Arabs & Israel feel shortchanged by ‘Great Satan’

America's Obama Obama and Iran's Rouhani (from algemeiner.com)

Led by Saudi Arabia, Arab governments are dumbstruck by Iran’s nuclear deal with world powers and the Islamic Republic’s acceptance on the global stage.

Not so Israel, which calls the deal a “mistake,” and not so the overwhelming majority of political analysts and commentators in the Arab media.

Fahmi Howeidi, dean of these Arab public opinion-shapers, concludes his think piece today for Aljazeera TV news portal with a sentence saying: “The long and short of the new balance of power in the Arab world is this: Iran tops the list of winners but there is no mention of the Arabs anywhere.”

Tariq Alhomayed, writing today for Asharq Alawsat, the Saudi newspaper of records of which he was editor-in-chief, believes “the deal with Iran is more treacherous than 9/11.”

U.S. President Barack Obama overnight defended the deal between Iran and world powers on Tehran's nuclear program.

The six-month interim deal struck in Geneva on Sunday saw Iran agree to curb some of its nuclear activities in return for sanctions relief.

The accord has been generally welcomed but Israel's prime minister called it "a historic mistake".

The West has long suspected Iran's uranium enrichment program is geared towards making a weapon, but Tehran insists it only wants nuclear energy.

The UN, U.S. and European Union had imposed a raft of sanctions on Tehran.

"Huge challenges remain, but we cannot close the door on diplomacy, and we cannot rule out peaceful solutions to the world's problems," the BBC quoted Obama as saying during an event in San Francisco.

"We cannot commit ourselves to an endless cycle of violence, and tough talk and bluster may be the easy thing to do politically, but it's not the right thing for our security."

Earlier, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu announced an Israeli team led by national security adviser Yossi Cohen would travel to Washington for talks on the deal.

"This accord must bring about one outcome: the dismantling of Iran's military nuclear capability," he said.

Israel has not ruled out taking military action to stop Iran developing the capability of a nuclear bomb.

Saudi Arabia -- Iran's regional counterweight -- cautiously welcomed the deal yesterday.

Under the deal which will last six months, Iran would receive some $7bn in "limited, temporary, targeted, and reversible [sanctions] relief" while a permanent agreement is sought.

Key points of the deal include:

• Iran will stop enriching uranium beyond 5% and "neutralize" its stockpile of uranium enriched beyond this point
• Iran will give greater access to inspectors including daily access at Natanz and Fordo -- two of Iran’s key nuclear sites
• There will be no further development of the Arak plant, which it is believed could produce plutonium
• In return, there will be no new nuclear-related sanctions for six months if Iran sticks by the accord
• Some sanctions will be suspended on trading in gold and precious metals, on Iran's car-making sector and its petrochemical exports
• Frozen oil sale assets will be transferred in installments, bringing in some $4.2bn of extra revenue.

Howeidi, in his piece today for Aljazeera quotes unnamed Iranian experts as telling him:

• The deal recognizes Iran as a regional nuclear power with the right to continue its uranium enrichment program for peaceful purposes
• The Iranians and Americans rushed the deal through to sidestep adverse pressure by Israel, France and some Gulf Arab lobbyists
• The Iranian-American understandings go beyond the nuclear program and the easing of economic sanctions. “The most important understanding is over Iran’s participation in the fight against terrorism in Syria, Iraq, Lebanon and Afghanistan”
• The deal allows Iran to receive some $7 billion in sanctions relief; about $1.5 billion of the frozen assets were promptly released to Tehran “by Asian banks in South Korea, Malaysia and Indonesia as early as last Sunday morning”
• Shell, which was complying with the sanctions, was the first oil major to resume work in Iran.

Howeidi sums up the most important features of the agreement between the 5+1 world powers and Iran as follows:

1. It seems a new axis is taking shape in the region comprising Iran and Russia, the two countries that played a key role in aborting an American military strike against Syria.
2. The U.S. will henceforth “rely on Iran and Turkey to keep the peace in the region now that Egypt has lost its standing in the Arab world.” Iran is on the ground in Syria, Iraq and Lebanon and to some degree in Yemen, where it is supporting the Houthis. Turkey on the other hand has its role in Syria, Iraq and the Caucasus in Central Asia. Ankara also has its strong economic ties with many Arab countries.
3. There are still question marks over a sectarian war between the Sunnis and Shiites in the Arab world, over Iran’s support of the Islamic movements in Palestine and Lebanon and over future links between Cairo and Tehran.
4. Israel is in a win-win situation. Syria’s chemical weapons are being buried and checks on Iran’s nuclear ambitions are being put in place.
5. Iran’s clout in the Gulf, Syria, Iraq and Lebanon is on the ascendancy. The Gulf, which usually banks on the U.S. is now less prone to challenge Iran. That’s particularly true of Saudi Arabia, which lost its gamble on America’s air strike on Syrian regime forces and on mobilizing Sunni forces against Tehran.
6. “The long and short of the new balance of power in the Arab world is this: Iran tops the list of winners but there is no mention of the Arabs anywhere.”

In the view of Saudi journalist Tariq Alhomayed, “fallouts of the deal on the region – specifically on Saudi Arabia and its Gulf Arab partners – will prove more treacherous than the consequences of the 9/11 terrorist outrage that pummeled the United States in 2001.

“I am not dramatizing. It is not so because the Obama Administration sold the region down the river or that the administration turned its back on its historic partnership with Gulfite Arabs.

Many forget that America betrayed Israel, her sacred cow in the region.

Alhomayed says Iran’s chief objective since the days of the late Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlevi was to become the “region’s policeman.”

The Islamic Republic will eventually rid itself of all economic sanctions and achieve its primary objective of creating nuclear weapons “much as India and Pakistan did under Bill Clinton, another Democratic Party president.” 

Killer love: The Alawites and the West

Postage stamp issued by the short-lived Alawite state under the French mandate

Fawaz Tello, a veteran Syrian opposition campaigner now based in Berlin, penned this think piece in Arabic for the aljzeera.net portal.

A leader of the 2001 “Damascus Spring” movement, Tello spent five years (2001-2006) as a political prisoner. He moved to Cairo end February 2012.

The author, Fawaz Tello

His degrees in Civil Engineering and Business Administration are from Damascus University.

To put his think piece into perspective, of the Syrian population of 22.5 million, 74 percent are Muslin Sunnis, 11 percent are Alawites, and 15 percent are from other religious denominations.

****

Last June 18, a Lebanese daily close to the Syrian regime quoted a Syrian official as saying in the presence of a UN organization representative, “We shall prevail with or without Bashar al-Assad. For us, what matters most is to see the state – i.e. the regime – survive without losing its regional status.”

Obviously the Syrian official is “Alawite.”

By saying, “what matters for us,” and by equating “state” and “regime,” he simply meant “Alawite rule.”

Over a year ago, after meeting diplomats and attending Syrian opposition conferences, I wrote two articles.

In them, I warned that the United States has -- since the first (February 2012) “Friends of Syria” conference in Tunis -- already contrived a roadmap for Syria.

With opposition groups’ blessings, the U.S. then underpinned the blueprint at the (June 2012) Action Group conference in Geneva and at subsequent “Friends of Syria” meetings.

Essentially, the roadmap is the political solution proposed for Geneva-2, whereby the “Alawite regime” retains the state’s military and security branches, which are sectarian Alawite par excellence.

These would supposedly be reformed gradually “in order to conserve state structures.”

In other words, proponents of Geneva-2 concur with the Syrian official who encapsulated “the state” in the word “regime” and “the regime” in “Alawite rule.”

The Americans, Europeans, Russians and Iranians share this rationale, their only dispute being over the role of “the regime president” in the negotiations and in the transitional stage.

The Americans have lately made common cause with the Russian position, meaning that at Geneva-2 the regime president would negotiate his “future role.”

That’s a new political rib-tickler worth adding to America’s stock of international wisecracks, particularly the joke of “non-lethal weapons.”

So Geneva-2 recognizes the current regime as a full and powerful partner without reference to justice or bona fide power transfer.

Rebels had to be coerced militarily to accept such solution. This was done by giving the Syrian regime a free hand to stifle the revolution by all means possible, including ceaseless carpet bombing and shelling; the use of ballistic missiles, chemical weapons and airpower; inexhaustible supplies of arms and ammunitions; blithe disregard for the regime’s recourse to sectarian mobilization by inviting mercenaries from Lebanon, Iraq and Iran.

By contrast, the Geneva-2 partners exerted immense pressure to starve rebels of arms and ammunitions, which some Arab states promised them 18 months ago.

The Geneva-2 Western patrons used the pretext of “opposition unity” at a timewhen Jabhat al-Nusra was nowhere in sight. The group’s catchword “wrong” hands later became the chief excuse although the “wrong hands” hardly represent five percent of the Free Syrian Army and moderate Islamic groups’ forces on the ground.

After Iran’s overt intervention in the battle for Qusayr through her proxies in Lebanon and Iraq, Arab countries resentful of Iran’s expansionism turned a deaf ear to Washington and started channeling weapons to the rebels.

That’s when the West -- read Americans and Europeans -- resorted to the political ploy of publicly declaring they would be arming the rebels while trying behind doors to prevent this from happening.

The West never stopped hoping the regime would succeed in crushing the revolution or in forcing it to the surrender negotiations table.

Never before did a dictatorship willingly transform into a democracy – neither at once nor piecemeal.

The Syrian Alawite official realizes this. But he is telling the West that Alawites would stay behind the sectarian dictator until they sense defeat, which is when they would make a deal with the West to dump the dictator and safeguard “Alawite rule.”

That’s what the “Western Friends of Syria” give the thumbs up to.

In truth, it’s the case of the West giving something it does not have to an undeserving side, the side being partisans of the sectarian Alawite regime, most of whom are actively supporting the dictator militarily and politically.

The West is saying a sectarian Alawite minority regime in league with other minorities is more suitable than a secular and moderate Sunni regime, even if modeled after Turkey’s.

The fitting secular Muslim, the West is saying, should preferably be “hostile” to all the cultural, authentic and manifest trappings of Sunni Islam. Problem is such Muslims are marginal among Sunnis and stand no chance of winning elections.

This explains the West’s penchant for quasi-democratic minority rule that leaves the military and security striking force in minority hands.

The clearest example yet of such political and intellectual bigotry by Western decision-makers and think tanks is Iraq, which was delivered to Iran on a silver platter at the expense of the West’s Gulf Arab allies.

What is happening in Syria today is the continuation of that policy. Iran is left to carry on shoring up Syria’s sectarian regime at all levels even if she swallowed Syria altogether and her expansionism detonated the entire region.

All this is to keep alive the Alawites’ half-a-century-old rule of Syria by means of the most repulsive sort of overlapping international support from America, Europe, the Soviet Union then Russia, Iran and Israel.

This minority regime gave the State of Israel unparalleled leeway to appropriate the Golan. It also gifted Israel a unique prize by crushing the Palestinian Revolution. Above all, by seizing power in the 1963 military coup in the name of the Baath Party, the minority regime interrupted the significant economic, political and social strides Syria was making to become a free and liberal Muslim democracy.

The latest evidence of the West’s complicity and its partiality towards Alawite governance is its refusal to pass on a simple message to the ruling Alawite sect.

The message is this: “You have to accept the new Syria as ordinary citizens. Instead of being stripped of your total control of state institutions posthaste, the erosion of your privileges would be phased. You have the choice of endorsing or resisting the change. It’s an opportunity that is slipping through your hands day by day.”

The West has yet to tell the pro-Assad Alawites their war crimes and human rights violations will not go unpunished. Although sectarian killings and massacres in Syria are still one-sided, their insistence on setting up an Alawite statelet would trigger a full-scale civil war against them and the regime.

Any shape or form of dismemberment or partition of Syria would lead to protracted internecine strife that could last for years and envelop the region.

Geneva-2 is stillborn. It could have drawn breath 18 months ago, but not anymore. Syria is neither Bosnia nor Yemen. Her revolution is total, not halfway.

No matter how long the war would last to shatter the dream of Balkanizing Syria and bring regime criminals to justice, the Syrians will fight on for a better life with their backs to the wall.

To be ruled by a sectarian minority is the Syrian majority’s worst option, even if such choice were to open the gates of hell on the West, the region and the Alawites.

The West, the region and the Alawites are the least of the Syrian majority’s worries.

No longer a Shiite Crescent

Press clipping dated Monday, 13 June 1949

By Jamal Khashoggi, Saudi Arabia’s authoritative political analyst, author and kingpin of the impending Al Arab TV news channel, writing in Arabic today for the mass circulation newspaper al-Hayat

When the term “Shiite Crescent” was coined a few years back, it was meant to warn of Iranian expansionism across the Levant.

Nowadays, after the Big Powers’ defeat in the Qusayr battle, Shiite fundamentalism is basking in all the glory of triumph.

With the resulting enlistment of hundreds of Iraqi Shiite volunteers in the war overtly championed by Iran, the Crescent is liable to evolve into a political axis stretching from Tehran to Beirut via Baghdad and Damascus.

The Iranian Oil Ministry will pull out old maps from its drawers to build the pipeline to pump Iranian oil and gas from Abadan (across Iraq) to Tartus.

The Iranian Ministry of Roads and Transportation will dust off the national railways authority’s blueprints for a new branch line from Tehran to Damascus, and possibly Beirut,

Why not? The wind is blowing in their favor and I am not making a mountain out of a molehill.

Tehran has been mulling and airing such projects for years without actually starting them.

But she will, once she settles the Syria war in her favor. It is only natural for her to consolidate victory on the ground by blending her triumphant axis in a singular political, economic and military network.

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Supreme Leader or Guardian Jurist of Iran, will realize his dream of delivering his sermon from the pulpit of Umayyad Mosque in Damascus, announcing the attainment of Islamic unity he has long promised.

He will then pompously step down from the pulpit to stroke the forehead of a wheelchair-bound Damascene boy, signaling that forgiveness is the attribute of the strong.

He will then stand next to a group of Syrian Sunni ulema wearing white turbans. There are lots of them, in the mould of Mufti Ahmad Hassoun, ready to oblige.

He will shake and raise their hands as camera clicks and flashlights capture the historic moment.

The Guardian Jurist will promise that his next prayer – or his successor’s. if he is sufficiently humble – will be in Jerusalem.

But he won’t mention the Golan. He knows the Russians are now the key component of the UN monitoring force separating Israeli and Syrian forces on the Heights.

Because Takfiris are still mounting desperate operations here and there, he realizes that Syrian troops and Hezbollah fighters are busy keeping the peace in predominantly Sunni cities, towns and townships.

In that afternoon, a huge reception will be held in a newly rehabilitated Damascus palace still showing the scars of war to mark the signing of a mutual defense pact by the presidents of Iran, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.

The Guardian Jurist will stand wreathed in smiles in the background, perhaps in awe at the likely appearance of the Hidden Imam to bless the agreement.

We turn southward to Riyadh and find the capital calm and dusty but concerned the battle was settled in favor of Bashar al-Assad and his partners.

Riyadh is conscious the clean sweep is not Bashar’s but that of Iran and the old Khomeini scheme.

Bashar becomes the representative of Vali e-faqih in Damascus.

Riyadh is also alarmed by Iranian activity in its surrounding area.

It fears for Bahrain. The Houthis have won uncontested control of more than half the old North Yemen. South Yemen, Saudi Arabia’s traditional ally, is being gradually eaten away by Iran.

Gulf unity plans have dissipated. Some Gulf countries are keen to flatter Iran so as to preserve a modicum of their national sovereignty.

The Arab common market and Fertile Crescent idea evaporated and with it the dream of resurrecting the Hejaz Railway that ran from Istanbul to Holy Mecca across Syria and Jordan.

Even the Europeans are buying the Iranian oil flowing through the Abadan-Tartus pipeline. They are also thinking of linking the European Gas Network with its Iranian counterpart. They have forgotten all about sanctions because the world always prefers to deal with winners.

On the Arab Gulf home front, young men are seething. They feel their governments let them down by failing to face up to the Iranian stratagem. The young men are in a sectarian tinderbox and buckling under economic stress. Extremism is rampant and the security services are busy hunting down extremist groups.

A nightmare, don’t you think?

That’s why I believe Saudi Arabia expressly will not allow Iran to win in Syria.

Iranian presence there proved a burden from the day Hafez al-Assad sealed his alliance with Iran’s Islamic Revolution as soon as it took over power 40 years ago.

Whereas the Syrian regime’s muscle under Hafez left a margin of balance and independence in the partnership, his son submitted totally to the Iranians and Hezbollah.

It is thanks to them Bashar is still alive and ruling a country in ruin. Instead of being their partner, he has become their subordinate.

The implication is that Iran’s presence in Lebanon and Syria now constitutes a clear threat to Saudi Arabia’s national security, and Turkey’s as well.

Consequently, Saudi Arabia must do something now, albeit alone. The kingdom’s security is at stake.

It will be good if the United States joined an alliance led by Saudi Arabia to bring down Bashar and return Syria to the Arab fold. But this should not be a precondition to proceed.

Let Saudi Arabia head those on board.

Let us put aside any misgivings about sequels of the Arab Spring, the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and Turkey’s ambitions.

Let the objective be to bring down Assad fast.

The objective is bound to draw together multiple forces ranging from the Anbar tribes to Hamas to Egypt’s Brothers to Tunisia to the Gulf Countries.

That would entice Turkey to partake in the alliance. France could follow. And whether the United States does or does not breeze in is inconsequential. After all, it’s our battle and our security. U.S. security is not on the line. 

Ex Hezbollah chief: Syria war coming to Lebanon

Giselle Khoury interviewing Subhi al-Tufayli in Baalbek the day after Qusayr

Former Hezbollah leader Subhi al-Tufayli says Iran has opened the door to an inevitable spillover of the Syria war into Lebanon and provoked 1.3 billion Muslim Sunnis by ordering the Lebanese Shiite Hezbollah movement to help out Bashar al-Assad’s army.

He made the accusation in a 25-minute interview with Giselle Khoury for Alarabiya TV news channel.

The interview took place in Baalbek within 24 hours of the fall of the Syrian town of Qusayr to Syrian government troops backed by Hezbollah fighters. 

Tufayli, who spent nine years studying theology in Najaf was spokesman for Hezbollah between 1985 and 1989, and became the militant Shiite group’s first Secretary-General from 1989 until 1991.

I excerpted and paraphrased from the interview these remarks by Tufayli on the fallout from Hezbollah’s military intervention in Syria:

Lebanon is bound for war – a war worse than any Lebanon has seen to date.

Regrettably -- regrettably again -- the war will be between Sunnis and Shiites who embraced the initiative of invading Syria.

We (Shiites) have alienated Lebanon’s Sunnis, the Free Syrian Army and Sunnis worldwide. We provoked everyone.

When we -- (a reference to Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah specifically) – declare openly, “Whoever does not share our view can come and fight us in Syria,” we are effectively provoking the world’s 1.3 billion Muslim Sunnis and not only the Sunnis of Lebanon, Syria and the Arab world.

Time will show that talk of a Hezbollah victory on the home front in the 7 May 2008 conflict in Lebanon is haywire.

At times, certain countries – in this case America – have an interest to see Hezbollah come out on top in a confrontation, such as happened in Beirut on May 7, 2008.

Talk of a Hezbollah victory in Qusayr is also a big lie.

I think Hezbollah suffered its worst defeat in Qusayr.

Qusayr is a small town. It was besieged. Some of its people were very poorly armed. It was blockaded and pounded by all sorts of shells, bombs and missiles from the air and the ground. It held out for a some time. When its defenders ran out of ammunitions, they were able to pull out and leave the town.

What I am saying is that Hezbollah defeated no one. The people in Qusayr held out as long as their weapons permitted. When they had the means to defend themselves, neither Hezbollah nor anyone else could overrun the town.

And I know the high number of fatalities suffered by the attackers of Qusayr, not to speak of the wounded.

The attackers did not go into Qusayr before the defenders completed their withdrawal.

All the boastful statements about changing the Middle East map evaporated at Qusayr’s doorstep. The empty rhetoric reminds me of Gamal Abdel-Nasser bragging about his al-Kaher and al-Zafer missiles.

Nothing is in store for us after Qusayr except catastrophes, especially if the Syrians (fighting Assad) manage to get qualitative weapons.

Let’s wait and see if (Hezbollah) won Hermel peace and stability or brimstone and fire.

Hezbollah was founded as a party to resist Israel, to defend and uphold the Ummah (Muslims throughout the world).

All this melted away in Qusayr.  Even the rank and file members of Hezbollah know we are no more a resistance party, a party to resist Israelis. We’ve been turned into a party to fight Muslims whether in Beirut or Qusayr, and now Damascus and then Homs.

Can you imagine Hezbollah joining a sectarian war?

The foolish step by Iran, ordering Hezbollah to intervene militarily in Syria, laid the ground for a chapter of killings, wars, bloodshed, harming children and women and desecrating the Ummah.

Is it a case of self-defense when Hezbollah attacks women and children in Qusayr?

States always boss the sides they finance. Iran vis-à-vis Hezbollah is no exception.

Blame the fire that will unquestionably scorch Lebanon on Iran and Iran only.

Obama must act decisively on Syria – McCain

On the heels of his trip to Syria and stops in Jordan, Turkey and Yemen, Senator John McCain (R-Ariz.) yesterday delivered this address at the Brookings Institution in Washington D.C. on “U.S. policy in Syria and the broader Middle East”:

Senator John McCain at Brookings yesterday

Thank you, Martin (Indyk), for that kind introduction.  

It is always a pleasure to return to the Brookings Institution, this bastion of conservative thought. It is nice to see so many friends, as well as a few enemies, in the audience this afternoon. I would like to make a few opening remarks, and then I’d be happy to respond to any comments, or questions, or insults you may have.

As most of you know, I traveled last week to Yemen, Jordan, Turkey, and Syria. This was my twelfth separate trip to the region since the events known as the Arab Spring began in December 2011. And what I can say categorically today is that I am now more concerned than at any time since the darkest days of the war in Iraq that the Middle East is descending into sectarian conflict.  

The conflict in Syria is at the heart of this crisis. Last week, together with General Salim Idriss, the chief of staff of the Supreme Military Council, I met with more than a dozen senior Free Syrian Army commanders in southern Turkey and northern Syria. They came from cities across Syria, including Qusayr, Homs, Damascus, and Aleppo. Many of them were joined by their civilian counterparts. And all of them painted the same grave picture of the state of the conflict in Syria.

Assad has turned the tide of battle on the ground. His foreign allies have all doubled down on him. Iran is all in. Russia is all in. Shiite militants are flowing into the fight from Iraq. And Hezbollah fighters have invaded Syria by the thousands. They were decisive in retaking the critical city of Qusayr, and now they are leading the attacks on Homs and Aleppo. Assad is using every weapon in his arsenal, from tanks and artillery, to air power and ballistic missiles. And according to a recent U.N. report, there are, quote, “reasonable grounds” to believe that Assad’s forces have used chemical weapons. The President’s red-line appears to have been crossed, perhaps more than once, and it should come as no surprise that new claims of chemical weapons use by Assad are already surfacing, as I heard in Syria.

The result of this onslaught is that Syria as we know it is ceasing to exist. More than 80,000 people are dead. A quarter of all Syrians have been driven from their homes. The Syrian state is disintegrating in much of the country, leaving vast ungoverned spaces that are being filled by extremists, many aligned with al-Qaeda. Some now put the number of these extremists inside Syria in the thousands. They are the best armed, best funded, and most experienced fighters. And every day this conflict grinds on, these extremists are marginalizing moderate leaders like the commanders I met last week – Syrians who don’t want to trade Assad for al-Nusra.

The worsening conflict in Syria is now spilling outside of the country and stoking sectarian conflict across the region. Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey are each straining under the weight of hundreds of thousands of Syrian refugees. Indeed, ten percent of Jordan’s population is now Syrian refugees. This would be equivalent to the entire population of Texas suddenly crossing our own border. And that number is expected to double this year. Terrorist bombings have struck Turkey, and Syrian groups are firing rockets into Shiite areas of Lebanon in retaliation for Hezbollah’s intervention in Syria. Old sectarian wounds are being reopened in Lebanon.

The situation is even worse in Iraq. The conflict in Syria, together with Prime Minister Maliki’s unwillingness to share power, is radicalizing Iraq’s Sunni population. Al-Qaeda in Iraq is back and stepping up its attacks on Iraqi Shiites. In response, Shiite militias are remobilizing and retaliating against Iraqi Sunnis. More than 1,000 Iraqis were killed last month alone, the highest level of violence since 2007. Some experts now believe that one watershed event, similar to the bombing of the Golden Mosque in 2006, could tip Iraq back into full-scale sectarian conflict.

Extremist forces are also gathering momentum elsewhere in the region. The fall of governments across the region has opened up ungoverned spaces that now stretch from the Arabian Peninsula and the Horn of Africa, across North Africa, all the way down into Mali and even northern Nigeria. Al-Qaeda affiliated extremist groups are now on the march throughout these vast ungoverned spaces. Iran is also seeking to exploit the present chaos. Indeed, every Yemeni and U.S. official I met last week in Sana’a said that Iran is a greater threat in Yemen today than Al-Qaeda.

Put simply, the space for moderate politics is collapsing as the Middle East descends deeper into extremism and conflict. A sectarian battle-line is being drawn through the heart of the region – with Sunni extremists, many allied with al-Qaeda, dominant on one side, and Iranian-backed proxy forces dominant on the other.  

What is more disturbing, however, is how little most Americans seem to care. Most are weary of war and eager to focus on domestic issues. But some hold a more cynical view: They see the Middle East as a hopeless quagmire of ancient hatreds and a huge distraction from worthier priorities, whether it is rebalancing toward Asia or nation-building at home. For those of us who believe otherwise, and who believe the United States must lead more actively in the region, we have to answer a fundamental question: Why should we care about the Middle East?

One reason is that we have enduring national interests in the Middle East that will not be diminished – not by our fatigue with the region and its challenges, not by our desire to focus on domestic issues, not by the growing importance of other parts of the world, and not even by the prospect of American energy independence. The Middle East has always been more important than oil. It still is.  

The United States has friends and allies in the Middle East who depend on us for their security, and who contribute more to the defense and well-being of our nation than most Americans will ever know. But believe me, Americans will know it very quickly if global trade and energy flows, not to mention U.S. warships, can no longer transit the Suez Canal, through which approximately 8 percent of the world’s seaborne trade passes. They will know it if we lose key Arab partners, such as the Kingdom of Jordan, along with their vital military, intelligence, and counterterrorism cooperation. And they will absolutely know it if Israel becomes beset on all sides by even more hostile governments and more violent extremists.

In short, if the Middle East descends into extremism, and war, and despair, no one should think America would be able to pivot away from those threats. Our national security interests will suffer. That is an inescapable reality. It is the lesson of September 11, 2001. And to believe otherwise is not only naïve; it is dangerous.  

The Middle East also matters because much of the rest of the world views it, rightly, as a test of American credibility and resolve. For decades, Presidents of both parties have said the United States will deter our enemies and support our friends in the Middle East. They have said we would not allow Iran to get a nuclear weapons capability. And they have said, as this President has said about Syria, that we would not tolerate the use or proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. If the United States now signals that it is unwilling or unable to meet its own stated commitments and enforce its own declared red-lines, that message will be heard loud and clear, far beyond the Middle East. It will demoralize our friends, embolden our enemies, and make our world a far more dangerous place for us.

But ultimately, there is a more positive reason why we have to care about the Middle East. This region is now experiencing a period of upheaval unlike any time since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire. Over the past three years, we have seen millions and millions of ordinary men and women rise up peacefully, and lift their voices, and risk everything on behalf of the same values we hold dear: freedom and democracy, equal justice and rule of law, human rights and dignity. They are doing so against impossible odds and, at times, in the face of merciless oppression and violence. These brave men and women are taking a chance on themselves, many for the first time. And they are asking us to take a chance on them – not after they have succeeded in their struggles, but now, when they need it most, when their fate hangs in the balance, and when American leadership can still be decisive.

I know some of our initial hopes for the Arab Spring have dimmed quite a bit – in part because of a lack of U.S. leadership.  But these hopes have not gone out. And so long as men and women across the Middle East still harbor hopes for a future of peace, and freedom, and prosperity, the Arab Spring will remain the greatest repudiation of everything that al-Qaeda stands for. Ultimately, this is how our long fight against global terrorist groups will be won. This is how conditions of lasting peace will finally be secured across the Middle East. Not through drone strikes and night raids alone, but by helping people across the region lift up democratic governments and growing economies that offer hope.

The entire Middle East is now up for grabs, and our enemies are fully committed to winning. Moderate forces and aspiring democrats are fighting for their futures and their very lives. The only power that is not fully committed in this struggle is us. And as a result, leaders and people across the region who share our interests and many of our values are losing ground to violent extremists.  

Our friends and allies in the Middle East are crying out for American leadership, as I heard again last week. We must answer this call. We must lead. We need an alternative strategy that creates space for moderate leaders to marginalize extremists and for people to resolve their differences peacefully, politically.  

An alternative strategy must begin with a credible Syria policy. I want a negotiated end to this conflict. But anyone who thinks that Assad and his allies will ever make peace when they are winning on the battlefield is delusional. I know that the situation in Syria is hugely complicated, and that there are no easy or ideal options. But we have to be realistic: This conflict will grind on with all of its worsening consequences until the balance of power shifts against Assad and his allies. And the longer we wait to take action, the more action we will have to take.

No one should think that we have to destroy every air defense system or put thousands of boots on the ground to make a difference in Syria. We have limited options. We could use our stand-off weapons, such as cruise missiles, to target Assad’s aircraft and ballistic missile launchers on the ground. We could enable a provisional government to establish itself in a safe zone in Syria that we could help to protect with Patriot missiles. And we could organize a full-scale operation to train and equip Syrian opposition forces. After all, Assad is getting weapons. Al-Nusra is getting weapons. The only forces in Syria that are not getting weapons are moderate commanders like those I met last week, who said their units desperately need ammunition and weapons to counter Assad’s tanks, artillery, and air power.

Would any of this immediately end the conflict? Probably not. But could it save innocent lives in Syria? Could it give the moderate opposition a better chance to succeed? And could it help to turn the conflict in Syria into a strategic disaster for Iran and Hezbollah? To me, the answer to all of these questions is yes.  

More decisive action in Syria could create new leverage to defuse sectarian tensions and counter Iran’s ambition of regional hegemony. In the Gulf, this would mean making the military threat more credible and apparent as Iran continues its pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability. And in Lebanon, this would mean making the strategic defeat of Hezbollah in Syria the centerpiece of a wider campaign to target its finances, cut its supply lines, delegitimize its leaders, and support internal opposition to its role as an armed force in Lebanese politics.  

An alternative Middle East strategy must also include a greatly enhanced effort to build the capacity of security forces across the region, especially in North African. Egypt needs a new police force. Tunisia needs help with border security. Libya is trying to build new national security forces from scratch. Mali basically needs a whole new army. One bright spot is actually Yemen, which is engaged in a promising restructuring of its armed forces and internal security units. These governments, and others like them, don’t want al-Qaeda affiliates exploiting their countries any more than we do. They have a lot of will to resist these groups. They just need help with the means. The U.S. military can play this role better than any force in the world. And it is in our interest to do so far more than we are currently.

More broadly, we must renew our leadership on behalf of human rights and democracy in the Middle East. This will take different forms in different countries. In Yemen, for example, where a managed transition is proving more successful thus far than many could have expected, we must continue to provide assistance as requested. In Jordan, Morocco, and the Gulf states, we must shore up the stability of these vital partners while also urging them to continue responding to their peoples’ desires for change, including through greater political reform.  

And then there is Egypt, where the high hopes that many of us, and many Egyptians, had back in January 2011 are being deeply disappointed. I am a friend of Egypt and a long-standing supporter of our assistance relationship. But after this week’s conviction of 43 NGO workers, Congress must reevaluate our assistance to Egypt. Our foreign aid budget is shrinking while the demands on it are growing. As a result, Egypt must show that it is a good investment of our scarce resources – that the return on this investment will be a freer, more democratic, more tolerant Egypt. If not, Congress will spend this money elsewhere. That is just a fact.

At the same time, we must make it clear that the United States does not align itself with any one ruler or group in Egypt. Rather, we stand for the principles and practices of democracy, for the freedoms of civil society, and for the basic rights of all Egyptians. We must not simply exchange a Mubarak policy for a Morsi policy. We need to have, at long last, an Egypt policy.  

Finally, any strategy to bolster moderates in the Middle East must include an effort to seek peace between Palestinians and Israelis. As always, such an effort must be weighed against its opportunity costs. With so many urgent priorities now demanding high-level attention in the region, especially Syria, I hope the President and his new national security team are carefully considering these trade-offs.

Each of the steps I have described today is necessary if we are to have a more effective strategy to advance our interests and values in the Middle East. But none of these steps will be sufficient without one additional factor: the sustained, outspoken, and determined leadership of the President of the United States.

Only the President can explain to the American people how high the stakes are in the Middle East. Only the President can change public opinion and rally the American people behind him. Only the President can push our government to be bolder, and more imaginative, and more decisive than it is inclined to be. Only the President can pull our friends and allies together and shape their individual efforts into decisive, unified international action. Only the President can do these things. And that is what we need from him now more than ever. We need him to lead.

That is also what our friends and allies in the Middle East want from our President. They want him to lead, and they want America to lead. That is what I heard last week in Jordan. That is what I heard in Yemen. That is what I heard in Turkey. And that is absolutely what I heard in Syria. That is what people and leaders tell me again and again as I travel throughout the region. They tell me they want America to lead because they are confident that America can still be decisive in shaping the future of the Middle East. In short, our friends and allies still believe in America. What they want to know is whether we still believe in ourselves.

Renewing American leadership in the Middle East should be a Republican goal. It should be a Democratic goal. And if the President makes it his goal, he will have my full support.