Lakhdar Brahimi: “It’s very complicated”

International troubleshooter Lakhdar Brahimi today held talks in Damascus, the last leg of a Middle East tour to lobby for a Syria peace conference, dubbed Geneva-2.

I am personally of the opinion he will keep huffing and puffing well into 2014 without getting up the steep Geneva-2 hill.

According to the Geneva Communiqué of June 2012, the principal objective of the proposed peace conference is to set up by mutual consent a transitional governing body with “full executive powers.”

I will come back to the prospects of Geneva-2 in a subsequent blog.

But here are highlights of what Brahimi told the Paris-based weekly newsmagazine Jeune Afrique in a 3,000-word interview published on the day of his arrival in Damascus yesterday.

The interview is fittingly titled “Mission Impossible”:

Jeune Afrique: Didn’t the agreement between the Russians and Americans [to remove Syria’s chemical weapons] put Bashar al-Assad back on the saddle?

Lakhdar Brahimi: He was an outcast; he became a partner… Bashar was never put off his stride -- so there is no reason to think that.

JA: Do you think he seriously considers running for re-election in mid-2014?

LB: Many of those around him take his running for another term as an accomplished fact.

He deems it as his absolute right, but that he would come to a decision in due time. He is adamant about completing his current term.

What I proclaim aloud and to all Syrians is this: History teaches us that after a crisis like this, there is no turning back.

President Assad could therefore significantly contribute to the transition from the previous Syria -- which is that of his father and his own -- to what I call the New Syrian Republic.

JA: What about the Syrian opposition?

LB: They are to consider who could represent them [at the peace table]. This is one reason why it takes time. Some of them even feel they should stay away from Geneva.

It's very complicated!

In this type of situation, there are many camps. Armed and unarmed opposition, opposition based outside and inside [Syria], Islamists, seculars, etc... We must realize Geneva-2, unlike the conference held in 2012, is not an end in itself but the beginning.

We hope the opposition will manage to agree on a credible and representative delegation. We must not delude ourselves: the whole world won’t be represented. However, the carry-over of this process will include as many people as possible.

JA: If the powerful Islamist rebels choose to boycott Geneva, it will be a real problem...

LB: Probably, but mind you there are two sorts of Islamists: those interested in the quest for peace, and those in the orbit al-Qaeda – such as Jabhat al-Nusra, for example. The latter wish to bring down the regime; they are not fighting to build a New Syrian Republic, but to set up an Islamic state. So they don’t give a hoot about Geneva.

JA: Is Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov a reliable partner?

LB: Absolutely – we know each other well.

He was ambassador to the UN and is an outstanding professional. He is also extremely knowledgeable about the Middle East.

Where Syria is concerned, there is much talk about Moscow's influence and the Russians’ political relations with the regime.

The Russians have had a significant, longstanding and uninterrupted presence in Syria.

Everyone bears in mind the Russian officers who are out there, but there are chiefly a lot of engineers. Remember, there are nearly 20,000 Russian women in Syria married to Syrians.

The Russians know Syria very well. When [Tunisia’s  Zine al-Abidine]  Ben Ali, [Egypt’s Hosni] Mubarak and [Libya’s Muammar] Gaddafi fell, few thought Bashar would survive more than three months.

Only the Russians kept saying: "Careful -- this is not the case, we are familiar with the country, and we know how it works. Syria is more complicated. "

Some thought this was pretentious, that it was an unconditional expression of support for Bashar.

JA: Do you think Syria’s national fabric can still be patched up?

LB: Yes, I think so. What threatens Syria is not the country’s partition. I would be surprised if the Alawites really want to create some sort of a bunker in their small mountains. They know very well it won’t be viable.

The real danger threatening Syria is a kind of "Somalization," one which will be more sustainable and profound than what we’ve seen in Somalia so far.

JA: Does the idea of ​​a Shiite crescent fighting Sunnis across the Arab and Islamic worlds seem pertinent?

LB: Effectively, we do have a problem, which is far from being new. I remember discussing it with [the highest ranking Shiite religious leader in Iraq] Grand Ayatollah [Ali] Sistani, when I was in Baghdad in 2004. I explained to him we might have on our hands a Shiite-Sunni problem stretching from Indonesia all the way to Morocco.

He answered me saying Iraq was not Pakistan, where internecine strife was rife. He was wrong... We're not yet at the stage of a general confrontation, although [Shiite-Sunni] tensions are numerous in Lebanon, Iraq, Pakistan or Bahrain. But we must be vigilant because we’re not too far off.

JA: What role is Iran playing in the Syrian conflict today -- that of a facilitator or an obstacle?

LB: You know, from my point of view, everyone represents an obstacle... Seriously, I met the new president, Hassan Rouhani, and his minister of foreign affairs in New York.

Iran's position is clear: there is no military solution to this conflict; an entente must be reached between the government -- towards which the Iranians are very close -- and the opposition that will result in free elections supervised by the United Nations.

I’m under the impression they [Iranians] think Bashar would win the ballot hands down.

JA: From [Mahmoud] Ahmadinejad to Rouhani, have you noticed a change in Tehran’s discourse and positions?

LB: On other issues, such as relations with the United States, certainly. But on the Syria crisis, no, absolutely not.

JA: What about Israel in all this?

LB: I feel that whatever the case, Israel is in a win-win situation. If Bashar goes, Syria will take a long time to stabilize. If Bashar stays, he will be broken-down. And if the internecine strife continues, it will be good for Israel... Moreover, chemical weapons were the only strategic weapons the Israelis feared. In short, Israel is in a win-win situation and I'm not sure the Arabs are aware of this...

No longer a Shiite Crescent

Press clipping dated Monday, 13 June 1949

By Jamal Khashoggi, Saudi Arabia’s authoritative political analyst, author and kingpin of the impending Al Arab TV news channel, writing in Arabic today for the mass circulation newspaper al-Hayat

When the term “Shiite Crescent” was coined a few years back, it was meant to warn of Iranian expansionism across the Levant.

Nowadays, after the Big Powers’ defeat in the Qusayr battle, Shiite fundamentalism is basking in all the glory of triumph.

With the resulting enlistment of hundreds of Iraqi Shiite volunteers in the war overtly championed by Iran, the Crescent is liable to evolve into a political axis stretching from Tehran to Beirut via Baghdad and Damascus.

The Iranian Oil Ministry will pull out old maps from its drawers to build the pipeline to pump Iranian oil and gas from Abadan (across Iraq) to Tartus.

The Iranian Ministry of Roads and Transportation will dust off the national railways authority’s blueprints for a new branch line from Tehran to Damascus, and possibly Beirut,

Why not? The wind is blowing in their favor and I am not making a mountain out of a molehill.

Tehran has been mulling and airing such projects for years without actually starting them.

But she will, once she settles the Syria war in her favor. It is only natural for her to consolidate victory on the ground by blending her triumphant axis in a singular political, economic and military network.

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Supreme Leader or Guardian Jurist of Iran, will realize his dream of delivering his sermon from the pulpit of Umayyad Mosque in Damascus, announcing the attainment of Islamic unity he has long promised.

He will then pompously step down from the pulpit to stroke the forehead of a wheelchair-bound Damascene boy, signaling that forgiveness is the attribute of the strong.

He will then stand next to a group of Syrian Sunni ulema wearing white turbans. There are lots of them, in the mould of Mufti Ahmad Hassoun, ready to oblige.

He will shake and raise their hands as camera clicks and flashlights capture the historic moment.

The Guardian Jurist will promise that his next prayer – or his successor’s. if he is sufficiently humble – will be in Jerusalem.

But he won’t mention the Golan. He knows the Russians are now the key component of the UN monitoring force separating Israeli and Syrian forces on the Heights.

Because Takfiris are still mounting desperate operations here and there, he realizes that Syrian troops and Hezbollah fighters are busy keeping the peace in predominantly Sunni cities, towns and townships.

In that afternoon, a huge reception will be held in a newly rehabilitated Damascus palace still showing the scars of war to mark the signing of a mutual defense pact by the presidents of Iran, Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.

The Guardian Jurist will stand wreathed in smiles in the background, perhaps in awe at the likely appearance of the Hidden Imam to bless the agreement.

We turn southward to Riyadh and find the capital calm and dusty but concerned the battle was settled in favor of Bashar al-Assad and his partners.

Riyadh is conscious the clean sweep is not Bashar’s but that of Iran and the old Khomeini scheme.

Bashar becomes the representative of Vali e-faqih in Damascus.

Riyadh is also alarmed by Iranian activity in its surrounding area.

It fears for Bahrain. The Houthis have won uncontested control of more than half the old North Yemen. South Yemen, Saudi Arabia’s traditional ally, is being gradually eaten away by Iran.

Gulf unity plans have dissipated. Some Gulf countries are keen to flatter Iran so as to preserve a modicum of their national sovereignty.

The Arab common market and Fertile Crescent idea evaporated and with it the dream of resurrecting the Hejaz Railway that ran from Istanbul to Holy Mecca across Syria and Jordan.

Even the Europeans are buying the Iranian oil flowing through the Abadan-Tartus pipeline. They are also thinking of linking the European Gas Network with its Iranian counterpart. They have forgotten all about sanctions because the world always prefers to deal with winners.

On the Arab Gulf home front, young men are seething. They feel their governments let them down by failing to face up to the Iranian stratagem. The young men are in a sectarian tinderbox and buckling under economic stress. Extremism is rampant and the security services are busy hunting down extremist groups.

A nightmare, don’t you think?

That’s why I believe Saudi Arabia expressly will not allow Iran to win in Syria.

Iranian presence there proved a burden from the day Hafez al-Assad sealed his alliance with Iran’s Islamic Revolution as soon as it took over power 40 years ago.

Whereas the Syrian regime’s muscle under Hafez left a margin of balance and independence in the partnership, his son submitted totally to the Iranians and Hezbollah.

It is thanks to them Bashar is still alive and ruling a country in ruin. Instead of being their partner, he has become their subordinate.

The implication is that Iran’s presence in Lebanon and Syria now constitutes a clear threat to Saudi Arabia’s national security, and Turkey’s as well.

Consequently, Saudi Arabia must do something now, albeit alone. The kingdom’s security is at stake.

It will be good if the United States joined an alliance led by Saudi Arabia to bring down Bashar and return Syria to the Arab fold. But this should not be a precondition to proceed.

Let Saudi Arabia head those on board.

Let us put aside any misgivings about sequels of the Arab Spring, the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood and Turkey’s ambitions.

Let the objective be to bring down Assad fast.

The objective is bound to draw together multiple forces ranging from the Anbar tribes to Hamas to Egypt’s Brothers to Tunisia to the Gulf Countries.

That would entice Turkey to partake in the alliance. France could follow. And whether the United States does or does not breeze in is inconsequential. After all, it’s our battle and our security. U.S. security is not on the line. 

U.S. diplomats squash Syrian opposition hopes

Ambassador Ford

 On the day President Barack Obama won his second term, American diplomats told participants in the Syrian opposition “jamboree” in Doha there would be no change in the Obama policy of refusing to intervene militarily or arm the resistance.

Instead, they said, Washington would seek a “political solution” to the carnage in Syria.

The American diplomats were named as U.S. Ambassador to Syria Robert Ford and A. Elizabeth Jones, a former Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs and one-time U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Kazakhstan.

Samir Nashar, one of the Syrian National Council (SNC) members who attended the meeting with Ford and Jones tells today’s edition of the Saudi daily Asharq Alawsat, “They plainly said the United States does not envisage a solution in Syria other than the political solution.”

Nashar added, “When we told the two diplomats such an American position will ruin the reputation of the United States among Syrians, their answer was: ‘You need to relay this to the Syrians in dozes – that the United States won’t intervene in Syria and they have no choice other than a political solution.’

Elizabeth Jones

“…We reiterated that -- despite (U.S.) criticisms of the SNC – we remain committed first and foremost to the Syrian revolution’s path and objectives, which foreclose any political solution that does not commence with Bashar al-Assad standing down.”

Political analyst Rajeh el-Khoury, writing for the independent Lebanese daily an-Nahar, describes Obama 2 as just “a carbon copy” of Obama 1.

“Barack Obama is back and nothing will change. We have a carbon copy of the U.S. president who will probably be less interested in foreign policy issues in order to focus during his second term on what James A. Baker calls America’s Titanic load of debt,” Khoury says.

“Look at Obama’s wavering and elusive policies vis-à-vis (1) the Libyan revolution (2) change in Egypt, which is now causing Washington a splitting headache, and (3) the revolution in Syria, where massacres and calamities multiply because of Russia’s malign alignment with the regime and America turning a blind eye to the bloodbath and cruelly denying arms to regime opponents. If we pondered all this, we would conclude that Obama 2 could only be like Obama 1… So don’t expect U.S. policy change. You won’t see it anytime soon.”

Zuhair Qusaybati, writing for the pan-Arab daily al-Hayat, notes that many regional states and politicians are pinning false hopes on Obama’s second term. Some see him arming the Syrian opposition adequately to overthrow the regime by year’s end, or warning to cut aid to Israel if it did not stop the building of settlements and the judaization of Jerusalem, or inviting Ali Khamenei to the White House to end the tug-of-war over Iran’s nuclear file and share spheres of influence in the ‘Shiite Crescent’ region.”

All this is wishful thinking, says Qusaybati, because the Obama administration’s “pullout from the region will from here on enter its second stage. So there is no good news on the way for the Syrians. Chances of the U.S. arming the opposition are low and the likelihood of military intervention is nil. Syria is abandoned to its fate. The balance of power will be decided on the ground -- at a prohibitive cost…”

“The rising Shiite-clad Iranian crescent”

Clockwise from top: Assad, Khamenei, Maliki and Nasrallah

Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s plain and explicit support this week of President Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria drives a Lebanese political analyst to raise the old specter of a “Shiite crescent” taking shape across the Middle East.

King Abdullah of Jordan coined the idiomatic expression late in 2004, when he spoke of a "Shiite crescent" that went from Tehran to Damascus via Baghdad.

Eight years on, Shiite powerhouse Iran is flaunting its nuclear ambitions. It has teamed up with Damascus and Baghdad after emerging as the biggest winner of the Iraq war. And it has a strategic cat’s-paw in Lebanese Shiite militia Hezbollah.

Iraq’s Maliki on Sunday warned Arab countries against supplying weapons and financial support to the Syrian opposition striving to oust Assad.

"We reject any arming of the opposition, we reject attempts to bring down the regime by force, because it will leave a wider crisis in the region,” Maliki told reporters at a press conference In Baghdad. He obliquely attacked Saudi Arabia and Qatar, without naming them, for saying they would extend financial and technical assistance to the Syrian rebels.

He spoke as the “Friends of Syria” conferees met in Istanbul to figure how best to support the Syrian opposition.

Analyst Asaad Bechara, writing today for the Beirut daily al-Joumhouria, perceives “a Shiite-clad Iranian crescent emerging all the way from Tehran to Beirut.”

When Muqtada al-Sadr and Maliki break silence to back Assad, when the Bahraini opposition says there is no revolution in Syria, and when Hezbollah turns its back on the Syrian people, the common denominator is obviously sectarian.

Bechara recalls that in 2009 Maliki withdrew Iraq’s ambassador from Damascus, saying “ninety percent of terrorists” were infiltrating Iraq through Syria. So what drove him now to toe Iran’s line and join the unholy sectarian alliance?

According to Beshara, Maliki -- who is seeking to eradicate Iraq’s Sunnite Baath Party -- has turned into an avid fan of Syria’s Alawite Baath Party. What makes those brought to power in Baghdad on the strength of U.S. Army tanks suddenly oppose international intervention in Syria, if only to protect Saddam Hussein’s clone in Damascus?

Bechara says a look at the circumstances surrounding the new crescent’s rise shows its staunchest advocates pulling out all the stops to open an unobstructed route from Tehran to Baghdad to Damascus and on to Beirut. Their aim is to fulfill old Persian expansionist dreams, but in Shiite garb this time. Problem is that by so doing, Shiite Arabs may be boxing above their weight. They risk losing their Arab shine and sense of identity by chasing what is beyond their authenticity and history.