the angry young man retorting, “This does not absolve you of responsibility. Where was your wisdom and savoir faire?”

I can also imagine the young man returning home last Wednesday night. He is exhausted and bloodied. He weeps for his dead brethren. He searches the social media for reassurances his other friends are safe.

A knock at the door frightens him. He is a wanted man now. He does not wish to become a fugitive. He forswears violence and is aware the leadership has lost control, or almost.

He catches a glimpse on the TV screen of a church going up in flames.  On hearing a leader trying to justify the arson, he fumes.

And when the leader speaks of the Mubarak regime making a comeback, the young man says out loud, “Don’t you recall state security refusing to protect Mubarak at al-Ittihadiya Palace?”

Before going to bed after Thursday’s dawn prayers, the young man murmurs to himself: “The revolution is not over yet. Recourse to the people is still mandatory. There will be new and transparent elections. Political Islam and revolutionary forces have to reconnect. A new generation has to take the lead and look to the future, not the past.

“But accountability should come first. Those responsible for the failure and successive losses of the battles of governance and sit-ins have to be brought to account.

“Accountability is the sine qua non of victory. Losers have no place in leadership.”

Is it “too late” for Egypt?

By Ghassan Charbel, editor-in-chief of pan-Arab al-Hayat

Wednesday was a long and gory day. All Egypt-lovers wished it would be sidestepped.

But all Egypt-watchers saw the day coming. Slamming the door shut tempts people to break it open.

It was difficult for two authorities to cohabitate in Egypt -- one headquartered in the palace and the other in Adawiya.

It was tough for the interim administration to tolerate a scene suggesting a face-off between two “legitimacies.”

The sit-ins were eroding the mandate sought and won by the interim administration.

At the same time, it was far from easy for the Muslim Brotherhood to consider Mohamed Morsi’s tenure a closed chapter. The defeat was more spectacular than the Brotherhood could bear. Its response was a mixture of bitterness and anger.

It reacted as if a tank storming the palace brought down Morsi. It did not try to understand that Morsi fell under the weight of a quasi-revolution and a quasi-coup.

It refused to notice the millions who gathered to give someone else authority to act. On that day, it only noted the portrait of Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi.

The Brotherhood did not perceive the decision to clear out the sit-ins as part of the authorization decision. It chose to break the will of both the mandated and mandating sides – namely, the millions of its detractors and the Military Establishment.

The Muslim Brotherhood dealt with internal and external mediations by setting the greatest possible demand. It never accepted anything short of Morsi’s reinstatement, meaning a full defeat of its opponents.

The Brotherhood behaved as an injured person so overcome by his wound as to refuse anything liable to alleviate his pain or cut his risks.

The Brotherhood could have embarrassed its opponents if it had capitalized on the mediations to propose a solution that would have made it hard for the interim administration to clear out the sit-ins.

It speculated that the price of disbanding the sit-ins would be so prohibitive as to deter the interim administration from implementing it.

The Brotherhood gambled when it insisted on recouping the presidential palace.

It left the interim administration no choice other than to crack down on the protest camps.

It let pass the fact it had clashed with most Egyptians before clashing with the police and the army.

It closed the eyes to the fact Sisi would not have asked directly for the peoples’ authorization if he, and the Military Establishment, did not feel the majority of Egyptians were intimidated by the Brothers’ rule. So much so that most Egyptians were willing to accept any measure to end their governance, even at the expense of dispersing an elected president’s administration.

The Brotherhood shut its ears to voices that spent months warning against exclusion, empowerment, Brotherhood-ization, reshaping the Egyptian citizens’ characteristics and manipulating Egypt’s spirit.

Any observer of developments in Egypt since the last days of Hosni Mubarak’s administration is aware that risk-taking by the Brothers started before Morsi.

The first gamble was when the decision was made to field a Brotherhood candidate in the presidential race and discounting chances the move would overburden Egypt and exceed its tolerance capacity.

This is due to the clout of revolution-breeders and makers, the Military Establishment’s deep roots and Egypt’s commitments resulting from its geographic position and economic conditions.

The degree of risk-taking deepened when the Muslim Brotherhood chose to singlehandedly share with the government of Hesham Qandil the burden of an extremely thorny transition.

Morsi found no effective partners and the Brotherhood didn’t help him unearth them.

He looked like dancing solo and dealing unattended with such files as the constitution, the judiciary and the rapport with the Military Establishment.

This risk-taking also led to loss of the compass, poor performance, a lack of perception and a dearth of cadres.

In politics, the Brotherhood or an individual has no right to push people to commit suicide and self-destruct the country. In politics, it is imperative to manage losses in the absence of profit.

Pictures of victims might serve a purpose. Numbers of martyrs and funerals might delay questions being asked and temporarily put off accountability for gambles made and responsibilities assumed.

But fact is the Brotherhood crossed swords with millions of Egyptians before coming under police fire.

Going forward, the greatest danger for Egypt is the Brothers’ acting with the “too late” mentality; that they have no choice other than confrontation, unrest, fires and other civil war practices; and that they can count on American and Western condemnations of the crackdown on protest camps.

Despite the inflamed feelings, the current leadership should avoid a victor’s arrogance, the “too late” approach and the politics of force.

The mandate that allowed the interim administration to clear out the sit-ins also demanded a constitution embracing all Egyptians, a revisit to the ballot box and free and transparent elections.

A return to the “too late” dictum is impermissible.

The priority now is to prevent a civil war and shut out Algerian scenes.

Egypt: More questions than answers for now

The crackdown

Egypt’s security forces, acting on the instructions of the military-backed interim administration, yesterday stormed and disbanded the two sit-ins in Cairo’s Nahda Square and near Rabaa al-Adawiya mosque.

Muslim Brotherhood supporters set up the two protests camps six weeks ago to demand the reinstatement of ousted President Mohamed Morsi.

Scores of civilians and security forces were killed or wounded in the crackdown on the two camps.

A month-long state of emergency was declared and curfews imposed in Egyptian cities.

Looking ahead, leading Egyptian media figure Emad Adeeb, writing for the Cairo daily el-Watan, wonders:

1. Does clearing the protest camps put an end to the crisis?

2. Does disbanding protesters in Nahda and Rabaa foreclose new Brotherhood sit-ins elsewhere in Cairo or in the provinces?

3. More importantly, in my opinion, what effect will clearing the two camps have on prospects of a negotiated political settlement between the old and new regimes?

Usually, whenever a crisis reaches violence level and political deadlock, chances are:

(a) The two sides realize there can be no winner or loser in the circumstances, so better to negotiate. This would see the authorities ditching the security option and the Brothers forsaking terrorist behavior.

(b) The situation remains unchanged, meaning the two sides continue playing the cat-and-mouse game of sit-ins and clear-outs.

(c) The more dangerous and costlier option is greater bloodletting resulting from violent tit-for-tat by the government and the Muslim Brotherhood.

This raises the question: How will the Muslim Brotherhood leadership be reading what took place in Rabaa al-Adawiya and Nahda?

Foresight, a responsible attitude and the fear of God are attributes liable to put pressure on the Brotherhood leadership to try and pick up the pieces of the flare-up and urge their supporters to remain calm and give time and space for political dialogue and rationalization to prevail so that the country can be spared the risks of civil war.

Though most Brotherhood leaders have been summoned to appear before the public prosecutor for questioning, it would be nonsensical if they thought in terms of, “Why fear getting wet when drowning?”

The crisis of the sit-ins is over. But is Egypt’s?

What is Egypt’s Gen. Abdel Fattah el-Sisi after?

Gen. Abdel Fattah el-Sisi

The formidable challenge facing the “two Egypts” today is to rescue politics from the street as the first step towards national reconciliation.

The man central for finding the way to achieve this is Gen. Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi, commander-in-chief of the armed forces, long regarded as the sole political arbiter in Egypt.

Following days of mass protests against President Mohamed Morsi at June’s end, the military warned it was prepared to step in “to stop Egypt from plunging into a dark tunnel of conflict and infighting.”

The army issued an ultimatum to Morsi on June 30, instructing him to respond to people's demands or step down within 48 hours. When he failed to do so, it removed him from office on July 3, appointed an interim civilian administration and issued a roadmap leading to fresh elections.

The Muslim Brotherhood and its supporters have been protesting since. They insist that protests will continue until the military-backed administration steps down and the democratically elected one is returned to power.

Egged on by anti-Morsi protesters as the savior of democracy, the Sisi-led military shows no signs of backing down.

In this catch 22 setting, Egypt’s brilliant columnist and talk show host Imad Adeeb wrote this profile of Sisi in Arabic for the country's al-Watan daily:

One question incessantly and markedly posed by all foreign intelligence agencies in Cairo since last June 30 is this: What is Gen. Abdel Fattah el-Sisi after?

Is he power-hungry? Is he leading a military coup? Does he want to ride to the presidency on the back of a Military Establishment tank?

The question puzzling everyone is: What does this man want exactly?

Some in Egypt portray him as a revolutionary inspired by Nasserite thought who rallied the military.

Others who support the Islamic current depict Sisi as a putschist who rode the revolution’s second wave on June 30.

So is he a putschist who rode the revolution wave or a revolutionary who exploited the Military Establishment?

In truth, or at least in my personal humble opinion, the man is simpler than this and that.

Abdel Fattah el-Sisi is an Egyptian who comes from an above-average class, loves Egypt and is extremely loyal to the Military Establishment.

Sisi is a prototype of the professional Egyptian army general who strives to uphold the clout, repute and role of the Egyptian Military Establishment, which has entrenched traditions dating back to 1805 and the launch of Muhammad Ali Pasha’s era.

Sisi personifies a set of national and nationalist thoughts shared by the overwhelming majority of the soldiers and officers in the Egyptian Army.

Sisi attended the U.S. Army War College, but he is neither America’s lackey nor her traditional enemy.

Sisi is an Egyptian nationalist committed to Egypt’s full sovereignty over every handspan of its national territory.

Sisi is an Arab nationalist who believes in Egypt’s pan-Arab role but is not prepared to apportion Egypt’s security and independence to any Arab sisterly country, whichever it may be.

Sisi’s moderation is epicentral in its political grasp of the nation’s territorial integrity and independence – this, without extremism or exaggeration and in the accompanying absence of laxity or dereliction.

The second wave of the January 2011 revolution is what won the hearts of Sisi’s generation, which is the first generation to be in command of Egypt’s Military Establishment after replacing leaders of the 1973 October War.

This is an exceptional and rare fusion in Egypt’s political life.

So what does Sisi want specifically?

You may not believe me if I told you that – other than seeing Egypt safe, secure and stable in a modern civil state where the army plays its constitutional role in safeguarding security and stability – the general wants to retire early.

Sisi is not after power, money or fame.

He is folksy in his love of Egypt and a Sufi in the matter of  power.

All this makes his profiles in foreign embassy reports totally inaccurate because it is difficult for a pragmatic and utilitarian mind to imagine a general who reached the helm on the strength of the street and the backing of a tank continue to yearn for nothing.

Egypt: My gloomy crystal ball reading

Egypt’s brilliant columnist and high-profile talk show host Imad Adeeb wrote this think piece in Arabic for the country's al-Watan news-paper:

Will we be “spiraling down” or “reaching a compromise” in Egypt?

What’s in the cards – more frenzy, demonstrations, violence and bloodshed, or the boon of commonsense, wisdom, moderation and serious negotiations?

It seems – and God knows best – that tension, escalation and bloodshed will prevail in the near and medium terms.

I sense further internecine bloodletting on public squares and streets and in Egyptian cities and provinces.

I see hundreds if not thousands killed and injured in the few coming weeks.

I see attacks on police stations, government buildings, party headquarters, public facilities, security directorates and military barracks.

I see the emergence of unconventional weapons in the upcoming battles, including the “Grenov” (RPG-18), rocket launchers and anti-aircraft missiles.

I see the beginnings of sectarian strife in the provinces and the appearance of weapons stockpiled for months in mosque and church basements.

I see all sides’ political elites keeping up their hysterics and inflammatory speeches calling for violence, killings and the total exclusion -- if not its erasure from history and geography -- of the opposite side.

Regrettably, I see no prospect of an imminent compromise.

I don’t see words of wisdom reaching open minds. Nor do I see an atmosphere conducive to dialogue between the parties to the crisis.

The tragic irony is the crisis we were controlling lately has now transformed into a crisis controlling us.

The problem that was running deep is now running out of anyone’s control.

The big tragedy is that nothing can lead to a solution or a compromise. Muslim Brotherhood rule won’t lead to stability. And shutting out the Brothers won’t restore calm.

Since January 2011, we tried a president with a military background, military council rule and a president from the Muslim Brotherhood. We are now trying an honorable man’s rule as interim president.

Despite these variations and experiences, we still haven’t found the desired solution.

We went through a revolution in January 2011 and another in June 2013 and saw the army intercede and millions take to the streets on both occasions.

No event, regime, revolution or coup d’état pacified people or restored their aplomb and satisfaction.

How can Egyptian society recoup its serenity, calm and stability?

It’s a great question worth pondering and answering.

Obama, president of Lebanon?

"No winner and no loser" image from www.aljazeera.net

The White House readout of U.S. President Barack Obama’s call with King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia:

President Obama spoke by phone today (July 12) with King Abdullah bin Abd al-Aziz Al Saud of Saudi Arabia.

The President relayed his warm wishes to the King on the occasion of Ramadan.

The leaders reaffirmed the strong and enduring partnership between the United States and Saudi Arabia and discussed regional issues of mutual interest.

The President and the King shared their perspectives on the situation in Syria and expressed their strong concerns about the impact of the conflict on the region.

The President emphasized the United States’ continued commitment to provide support to the Syrian Opposition Coalition and the Supreme Military Council to strengthen the opposition.

The President and King also exchanged views on recent developments in Egypt.

They agreed that the United States and Saudi Arabia have a shared interest in supporting Egypt’s stability.

The President expressed his serious concern about the violence in Egypt and underscored the urgent need for an inclusive political process that will enable an early return to a democratically elected civilian government in Egypt. 

The leaders pledged to continue close consultations between their two governments.

Separately, Tariq Alhomayed, the former editor-in-chief of Saudi Arabia’s leading daily Asharq Alawsat, writes today of Obama seeming like a president of Lebanon:

A watcher of the U.S. president’s approach to our regional files does not perceive Barack Obama as leader of the world’s most powerful nation, but as the president of Lebanon, where the mantra is “no winner and no loser.”

In Egypt, the Obama Administration is still at a loss whether to describe the June 30 “corrective movement” as a military coup or a response to popular demands, despite saying Mohamed Morsi’s government “wasn’t a democratic rule.”

While confirming plans to send four shiny F-16 fighter jets to Egypt’s military, the Obama Administration formally puts U.S. aid to Cairo under review. It urges the Muslim Brotherhood to renounce violence and at the same time warns the interim leadership against Brotherhood arrests.

Worse still, the Obama Administration calls for Morsi’s release just as the White House says, “We’re not taking sides in Egypt.”

Can you imagine a worse muddle?

As concerns Syria, the fumbles are greater, more serious and profound.

Obama had asked all sides to wait for his reelection campaign to end, but nothing changed thereafter.

He did zilch despite Bashar al-Assad forces killing more than 100,000 Syrians and disregarding his “game-changer” threat that moving or using chemical weapons would cross a “red line” and “change my calculus.”

When Iran and Hezbollah intervened in Syria to defend Assad, Obama remained passive.

And after he undertook to arm Syrian rebels, he failed to deliver.

His administration cites broad-based concerns the weapons could fall into wrong hands of hardline Islamists. Strangely, the administration has no such concerns about Egypt’s hardline Islamists, despite the Egyptian Army being targeted in Sinai by terrorists loyal to the Brotherhood.

The Obama Administration’s fumbling and dithering is countless.

The president’s rash exit from Iraq turned it into an Iranian springboard to attack Syrians and defend Assad through the Baghdad government and armed Shiite groups.

Also we’re now into the fallouts from the planned U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, not to mention American heedlessness to Libya.

President Obama doesn’t want to do anything anywhere, despite all the security threats, risks to U.S. political interests and the violations of laws and principles such as in Syria.

The Obama Administration has also disconcerted other regions. European countries are demanding that Washington immediately stop its eavesdropping on European Union officials and diplomats.

There too, Obama is trying to circumvent the issue à la Libanaise – “no winner and no loser.”

Obama has the earmarks of a president of Lebanon, instead of the president of the most powerful nation on earth.