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Showing posts with label Maliki. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Maliki. Show all posts

Thursday, 16 January 2014

“Assad will run again… America will go along”


“Assad will run again… America will go along.” That's what renowned Lebanese political analyst and journalist Sami Kleib writes today for Beirut’s daily al-Akhbar, which speaks for Iran, Syria and Lebanese Hezbollah.

The article penned by Kleib, who formerly worked for Aljazeera but is now news director of the pro-Iran Al-Mayadeen TV, features simultaneously this morning on Syria’s online daily Champress as well as on the news portal of Hezbollah’s Al-Manar TV.
Better still, Kleib is married to former Aljazeera anchorwoman Luna Shibl, who now serves as media advisor to President Bashar al-Assad.
To Kleib’s mind:
It is almost inevitable that Assad will again run for president come mid-2014. He won’t be standing down, or renewing or extending his term. He links his candidacy to the yearning of the people. He is also convinced renewal of his presidential mandate will happen.
American circles handling Syrian affairs are convinced Assad will run and win. It is consequently imperative to look for a credible way out to justify any likely American u-turn in Geneva or elsewhere, but not instantly.
The Americans tried long and hard to convince Russia and Iran to press Assad to leave office at the end of his current mandate next June. They offered keeping the régime and state institutions unchanged and suggested replacing Assad by an Alawite figure. Moscow and Tehran would have nothing of that.
The same happened when Secretary of State John Kerry told international troubleshooter for Syria Lakhdar Brahimi in the presence of Kerry aide Wendy Sherman, “Try pressuring the Russians and Iranians to advise Assad against running.”
Brahimi replied the first time he broached the subject he found Assad “flexible.” The second time Assad refused to discuss the matter saying the Syrian people decide on this. On his third visit to Damascus, Foreign Minister Walid Muallem advised Brahimi not to raise the matter as a precondition for the meeting. Brahimi did as told.
The Americans’ problem is how to save face after repeating for two years that Assad must step down.
All the above was before the world powers reached an agreement with Iran on her nuclear ambitions, prior to the outrage against the Iranian embassy in Beirut and ahead of the agreement between Baghdad and Washington to shore up Iraqi Premier Nouri al-Maliki in his war against Jihadists and DAESH.
Since all issues revolve around the war on terrorism, the matter is bound to top the Geneva-2 agenda.
Provision 2 of Article 87 in the amended Syrian constitution states: “If the term of the President of the Republic finished and no new president was elected, the Existing President of the Republic continues to assume his duties until the new president is elected.”
This is to say the “Game of Nations” over Assad’s future will remain in full play well past June 2014.

Monday, 12 August 2013

Iran-Iraq pushing for Syria's balkanization

Barzani and Maliki (top) and a Balkanized Syria map

The specter of Syria’s balkanization has yet to pass from sight.
Tehran has now given the thumbs up for a “provisional civil administration” in Syria’s Kurdish areas and agreed to help clear out Qaeda-linked extremists there.
Fresh from talks in Tehran, Salih Muslim, head of the Syrian Kurds’ Democratic Union Party (PYD), an affiliate of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), says Iran gave the go-ahead for a “transitional civil administration” planned by the “Western Kurdistan Council.”
Western Kurdistan refers to the Kurdish areas in northern and northeastern Syria bordering Turkey.
Muslim also tells pan-Arab al-Hayat today agreement was reached with the Iranian side “to fight our common enemy,” chiefly Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant.
Muslim said he met with high-ranking foreign ministry and Revolutionary Guards officials during his August 7-8 stay in Tehran at the invitation of the foreign ministry.
“Iran is an important country. It is the only one in the region to have the ear of the [Syrian] regime,” he said.
Barzani
On August 10, Masoud Barzani, president of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in northern Iraq, posted a statement on the KRG’s official website saying:
For a while now, the print media and a number of political and media centers have been saying terrorists in Western Kurdistan have mobilized against Kurdish citizens and that Qaeda-linked terrorists are attacking innocent civilians and massacring Kurdish women and children.
To verify such news, I am calling for a special inquiry commission to travel to Western Kurdistan and investigate. If it finds that innocent Kurdish citizens, women and children are under threat of death and terrorism, the Iraqi Kurdistan Region will make use of all its capabilities to defend innocent Kurdish women, children and citizens in Western Kurdistan.
Barzani's statement referred to Kurdish areas in Syria as “Western Kurdistan.”
Spread over large, adjoining tracts of Iraq, Syria, Turkey and Iran, the Kurdish people are often described as the largest ethnic group without their own state.
The northern Iraqi region of Kurdistan, which has its own government and armed forces, is pursuing increasingly independent energy and foreign policies, infuriating Baghdad.
Iraqi Kurds have sent fuel, food and medical aid to their ethnic kin over the border in Syria, extending Barzani’s influence, but Saturday’s statement appeared to be the first time that he had suggested intervention.
In Syria, where they make up nearly 10 percent of the population, Kurds have been widely discriminated against under Bashar al-Assad and his late father before him, who stripped more than 100,000 of their citizenship.
For Syrian Kurds, the insurrection against Assad presents an opportunity to win the kind of rights enjoyed by their neighbors in Iraqi Kurdistan.
Maliki
Quoting from Kuwait’s al-Seyassah newspaper, Baghdad’s Shafaq News reported August 9,  “Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki notified KRG President Masoud Barzani that the Assad regime is not against Peshmerga forces entering northern Syria to defend Syrian Kurds against attacks by al-Qaeda.
“A highly-placed Kurdish source in Baghdad said Iranian leaders, together with the Iraqi premier, are putting pressure on Barzani to stop supporting the Syrian revolution and back Assad’s regime… especially that al-Qaeda poses a threat to both Irbil and Baghdad.”
All this highlights the potential for Peshmerga, Syrian Kurd, Iranian and Iraqi forces banding together to help Assad win his presumed war on Takfiris, Jihadists and al-Qaeda -- at least in Western Kurdistan.
Israel
Separately, Lazar Berman wonders in his think piece for The Times of Israel this week: “Is a free Kurdistan, and a new Israeli ally, upon us?”
In his opinion, Syria’s Kurds are bent on carving out an autonomous enclave in northeastern Syria.
The PYD “has been taking advantage of the power vacuum caused by the two-year-old conflict to push out rival opposition fighters and move closer to autonomy…
“According to Kurdistan expert Ofra Bengio of Tel Aviv University, independence is not on the Syrian Kurds’ agenda any time in the near future. ‘The PYD is not talking about independence now and will be reluctant to use such terminology in order not to antagonize any of the governments or the international community. Autonomy is the safer goal now,’ she said.”
Berman says “Israel has long developed alliances with non-Arab countries on the periphery of the Middle East. Today, that policy rests on partnerships with Cyprus, Greece, Bulgaria, and Caucasian and central Asian countries. Kurdistan fits perfectly into that framework…
“With few friends in the region, the Kurds will likely look to Israel to help them gain security and closer relations with the United States. As Arab governments in the Middle East totter and fall, and Islamists look to exploit the chaos, the alliance is one that both countries may find beneficial to pursue.”
Kissinger
This reminds me of the presentation former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger made at the Ford School in New York City last June, when he said a Balkanized Syria is the best outcome to emerge of its current Assad-controlled unity.
“There are three possible outcomes. An Assad victory, a Sunni victory, or an outcome in which the various nationalities agree to co-exist together but in more or less autonomous regions, so that they can’t oppress each other. That’s the outcome I would prefer to see. But that’s not the popular view,” he said.
Are Assad’s allies heeding Kissinger’s counsel and pushing Barzani and Syria’s Kurds to go down that route?

Saturday, 22 June 2013

“You’re not helping me cast out sectarian bigotry”


Saudi national flag (top) and a Shiite banner 

By Jamal Khashoggi, Saudi Arabia’s authoritative political analyst, author and kingpin of the impending Al Arab TV news channel, writing in Arabic today for the mass circulation newspaper al-Hayat
If we were to map out Syrian regime supporters, we would regrettably find them mirroring the minority Shiite population’s distribution in the Muslim world.
In this, we are excepting a few voices heard here and there.
Among them, for instance, are Shiite intellectuals in Lebanon issuing a statement, or Hezbollah defectors going live on Arab TV networks, to declare the party does not represent them.
Or to express concern their community is being dragged into a sectarian conflict for which they would have to pay in a predominantly Sunni environment representing most of the Ummah.
The aforesaid exceptions prove, rather than undermine, the premise.
On the fringes of this Shiite landmass stretching from Iran to Iraq and Lebanon, there are in Arab capitals tiny and hardly discernible patches of nationalist intellectuals, Nasserite politicians, or Baathists rooting for Bashar al-Assad.
They also parrot the theory of an American-Zionist conspiracy aimed at undermining the bastion of contrariety and resistance and the ultimate Arab army.
Like the Shiite fundamentalists shepherding the Shiite general public to back Syria’s regime, they do not see the limpid, unobstructed and good-sized “banner of freedom” the Syrian people have been raising for more than two years.
But they clearly notice the Takfiris, the eaters of human organs and the suicides.
They make these out to be the Syrian Revolution, which at heart is nationalist, Islamist, moderate, broad-based and genuinely representative of all spectrums of the Syrian population.
Yes, there are Takfiris linked to al-Qaeda and to hardline Salafist currents fighting in Syria.
True, they are motivated by their hatred of Shiism, modernism and all “The Other.”
They don’t strive for democracy or a modern civil state in which all Syrians are equal.
They can’t be part of a Syrian national body politic, whether headed by a turbaned sheikh or its current leader George Sabra.
They are the same underground movements Syrian Intelligence used to send to Iraq, prompting Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki (in 2009) to press for the trial of Syria-based terrorists by a UN tribunal.
That was two or three years before the outbreak of Syria’s uprising.
The uprising saw Maliki bury old differences, switch sides, and become Bashar’s partner – a bizarre turnaround that can only be explained by sectarian motives.
Thieves, highway bandits and opportunists joined the mavericks infiltrating the Syrian revolution since revolutions don’t attract honorable people only.
But to put those in the spotlight is sheer escapism, which Bashar cheerleaders use in order to justify turning their back on a bona fide revolution against a tyrant and a repressive regime that people have been itching to bring down for decades.
Bashar’s non-Shiite disciples, on the other hand, can find an excuse for their evildoing.
For example, Lebanon’s Maronite Marada Movement thrived on the Syrian regime’s protection and was able to challenge Lebanese Maronite parties hostile to Bashar. The Marada in other words has a political, albeit contemptible, motive.
That is also the case of Lebanese Gen. Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement, except that Aoun will be the first to jump ship when Hezbollah and Bashar lose out.
There are also politicians and journalists endorsing Bashar simply for cash.
In South Lebanon’s port city of Sidon, there is the Popular Nasserite Organization, which suffices with its Nasserite credentials to account for its stance.
The organization’s icon in Cairo is former presidential candidate Hamdeen Sabahi who doesn’t hide his affinity for Bashar.
Other than those, you hardly find in Arab capitals any Bashar partisans, except perhaps the habitués of state-run Syrian TV.
They are what I would call “Speakers’ Corner forces” or “political megaphones” with no presence on the streets or in national assemblies.
One exception perhaps is in Jordan, specifically in its al-Karak city, which is home to some members of the pan-Arab Command of the Syrian Baath Party who are now lying low in view of the circumstances.
All the tiny pockets cited above are swamped by an Arab torrent sympathetic to the Syrian people.
Taking a second look at the Shiite landmass in our midst, we come up against a cohesive bloc ready to fight and die on Bashar’s side.
That’s what Hassan Nasrallah did in Qusayr and is still doing elsewhere in Syria.
Likewise, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is propping up the Syrian regime with arms and oil and allowing Iraqi Shiite volunteers to stream into Damascus. He is very familiar with the regime they will be fighting for.
These volunteers include politicians and clerics entrusted with the task of exonerating crimes committed by Shiites against their Sunni brothers.
A Kuwaiti parliamentarian has also openly defended and backed the interventions.
The sectarian commitment we are seeing is both unparalleled and alarming.
Even the Marjas (or highest authority on religious laws in Shiite Islam) who regularly issue fatwas and opinions have fallen silent.
They neither spoke in the revolution’s favor nor denounced the Shiites’ intervention in favor of the offender.
In my country, Saudi Arabia, the Shiite religious scholars and dignitaries kept mum on happenings in Syria.
They seem perturbed when asked, “What’s your position on the affront of the century that has seen the death so far of 100,000 Syrian Muslims?”
One cleric mouthed off: “Are we supposed to issue a statement on each occurrence? It’s a sedition and we’re distancing ourselves from it.”
My Shiite friend wanted to be amiable. He wrote to me saying, “I sympathize with the Syrian people. They deserve better than the regime killing them. But they also merit other than the Free Syrian Army.”
He probably believes he made me a big concession by saying what he did.
My answer is this: “My friend, I don’t want to be sectarian. I hate my growing sectarian penchant. But you’re not helping me.”

Monday, 20 May 2013

The Middle East is falling apart at the seams


Painting by Syrian artist Wissam Al Jazairy

Ghassan Charbel, editor-in-chief of al-Hayat newspaper, penned this think piece in Arabic for today’s edition
Times are hard for the Middle East. It has to find a recipe for coexistence, drawing in the Muslims, Jews and Christians, which is not easy.
It has to search for a coexistence formula binding the Turks, Persians, Kurds, Arabs and others and a coexistence blueprint joining ethnicities, nationalities, religions and sects. This is not simple either.
Long lulls are deceptive. They feign that old conflicts have been assigned to the history books. This is not true -- any sudden twist is liable to rekindle old feuds streaming with blood.
Nation-states that were configured in the aftermath of World War One either curbed these conflicts or gave them other names. Once these nation-states’ repressive machines crack, the old demons resurface.
We’re clearly on the way to a ghastly, rather than a new, Middle East – one where the coexistence chapter drawing together its various components ends, heralding the reconfiguration of nation-states and maps.
We are unmistakably facing something more cataclysmic than the fall of the Berlin Wall or the breakup of Yugoslavia.
We are facing a Nakba worse than the 1948 Nakba of the Palestinian people, one marking the demise of coexistence.
We are into violent cross-border designs and aspirations tackling maps like an inmate treats his prison walls.
Don’t accuse me of being a prophet of doom. The pointers are everywhere in the print and audiovisual media, supported by rivers of corpses and declarations promising endless wars.
A suicide attacked a Husseiniya (Shiite house of worship) in Kirkuk, and the response was a spectacular offensive against Sunni mosques in or near Baghdad.
Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki blamed remnants of the “Baath” and “sectarian hatred.” His adversaries accused him of being a “sectarian bigot.”
Protesters in al-Anbar province treat the Iraqi army as a “Shiite militia” or the cover for one.
The Sunnite Iraqi says he won’t accept to be a second-class citizen, which is what the Shiite Iraqi was saying in decades past.
We’ve moved from the Arab-Kurd crisis to a Sunni-Shiite-Arab-Kurd predicament. It’s as if the whole Middle East has turned into the knotty problem of the disputed Iraqi city of Kirkuk.
Both sides in the Syria war are keen to deny its sectarian character. One side paints it as a war on inflowing terrorists and the opposite side depicts it as a revolt against a dictatorship.
So how do we explain the presence of Chechen fighters in Idlib, the arrival of Libyans to support their Sunni brethren or a funeral for a young Iraqi in Basra killed defending the Shiite shrine of Sayyeda Zeinab in Damascus?
Also, how do we explain the funeral for a young Sunni in the North Lebanese port city of Tripoli killed trying to infiltrate into Syria and the funeral for a Hezbollah member felled while on “jihadist duties” there?
Why does the Sunni Lebanese support the Syrian revolution and the Shiite Lebanese hinder it?
Why didn’t Alawites flee before rebels entered their villages or Sunnis take to their heels before government and allied forces stormed their townships?
Do the slogans of “objection” and “resistance” justify the military involvement of Iran and its allies in the Syria war? The counter-meddlers could be asked the same question.
What you hear in Lebanon, which used to be a model of and a proving ground for coexistence, is worrisome and unnerving.
Yesterday, I heard a prominent member of Gen. Michel Aoun’s “Free Patriotic Movement” accuse other Christians of treason. His charge sheet says the other Christians agreed to an electoral law allowing Muslims to have a weighty say in the election of 10 Christian legislators out of the 64 allotted to Christians in parliament.
A retreat to self-made islands won’t solve either Lebanon’s problems or the problem of its minorities. The biggest danger for Lebanon now is the growing number of risk-takers walking on thin ice.
Clearly, we are toughing out the eclipse of coexistence.
Our nation-states, our societies and our armies are breaking up.
The inviolability of international borders has evaporated. We’re in the midst of a regional civil war caused by a stream of cross-border projects. I am afraid we’re on the way to a period awash with statelets, militias, cemeteries and “cleansed regions.”

Tuesday, 7 May 2013

Struggle for Syria is now the Shiites’ holy war

Public funerals for Iraqi (top) and Lebanese (below) Shiite fighters killed in Syria

Whipped up by Shiite Iran, the struggle for Syria has degraded into a Shiite holy war.
Iranian, Iraqi and Lebanese Shiite fighters have been trickling into Syria for months.
Effectively, their charge is to prevent the fall of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, whose Alawite sect is an offshoot of Shiite Islam.
But the “rallying banner” used for their recruitment is to protect the revered Sayyeda Zeinab shrine in Damascus.
For a comprehensive background of the clarion call by Iran to shore up Assad, please refer to my April 26 post, “Iran’s Shiite counterattack… from Syria to Iraq.”
The longer the fighting continues in Syria, the greater the risk of exposing fault lines between Shiites and Sunnis in both Lebanon and Iraq.
Whereas Iran is 90 percent Shiite, Syria is 75 percent Sunni and 10 percent Alawi-Shiite.
In Lebanon, Muslims are very roughly divided into two quasi-equal Sunni and Shiite halves.
Iraqi Muslims are two-thirds Shiite and one-third Sunni.
Lebanese Hezbollah’s head-on plunge to fight alongside Assad forces against Syria’s Sunni rebels is increasingly radicalizing Lebanon’s Sunnis and threatening Lebanon’s own future.
Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah declared in a televised speech last week, "Syria has real friends who will not let it fall to the U.S., Israel or Islamic radicals".
With armed opposition groups in Syria threatening to capture villages under Damascus government control, he said, it was “normal to offer every possible and necessary aid to help the Syrian army.”
Hezbollah fighters are at the moment openly and freely waging war on Assad’s opponents in Qusayr, Homs and the suburbs of Damascus.
Concomitantly, there has been an uptick in the number of Iraqi Shiite fighters arriving in Syria to join Assad’s war on Sunni “armed gangs.”
They belong chiefly to the Abu-Fadl al-Abbas and Iraqi Hezbollah brigades, and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq.
Initially the only proof of a Lebanese or Iraqi Shiite fighter killed in Syria was the occasional hushed funeral.
The funerals are now public and much more common in both Lebanon and Iraq.
The latest, for two members of Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq who died in Syria, was held in Najaf earlier this week (see photo above).
Hawija
The Syria war is also fueling renewed Sunni-Shiite strife in Iraq, where sectarian violence is on the rise.
Iraqi security forces used “disproportionate force,” including shooting unarmed civilians, during their raid on an encampment of Sunni protesters last week that left 45 people dead.
Images of Iraqi Sunni protesters killed in Hawija
The April 23 crackdown on Sunnis in the city of Hawija in Kirkuk province who were protesting against the Shiite-led Iraqi government of Prime Minister Nouri el-Maliki unleashed a backlash of deadly attacks by Sunnis and battles between gunmen and security forces that have claimed more than 250 lives.
The unrest poses the most serious threat to Iraq's stability since the last American troops left in December 2011, and raises fears of a new phase of widespread sectarian fighting.
A parliamentary committee probing what happened at Hawija found this week that 44 Sunnis were killed, along with one soldier. They were all killed by gunshots and ranged in age from 13 to 55 years old, according to the report.
Seven of those killed were shot from behind, and five victims had bruises or other injuries in addition to the gunshot wounds, the report states.
The parliamentary committee report indicates that “senior officials gave orders for army, federal police, and SWAT forces, all of which fall under Maliki's military office, to invade the demonstration site, remove demonstrators and level tents," according to Human Rights Watch.
Witnesses told members of the parliamentary committee that at dawn on April 23, security forces sprayed demonstrators with hot water and threw sound and smoke bombs into the square. Black cars that federal police typically use for crowd dispersal and tanks invaded the square, “razing everything, including tents and cars,” the report quoted witnesses as saying.
The report said some of the corpses also bore abrasions, fractures, and bruises consistent with beatings, and witnesses reported that security forces wearing black uniforms beat them with batons and fired on protesters with live rounds using automatic weapons.
On the basis of these witness accounts and of interviews with members of parliament and local and federal government officials, the report concluded that 44 civilians were killed, including five children.


The parliamentary committee gave Human Rights Watch photographs it says were taken of the victims in the attack’s immediate aftermath. The photographs show the corpses of several men lying in the area of Pride and Honor Square, amid flames and burning cars. Their hands are bound and they appear -- because of the way the bodies are positioned -- to have been executed with gunshots.
High-risk
Editorially, Egyptian political analyst Imad Adeeb, writing today for the leading Saudi daily Asharq Alawsat, believes Iraq is more high-risk than Syria.
His four reasons:
1. Whereas the regime in Syria is aligned to Iran and Russia and standing on its last legs, Iraq has a government that makes common cause with Iran and is likely to stay.
2. In Syria, a sectarian regime is setting out. In Iraq, a sectarian regime is sinking roots and increasingly buoying up its sect on the home front and regionally.
3. Unlike Syria, Iraq is an oil-rich country par excellence. It recently made a major gas field discovery to boot.
4. Iraq reflects the failure of an American venture that cost Washington two trillion U.S. dollars. While it is difficult to imagine U.S. troops returning to Baghdad, Iranian intelligence services and Republican Guards are already having a field day in Iraq.
Adeeb says, “This makes Iraq under the government of Maliki, and his political and sectarian alliances, pose the highest threat to the independence of a modern civil state in the Arab world.
“Under Maliki, Iraq is becoming a satellite state orbiting Iran and its sectarian scheme…
“Iraq’s Sunnis have no idea what’s in store for them. Would they be driven to fall into the lap of armed religious extremists or should they wait passively for a political organization to champion their cause?”   

Saturday, 9 March 2013

Syria: Doctors’ hesitation risks losing the patient


Artwork by Syrian artst Wissam Al Jazairy
By Jamal Khashoggi, Saudi Arabia’s analyst, author and kingpin of the impending Al Arab TV news channel writing today for pan-Arab al-Hayat
An ugly sectarian scenario is now in motion in Syria.
Some doctors are indecisive by nature.
If lab results confirm their diagnosis that a patient requires difficult surgery, they first prescribe medication, hoping this would help spare the patient a complex surgical procedure.
Skeptics would say the doctor sought to profit from prolonging the treatment or lacked confidence in his ability to perform the surgery. Optimists would argue the doctor simply tried not to put the patient’s life at risk.
U.S. President Barack Obama faces a similar problem with the Syrian patient. The intentions of the other treating physician – Russian President Vladimir Putin – are flagrant. But there is no escape from leaving the Syrian patient under the consortium’s care.
Obama and Putin know the medication they prescribed is not working. They asked their foreign ministers to get together and hammer out a political solution.
The two presidents are aware the regime totally rejects “peace” as a self-defeating proposition and that the opposition craves for peace after having been forced to take up arms.
The two presidents also realize the regime’s talk of “negotiations” is a PR gimmick.
To pave the way for peace negotiations between the two warring sides, the regime and the Russian Federation want arming of the opposition to cease.
But there are no “two warring sides.” There is simply a repressive regime bent on retaining power on one side and an enraged and revolting population seeking freedom and a new Syria on the other.
The regime is not facing one Syrian party or sect. The Free Syrian Army and the Syrian National Coalition embrace and enfold all the Syrians’ sects, which despite their different stripes and trends are now united “against the regime.”
They will break up into opposing groups and political parties once they contest democratic elections after the regime’s fall.
The majority of quasi-loyalist Syrians now living in Damascus and in parts of Aleppo and Homs that remain under regime control will take to the streets to demand change as soon as the regime security services begin to falter.
Obviously, one precondition for any peace agreement between the regime and the opposition – if Sergei Lavrov and John Kerry sponsor one – would be a cessation of violence by the two sides.
By definition, the cessation of violence would ensure freedom of association and the right to demonstrate peacefully without risking prosecution.
This would take us back to the starting point demanded by the Syrian people in March 2011 and then by the Arab League, the United Nations, Kofi Annan and Lakhdar Brahimi.
That starting point has been rejected by the regime all along. It will be rejected again and again for evermore.
Peace and nonviolence don’t work in the regime’s favor. The regime lives by the sword and won’t win except by the sword.
So why waste time on fruitless initiatives?
The answer lies in the game of so-called “international diplomacy.”
Obama, Jordan’s King Abdullah, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and all Arab and European leaders wish for something to happen in Damascus that would bring the conflict to a close without their intervention.
But there are no signs of such a thing happening.
Instead, the Syria crisis has started spilling over.
Seven Iraqis were killed last week as they escorted Syrian soldiers who had sought refuge in Iraq after being evicted from a border crossing. The Syrian “regular army brethren” were in a convoy heading to recapture the border crossing from the Free Syrian Army. Unidentified gunmen ambushed the convoy inside Iraqi territory. It is unclear whether they belonged to the FSA or to its Iraqi Sunnite allies. The latter are avowed supporters of the Syrian revolution, raising its flag in their uprising against Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s government.
Iraqis who are already divided over their internal affairs have thus added an extra discordant issue.
In turn, Iraq’s Shiites are not hiding their backing of the Syrian regime’s war despite claiming deployment in Damascus of their armed brigade, named after Abul Fadhl al-Abbas, is simply meant to protect the shrine of Sayyeda Zeinab.
Incidentally, the shrine is revered by Syria’s Sunnites, much as the Egyptians venerate the Tomb of Imam Hussein in Cairo.
It’s all pure and utter sectarianism.
An absurd exploitation of a 1,400-year-old conflict is rearing its head to entice the simple-minded into a fierce battle once the FSA breaches the walls of Damascus.
Further away to the West, the no-less sectarian Hezbollah is already fighting inside Syrian close to Lebanon’s northern borders.
Those borders were demarcated by the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement, which tailored Lebanon’s froniers to the correct size of its sects. The borders were meant to geographically apportion predominantly Sunnite villages to Syria, ultimately serving as a buffer between Lebanon and the Alawite mountains.
Therein lies Plan B – an Alawite state that Bashar al-Assad would set up for his Alawite community.
Hezbollah is accordingly out to secure a supply line to the would-be statelet. Hence its offensive in the Qusayr region, such as the Serbs did in Bosnia.
Hezbollah’s drive to create a supply route to the rump Alawite state entails ethnic cleansing in an area stretching from northern Lebanon to Qusayr and all the way to the west of Homs.
However, should Syria remain whole in the hands of nationalist forces, the noose would tighten around Hezbollah’s neck. It would be cut down to size and turned into a political force on par with others in Lebanon.
Ensuring the viability of an Alawite state envisaged by the faltering regime also calls for a parallel ethnic cleansing campaign along Syria’s chiefly Sunnite coastline.
A gloomy sectarian scenario is unfolding. Denying it is wrong. Not so speaking about it. 

Tuesday, 5 March 2013

Assad cedes provincial capital, is ambushed in Iraq

The ambush was near Akashat (center), inside Iraq, not far from the Syrian border (Map from Euronews)

The Damascus and Baghdad governments were dealt a spectacular body blow each yesterday.
In one blow to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s government, Syrian militants scored one of the biggest gains of their two-year revolt by capturing the strategic northern city of Raqqa.
Situated on the highway to the major northeastern towns of Qamishli, al-Hasakah and Deir Ezzor, Raqqa is the first Syrian provincial capital to fall into opposition hands.
In another blow to Assad and his ally, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, 48 Syrian and nine Iraqi soldiers were killed in an ambush near Akashat, inside Iraq, not far from the Syrian border.
Iraqi officials said the Syrians had sought refuge through the Rabi’a border crossing in northern Iraq during recent clashes with rebels and were being escorted back home through a different crossing farther south when the ambush occurred.
The fact the Syrian soldiers were on Iraqi soil at all raised questions about Baghdad’s perceptible willingness to help Assad’s embattled regime by stealth.
Maliki told The Associated Press last week a victory for Syrian rebels would spark sectarian wars in Iraq and Lebanon (see my Feb. 28 post, “Iran proxies growl: Hands off Assad”).
“If truth be told,” political analyst Elias Harfouche writes today for the pan-Arab daily al-Hayat, “what risks destabilizing Iraq is its prime minister’s prejudiced meddling in the Syria crisis,” his corruption and his blackballing of Iraq’s Sunnites and Kurds.
Noting that this month marks the 10th anniversary of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Harfouche evokes the expression “you can lead a horse to water, but you can’t make it drink.”
In the same vein, he says, you can rid a country of a tyrant, but you can’t turn it into a democracy if its regime balks at the concept.
To prove his point, Harfouche cites the case of Iraq, where he says Maliki’s “democracy” is worse than Saddam’s dictatorship. He also quotes from the first two of a six-part series on “today’s Iraq” penned by Patrick Cockburn for The Independent.
According to Cockburn:
Iraq is disintegrating as a country under the pressure of a mounting political, social and economic crisis, Iraqi leaders say.
They add that 10 years after the U.S, invasion and occupation the conflict between the three main communities – Shiite, Sunnite and Kurd – is deepening to a point just short of civil war...
The record of failure of post-Saddam governments, given the financial resources available, is astounding. One of the reasons many Iraqis welcomed the fall of Saddam in 2003, whatever their feelings about foreign occupation, was that they thought his successors would restore normal life after years of sanctions and war. To their astonishment and fury this has not happened, though Iraq now enjoys $100bn a year in oil revenues. In Baghdad there is scarcely a new civilian building to be seen and most of the new construction is heavily fortified police or military outposts. In Basra, at the heart of the oilfields, there are pools of sewage and heaps of uncollected rubbish in the streets on which herds of goats forage...
Theft of public money and incompetence on a gargantuan scale means the government fails to provide adequate electricity, clean water or sanitation. One-third of the labor force is unemployed and, when you include those under-employed, the figure is over half. Even those who do have a job have often obtained it by bribery...
The rule of Nouri al-Maliki, Prime Minister since 2006, has become a near dictatorship with highly developed means of repression, such as secret prisons, and pervasive use of torture. He has sought to monopolize control over the army, intelligence service, government apparatus and budget, making sure that his supporters get the lion’s share of jobs and contracts...
As the pre-eminent leader of the Shiites, three-fifths of the population, he alarms them by suggesting that their political dominance is under threat from the Sunni, a fifth of Iraqis, once in charge under Saddam but now marginalized. Last year, Maliki sought to unite Sunnite and Shiite Arabs against the Kurds, another fifth of the population, by massing troops and threatening to invade Kurdish-controlled but disputed areas.
The Sunni had suffered shattering defeats with the overthrow of Saddam Hussein, the formation of a Shiite-Kurdish government and loss of the sectarian civil war. But the conflict in Syria marked a change for the better in Sunni fortunes. They have been emboldened by the bid for power of Syria’s Sunni majority just across the border from their own heartlands in Anbar and Nineveh provinces...
Maliki may employ a million men in different branches of the Iraqi security forces. In most countries this would guarantee government control, but in practice Maliki only has full authority in about half the national territory. He has no power in the northern third of the country held by the Kurds and increasingly limited influence in Sunni areas...
A few months before the invasion, an Iraqi civil servant secretly interviewed in Baghdad made a gloomy forecast. “The exiled Iraqis are the exact replica of those who currently govern us… with the sole difference that the latter are already satiated since they have been robbing us for the past 30 years,” he said. “Those who accompany the U.S. troops will be ravenous.”
Many of the Iraqis who came back to Iraq after the U.S.-led invasion were people of high principle who had sacrificed much as opponents of Saddam Hussein. But fast-forward 10 years and the prediction of the unnamed civil servant about the rapacity of Iraq’s new governors turns out to have been all too true. As one former minister puts it, “the Iraqi government is an institutionalized kleptocracy”…
Last week, Harfouche recalls, Maliki warned that a victory for the opposition in Syria would lead to “a civil war in Lebanon, divisions in Jordan and a sectarian conflict in Iraq.” His warning echoed Assad’s earlier threat – namely, that sparks from his regime’s fall would ignite the entire region.
Harfouche says the alarming trade-off being proposed is this: we [Assad and Maliki] shall keep the peace in Syria, Iraq and the entire region if you let us keep our sectarian hold on power in Damascus and Baghdad.
“If truth be told,” Harfouche writes, “what risks destabilizing Iraq is its prime minister’s prejudiced meddling in the Syria crisis and his piloting the de-structuring of Iraq through corruption and the exclusion of large numbers of Iraqi Sunnites and Kurds from public office and the decision-making process.
“The Americans can’t be blamed for backing Nouri al-Maliki’s rise to power. Nor are they supposed to crave for Iraq’s destiny more than Iraq’s prime minister.”