Killer love: The Alawites and the West

Postage stamp issued by the short-lived Alawite state under the French mandate

Fawaz Tello, a veteran Syrian opposition campaigner now based in Berlin, penned this think piece in Arabic for the aljzeera.net portal.

A leader of the 2001 “Damascus Spring” movement, Tello spent five years (2001-2006) as a political prisoner. He moved to Cairo end February 2012.

The author, Fawaz Tello

His degrees in Civil Engineering and Business Administration are from Damascus University.

To put his think piece into perspective, of the Syrian population of 22.5 million, 74 percent are Muslin Sunnis, 11 percent are Alawites, and 15 percent are from other religious denominations.

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Last June 18, a Lebanese daily close to the Syrian regime quoted a Syrian official as saying in the presence of a UN organization representative, “We shall prevail with or without Bashar al-Assad. For us, what matters most is to see the state – i.e. the regime – survive without losing its regional status.”

Obviously the Syrian official is “Alawite.”

By saying, “what matters for us,” and by equating “state” and “regime,” he simply meant “Alawite rule.”

Over a year ago, after meeting diplomats and attending Syrian opposition conferences, I wrote two articles.

In them, I warned that the United States has -- since the first (February 2012) “Friends of Syria” conference in Tunis -- already contrived a roadmap for Syria.

With opposition groups’ blessings, the U.S. then underpinned the blueprint at the (June 2012) Action Group conference in Geneva and at subsequent “Friends of Syria” meetings.

Essentially, the roadmap is the political solution proposed for Geneva-2, whereby the “Alawite regime” retains the state’s military and security branches, which are sectarian Alawite par excellence.

These would supposedly be reformed gradually “in order to conserve state structures.”

In other words, proponents of Geneva-2 concur with the Syrian official who encapsulated “the state” in the word “regime” and “the regime” in “Alawite rule.”

The Americans, Europeans, Russians and Iranians share this rationale, their only dispute being over the role of “the regime president” in the negotiations and in the transitional stage.

The Americans have lately made common cause with the Russian position, meaning that at Geneva-2 the regime president would negotiate his “future role.”

That’s a new political rib-tickler worth adding to America’s stock of international wisecracks, particularly the joke of “non-lethal weapons.”

So Geneva-2 recognizes the current regime as a full and powerful partner without reference to justice or bona fide power transfer.

Rebels had to be coerced militarily to accept such solution. This was done by giving the Syrian regime a free hand to stifle the revolution by all means possible, including ceaseless carpet bombing and shelling; the use of ballistic missiles, chemical weapons and airpower; inexhaustible supplies of arms and ammunitions; blithe disregard for the regime’s recourse to sectarian mobilization by inviting mercenaries from Lebanon, Iraq and Iran.

By contrast, the Geneva-2 partners exerted immense pressure to starve rebels of arms and ammunitions, which some Arab states promised them 18 months ago.

The Geneva-2 Western patrons used the pretext of “opposition unity” at a timewhen Jabhat al-Nusra was nowhere in sight. The group’s catchword “wrong” hands later became the chief excuse although the “wrong hands” hardly represent five percent of the Free Syrian Army and moderate Islamic groups’ forces on the ground.

After Iran’s overt intervention in the battle for Qusayr through her proxies in Lebanon and Iraq, Arab countries resentful of Iran’s expansionism turned a deaf ear to Washington and started channeling weapons to the rebels.

That’s when the West -- read Americans and Europeans -- resorted to the political ploy of publicly declaring they would be arming the rebels while trying behind doors to prevent this from happening.

The West never stopped hoping the regime would succeed in crushing the revolution or in forcing it to the surrender negotiations table.

Never before did a dictatorship willingly transform into a democracy – neither at once nor piecemeal.

The Syrian Alawite official realizes this. But he is telling the West that Alawites would stay behind the sectarian dictator until they sense defeat, which is when they would make a deal with the West to dump the dictator and safeguard “Alawite rule.”

That’s what the “Western Friends of Syria” give the thumbs up to.

In truth, it’s the case of the West giving something it does not have to an undeserving side, the side being partisans of the sectarian Alawite regime, most of whom are actively supporting the dictator militarily and politically.

The West is saying a sectarian Alawite minority regime in league with other minorities is more suitable than a secular and moderate Sunni regime, even if modeled after Turkey’s.

The fitting secular Muslim, the West is saying, should preferably be “hostile” to all the cultural, authentic and manifest trappings of Sunni Islam. Problem is such Muslims are marginal among Sunnis and stand no chance of winning elections.

This explains the West’s penchant for quasi-democratic minority rule that leaves the military and security striking force in minority hands.

The clearest example yet of such political and intellectual bigotry by Western decision-makers and think tanks is Iraq, which was delivered to Iran on a silver platter at the expense of the West’s Gulf Arab allies.

What is happening in Syria today is the continuation of that policy. Iran is left to carry on shoring up Syria’s sectarian regime at all levels even if she swallowed Syria altogether and her expansionism detonated the entire region.

All this is to keep alive the Alawites’ half-a-century-old rule of Syria by means of the most repulsive sort of overlapping international support from America, Europe, the Soviet Union then Russia, Iran and Israel.

This minority regime gave the State of Israel unparalleled leeway to appropriate the Golan. It also gifted Israel a unique prize by crushing the Palestinian Revolution. Above all, by seizing power in the 1963 military coup in the name of the Baath Party, the minority regime interrupted the significant economic, political and social strides Syria was making to become a free and liberal Muslim democracy.

The latest evidence of the West’s complicity and its partiality towards Alawite governance is its refusal to pass on a simple message to the ruling Alawite sect.

The message is this: “You have to accept the new Syria as ordinary citizens. Instead of being stripped of your total control of state institutions posthaste, the erosion of your privileges would be phased. You have the choice of endorsing or resisting the change. It’s an opportunity that is slipping through your hands day by day.”

The West has yet to tell the pro-Assad Alawites their war crimes and human rights violations will not go unpunished. Although sectarian killings and massacres in Syria are still one-sided, their insistence on setting up an Alawite statelet would trigger a full-scale civil war against them and the regime.

Any shape or form of dismemberment or partition of Syria would lead to protracted internecine strife that could last for years and envelop the region.

Geneva-2 is stillborn. It could have drawn breath 18 months ago, but not anymore. Syria is neither Bosnia nor Yemen. Her revolution is total, not halfway.

No matter how long the war would last to shatter the dream of Balkanizing Syria and bring regime criminals to justice, the Syrians will fight on for a better life with their backs to the wall.

To be ruled by a sectarian minority is the Syrian majority’s worst option, even if such choice were to open the gates of hell on the West, the region and the Alawites.

The West, the region and the Alawites are the least of the Syrian majority’s worries.

Iran can’t just gobble up and Shi’ize Egypt

Political analyst Yasser el-Zaatreh, a native of Jericho, has been  freelancing for 27 years. He wrote this think piece in Arabic for Aljazeera.net

File pictures of Morsi and Ahmadinejad

Egyptian leaders are keeping nose to grindstone to mitigate internal disquiet.

They are less focused on recovering Cairo’s Arab and regional clout and role.

So before Egypt overcomes its internal travails, its leadership will find it hard to conjure up a clear Arab and regional vision.

Where events in Syria are concerned, Cairo remains as supportive of the Syrian people as it can be.

President Mohamed Morsi’s Syria statements and Cairo’s backing of the Arab League decision giving Syria’s seat to the Syrian Opposition Coalition corroborate this. The Arab League switch would not have been possible without Egypt’s full backing.

When discussing Egypt’s stance on Syria, we’re talking by implication about the position of Iran, which sees in Bashar al-Assad’s political survival the cornerstone of its strategy in the region.

After all, Iran effectively sacrificed its relations with the best part of the Ummah to preserve this immoral position. And the Islamic Republic’s loss on that matter is immeasurable by strategic standards.

Morsi would not have been supportive of the Syrian opposition had he been anxious to win Iran’s heart and mind.

He is aware that vexing Iran could tempt her to support and fund his opponents, if not tamper with Egypt’s internal security – chiefly in the soft areas of Sinai, where tribal groups and some Islamists are being led to believe they could challenge “Zionists” from that particular frontline.

On his February trip to Egypt for the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) summit, Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad did not meet with Morsi except at Cairo airport, which is where Ahmadinejad offered him oil grants and financial support. Morsi simply ignored the offer.

Likewise, you can’t read much into the bilateral tourism promotion agreement between Egypt and Iran and the normalization of their commercial ties.

By comparison, tourism and commerce links between Turkey and Iran continue to prosper even though the two countries are exchanging blows in Syria and fighting a cold war across the region.

This is not to mention Tehran’s attempts to play the Kurdish card – a no-hoper since Recep Tayyip Erdogan made his historic peace deal with the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).

While Egypt has yet to resume diplomatic relations with Iran and bilateral tourism and commerce is just beginning, Arab Gulf states and the Islamic Republic share a wide range of diplomatic, tourism and trade links. For instance, hundreds of thousands of Iranians travel to Saudi Arabia annually to perform the Hajj and Umrah. Tens of thousands of Iranians also visit the UAE, Kuwait and Oman.

So can Morsi and his government overlook Egypt’s economic interests and shut out Iran? And is Egypt’s national security so porous as to be easily compromised by Tehran?

This takes us to the preoccupation of many people with Shi’ization (or the “missionary-style” spread of Shiism).

In truth, the obsession with Shi’ization is an insult to the Sunni branch of Islam, depicting it as vulnerable and easily pliable, which is far from being the case.

Inasmuch as Alawites are part of Shiite Islam, did 40-plus years of Alawite rule in Syria convert the country’s Sunni majority to Shiism?

More importantly, was Shiite Iran able to Shi’ize its own Sunni population (of about 10 percent) over the years?

Iran’s occasional dabbling in Shi’ization drives is provocative, featherbrained and futile. But the Arabs’ problem with Iran is far from being sectarian. The problem is political par excellence.

Egypt, it must be said, is a regional heavyweight with an impressive cultural and historical legacy. It is also home to the millennium-old Al-Azhar University, the foremost institution in the Islamic world for the study of Sunni theology and Islamic law, and to Al-Azhar Mosque.

The future will show that whoever thinks Iran can gobble up and Shi’ize Egypt is hallucinating.

Egypt will never fall in Iran’s lap, neither under Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood nor under anyone else. Politics, history and the balance of power won’t let this happen.

Let’s stop portraying Iran as an omnipotent sovereign when it is wobbling under the weight of its problems in Syria, in Iraq and at home.

Iran will revert to its original size once Assad is shown the door. The Arab world will then have no problem building good neighborly relations with Tehran as it now has with Ankara.

Iraq’s Maliki: Syria's Assad is going nowhere

Maliki with Assad in Damascus in 2007

Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki says the Syrian regime of President Bashar al-Assad “does not want an exit pass. Impossible! The regime is not looking for a way out. It is not free to accept or refuse because its internal circumstances dictate it should stay put and fight to the finish.”

Maliki was speaking in a wide-ranging interview with Adel al-Tarifi, the newly named editor-in-chief of the leading Saudi daily Asharq Alawsat.

The 3,800-word interview published today was conducted in Cairo on the sidelines of the just-concluded summit meeting of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC).

Here, in his words to Asharq Alawsat, is Maliki’s full take on Syria:

Initially, I spent two years in Syria before moving [in1982] to the Ahvaz area in Iran. I went back to Syria in 1989 before returning to Iraq 16 years later.

I have memories there [in Syria]. I have lots of love for it. I miss it. I crave to live there.

I am choked with pain because the country could have been more stable and harmonious. Syria today is exposed to ruin and the total destruction of its institutions and homes. And frankly, no one sees anything at the end of the tunnel.

Because I lived in Syria for many long years, I am familiar with the nature of Syria’s social structure. The longstanding sectarian strife between so-called “Alawites” and “Sunnites” – including mutual massacres -- is an open secret. The Alawites were able to regain power. That’s why the entrenchment is difficult to surmount.

Accordingly, those who believed the regime would surrender and withdraw were in the wrong.

I told them: No the regime won’t surrender or withdraw because that would mean its demise. Given the sectarian background, it’s like telling a person to choose between “dead and deadest” whether the person resists or not. Hence the motto, “Don’t give them the courage of despair.”

In reality, the Alawites were given “the courage of despair.” That’s why their men and women are fighting with their teeth for their survival.

None of that is new to me. I saw it as clear as day.

I said it in Washington to [Barack] Obama, [Joe] Biden] and [Hillary] Clinton.

When they said, “President Assad would fall in two months,” my answer was, “Not even in two years.”

They then said, “That’s the information we have.”

My answer was, “No problem. I know Syria very well. They [Alawites] will fight back in tandem with the secularists, Christians and others. It will snowball until it becomes a proxy war.”

Their answer was: “No, that won’t happen.”

The problem has now turned into a proxy war, not a Syrian civil war. It has grown into a proxy regional war, with Russia and America also involved in both battle and dialogue.

It seems they have lately agreed on a solution to the crisis.

All our feelings and emotions are supportive of the Syrian people and their quest for democracy, freedoms, including the freedoms of expression and association.

The [pre-uprising] atmosphere was unacceptable. But to express [grievances] that way led the country to ruin. No one knows how Syria can be rebuilt.

However, we hope the crisis ends in a way allowing Syrians to realize their demands, Syria to recover its stability and the killings to stop.

Without its cessation, violence will increase and so will the arming of both sides, leading them to believe they can settle the issue [by force]. That could be true elsewhere. But in Syria, the force of arms won’t settle the battle.

The regime does not want an exit pass. Impossible! The regime is not looking for a way out. It is not free to accept or refuse because its internal circumstances dictate it should stay put and fight to the finish.

The gamble was on outside forces intervening, as happened in Iraq. But it seems the Iraq template cannot be duplicated in Syria or in other places because it is too burdensome.

Thus, the regime’s insistence on its options can be traced back to its accurate reading of the international map. It knew that what happened in Iraq is impermissible for Syria, which explains the repeated Russian and Chinese vetoes [at the UN Security Council].

The Syrian regime is smarter than the regime of Saddam Hussein, and more capable of analyzing and adapting to shifts. Saddam used to say, “God is on our side, so how can America and Satan win?”

[Regime] Syrians on the other hand have political insight. Their political map reading was correct.  They dumped their problem in Russia’s lap.

We in Iraq took a neutral stand on the issue because Syrian unrest affects our country first and foremost. We were worried al-Qaeda would seize a new opportunity in Syria. In effect, Jabhat al-Nusra and other offshoots of al-Qaeda found themselves in Syria. This affects us directly in Iraq.

After we thrashed al-Qaeda in Iraq, we now dread its return through the Syrian door under a new [Syrian] regime.

That’s why we chose to remain neutral, saying we are neither with the regime nor with the opposition.

We visualized a solution, which we shared with Kofi Annan then Lakhdar Brahimi, with some delegations to the Arab summit [in Baghdad]. Our perceived solution is where dialogue reached today.

There is no choice other than a peaceful settlement. It seems to me an agreement on one is looming on the horizon.

That’s what Syrian National Coalition leader Moaz al-Khatib talked about, despite the brouhaha his proposal created in Coalition ranks.

I don’t think Khatib made his [talks] offer without sensing an international decision to go that route, whereby sequentially: a new government is formed, Bashar al-Assad stays, elections are held, a consensual government of national unity is set up, Assad would not run for another term.

That’s the reality as it is, whether acceptable or otherwise, whether we like it or not…

That’s the only peaceful solution on the table. Calls for Assad’s exit are vehemently disapproved by Russia. He refuses and Russia objects.

But would he [Assad] stay during the peaceful solution and then run [for re-election]?

It seems the solution provides for him to stay but not run [for another term]. He would stay in the shadow of a new government comprising opposition and regime figures. It would also be balanced so as to get things done. 

National elections under international supervision would be next. These would yield a constituent national assembly to either draft a new constitution or revise the existing one.

A government would then be set up in keeping with the weight of representation in Parliament.

That’s what we believe.

“Syria, heartland of the world”

From top, Red Square, Tiananmen and Umayyad squares

The Syria crisis sprung many surprises in the 17 months since the outbreak of the Syrian revolution.

What looked like one more of the Arab Spring waves of democratization originating in North Africa turned out to be much more turbulent, according to veteran Lebanese political analyst Jihad el-Zein.

True, he writes for the independent Beirut daily an-Nahar, the waves of Arab revolutions represented per se a new phase of dramatic political and ideological change across the region. The change calls to mind (Francis Fukuyama’s essay) “The End of History” and the ascendency of democratic thought in Eastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union.

These were preceded by the wave of democratization in Latin America in the seventies and early eighties, Zein notes.

All this is true. But the interplay and aggravation of past and present events in Syria precipitated confrontational twists and turns in international relations – so much so that the new world order’s image will be shaped by the outcome of the struggle over Syria.

The said twists and turns, according to Zein, brought about a series of seven major surprises:

1. The first underscored not so much Iran’s all-important status and role in the region’s future, but Russia’s part in reordering international relations.

2. The other was Beijing choosing to side with Damascus – a sort of discordant Middle East diplomacy outside the bounds of the Far East and Southeast Asia – amidst mounting political strains in China’s immediate milieu, which is becoming the hub of global economic vitality.

With both Russia and China on board, Syria sees its borders stretching from the Caucasus to Central Asia. And with the United States preaching “soft power,” Damascus’ Umayyad Square now adjoins Red Square in Moscow and Tiananmen Square in Beijing. The common peril of liberal democracy is binding the three regimes’ together.

3. The third was Turkey’s rush to come nearer the Arab Spring waves when unprepared. The hurried move to drastically change premises set by Kemal Atatürk in 1923 and turn around to the Muslim East will consequently determine the future in power of the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP).

4. The AKP’s passionate Syria approach triggered a fourth surprise. It exposed the affinity between Turkey’s Alevis and Syria’s ruling Alawites. In other words, the Syria saga unmasked a sectarian divide in Turkey.

5. Not counting paramilitary forces, Syria’s 200,000-strong, heavily armed and highly mechanized army is startlingly still capable of handling the threats it is dealing with.

6. Perhaps the most spectacular surprise is the level of destruction in Syria. The devastation exceeds that seen in Iraq or the one suffered by Lebanon in the course of 15 years of infighting.

7. Lastly, Christian support of the Syrian regime, subtly by the Catholic clergy and vociferously by the Russian Orthodox Church, which is openly aligned with the Kremlin. 

Is Turkey-Syria on Pakistan-Afghanistan path?

Syria's Assad and Turkey's Erdogan in the good old days

Can Syria’s Bashar al-Assad, in tandem with Iran’s Ali Khamenei, Iraq’s Nouri al-Maliki, Russia’s Vladimir Putin and Hezbollah’s Hassan Nasrallah, turn the tables on Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan?

And does Ankara’s support of the protracted Syrian revolution risk wrecking Turkey the same way the Afghan war trashed Pakistan?

The possibilities are tenable, according to Jihad el-Zein, an old hand Lebanese political analyst.

According to his line of reasoning, penned in two installments (one last Tuesday and the second yesterday) for Beirut’s independent daily an-Nahar, criticism of Erdogan and his governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) by the opposition and media has been joined by big business, which is now calling for much greater transparency by the state.

Zein notes that Umit Boyner, chairwoman of the Turkish Industry and Business Association (TUSIAD) and the leading Turkish business lobbyist, warned recently, “We are moving away from the rule of law day by day… We are watching the power struggle within the Turkish state with horror and an increased sense of insecurity.” Last week, she said polarization, hatred and enmity on the home front risked wasting Turkey’s “social, political and economic achievements.”

Meantime, says Zein, Ankara’s backing of regime change in Syria is circuitously exasperating Turkey’s problems with its Kurds and Alevis.

Of a total Turkish population of about 75 million, an estimated 15 million are Kurds and about another 15 million are Alevis. And the two sizable minorities are concentrated in Turkey’s southeast, next door to Syria.

Turkish Alevis and Syria's Alawites are distinctive communities and represent different strains of Islam (see Are Syrian Alawites and Turkish Alevis the same?). But a sectarian Sunnite-versus-Alawite conflict in Syria could potentially spill over into Turkey, causing tensions between its Alevis, who express sympathy for the Alawite-dominated Assad regime, and the government in Ankara.

Mired in its own conflict with the separatist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in the southeast, Ankara cannot afford another major security problem there with the Alevis.

Turkey has an 882-km border with Syria, a second 499-km one with Iran and a third 352-km border with Iraq.

Inflamed by Syria, in concert with Iran and Iraq, Turkey's long-simmering war with the PKK has escalated in recent months, reaching death tolls unseen in more than a decade.

"Turkey's Kurdish conflict is becoming more violent, with more than 700 dead in 14 months, the highest casualties in 13 years," according to an International Crisis Group report.

Listed as a terrorist organization by Turkey, the EU and the U.S., the PKK has been carrying out a bloody separatist war in Turkey's southeast since 1984. More than 40,000 people have been killed in the conflict so far.

More importantly, Zein notes, a video released by Doğan news agency in late August showed nine Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) lawmakers, including BDP co-chair Gültan Kişanak, hugging and chatting with PKK militants along a highway in the eastern province of Hakkari.

The lawmakers told reporters the meeting was a chance encounter and not planned in advance.

And this week, Istanbul’s pro-BDP legislator Sebahat Tuncel was sentenced to eight years and nine months in prison for being a member of the PKK.

To borrow from USIAD’s Umit Boyner, says Zein, how does all this affect the future of Turkey’s achievements?

“There is no doubt,” he writes, “Turkey is today in Pakistan’s previous and current circumstances vis-à-vis Afghanistan since its occupation by the Soviet Union.

“The Soviets were defeated in Afghanistan at the hands of the Mujahedeen. But Pakistan has not been the same since. Its instability became entwined with its role in the Afghan war that has yet to come to a close.”

True, Pakistan was intended to be the Indian Muslims’ nation-state. It was far from being fundamentalist; its elites were secular-minded; and its army was aligned with the West.

“What led to Pakistan’s ruin is the leading role it played over the past three decades in the Afghanistan quagmire, according to Zein. “What disintegrated first and foremost was Pakistani society. The hundreds of thousands of fundamentalists – initially funded by the U.S. and Saudi Arabia and backed by Iran – who crossed Pakistan on the way to fight the Soviets in Afghanistan, destabilized Pakistani cities, provinces and society -- from Peshawar to Punjab to Sindh.

“This happened while the Pakistani army kept consolidating ties with the Taliban, notwithstanding its alliance with Washington.

“In short, the Mujahedeen won in Afghanistan but Pakistan seriously undermined its elites, institutions and economy in the process. The result is the spectacular metamorphosis of a declared nuclear weapons state to a quasi-rogue nation.”

Though always more successful economically than Pakistan, even in the era of its military coups, Turkey was fated in the 21st century to become the principal springboard for supporting the Syrian revolution, which evokes memories of Pakistan’s role against the Soviets.

Today, says Zein, “Turkey – but not Jordan or North Lebanon – is the main launching pad for action against the Assad regime.” This means Ankara should – and in fact started to – adapt to a new ballgame. It should attune to the influx of tens of thousands of Syrian refugees, insurgents and defectors as well as Arab and non-Arab fighters.

“But what if the Syrian war dragged on?” Zein wonders. “What if the long Kurdish furrows along Syria’s northeastern border persisted for years as ‘Pakistan-ization’ turned Gaziantep into a new Peshawar and the road between Urfa and Azaz into a new Khyber Pass?

“There is no turning back in Syria, where regime change is inevitable. But what if the transition period proved drawn-out and impaired Turkey’s national fabric in the process of winning change in Syria?

“Turkey joined the Arab Spring fray from the Syrian door, which turned out to be the most dangerous, without being prepared.

“Erdogan gambled on inheriting Iran after a quick Syrian regime exit.

“He underestimated the enmity of the Russian Bear in the vicinity and overlooked the aptitude of the Saudi Camel to be Tehran’s inheritor in Syria instead of Ankara…” 

Syria and Mideast "facing long haul to stability"

The Middle East, with Syria at its core, faces a long haul to stability.

The disheartening opinion is today shared in separate think pieces penned by Talal Salman, founding publisher and editor-in-chief of the Lebanese daily as-Safir, and George Semaan, former editor-in-chief of the pan-Arab daily al-Hayat.

Long haul

According to Semaan, writing for al-Hayat under the title “Syria stirs regional wars and the finale is way-off,” all Syria players know the regime’s fall is a matter of time.

What they fear is Syria collapsing totally and becoming ungovernable or inhospitable to any new regime.

The utter and systematic destruction of most of the country’s cities and townships goes on unabated. The opposition did not leave Homs, Hama, Idlib or Deraa, but little of them is left. That’s what will also happen to the two capitals, Aleppo and Damascus.

The Annan mission that was meant to give international and regional players extra time has breathed its last, prompting the regime to disseminate seeds of conflict on several regional fronts.

Among such seeds are (1) the regime’s talk of chemical and biological weapons to perturb the whole world, chiefly Israel (2) its empowerment of Syrian Kurdish groups on Turkey’s doorstep (3) its apathy to the pouring of Syrian refugees into neighboring countries, including Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq, and (4) its apparent indifference to sectarian fighting that could well draw in Arab countries and non-Arab Iran.

In Iraq, America’s decapitation of the Saddam regime changed the country from a Sunnite-led dictatorship to a Shiite-led democracy. In Syria, forcible change from an Alawite-led dictatorship to a Sunnite-led democracy would fire up Iran.

How else would you translate the recent flood of threats by Iran, basically saying that regime change in Syria is just a dream?

“The forceful emergence of the Iranian factor in the Syria crisis coupled with shockwaves of sectarian and ethnic struggle in the region won’t perturb the Russians. They would strengthen her hand in standing up to the West and many Arabs.

“Syria’s breakup and its becoming a failed state after the regime’s exit won’t perturb the United States and Israel either.

“We are thus into a new and lengthy chapter bound to prolong the sufferings of Syrians and their neighbors as well,” Semaan concludes.

Lebanon template

In his leader for al-Safir, Talal Salman sees Lebanon becoming the prototype for Arab world statelets gripped by civil war.

Lebanon, he explains, is renowned as a country where society is infinitely stronger than the state.

The experience of the 20 years of armed internecine strife – which subsided but remained simmering – showed that, despite occasional cosmetic change, Lebanon’s sectarian regime is a “constant” whereas statehood is the “variable.” Statehood might dissipate for a few years before being resurrected as per new sectarian power balances and outer sponsors. Once brought back to life, the “state” resumes the role of relations manager and traffic policeman.

In truth, conditions in Lebanon – which appear farcical but are tragic in origin – reflect the turbulence sweeping the Arab World’s Mashreq and Maghreb.

Syria is sinking in the blood of its urban and rural areas, army, security forces and insurgents backed by disparate regimes and policies united by a “sole enemy” – namely a Syrian regime that lost its credibility amongst its people before losing its undeserving “friends.”

In Egypt, ongoing attempts to monopolize power are almost burying the Tahrir Square Revolution. The party that won the presidency for its candidate cannot claim to be the “ruling party.” Nor can its allies accept seeing the “compromise candidate” act as a partisan.

But, though open-ended, the power struggle in Egypt remains peaceful and unlike in Syria, where the ruling party evaporated by orders from above for failing to cover up one-man rule. And while the situation in Egypt is temporary, Syria’s is pending.

In Iraq, the legend of a “leader party” ruling the country and its people in the sole leader’s name is no more. But the situation is Iraq is still knocking at the door of civil war.

Lebanon being the only country that can survive as a collection of sectarian statelets, the danger today is of Lebanon becoming the template for restructuring the “states” around it, whether far or near.

Talking virtual reality after Assad’s exit

Syria activists documented 20,356 violent deaths in the uprising by July 18

This is my paraphrasing of a figurative think piece by Saudi mass media celebrity Jamal Khashoggi. It appears in Arabic today in the pan-Arab daily al-Hayat

Jamal Khashoggi

Imagine this:

Before long, Middle East leaders awaken one morning and find the Middle East without Bashar al-Assad and Syria welcoming them with open arms.

The new reality, with all its opportunities, risks and challenges, dawns on them.The regime imploded without their direct intervention. Their security advisers had told them to stay out of the fray for fear of repercussions at home. They were told the Syrians could fend for themselves. So they funded and pseudo-armed the opposition groups and granted them freedom of movement.

But regional leaders are worried about the state of post-Assad Syria. The breakup of the regular armed forces saw members defect to the Free Syrian Army (FSA) or lay down arms and rejoin their tribes for protection. Only the armed forces’ Alawites organized an orderly retreat with their armaments to their villages and mountain strongholds – a great cause of concern for new-Syria’s prospects.

The Syrian army did not stage the semblance of a coup like in Tunisia or keep the country whole and put up with the revolution as in Egypt.

The opposition in turn failed to unify the FSA, which remains without a command and control (management) so it can inherit the ministry of defense and other security agencies. Their staffs are also considered enemies of the revolution.

Restructuring the Syrian army and its various branches is the most daunting task facing new-Syria’s leaders who remain divided between those in the Syrian National Council (SNA) claiming legitimacy and calling for a meeting of national forces to be held within days in Syria’s parliament and heads of other opposition groups objecting.

The head of state of one of the regional countries destined to groom Syrian affairs is perturbed.

He wonders, “How can we unite them? Is it a task the Arab League can handle?”

The fight with the Alawites is not over. Some of them are still resisting.

There is the risk of Syria’s Sunnites seeking revenge against Alawites for the series of atrocities and mass massacres committed against them.

The anxious head of state wakes up early the next morning to hear the newsreader saying Syria had a troubled night. Joy over the regime’s fall was mixed with concern about the future.

The head of state ponders; “What can we do? Send in our army? Sending in our troops is not politically correct. The SNA and local leaders promised to protect the Alawite minority. Hopefully, they will keep their word and the Syrians will restrain their anger.”

This restless head of state’s concern is not for love of the Alawites but for fear of some of their lot emigrating and sheltering in his homeland. He is also worried about unending unrest in Syria.

Syria is not Egypt. Change there won’t be internal only -- it will spill over.

There are several hundred thousand Syrians residing in Jordan, Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries.

Some of them will return to their country of origin for the first time. Most of them are supportive of the Muslim Brotherhood movement. They had left Syria during the movement’s clash with the regime in the Seventies and Eighties. Their homecoming would boost the Muslim Brotherhood’s chances in future national elections.

Jordan and the Gulf partners won’t be troubled by the departure of Syrian expatriates since their economic are all afflicted by high rates of unemployment.

Rich Syrians won’t join the exodus home. They would probably stay in the host countries and serve as bridges to the new-Syria.

Would Syria’s return to the Arab fold and the opening of its doors to its neighbors breathe new life into the “Greater Syria” concept?

Most probably it won’t.

States and borders won’t change. There would be no place today for al-Sham al-Kabir or a Greater Lebanon. That’s all part of history now.

What we would see is Syria returning to its natural geographic and political environment and to a market economy where Syrians shine.

We would also see Syria reopening its borders with its neighbors.

Aleppo and northern Syria could become an extension of the Turkish economy.

Mutual Jordanian, Syrian and Lebanese interests would conjoin with Saudi Arabia’s.

Post-Assad, borders between Jordan and Syria will melt away completely, if only for humanitarian reasons. But Jordan would have to tread carefully. There are loads of arms around in Syria, including chemical weapons.

Saudi Arabia would need to keep a watchful eye on Lebanon.

Lebanese Sunnites would be celebrating Assad’s exit passionately. That would upset a component of the Maronite community and rekindle apprehensions of the Greater Syria idea. But the negative reaction would be chiefly vocal.

The fear, however, is of Hezbollah’s response. Hezbollah is agitated already. As a wounded tiger, it would want to prove to the Sunnite “victors” that the party is still strong despite losing Syria.

So better let Hezbollah swallow the bitter pill gradually. At the end of the day, the party would acknowledge the magnitude of its loss and change course accordingly.

Nevertheless, this would require Saudi Arabia to keep Sunnites on a leash, preventing them from provoking Hezbollah, and to remind the party calmly that the kingdom is the next powerbroker in Lebanon.

Trounced in Syria, Iran would want to ward off a Sunnite and contagious Arab Spring by consolidating its hold on Iraq.

Tehran’s tactless support of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his government is liable to offend Iraq’s Sunnites who would eagerly team up with their Syrian counterparts.

Iraq’s Sunnites would be rejoicing at first and then planning to regain their clout.

Here again, a power struggle is looming – one that could perhaps enable Saudi Arabia to shut out Iran from Iraq. But will the United States help the kingdom do that?

Iraq’s Kurds would join such endeavor. They would also have found a new (Kurdish) expanse for them in Syria.

Syria’s Kurds won greater rights and full citizenship rights in the campaign to push out Assad. They look forward to the kind of prosperity enjoyed by their kinfolk in Iraq. Economic benefits could draw Iraq’s Kurds closer to a new Sunnite regional order based on public freedoms and a market economy.  Such benefits could entice them to break with fundamentalist Shiite parties and help build a new, democratic Iraq.

It is still too early to envisage the Muslim Brothers winning national elections, forming a government and hammering out a new constitution in the new-Syria as in Egypt. But they will have a bee in their bonnet, which could embolden their Jordanian opposite numbers and thus pose a challenge for Amman.