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Showing posts with label Syria transition. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Syria transition. Show all posts

Friday, 1 March 2013

Manaf Tlass goes back to the grind in Moscow


Elena Suponina photo of Manaf Tlass in Moscow
Brig. Gen. Manaf Tlass, Syria’s most prominent military defector and a former buddy of President Bashar al-Assad, is in Moscow for surprise talks with Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and then with Lavrov’s deputy Mikhail Bogdanov.

Though Tlass is a Sunni Muslim, he commanded an elite unit of the Republican Guard, which is about 80 percent Alawite, the ethnic minority from which Assad and his inner circle are drawn.
The general's father, Mustafa Tlass, was Syria's longest serving defense minister, who helped to ensure Assad’s succession to the presidency in 2000 following the death of his father Hafez.
In announcing news of his impending talks with Lavrov, Voice of Russia describes Manaf Tlass as “one of Syria's most influential opposition leaders.”
It says he arrived in Moscow “recently” from Paris, where he set up home after his getaway from Syria last July.
According to Voice of Russia, powerbrokers pin “special hopes” on the general mediating between the warring sides and playing a key role in a Syria power transition.
“Gen. Manaf Tlass does not like to give interviews, and now during his visit to Moscow he is in no hurry to talk to the press. Nevertheless, he agreed to answer the questions of Elena Suponina, a political correspondent of the Voice of Russia”:
General Manaf Tlass, what is the purpose of your current visit to Moscow?
The purpose of my visit to Moscow is to help find a solution to the Syrian crisis. The bloodshed in Syria must be stopped. This vicious circle of violence needs to be broken. Russia’s political weight is great enough to help find the solution. And the solution lies in dialogue replacing continuation of the standoff.
What specifically is required of Russia?
Russia can help preserve Syria as a state. I mean its unity, its complex structure with all the ethnic and religious minorities, its infrastructure and secular nature. The state and the regime are not the same thing. We need to save the Syrian state, but not the ruling regime. One must presume that helping to preserve Syria as a state is possible only by disassociating oneself from the current regime.
The regime is trying to present the situation like there is supposedly no alternative to it other than the religious extremists or anarchy. We are saying that there is an alternative. There is a third side in Syria, which is not associated with the regime or the extremists. The majority of the Syrian people do not want to choose between these two extremes, but want to build their lives in a stable and safe country. And Russia could support the moderate forces in Syria, those who favor the happy medium.
A few days ago during his visit to Moscow, Syria's Foreign Minister Walid Muallem for the first time made some important statements about his government's readiness to start a dialogue with the opposition. What is your attitude to that?
I don't trust such statements. I very well know Syria's government structure from the inside. And I well remember during the entire crisis the government made repeated promises that gave hope but never fulfilled them. There has been too much lying from that government for us to believe it now.
In any case, there is the key precondition for the beginning of the dialogue – it is ceasefire in Syria. The warplanes need to stop bombing. The missile strikes need to cease. Look – recently Scud missiles at the government’s disposal attacked the city of Aleppo. I want to express my condolences to the residents of that city that were hurt, as well as to residents of the other attacked cities. What kind of dialogue can there be when the attacks continue?
How can a ceasefire be reached?
I believe this can happen under the auspices of the Russian-American cooperation and, of course, under the auspices of the United Nations Organization. The parties to the conflict cannot be guarantors of the ceasefire, and the regime even less so. The leading powers of the world can act as such guarantors.
But a part of the opposition is also opposed to the dialogue with the representatives of the government. What is your view on that?
The opposition is for democracy, which means that there can be and must be different opinions. But there are some points that everybody agrees upon. All opposition members want this regime to leave. And at the same time all opposition forces want the killing in Syria to stop, they want the bloodshed to stop.

Friday, 1 February 2013

Leaked Brahimi report suggests Assad should go


Talks aimed at trying to end the civil war in Syria will today see international powers meet with the opposition to discuss a political transition.
Special Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi
Ahead of the meetings, peace envoy Lakhdar Brahimi suggested in his leaked January 29 briefing to the UN Security Council that President Bashar al-Assad must step down as part of the transition.
The briefing featured a six-point plan laid out by the envoy as he prepares to join U.S. Vice-President Joe Biden in Munich for the meetings today with Ahmed Moaz al-Khatib, head of the Syrian National Coalition.
UN Report posted this full text of Brahimi’s briefing to the Security Council, which suggests that Assad should go:
BRIEFING TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL
Joint Special Representative for Syria
, Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi
New York, 29 January 2013
Thank you very much indeed, Mr. President,
Mr. President,
Distinguished Members of the Council,
1. It is an honor to come to this Informal Consultations of the Council to discuss the Syrian situation, and it gives me particular pleasure to do so under your Chair, Mr. President. I believe it is not too late to express to you and to your Colleagues and Staff a happy 2013. I guess that the best wish one could express to the Security Council as a whole is that you have no work at all. Indeed no work at all for you would be what the people of the world would appreciate most.
2. In my opening remarks, I’ll address the disastrous consequences of the crisis on the people of Syria. I will speak after that about the political and military situation and how in my view, the conflict needs to be addressed. I hope to show that intervention of the Council is now necessary. Without your action, Mr. President, Syria runs the risk of sliding fast into Somalization.
3. Things in Syria are not any better today than they were when I last briefed the Council, on 29 November 2012: as we, and most observers keep repeating, things continue to get worse by the day. You were briefed ten days ago by High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay and by the Emergency Relief Coordinator Valerie Amos. Since then more Syrians have lost their lives, more Syrians have lost their limbs; and more Syrians have lost hope.
4. I thought that the sickening attack at the University of Aleppo earlier this month was the most revolting illustration of the immense suffering this conflict is inflicting on the people of Syria: the mass murder of nearly one hundred students and displaced persons living on the Campus, and the wounding of scores of others had no military value. It was killing for the purpose of terrorizing and inflicting harm on the civilian population and little else.
5. But then came those unbearable images brought back by Lyse Doucet of the BBC from the rural settlement of Haswaeyeh near the city of Homs; there, we saw that it was still possible to reach even worse levels of horror. In this rural, and until then rather peaceful part of Syria, God knows how many peaceful, helpless civilian men, women and children were literally slaughtered and burned by cruel, evil men.
6. But the tragedy simply does not have an end. Just before coming down, we read of yet another horror, in a suburb of Aleppo this time; sixty-five bodies discovered with their hands tied and shot in the head.
7. Or look also at the nearly 30 bakeries targeted in the course of 2012, often when long queues of people were waiting to buy a loaf of bread. After each of these and similar crimes, both sides were quick to claim innocence and accuse the other party of the crime. Due to a track record and, at times, circumstantial evidence, strong suspicion if not actual evidence often points the finger at Government Forces or their shadowy militia, the Shabiha as the perpetrator. It is however an established fact, that armed opposition groups have also been known to commit equally outrageous crimes against civilians.
8. These amount surely to crimes of war and crimes against humanity and it may be useful to initiate specific inquiries into crimes such as those committed earlier this month in Aleppo University, the village of Haswaeyeh or the Bakery attacks. It is of course difficult to undertake such tasks from a distance but I feel certain that, in many instances, it will be possible to establish responsibility. And that is worth doing; as it would be a useful complement to the serious work being done by the International Commission of Inquiry led by Professor Paulo Sergio Pinheiro.
9. Valerie Amos told you, Mr. Chairman, everything there is to say about the dire humanitarian situation. To further underline the magnitude of the problem, please listen to the following sentence I have taken one out of the large number of reports and articles we all see every day. I quote: “The U.N. refugee agency in Jordan says there has been a spike in the number of Syrians fleeing the civil war at home and crossing into Jordan. UNHCR's representative Andrew Harper says about 3,000 Syrians have entered Jordan every night for the past five days. Harper said Tuesday that the spike is due to intensified shelling, fighting and the "desperate situation" in Syria's southern villages. He says Jordan's Zaatari refugee camp is filling up quickly and UNHCR is running out of money to expand and set up other camps.”
10. Another illustration of the magnitude of the tragedy: talking to a visiting UN delegation a few days ago, a senior official of the Syrian Government said that the city of Daraya in the suburbs of Damascus has seen its population dwindle to seventy thousand – 70,000 – from an original total of more than 300,000; which means that more than two thirds – 2/3 – of the inhabitants of that city have left it.
11. Let us, for a minute or two play a game of guess work: should the military situation around Damascus take a turn for the worst, we will of course see a massive exodus of civilians fleeing the capital. Let us suppose that, not two thirds like Daraya, but one third only of them leave. You would then be speaking of more than one and a half million people getting out of Damascus. Let us further suppose that one third of the people on the move find refuge somewhere else inside Syria.
12. Where would the remaining one million people go? Obviously to the nearest borders, that is the Lebanese and Jordanian borders.
13. This is of course a worst-case scenario; but it would be totally wrong to assume that this is far fetched or only a very remote possibility. Someone who knows Syria much better than me speaks of another scenario far more gloomy and frightening: he sees Damascus being the theater of a long and bloody confrontation where the beautiful Old City will be completely destroyed.
14. But let us stay with our own scenario: I am sure you’ll agree with me that Lebanon would collapse under the weight of 500,000 additional people forcing their way into its territory and that Jordan will be equally critically destabilized by the flow of half a million new arrivals from Syria.
15. Do we need to add to this description the familiar figures of 60,000 people at the very least of those killed and probably five times maybe more that number of the wounded during this conflict. And the refugees already abroad 700,000 of them, predicted to go up to one million in a few months time. And the internally displaced: more than two million. And those who need help inside the country: four, perhaps already close to five million.
16. Let us also remember the detainees: I saw a nominal list of nearly 30,000. Their real number is certainly very, very much higher; some speak of 60,000 others of 100,000. It has been established, as you all know, that torture is routinely practiced in official and non-official detention centers. And there are also countless people who have disappeared and are said to have been detained or killed by the many security organizations of the State and the much feared, shadowy Shabiha.
17. And do I need to mention again the physical destruction of the country, those parts of some cities that look like Berlin in 1945? The priceless cultural heritage of Syria being destroyed or plundered? The bandits and traffickers doing what they do best? The hospitals and other health facilities destroyed completely, or closed, or used by security agents to arrest people suspected of being part of the opposition? Electricity being cut off for long hours every day? In some place lately there is no electricity at all. Shortages in almost everything? The galloping unemployment and punishingly high prices that continue to increase almost by the day: two very quick examples of how difficult life is for Syrians today: to get some gas it is necessary to queue with you car for up to 24 hours in front of a petrol station. And the price of a cooking gas canister has gone up – listen to this - from 350 to 5,000 liras.
18. Syrians themselves are helping one another to the best of their ability. For example, the small town of Salmya is home to 100,000 to 120,000 mainly Ismailis. They have received and are supporting 100,000 IDPs, with little help from outside. Some Kurdish villages have seen their population shoot up from 10,000 to 60,000 people.
19. Syria’s neighbors deserve everyone’s admiration and profound gratitude for their inspiring sense of international responsibility, their fraternal solidarity with their neighbors and their amazingly generous hospitality extended to those hundreds of thousands of refugees.
20. All UN Agencies are mobilized, as you know. Together with others, the ICRC chief among them, they are doing their best to come to the rescue of all these people, be they inside or outside Syria, in Government or opposition controlled territory. Theirs is not an easy task. They do not always succeed in reaching those who need them the most; and their work is not without risk for national and international staff alike. But it is indispensable to do this work and it is being done as well as conditions permit.
21. In addition to the physical difficulties faced on the ground, humanitarian aid is crippled by the lack of funding, so much so that food rations are now being curtailed. In addition to what Valerie Amos told you on the subject, let me quote from what the Secretary General said a few days ago in Davos. I quote: “The humanitarian community needs $1.5 billion for the next six months -- the largest-ever short-term appeal. However, our appeals to date have been woefully under-funded. That is why I am convening a pledging conference in Kuwait on January 30th. 
For many years, Syrians have shown great generosity and solidarity in hosting refugees from Palestine, Iraq and Somalia. The international community should come to Syria’s aid in its own time of need.”
Mr. President,
22. Of course humanitarian action is indispensable and urgent. It will address the needs created in and around Syria by the terrible crisis, which has been affecting the country and its people as well as their neighbors for close to two years now.
23. But humanitarian aid does not address the core of the problem; it addresses only the consequences. To go to the roots of the problem, a lasting solution has to be found for the crisis.
24. Two months ago, when I briefed the Council, many believed that the Syrian regime was crumbling and President Assad about to fall or flee the country in a matter of weeks perhaps even days. Today, the mood has shifted; President Assad is said to be doing well and his regime still strong. He will be there for the foreseeable future if not forever, we are told. To drive the point home some journalists in Damascus and Beirut write very optimistically articles about the progress being made every day. One went as far as to say total victory, for the regime of course, is not more than a few weeks away!
25. We were not convinced by the analysis, which prevailed two months ago, anymore than we are convinced by what is being said today. The truth is that the regime has been seriously shaken and it has not regained its balance. It was under stronger pressure two months ago than it is today, but Kissinger’s formula is as valid today as it was yesterday: “A conventional army loses if it doesn't win; the guerilla army wins if it doesn't loose”.
26. The regime is still strong enough to keep President Assad in power. But its legitimacy has been severely, probably irreparably damaged and many are those who have serious doubts that President Assad will be able to regain that legitimacy anytime soon, if at all. Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev of the Russian Federation has come closer to the truth than most when he said a few days ago in Davos and I quote: I think that every day, every week, every month the chances of him (meaning President Assad) surviving are becoming less and less. And Prime Minister Medevdev added “but I repeat, again, this must be decided by the Syrian people. Not Russia, not the USA not any other country.”
27. Much has been said in 2011 about the fact that in the countries of the so-called Arab spring “the wall of fear has come down.” In the course of the dramatic developments of these past months in the region, this may have been forgotten. But that is a fundamental reality and it is as valid in Syria as it is elsewhere. The regime in Damascus is still as repressive as it has been, if not more, and is engaging in a full scale war against entire segments of its population, but it is nevertheless still true that people are less afraid to speak out and many have taken arms to challenge the domination of the regime. Indeed, many, as you know, have deserted the ranks of the armed forces, the Police, the Government, the Baath party and the bureaucracy.
28. In this connection much nonsense has been written or said about what passed between President Assad and myself when we met on 24 December 2012. Our conversation was in fact perfectly “normal”, exactly what a conversation between a Head of State and a United Nations Envoy is and should be. Our exchange was easy, candid and mutually respectful. I invited the President to tell me how he saw the situation and what he intended to do, and he did tell me. I then told him honestly how I saw things and what, in my opinion, the reactions of Syrians and non-Syrians would be to what he had told me of his forthcoming initiative. And he listened to me with attention and patience.
29. I later spoke publicly about President Assad’s speech of 6 January 2013. I stand by everything I said except for the word “sectarian” which was not an accurate description of what was in the speech. A few days later, on 9 January I think, Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs Walid al-Muallem sent to the Secretary-General a memorandum, which tried to give an infinitely more positive reading of the speech than what had been actually said by the President. And yesterday, Syria’s Permanent Representative sent you another letter to inform you of how his country’s Government is trying to implement President Assad’s initiative.
30. The fact remains, however, Mr. President that the Syrian parties to the conflict are still very far apart. For President Bashar, the problem is almost exclusively, an external conspiracy implemented by terrorist organizations trained, armed and funded by external enemies of Syria. As for the opponents of the Government, they see a popular uprising against a repressive regime that has lost its legitimacy. It is important to note in this connection that this analysis of the opposition is shared by all of the components of the opposition, those who are working from abroad and those who are inside the country; those who have taken up arms and those who still believe in the possibility of peaceful protest and action.
31. One change that has taken place, however, deserves attention: the Government as well as opposition groups now speak timidly of “a political solution” even if neither appears to be ready to give up its fundamental preconditions.
For the government those preconditions are that the “external conspiracy has to come to an end first; funding and arming of the rebellion must be suspended and “the terrorists” as they call their opponents put down their weapons; and
For the opposition groups those preconditions are that President Assad abandons power, if not immediately, within a very short period of time.
32. But this very modest progress in no way means that things have changed enough for what I call the “inner circle” meaning the Syrian track to be the place where a peaceful process maybe initiated. The Syrians alas, are not really ready to talk to one another even through intermediaries. They need much help to reach that stage.
33. And, as I said in my previous briefing, at the regional level, the picture is not very promising either. It is in fact worrisome. The challenge of building a regional consensus for a peaceful settlement in Syria is made difficult by the clear alignment of most regional parties with one or the other of the parties in Syria.
34. Grave concern is expressed in many ways among Syria's immediate neighbors as to the present impact of the Syrian crisis and of its future implications if the crisis continues spiraling, as well, we all fear it could. There is, first and foremost, the problem of the wellbeing of hundreds of thousands of displaced Syrians rendered more serious by particularly harsh winter conditions. Public opinion in each of those countries is already divided on the Syrian issue with factions having expressed support for the government and others for the opposition. The flow of Syrian refugees is increasingly becoming a matter of controversy in those countries with some calling for an open borders policy to help alleviate the displaced people’s misery and others insisting on closing the borders before them. There are also strong indications that Syrian factions are getting material support from allies in neighboring countries and that citizens of those countries are fighting alongside their Syrian allies.
Hence the two big risks that are of serious concern to the international community:


35. The first is the transformation of Syria into a playground for competing regional forces, governments and non-state actors alike. This process is largely underway and can become acute in view of the high stakes embedded in the Syrian tragedy. As many have already observed, what we are presently witnessing in Syria is AT THE SAME TIME, and with the same intensity, a struggle INSIDE Syria and a struggle FOR Syria. The combination of these two processes substantially fuels the present conflict and complicates its settlement through diplomatic mediation.


36. The second, and no less serious concern, is the risk of a full-fledged regionalization of the Syrian civil war through the growing osmosis of that war with unresolved domestic issues within its immediate environment. No country, and certainly not Lebanon or Jordan, Iraq or Turkey, not to mention the Palestinians, is immune to the military and political fallout of the Syrian civil war. The Syrian civil war may well end up becoming contagious and affect the whole Levant where similar sectarian makeups and cleavages are to be found not to mention trans-state ideological and partisan movements. In other words, Mr. President, far from being in a position to help Syrians solve their present problem, the region is facing the risk of being itself contaminated by Syria’s difficulties and engulfed in its crisis.
37. We are still where we were two months ago: only the Security Council is in a position to help, if I may so Mr. President, and the time to act is now.
Mr. President,
38. As you and the other distinguished members of the Council are aware, since I last briefed the Council I had three meetings with representatives of the Russian Federation and the United States. The first meeting was in Dublin on 6 December and was attended by Secretary of State Hilary Clinton and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, the second and third meetings took place in Geneva on 9 December 2012 and 11 January 2013 respectively, and were attended by the Personal Representative of the President of the Russian Federation for the Middle East and Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov and United States Deputy Secretary of State Mr. William Burns.
39. I am deeply grateful to Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov for meeting with me in Dublin and for agreeing to the two other meetings with their respective deputies. I will not be so presumptuous as to comment on those meetings in the presence of Ambassador Susan Rice and Ambassador Vitaly Churkin.
Mr. President,
40. I am sorry if I sound like an old, broken record. But I seriously don’t see where else one should start or end except in saying that, things are bad and getting worse, the country is breaking up before everyone’s eyes; there is no military solution to this conflict – at least not one that will not destroy Syria completely and destroy also the  nation of Syria; Syrians cannot themselves start a peace process, their neighbors are not able to help them; only the international community may help and is the international community is first and foremost the United Nations Security Council. And the Geneva Communiqué and Action Plan offer good bases to initiate the necessary action to provide that help.
41. There evidently is now a better assessment worldwide, of the tragic dimension of the crisis and its terrible consequences on the Syrian population and, no less important, of the huge disintegrating impact it is having on the social fabric of the country, of the rising influence of extremist groups on both sides and of the growing violent sectarian alignments.
42. Compared to the upheavals that have struck some countries in the Arab world, the Syrian conflict has indisputably proven to be the deadliest and most intractable, the most threatening for its neighbors and the most worrisome for the country’s future. Does international action measure up to this climatic peak in the so-called “Arab Spring”? Does the diplomatic management measure up to the dimensions of the tragedy and the stakes at play? Does the pressure from third parties on the belligerents to accept a negotiated settlement measure up to the violence and devastation? To all these questions, I am sure you will agree, distinguished members of the Council, the answer is, at best, a very polite “not enough.”
43. I think that public opinion the world over is now looking up to the Security Council to take a determined, strong lead.
44. The principles on which the Council’s actions might be based are explicitly or implicitly contained in the Geneva Communiqué:
a) Syria’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity must be preserved;
b) There must be clear recognition that the ultimate objective is to enable the Syrian people to exercise their legitimate rights to dignity and human rights and to have a full say in the manner in which they are governed;
c) An essential element in that process is the formation of a transitional Government with full executive powers. The meaning of “full executive powers” has to be clarified before the Syrian parties come together to discuss the formation of that transitional government. Leaving that definition, the definition of full executive powers, to the parties is fairly certain to lead to a dead end;
In this connection, the Geneva communiqué was elegant and creative in that it did not speak of President Bashar Al-Assad and his role in the transition and beyond. I think, however, it is largely understood that “governing body with full executive powers” clearly meant that the President would have no role in the transition;
Now, Mr. President,
And this is another point that needs to be taken into consideration,
d) The actual negotiation should take place between a strong, fully representative team on behalf of the opposition and a strong civilian- military delegation representing the Government. Of course both negotiating teams should be comprised of individuals capable of reaching a compromise agreement during a reasonable period of time;
e) These negotiations should start outside of Syria and take place according to an agreed timetable to enable the process to move – as fast as possible - towards the democratic process which would include the election, constitutional reform and referendum. From what I heard in Damascus and elsewhere, it will not be to difficult to secure agreement to move the country from the present Presidential system to a Parliamentary system of Government;
f) It is important that the Council unequivocally expresses support for the right of each citizen in Syria to enjoy full equality before the law irrespective of gender, religion, language or ethnicity.
Mr. President, Distinguished Members of the Council
45. I have put down a number of elements, which in my view could inform an initiative of the Security Council, which in turn would offer a base for negotiations between a team representing the opposition and another acting on behalf of the Government.
This, of course, not a draft resolution; I would not be so presumptuous as to submit such a draft to all the experts around this table.
Mr. President,
46. I have been blamed by many because I did not submit my plan for the resolution of the conflict soon enough.
I accept that criticism. In my defense, I will only say that I did not consider that presenting my own personal plan was the main objective of my mission.
I thought and still think that the main objective was and still is to ensure that there is a SYRIAN PLAN, a plan that the Syrians can accept and implement.
47. I believe that difficult as it is, reaching that stage is possible. But it is necessary to obtain, first, a strong, unequivocal support from the Security Council. And that is what I am asking you Mr. Chairman and honorable delegates today.

Thursday, 26 July 2012

Syria’s Gen. Tlass talks his fill in Saudi Arabia


Gen. Tlass during his interview with Asharq Alawsat in Jeddah

It is legitimate at times to blow your own horn -- in this case, ArabSaga’s.
Yesterday’s post was the first in the global media to report Syrian Gen. Manaf Tlass’ arrival in Saudi Arabia. It led off with his landing in Riyadh before flying to Mecca to perform the Umrah. And it hinted at the considerable significance of the visit a propos the Saudi drive to rid Syria of President Bashar al-Assad  (see the posts of July 25, July 19 and July 18).
Today, the leading Saudi daily Asharq Alawsat confirms Tlass’ presence in the kingdom by running a full-length interview and a picture of him in Jeddah.
Significantly, the interview was conducted in person overnight by Asharq Alawsat’s editor-in-chief Tariq Alhomayed.
The newspaper’s front-page screamer reads, “Gen. Manaf Tlass to Asharq Alawsat: No to eradication and I don’t see Syria with Assad.”
All this confirms my impression that Saudi Arabia is grooming Tlass to lead the transition to post-Assad Syria.
Following are the crucial remarks Tlass makes in his all-embracing interview with Alhomayed:
On exiting Syria
My exit was a complex operation that took time and involved several parties. But I won’t say more so as to protect those who helped me. Maybe one day I will reveal how I exited Syria.
From the beginning, I disagreed with the regime on ways to handle the crisis. I self-distanced myself for a while as mistakes in handling the crisis multiplied. I had no decision-making input on the matter. That’s why I preferred to leave. I always sought not to take sides. I tried to help all sides come together to overcome the crisis. That’s why I didn’t give a reason for my defection.
I am not looking for authority. I am looking forward to security and stability for Syria. If I get the opportunity as an ordinary citizen to return and build Syria, then I’m ready. But I am not looking for authority.
I did not leave Syria to lead the transitional period. I am aware the phase is difficult. It will be difficult for any one person to assume sole responsibility for this chapter. Better if people on the ground in Syria and abroad cooperate to see this phase through.
I did not leave to play a role. I left because I refused to participate in a security solution. That’s the main cause of my exit.
I was in disagreement with the security agencies over their management of the crisis. I tried my best to solve it peacefully.
I discovered a security solution was their priority, so I turned my back on this environment because I thought the crisis was complex and needed a genuine solution.
What I saw was the uprising being met with nothing but firepower. I refused that. There were people calling for dialogue and wishing the regime would listen to them. But it did not. I was among those who preferred having a dialogue with the uprising. That’s why I stood aside.
I was aware that once a security solution is launched, abandoning it becomes costly. That’s why I always thought the security solution is suicidal to the regime.
I self-distanced myself the instant the uprising was met with violence.
I effectively defected at the onset of the crisis. I was a defector while still in being in Syria. A defector doesn’t have to make a televised declaration. I deemed myself a defector because the manner in which this regime managed the crisis ran counter to my convictions and aspirations.
I don’t have blood on my hands. I don’t see history ever suggesting I had blood on my hands. I judge myself before history judges me. And I don’t care about authority or office.
On Assad and the inner circle
It’s about a year (since I last met with Assad).
I wish he listened to me (and opted for a political solution).
Chances (of a solution that keeps him in office) have dissipated. His staying in office after the huge number of deaths is unlikely. I wish he didn’t opt for a security solution to stay in power. But the security agencies misled him. Mistakes in politics can sometimes prove deadly.
(The bombing that killed four of Assad’s inner circle) was proof of a major security lapse. The bombing took place in a very secure area. This shows the uprising is getting evermore sophisticated and that the regime needs to lend its ear (to insurgents). It will be catastrophic if it doesn’t.
Maher al-Assad would not have been at such a (inner circle meeting). His ranking does not entitle him to attend.
A coup d’état in Syria would be difficult in view of the regime’s structure. The coup should have taken place at the onset of the crisis.
It would be difficult for me to quantify support (for the regime by Iran, Hezbollah, Iraq and the Russians), particularly that I was not a member of the crisis management team.
But the longer the crisis lasts, the more difficult it would be for Syria to recover.
No, he (Assad) is not weak. People around him simply belittled the crisis and that’s why he chose the security solution.
On future plans
My plan is to settle securely with my family and children in a place that is safe. I have the same wish for the Syrian people.
If Syria is safe and if safety is what Syrians feel, I would be the first one back in Syria because I am a Syrian citizen. Safety and security are what I wish for all Syrians, including myself.
I wasn’t thinking of whether I would be politically active or not, or in terms of having a political mission, when I left Syria. But if this were to serve my country and Syria’s security and stability, I’d possibly play my role as an ordinary citizen. Anyone else wanting to help solve this crisis would do the same.
There are nationalist people in and outside Syria. I yearn for a consensus solution that forestalls Syria’s destruction.
There are many honorable people in Syria and beyond. I hope they would set a roadmap to end this crisis peacefully and at minimal losses to Syria.
This is because Syria is a country of coexistence bringing together different minorities and ethnicities.
Citizens need a secure expanse to heal their crisis-inflicted wounds. I look forward to genuinely nationalist and honorable sides that can nurse those wounds and prevent further degradation in Syria that puts its future at risk.
I wish Syria a roadmap to end its crisis.
I will connect with every honorable person wanting to build Syria -- whether in the Syrian National Council, the Free Syrian Army or inside the country.
I will link up with everyone to determine a roadmap to end this crisis. There are many in the regime whose hands are not stained with blood. They were not consulted. They should not be ostracized. We need to safeguard our national institutions as well as Syria the state.
Honorable Syrian citizens can’t possibly be ostracized from Syrian society. Our mosaic-like Syrian society will have to bring back to life the Syria of old and build on it. But no, I don’t see such (new) Syria with Bashar al-Assad (staying).
On Saudi Arabia
I am happy to be here in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
I am glad to have performed the Umrah.
Saudi Arabia is Syria’s friend. The regime committed a strategic mistake in squandering this relationship with Saudi Arabia. I expect Saudi-Syrian relations to always be close-knit because the two countries share the same faith, nationalism and pan-Arabism compass.
I flew in to greet our Saudi brothers and weigh up their propensity to help us draw the roadmap alongside our other friends in the region and the international community. We shall interconnect with each and everyone capable of helping Syria put a stop to this crisis.
I, of course, seize this occasion to thank the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques, His Majesty King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz, for giving me the opportunity to visit Saudi Arabia and for standing by and assisting the Syrian people.

Wednesday, 25 July 2012

Saudi Arabia stepping up a gear against Assad


Tlass on al-Arabiya, the tweet on his Saudi trip and the envoy who jumped ship

With fierce battles now raging for control of Syria’s two largest cities – Aleppo and the capital, Damascus – Saudi Arabia is stepping up a gear to oust the country’s president, Bashar al-Assad.
Brig. Gen. Manaf Tlass -- the highest-level defector from the Syrian regime now tipped to lead a political transition in Syria should Assad fall -- was said overnight to have arrived in Riyadh. (See the tweet in the collage above, as well my July 18 post, “Would Gen. Manaf Tlass ease Assad’s way out”).
Later in the day, he reportedly travelled on to Mecca to perform the Umrah (or lesser Hajj pilgrimage).
If confirmed, his trip to Saudi Arabia would have come hours after he went on the kingdom’s al-Arabiya TV news channel to call on Syrians to unite and start building a democratic post-Assad Syria.
Reading a prepared statement in his televised address, Tlass called on Syrians to “unite... to serve a post-Assad Syria... and do the impossible, to ensure the unity of Syria, and to be sure to start building a new Syria.”
Tlass, a Sunnite member of Assad’s inner circle and commander of one of Syria’s elite Republic Guard units who moved to France earlier this month, said he was “reaching out to (Syrians) in these difficult times for the country, as the blood of its innocents is being shed, when their only crime was to call for freedom.”
He said the “new Syria ... should not be built on revenge, exclusion or monopoly.”
He said he was speaking as “one of the sons of the Syrian Arab army, who has rejected this regime's criminal and corrupt ways ... and who cannot accept its crimes against our country...
“Whatever mistakes made by some members of the Syrian Arab army ... those honorable troops who have not partaken in the killing ... are the add-on to the (opposition) Free Syrian Army.”
Tlass, son of Mustafa Tlass who served as defense minister for 30-odd years under Assad’s father Hafez, said it was “the duty of Syrians to unite, to build a free, democratic Syria.”
The report about Tlass’ trip to Saudi Arabia comes hot on the heels of news that:
(1) Saudi Arabia is drafting a resolution on the situation in Syria for a UN General Assembly meeting next Monday (July 30). The kingdom’s permanent representative to the UN, Ambassador Abdullah Y. al- Mouallimi, called for the General Assembly meeting and is penning the draft resolution in his capacity as chairman of the Arab League caucus at the world body. The draft resolution would restate the position of the Arab League Council of Foreign Ministers offering Assad a safe exit, warning him against using chemical weapons, and pressing for humanitarian corridors and security zones in Syria.
(2) Two more Syrian ambassadors have crossed the aisle to the opposition. They include Lamia al-Hariri, a niece of Syria’s Vice President Farouk al-Sharaa who headed the embassy in Cyprus, and her husband Abdullatif Dabbagh, who was ambassador to the UAE. Syria’s ambassador to Iraq, Nawwaf Faris, was the first to join the opposition this month. All three have now relocated to Qatar.
(3) The equivalent of some $50 million were raised across Saudi Arabia in the first 48 hours of a five-day public campaign for Syrian humanitarian aid ending early Friday. King Abdullah ordered the nationwide campaign on Monday -- the day he also called for a summit of Muslim nations in mid-August possibly linked to the Syria crisis. The monarch had days earlier appointed Assad’s nemesis Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the kingdom’s ambassador to the United States for 22 years, as the new chief of General Intelligence.
Mohammed Ballout, in his column this morning for the Beirut daily as-Safir, says whereas France is pressing the Syrian opposition to set up a coalition government for the political transition, the United States “prefers to see a military council” lead the transition in Syria (much as Egypt’s SCAF, or Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, oversaw the transition from Hosni Mubarak to Mohamed Morsy).
Ballout says Manaf Tlass is Washington’s preferred candidate to head the proposed military council. The Americans “believe he is best suited to convince senior officers in the president’s immediate circle to depose him.”
Separately, Mustafa al-Sheikh, one of the first generals to jump ship, eventually taking charge of the Free Syrian Army's military council, told al-Arabiya, “Tlass does not have Syrian blood on his hands… He will link up with the revolution and play a role.”

Wednesday, 18 July 2012

Would Gen. Manaf Tlass ease Assad’s way out?


The Syria uprising entered a dramatic new phase with today’s killing in a bomb attack in the heart of Damascus of at least four of President Bashar al-Assad's top security aides.
They are Defense Minister Gen. Daoud Rajha; his deputy Assef Shawkat (who is Assad's brother-in-law); former defense minister and current Assistant Vice President Hassan Turkmani; and Hafez Makhlouf, head of Intelligence Agency investigations and brother of business tycoon Rami Makhlouf.
Several security officials were also seriously wounded in the attack, including Intelligence chief Hisham Bekhtyar and Interior Minister Mohammad Ibrahim al-Shaar.
The attack on the headquarters of Syria's National Security Council in the Rawda area is a deadly blow to the heart of the regime after two recent high-level defections – by Syria's ambassador to Iraq, Nawaf al-Faris, and a Republican Guard general, Manaf Tlass.
News of the devastating blow to Assad’s regime broke while I was working on the post below. For a while, I thought the post has probably been overtaken by events.
I doubt, but I leave it to the reader to judge:

Manaf Tlass (right) with Hafez and Bashar al-Assad
The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) oversaw the transition in Egypt from Hosni Mubarak to Mohamed Morsy.
Would world powers refine the SCAF template and choose a body of senior officers in the Syrian military to oversee a Syria transition plan?
If so, would Brig-Gen. Manaf Tlass, a Sunnite member of President Bashar al-Assad’s inner circle and commander of one of Syria’s elite Republic Guard units who moved to France earlier this month, turn into Syria’s Hussein Tantawi?
Tlass yesterday called for a political transition in Syria and condemned military attacks on civilians in a statement sent to AFP.
Expressing anger that security forces were being used to suppress dissent, he said the regime held “the major responsibility” for the crisis and confirmed he was in Paris.
“I sincerely hope the blood stops flowing and the country emerges from the crisis through a phase of constructive transition that guarantees Syria its unity, stability and security, as well as the aspirations of its people,” said Tlass, a childhood friend of Assad.
“I am ready like any other Syrian, with no other ambition, to fulfill my civic duty to contribute to a better future for my country, as much as I can, and like all those... who have already made many sacrifices,” he said.
However, he did not specifically call for Assad to step down or say he was joining the Syrian opposition.
“I cannot but express my anger and pain at seeing the army pushed to carry out a fight that is against its principles, a fight directed by security forces and in which the people, including the soldiers, are the victims,” he said.
“When I took a position and refused to take part in the security action, I was isolated, accused and even labeled a traitor,” he said. “But my conscience, my deep conviction, pushed me to challenge this destructive action and to distance myself.”
Tlass said in the statement sent to AFP: “Faithful to my country and my beliefs, I always tried over the past 18 months to do my duty, unfortunately without success. I was not complacent with the regime, I did not accept nor participate in an action that led the country to its current tragic situation.”
Writing for today’s edition of the Lebanese pro-Assad daily al-Akhbar, Nasser Sharara gives an invaluable insight into the reasons behind Tlass’ flight to France.
My synopsis of Sharara’s 1,700-word account:
To this day, the way Manaf Tlass left Damascus remains a mystery to the Syrian security services.
He may have left via Lebanon. What is certain is that on the day news broke of Manaf having left Syria, his wife and young son who were in Beirut were driven by “M.H.” to Rafik Hariri International airport. There, they boarded a flight to Paris under their real names: “Tala Ahmad Khair (maiden name of Manaf’s wife) and (her son) Ahmed Manaf Tlass.”
In Damascus, however, officials still have reservations about calling Manaf a “traitor.” It seems “they’re still betting on keeping him close to President Assad whether he returns to Syria or stays abroad.”
Manaf did not break with Assad. He kept saying his clash was with the security services bigwigs who had Assad’s ear.
He complained to visitors, “The three closest persons to the late Hafez Assad were Sunnites. With the president now, I rank ninth.”
Manaf’s disaffection was with “the political solution saboteurs.” Media reports that he sulked at home after taking off his military uniform are false. Even when slamming “spoilers” in the security services, he kept turning out at his office in the presidential palace and at the headquarters of Presidential Guard Unit #105, which he commanded.
Throughout his disaffection, Manaf remained in contact and on good terms with Assad, whom he always addressed as “Boss.” He also kept repeating, “I can play the role of a go-between, connecting the Sunnite opposition in particular with President Assad. I played that role before. The Boss mandated me earlier to do just that. But opponents of a political solution sabotaged my task for fear of losing their vested interests in case a settlement is reached. That’s why I bowed out.”
In early 2012, Manaf got wind of a Moscow-backed suggestion by world stakeholders to solve the Syria crisis by a agreeing a mixed military council to oversee a political transition. The council would consist of officers from the various sects and mirror Egypt’s SCAF. People who heard him discuss this felt he was thrilled by the idea, “perhaps because he was promised a key role in the council.”
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