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Showing posts with label Lakhdar Brahimi. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Lakhdar Brahimi. Show all posts

Thursday, 7 November 2013

“U.S., Russia looking for pliant Syrian opposition”

Clockwise from top L.: Bogdanov with Rifaat al-Assad, Kassis, Muslim. Jamil, Tlass and Manna'

The leading Saudi daily Asharq Alawsat today suggests in its front page lead that the Americans and Russians are working hand in hand to put together a pliant Syrian opposition to negotiate with President Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Geneva.
The paper says U.S. and Russian representatives held talks this week with opposition figures outside the Syrian National Coalition of Opposition and Revolutionary Forces, which most Western and Arab countries recognize as sole legitimate representative of the Syrian people.
Asharq Alawsat’s report follows remarks by Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov saying he would be meeting separately in Geneva Wednesday with each of:
Rifaat al-Assad, who fled Syria and went into exile in Europe in 1984 after staging a failed coup attempt against his brother Hafez al-Assad, the then president and father of Bashar. A sworn opponent of the current regime from which he has firmly distanced himself, there are no international sanctions against him. But human rights groups accuse him of playing a leading role in the bloody crushing of a 1982 uprising against his brother, in which tens of thousands were killed in Hama. He has denied the accusations.
More recently, French anti-corruption campaign groups have accused him of corruption, money laundering, embezzlement of public funds and misuse of corporate assets.
Siwar al-Assad, a son of Rifaat, told The New York Times in a telephone interview from Geneva his father wanted to attend the proposed peace talks, known as Geneva II, as an opposition figure whose presence would reassure government supporters and help bring about a compromise.
He said his father did not insist that President Assad step down as a prerequisite for talks.
“By putting preconditions, nothing will change, and every day people are dying,” Siwar al-Assad said, calling President Assad’s imminent departure “a fantasy” and adding, “I’m not pro-Bashar, but I’m a person who is realistic.”
It was unclear whether other parties would accept even sitting with Rifaat al-Assad at talks, much less whether talks will take place. But the Russian move was a sign of casting about for new ways to break the impasse.
The meeting between Rifaat al-Assad and Bogdanov drew scorn from many opponents of the president. They call Rifaat al-Assad the Butcher of Hama, a reference to his role in the bloody suppression of a violent uprising in that Syrian city in 1982.
Siwar al-Assad said his father did not want to be president and advocated a gradual handover of power under a transition council including government and opposition members, a new constitution guaranteeing freedom of speech and of the press and an independent judiciary, and transparent elections in which anyone, including Bashar al-Assad, could run. Asked if Rifaat al-Assad expected to meet soon with American officials, Siwar al-Assad told The NYT, “maybe.”
Manaf Tlass, a former Brigadier General of the elite Syrian Republican Guard and a member of Bashar al-Assad’s inner circle until his defection in July 2012. He is the son of Mustafa Tlass who served as defense minister for 32 years from 1972 to 2004.
Haytham al-Manna’ of the National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change (NCC), denies meeting Rifaat al-Assad in Geneva on Wednesday. “I am one of the people who started the criminal case against Rifaat al-Assad… I am still a member in Arab Commission for Human Rights (ACHR) and not the commission to protect dictators.”
He said he does not have any contact with Rifaat or Qadri Jamil or any regime figure.
Saleh Muslim, leader of the Democratic Union Party, a Syrian affiliate of the Kurdistan Worker's Party (PKK), and the most powerful member of the Kurdish opposition in the Syrian civil war
Qadri Jamil, one of the top leaders of the People’s Will Party and the Popular Front for Change and Liberation and a former member of the Assad government. Assad dismissed him last month from the post of deputy prime minister for economic affairs for acting without government permission when he met with U.S. officials in Geneva.
Ms Randa Kassis, president of the Coalition of Secular and Democratic Syrians and member of the Syrian National Council. She is also an anthropologist and journalist.
Syria troubleshooter Lakhdar Brahimi had hoped to hold the Geneva-2 peace conference this month.
But he said he was not able to announce a date, despite a day of meetings first with senior diplomats from the U.S. and Russia, then with the other permanent members of the UN Security Council -- the UK, France and China -- as well as Syria's neighbors Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan and Turkey.
Brahimi said he was still "striving" for a summit by the end of the year.
Attempts to set up a conference have been going on for months amid disputes over who should attend and its agenda.
The Syrian opposition has insisted President Assad should resign before any talks can take begin, but the government has rejected this.
The U.S. and Russia disagree on whether Syria's key regional neighbor Iran should be present.
The idea of a conference was first mooted in May, and in September UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon announced a tentative date of mid-November after the Security Council passed a binding resolution on Syrian chemical weapons.
Meanwhile, aid agencies have warned that more than nine million Syrians, almost half the population, are now in need of humanitarian relief, and 6.5 million were now homeless within Syria.

Tuesday, 29 October 2013

Lakhdar Brahimi: “It’s very complicated”

International troubleshooter Lakhdar Brahimi today held talks in Damascus, the last leg of a Middle East tour to lobby for a Syria peace conference, dubbed Geneva-2.

I am personally of the opinion he will keep huffing and puffing well into 2014 without getting up the steep Geneva-2 hill.

According to the Geneva Communiqué of June 2012, the principal objective of the proposed peace conference is to set up by mutual consent a transitional governing body with “full executive powers.”

I will come back to the prospects of Geneva-2 in a subsequent blog.

But here are highlights of what Brahimi told the Paris-based weekly newsmagazine Jeune Afrique in a 3,000-word interview published on the day of his arrival in Damascus yesterday.

The interview is fittingly titled “Mission Impossible”:

Jeune Afrique: Didn’t the agreement between the Russians and Americans [to remove Syria’s chemical weapons] put Bashar al-Assad back on the saddle?

Lakhdar Brahimi: He was an outcast; he became a partner… Bashar was never put off his stride -- so there is no reason to think that.

JA: Do you think he seriously considers running for re-election in mid-2014?

LB: Many of those around him take his running for another term as an accomplished fact.

He deems it as his absolute right, but that he would come to a decision in due time. He is adamant about completing his current term.

What I proclaim aloud and to all Syrians is this: History teaches us that after a crisis like this, there is no turning back.

President Assad could therefore significantly contribute to the transition from the previous Syria -- which is that of his father and his own -- to what I call the New Syrian Republic.

JA: What about the Syrian opposition?

LB: They are to consider who could represent them [at the peace table]. This is one reason why it takes time. Some of them even feel they should stay away from Geneva.

It's very complicated!

In this type of situation, there are many camps. Armed and unarmed opposition, opposition based outside and inside [Syria], Islamists, seculars, etc... We must realize Geneva-2, unlike the conference held in 2012, is not an end in itself but the beginning.

We hope the opposition will manage to agree on a credible and representative delegation. We must not delude ourselves: the whole world won’t be represented. However, the carry-over of this process will include as many people as possible.

JA: If the powerful Islamist rebels choose to boycott Geneva, it will be a real problem...

LB: Probably, but mind you there are two sorts of Islamists: those interested in the quest for peace, and those in the orbit al-Qaeda – such as Jabhat al-Nusra, for example. The latter wish to bring down the regime; they are not fighting to build a New Syrian Republic, but to set up an Islamic state. So they don’t give a hoot about Geneva.

JA: Is Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov a reliable partner?

LB: Absolutely – we know each other well.

He was ambassador to the UN and is an outstanding professional. He is also extremely knowledgeable about the Middle East.

Where Syria is concerned, there is much talk about Moscow's influence and the Russians’ political relations with the regime.

The Russians have had a significant, longstanding and uninterrupted presence in Syria.

Everyone bears in mind the Russian officers who are out there, but there are chiefly a lot of engineers. Remember, there are nearly 20,000 Russian women in Syria married to Syrians.

The Russians know Syria very well. When [Tunisia’s  Zine al-Abidine]  Ben Ali, [Egypt’s Hosni] Mubarak and [Libya’s Muammar] Gaddafi fell, few thought Bashar would survive more than three months.

Only the Russians kept saying: "Careful -- this is not the case, we are familiar with the country, and we know how it works. Syria is more complicated. "
Some thought this was pretentious, that it was an unconditional expression of support for Bashar.

JA: Do you think Syria’s national fabric can still be patched up?

LB: Yes, I think so. What threatens Syria is not the country’s partition. I would be surprised if the Alawites really want to create some sort of a bunker in their small mountains. They know very well it won’t be viable.

The real danger threatening Syria is a kind of "Somalization," one which will be more sustainable and profound than what we’ve seen in Somalia so far.

JA: Does the idea of ​​a Shiite crescent fighting Sunnis across the Arab and Islamic worlds seem pertinent?

LB: Effectively, we do have a problem, which is far from being new. I remember discussing it with [the highest ranking Shiite religious leader in Iraq] Grand Ayatollah [Ali] Sistani, when I was in Baghdad in 2004. I explained to him we might have on our hands a Shiite-Sunni problem stretching from Indonesia all the way to Morocco.

He answered me saying Iraq was not Pakistan, where internecine strife was rife. He was wrong... We're not yet at the stage of a general confrontation, although [Shiite-Sunni] tensions are numerous in Lebanon, Iraq, Pakistan or Bahrain. But we must be vigilant because we’re not too far off.

JA: What role is Iran playing in the Syrian conflict today -- that of a facilitator or an obstacle?

LB: You know, from my point of view, everyone represents an obstacle... Seriously, I met the new president, Hassan Rouhani, and his minister of foreign affairs in New York.

Iran's position is clear: there is no military solution to this conflict; an entente must be reached between the government -- towards which the Iranians are very close -- and the opposition that will result in free elections supervised by the United Nations.

I’m under the impression they [Iranians] think Bashar would win the ballot hands down.

JA: From [Mahmoud] Ahmadinejad to Rouhani, have you noticed a change in Tehran’s discourse and positions?

LB: On other issues, such as relations with the United States, certainly. But on the Syria crisis, no, absolutely not.

JA: What about Israel in all this?

LB: I feel that whatever the case, Israel is in a win-win situation. If Bashar goes, Syria will take a long time to stabilize. If Bashar stays, he will be broken-down. And if the internecine strife continues, it will be good for Israel... Moreover, chemical weapons were the only strategic weapons the Israelis feared. In short, Israel is in a win-win situation and I'm not sure the Arabs are aware of this...

Wednesday, 26 June 2013

Saud’s tough talk on Syria and Kerry’s inshallah

John Kerry and Saud al-Faisal meet the press after their talks in Jeddah

As far as I can recall, yesterday was the first time I see Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Faisal so spirited in public.
He was speaking at a joint news conference with U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry after their talks on Syria in Jeddah.
The pair’s body language was also telling.
Showing no sign of his debilitating back pain, Prince Saud was blunt and passionate about the state of play in Syria. His words read like sheer exasperation.
Kerry on the other hand sounded listless and downcast.
Prince Saud’s tough language:
  • Saudi Arabia cannot be silent at Hezbollah crossing from Lebanon to back regime forces in Syria.
  • Syria is facing a double-edged attack by Hezbollah and Iranian Revolutionary Guards with unlimited military support from Russia. Along with the regime's genocide against its own people, this adds an even deadlier element in the form of an all-out foreign invasion.
  • Syria now can only be considered an occupied land. This requires resolute and swift action by the international community.
  • There no longer is rhyme or reason to let pass Russia’s blatant and incessant arms supplies to the Syrian regime… Meantime, we are still failing to secure international protection for the Syrian people, or at least provide some sort of military assistance to help them defend themselves against abhorrent crimes being committed against them with nary an excuse.
  • The kingdom demands a clear, unequivocal international resolution that bans any sort of weapons’ support for the Syrian regime and declares null and void the regime’s legitimacy.
  • The illegitimate regime cannot possibly be part of any arrangement or play any role whatsoever in shaping the present and future of Syria.

Kerry’s inshallah:
  • This is a situation that’s been made far more difficult and complicated by Assad’s invitation to Iran and to Hezbollah, Iran’s surrogate, to cross lines – international lines – and to become engaged on the ground in Syria. It is the Assad regime that has internationalized the violence on the ground in the worst of ways.
  • We believe the best solution is a political solution in which the people of Syria have an opportunity to be able to make a choice about their future. And we believe that every minority can be respected, that there could be diversity and pluralism, and that people could do so in a climate of peace in the absence of oppression and violence or the involvement of foreign fighters, providing the Assad regime is prepared to live by the framework that was created in the Geneva communiqué for a transition government with full executive powers chosen by mutual consent of all the parties, which really has the best chance of bringing about peace in Syria.
  • We continue to believe Geneva-2 offers the best opportunity to be able to try to bring that about.

Syria's Foreign Minister Walid al-Muallem told a news conference in Damascus on Monday regime representatives will attend Geneva-2 -- but “not to hand over power to the other side.”
As Prince Saud and Kerry were speaking in Jeddah, Syria troubleshooter Lakhdar Brahimi was telling reporters in Geneva ahead of talks with American and Russian officials that Geneva-2 was unlikely to take place in July as he had hoped.
"I very, very much hope governments in the region and the Big Powers -- in particular the United States and Russia -- will act to contain this situation that is getting out of hand, not only in Syria but also in the region."
Brahimi voiced deep concern at the deadliest outbreak of violence in Lebanon since the start of the Syrian conflict in 2011.
“Events in the city of Sidon in Lebanon yesterday, where over 50 people were killed, are a stern reminder to all of the risks of the conflict in Syria spreading across borders to neighboring countries,” he said.
Editorially, Saudi daily Asharq Alawsat’s former editor-in-chief Tariq Alhomayed writes:
Foreign fighters – whether from Iran’s Revolutionary Guard or Quds Force, or Hezbollah, or Iraqi Shiite militias, or regrettably other regional Shiites – swarmed into Syria at Bashar Assad’s invitation to save his regime. Even the security of Damascus is in the hands of Qassem Soleimani who hardly leaves the capital city.
Hezbollah rules Syria’s borders with Lebanon.
The Baghdad government controls Syria’s border with Iraq and directs its forces and the Iraqi Shiite militiamen to back Assad and stifle the Free Syrian Army (FSA).
Israel occupies the Golan and allows Assad’s army to deploy tanks on the Heights to shut out FSA fighters from the Quneitra crossing.
Russian warships are off Syria’s Mediterranean waters.
All this shows Syria is splintered and occupied after Assad killed about 100,000 of his own people.
Prince Saud al-Faisal’s remarks mean Saudi Arabia does not accept a political solution in Syria that keeps Assad in office. This is the kingdom’s underlying position vis-à-vis current or future political initiatives that aim to save Assad, including the unlikely Geneva-2.
Prince Saud al-Faisal’s remarks were pivotal and conclusive. He called things by their name and gave the Syrian opposition a shot in the arm.
His remarks mean Riyadh is proceeding with propping up the FSA so it can defend peoples’ lives and land.

Wednesday, 22 May 2013

Marketing of Geneva-2 kicks off in Amman

Kerry and Lavrov, the architects of Geneva-2

John Kerry and the 10 other members of the “Friends of Syria” core group are meeting in Amman today to push for a Geneva-2 conference the U.S. secretary of state consented to with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov.
The Geneva framework envisages bringing together representatives of Bashar al-Assad and the Syrian opposition to agree a joint “transitional government with full executive powers” to end more than two years of internecine strife.
The “Friends of Syria” sitting with Kerry at the Amman meeting are the foreign ministers of Germany, Italy, France, the United Kingdom, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Jordan, the UAE and Egypt.
Like most Syrians and Syria-watchers, two Arab political analysts still have their misgivings about the proposed Geneva-2, which they sum up in a sentence each.

In the view of Abu Shakra, who specialized in Middle Eastern Studies at The University of London’s School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS):
Does Syria have any friends left?
The question is relevant in the countdown to the meeting in Amman of the 11 members making up the “Friends of Syria” core group.
Above all, what are some of the “Friends of Syria” exactly after? And can all those sitting at the Amman round-table be described as friends?
The Syrian uprising is today looking for friends right and left but hardly finding any who would bring to a close the Syrian regime’s crackdown and its rush to partition Syria by blitzing Homs city and the rural areas of Homs province.
With due respect to the true “friends” who are being pressured by global kingmakers, a majority of partakers in Amman today will hopefully recognize that the Syrian people deserve some measure of truthfulness and a greater measure of courage in the face of those conspiring against them.
Honestly, is there any hope of Assad and his inner circle stepping aside with Lavrov tailoring a Syria solution and towing Kerry along by the hand?
Can any brainy observer imagine Tehran – which has been investing men, money, arms and all sorts of services in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon for three decades – simply turn its back, walk away and bury its regional ambitions?
Frankly, no one will answer the questions positively, save for Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, and perhaps John Kerry.
According to Ms Mardini:
The Syrian opposition is sitting hesitantly between the two fires of a political solution.
One fire would char her if she accepted to sit with the Assad regime after it killed at least 80,000 Syrians.
The other fire would scorch her internationally if she refused, given that the chances of American intervention are zilch and the Syria crisis has now gone into the international bazaar.
Background briefing
Overnight, a senior State Department official gave reporters a background briefing on Kerry’s trip to Amman.
I have excerpted remarks the official made in the course of the curtain raiser (that you can read in full here):
(The meeting in Amman) is basically to review where we are on Syria, and obviously there’s going to be a discussion both about the situation on the ground in the country. I’m sure there will be a discussion of the refugee situation since the Turkish and Jordanian foreign ministers will be there. There will certainly be a discussion about Geneva, and there’ll be a discussion about what things our countries need to be doing in the days and weeks ahead. So it is part of an ongoing set of discussions. It is not by itself a particularly – it’s not a place where we’re coming to make big decisions because we’re in touch with these countries regularly anyway.
+++
With respect to Geneva and the opposition’s attendance, I don’t think any of the different opposition elements have yet announced definitively whether or not they will attend. And of course, the opposition, the political opposition, is in the middle of meetings right now in Istanbul to pick a new leadership. So we will work intensely with that new leadership in the run-up to Geneva.
+++
Let me say a couple of things about the fighting in Qusayr, which is up near Homs. It’s southwest of the city of Homs. It is the most visible effort we have seen of Hezbollah to engage directly in the fighting in Syria as a foreign force. We understand there are also Iranians up there. That is what the Free Syrian Army commanders are telling us. I think this is an important thing to note, the direct implication of foreigners fighting on Syrian soil now for the regime.
+++
With respect to the Syrian regime’s strategy leading up to Geneva, I would just say that we have long said – and the Secretary has said – that it is important to change Bashar al-Assad’s calculations in order to get to a political settlement and that the balance on the ground – the military balance on the ground is a huge factor in those calculations, and we understand that. And so one of the things we’ll be talking about here in Amman tomorrow is what else needs to be done with respect to the military balance on the ground.
+++
For us, the important thing is for (Assad regime) to understand the purpose of this new meeting in Geneva is to discuss how to implement fully – and I want to emphasize those words – how to implement fully the Geneva communiqué, which stipulates that there will be a transition governing body established with full executive authority, including over the military and the security apparatus and that will be established by mutual consent.
+++
The final invite list for the Geneva conference is still being worked on. It’ll be an issue tomorrow, I am sure, on the agenda of the 11 foreign ministers meeting here in Jordan. But also we have to talk to countries that are not here. We’ll certainly have to talk to the Russians more, and we’ll have to talk also to the United Nations because they very well will have a big role. And so that final attendance list is still under discussion.
+++
The Syrian opposition has been invited to Amman, both Gen. (Salim) Idriss or a representative from him for the Supreme Military Command as well as the political opposition. So they’ve both been invited. I’m not sure exactly yet who is attending.
+++
Certainly there are (arms) contracts that predate the outbreak of the Syrian revolution that the Russians are delivering equipment under. Of course, that doesn’t mean that they couldn’t suspend deliveries given the extraordinary circumstances in which Syria now finds itself, but legalistically, they are correct; these are old contracts.

Thursday, 9 May 2013

Obama's “red line” changes to “white flag”


Kerry and Lavrov: Gimme five!

U.S. President Barack Obama’s “red line” for Syria has transmuted into a “white flag,” according to Abdelbari Atwan, publisher/editor of the London-based pan-Arab daily al-Quds al-Arabi.
And most political analysts in today’s Arab press seem to be of the same opinion.
The reaction is to last Tuesday’s announcement in Moscow of a U.S.-Russian agreement to convene an international conference to find a political solution on Syria.
U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said they would encourage both Damascus and the opposition to negotiate.
The deal came after Kerry's talks in Moscow with President Vladimir Putin and Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov.
Kerry and Lavrov announced they would try to organize the international conference before the end of May if possible.
The forum will try to convince both the Syrian government and opposition to accept a solution based on the core elements of the final communiqué issued on 30 June 2012 after the UN-backed Action Group for Syria meeting in Geneva (see my post of the same date, “Syria Action Group leaves open Assad Question”).
The Geneva communiqué called for the formation of a fully empowered transitional government. But there was no understanding on the future role of President Bashar al-Assad and his inner circle.
The opposition and Washington were insisting he should stand down before any negotiations.
Now Washington seems to have softened its position to the extent of leaving Assad's future up to the outcome of negotiations and whatever the Syrians themselves decide, which has long been Moscow’s position.
Atwan, in his editorial comment for al-Quds al-Arabi, says: “Clearly, the U.S. administration made the bigger concession in Moscow by embracing the Russian position.
“After drawing red lines, saying it was reviewing its previous cautions policy and positions on the Syria crisis, and considering the supply of lethal weapons to the Syrian opposition, we see Washington totally surrendering to Russia’s conditions and calling for a peace conference that recognizes the Syrian regime’s legitimacy.”
The administration has suddenly clammed up on Assad having to step down before any negotiations, on evidence of his using chemical weapons against his people, and on his days being numbered.
Atwan says, “There are two winners from the American-Russian political move.
“The first is President Bashar al-Assad, albeit for the time being.
“The second is Special Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi.
“Assad has recouped his international legitimacy because he and his regime will now make a strong comeback to the international arena – with the kind of U.S. blessings he had long been hunting for.
“Lakhdar Brahimi will shelve for six months his plans to resign and go into retirement and oblivion. He will bask again in all the glory of returning to the political and media spotlight, which he must be missing.
“America does not want a war in Syria or Iran and wants to avoid them by all ways and means. The Russians share its apprehension.
“The only war the two sides want to wage independently or in tandem is against Islamic Jihadist groups in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan.
“Thus, be prepared for American and Russian ‘revivals’ that are now in the making.
“Whether the planned international conference succeeds or fails, stifling Jabhat al-Nusra and its sisters is the headline of the new Russian-American entente.”
Assad
Whether by design or coincidence, three media outlets that speak for Assad say, “The Syrian leadership is glad to see the world redirect its center of attention to the threat posed by Muslim extremists and Takfiris.”
The quote comes from a news report penned by Elie Chalhoub, co-founder and managing editor of al-Akhbar daily, Assad’s mouthpiece in Lebanon
The report -- which is published simultaneously by Al-Akhbar, Syria’s state-run Champress and Hezbollah’s al-Manar news portal for emphasis -- quotes unnamed Assad aides as saying, “Several factors worked very much in our favor, including Israel’s airstrike, al-Qaeda, Jabhat al-Nusra, the Qatari-Saudi rivalry, Turkey’s Ottoman-style approach and the opposition’s splintering. All this proved to all and sundry that there is no substitute to the Syrian state.”
Chalhoub quotes Assad personally as telling visitors, “We could have easily responded to Israel’s airstrike in Damascus by firing a few missiles at Israel…
“That would have been a tactical response. We prefer a strategic reaction by opening the door to the Resistance and turning the whole of Syria into a resistance country…
“We have full confidence in Hezbollah and are extremely grateful for its good judgment, loyalty and steadfastness. That’s why we decided to give them everything. For the first time, we both felt we shared the same circumstance. We are not only allies and paired…
“(We in Syria) decided to get closer and become a resistance state akin to Hezbollah for the sake of Syria and (its) future generations.”
Winner and loser
The United States has for years listed Hezbollah as a terrorist organization.
Saudi Arabia’s most eminent journalist, Abdurrahman al-Rashed, who heads Alarabiya TV news channel, makes no mention of the group in his column today for the leading Saudi daily Asharq Alawsat.
But he says, “Regrettably, the Americans are going along with Lavrov’s plan…
 “What we can tell Secretary Kelly is not to trust the Russian-Iranian offer, which manipulates American fears to dictate a political solution aimed at getting rid of Jihadist organizations.
“In practice, the offer can only widen the conflict and empower the terrorist groups. The latter will surely exploit the wrath of the majority as it is coerced to go along with a solution it does not want, coming as it is at the price of 100,000 deaths, five million refugees and a country biting the dust.
“The solution should take the opposite route, one that sees the international community empower the majority to win its political rights with Assad shown the door immediately and not in a year’s time.”
The Russians, Rashed adds, are capitalizing on the Americans’ alarm at getting Jihadists the day after Assad.
It is two years now since chaos and terror blighted Syria. Subduing the revolting majority at this point will make it impossible to restore any semblance of stability. “For the first time in the region’s history terrorist groups like al-Qaeda will be able to amass loads of partners.”
Washington-based political analyst Hisham Melhem, writing today for the independent Lebanese an-Nahar, opines on “Winners and losers.”
Unlike regular warfare, he says, civil wars are fierce and emotive. Each side is familiar with the other, perceives the fight as existential and anticipates a loser and a winner rather than a compromise.
“Countries where civil wars ended with a loser and a winner – America and Spain, for instance – had a better chance to rebuild and lay sound statehood foundations after a difficult transition, chiefly for the loser.
“Countries where civil wars ended in compromises, specially under international auspices – Yugoslavia, Lebanon, Iraq – remained fragmented and prone to renewed internecine strife.”
The Syria war is unlikely to end with a negotiated political solution and the U.S.-Russian blueprint as it stands is no more than a pipe dream.  

Wednesday, 24 April 2013

Brahimi’s update to UN Security Council – full text


Credit to Nabil Abi Saab’s “UN Report” for releasing this April 19 briefing to the Security Council by Lakhdar Brahimi, the joint special representative of the United Nations and League of Arab States for Syria:
Mr. President, Distinguished Members of the Security Council,
1. I thank you Mr. President for giving me the opportunity to brief the Council once again on Syria. This is an honor indeed and I am very much aware that I’ll be speaking under the Chair of the Distinguished Ambassador of Rwanda, a country where people know a thing or two about repression, injustice and suffering, all things we shall be saying much about during our conversation this morning.
2. Yesterday, the Council held an open session and heard from Valerie Amos, Antonio Gueterres, Zainab Bangura and Leila Zerrougui, who described the dire humanitarian situation in all its manifestations. They spoke with the authority of their respective high positions and the intimate knowledge they have acquired of the situation. They spoke with eloquence and emotion about the sufferings of millions of Syrians inside and outside their country. They highlighted for you in particular the unbearable conditions under which children live and die and the many humiliations women and girls have to endure.
3. To what you heard yesterday, there is nothing I can add – except perhaps the following remarks:
a) Let us spare a thought for the tens of thousands of prisoners and detainees held in official prisons and secret detention centers, most of who are routinely subjected to torture and humiliating and degrading treatment. And let us once again call for their immediate release.
b) Let us remember that even when they still have a roof over their head, and some income, practically every man, woman and child in Syria, except the very privileged few, live in constant fear; fear that the next car bomb may go off in front of their home; fear that their workplace may be blown up or forced to close; fear that the bakery of the neighborhood will be destroyed; fear of being arrested by one of the many security branches; fear that one’s child will be kidnapped. In short, everyone in Syria today lives with terror in their hearts that a catastrophe is waiting to affect their shattered lives.
c) Let me express once again my appreciation of, and my gratitude for the generosity of those governments, organizations and individuals who have given so much to help needy Syrians at home and abroad. The same appreciation and gratitude go to tireless workers -- Syrians and foreigners -- who, at considerable risk some of the time, work around the clock to try to bring aid and comfort to those same, needy Syrians.
d) And last but not least, let me underline the important point made yesterday to the effect that we cannot expect the generosity of donors and the dedication of aid workers to solve Syria’s problem: you all know better than I do that the generosity of donors and the dedication of aid workers is not the solution.
Mr. President, Distinguished Members of the Council,
4. All in this room are aware that efforts to bring the violence to an end and to restore peace have not been successful so far. I am personally, profoundly sorry that that my own efforts have produced so little. I apologize to the Syrian people for having, in the end, done so little for them during these past eight months and to you, in this Council, for having had only sad news to report to you, each of the four times I have addressed the Council.
Mr. President,
5. It may be useful, for our purpose today, to rapidly look back at the past efforts to tackle the Syrian conflict. There may be a lesson or two that can be usefully learned for the future.
6. It is generally agreed by all, including in circles that are very close to the heart of power in Damascus, that the crisis could have been solved in its prime infancy -- indeed in its first few days, when those kids wrote graffiti on some Walls in the Southern city of Deraa. It is said that President Bashar al-Assad was advised to travel to Deraa, apologize to the victims and their families, offer generous compensation, dismiss the governor and those who were responsible with him for the brutality and hold them to account, announce there and then a comprehensive package of reforms that would be diligently and honestly implemented. That did not happen. In his long TV interview two days ago, President Bashar al-Assad made a reference to this episode and said “he was right NOT to have followed that advice”!!
7. The Arab League then tried to help. Its efforts culminated in the Arab observer mission led by Gen. Al-Dabi from the Sudan. It is said that the mission was doing reasonably well but the cooperation from the parties was not apparently meeting the expectations of Arab States; the conflict was expanding much faster than the efforts to end it.
8. Kofi Annan was then brought on as Joint Special Envoy of the Secretaries-General of the United Nations and the League of Arab States. The Security Council immediately endorsed his 6-point plan and the necessary UN observer mission, UNSMIS, was deployed to monitor implementation.
9. Kofi Annan then brought together the now famous Action Group of Countries whose Foreign Ministers met in Geneva and produced another remarkable document: the Declaration of 30 June, followed by its Action Plan. Unfortunately, Kofi’s creativity and diligence also fell short: the steps needed to implement the plan were not taken.
10. Kofi’s admirable and creative ideas were defeated by the determination and confidence of each party to the conflict that they can win on the ground and, as Kofi himself said, by the lack of unity in the international community, and especially inside this Council to give his plan the necessary support to overcome the strong resistance he was encountering on the ground.
11. When I arrived on the scene, I thought I should try to overcome the difficulties Kofi encountered by concentrating my efforts in two directions: (i) talk to the parties to the conflict inside and outside Syria, as well as to their respective regional and international backers and; (ii) see if the Security Council would unite again to effectively support the Geneva communiqué and Action Plan and my own work aimed at creating the conditions conducive to its implementation.
12. I was constantly asked to produce a Brahimi plan. But what l was working on was how to help produce a Syrian plan to implement Geneva, which specifically said that what was needed was a Syrian-led process. Unfortunately, progress at the local and regional levels was almost nil and, at the international level, progress was both far too slow and too modest.
13. Then, on 30 January, came the surprising initiative of Moaz al-Khatib, the president of the National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (NCSROF), the opposition organization set up in November 2012. As you will recall this initiative came soon after my previous briefing to this Council on 29 January 2013. In that briefing, l had said, amongst other things, that there were no prospects that Syrians could accept to talk to one another to put an end to the violence and agree on a process for a political, peaceful solution.
14. Moaz al-Khatib’s initiative seemed to prove me wrong on that particular point. Indeed, that initiative, in its simple, almost naïve form, was a breath of fresh air and a ray of hope in a profoundly bleak situation. It was, as a French expression puts it: “un coup de pied dans la fourmilière”, a stir in the pot, a stone thrown in dormant waters, a vigorous shout to all concerned that said, “Yes, peace is possible. Let us make it happen.”
15. Sheikh Moaz asked nothing more of the government than to deliver passports to Syrian expatriates who needed them and to release the tens of thousands of political prisoners. He later lowered his demand to the immediate release of women prisoners only. These were not really preconditions: a simple reminder of purely humanitarian problems and demands that were unanimously made by Syrians of all walks of life and political and religious persuasion as well as by people the world over.
16. The government in Damascus was surprised and embarrassed; its reaction was slow and confused. After some contradictory declarations and a Visit by Foreign Minister Walid Muallem to Moscow, the government at long last, declared it was ready to meet with a delegation representing the opposition in what they called a “pre-dialogue” in Moscow, Geneva or Vienna. Meanwhile, Moaz al­Khatib’s own colleagues in the Coalition took a different direction. Meeting in Cairo, in February, they rejected their chairman’s proposal and decided that, in the future, no initiative would come out from their organization except from the general assembly -- all 70 or so members of them.
17. The next step came from the League of Arab States, whose Council of Ministers adopted a resolution on 6 March 2013 inviting the Coalition to form what they called an Executive Body, to attend the Arab Summit on 26 and 27 March and represent Syria in all the agencies of the League of Arab States system, until elections are held in Syria. The ministerial resolution was endorsed by the Arab Summit.
18. If the language of that resolution is to be taken literally, this means that, for the League of Arab States, the Geneva process is to be considered obsolete; no dialogue or negotiations are possible or necessary.
19. If in this depressing environment, we want to nonetheless find some hopeful signs, l would point out to the acceptance by the Coalition, for the first time that, under some conditions, they would consider a political process. And also the fact that the government has at long last moved from the position that the vague dialogue they were promoting would have to take place in Damascus and agreed to meet the other side outside of the country.
20. Even these meager, positive elements were soon put in question by Mr. (Ghassan) Hitto, the premier-designate of the government that the Coalition is trying to form, when he solemnly declared that his side wouldn’t participate in any dialogue with Damascus. On his part, President Bashar al-Assad in his long television interview two days ago again spoke of the opposition and of his understanding of dialogue in terms that are hardly encouraging.
21. On the ground, fighting has intensified, causing more victims, more destruction and more dislocation of society. That is why Valerie Amos told you yesterday there are now 6.8 million people who need aid inside Syria and Antonio Gueterres that the number of refugees will go up to 3.5 million by the end of the year. If you add to those already staggering numbers, that of hundreds of thousands of Syrians who left their country but are not officially registered as refugees, we would be saying that almost 50% of the Syrian population is being gravely affected by the conflict. I wonder if this is not a depressing record in the history of conflict, reminiscent perhaps of the exodus of Palestinians from their land in 1948 and 1967.
Mr. President,
22. Over the last few Weeks, a great deal of attention has been focused on al-Qaeda, Jabhat Al-Nusra and other similar groups fighting the regime in Syria. Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of al-Qaeda International, and Jabhat Al-Nusra itself have confirmed what was already common knowledge and that is that Jabhat Al-Nusra and other like-minded groups were formally affiliated to al-Qaeda or shared in its ideology and practices.
23. Equally confirmed is the fact that al-Nusra and its sister organizations were more important than originally thought. The Financial Times yesterday seemed to know that they represent only 10% of those who are engaged in the armed struggle against the regime. There also is more talk than ever about non-Syrians participating in the fighting in Syria, mostly Arabs but also other nationalities from Asia and Europe, East and West. Are all these foreign volunteers fighting in the ranks of al-Nusra and its sisters or are they spread more or less evenly among various armed groups? I don’t know. Nor do l know how credible are the numbers of those foreign fighters that vary considerably from one source to another. Four months ago, a reliable source close to the regime estimated the number of foreign fighters at a few hundred men and Jabhat al-Nusra at 3,000 to 5,000. Another source, now speaks of no less than 30,000 to 40,000 foreign fighters.
24. Foreign presence on the side of the government is also a reality. Both Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, the secretary-general of Hezbollah, and an official spokesperson in Tehran have confirmed that they were militarily present in Syria. How many; where; and doing what? There again, I do not know for certain. And again, these numbers vary widely from one source to the other; with some saying Hezbollah is only protecting religious Shiite shrines and the Iranians providing a few military advisors, and others claiming that the well-coordinated Hezbollah-lran presence counts thousands of fighters actively engaged alongside Government forces, plus advisers helping the regime form what they call the People’s Army, a decentralized militia force acting locally to replace or support the shadowy and much feared Shabiha gangs.
Mr. President
25. Until recently, the debate was moving back and forth from prediction of imminent fall of the regime to claims that the armed opposition was loosing momentum. I fear the debate may now shift to arguments about the importance of al-Qaeda and associated groups and how that will, or should, affect the attitude of regional and international players.
26. I hope the tree is not going to hide the wood. To learn who is who in the confrontation in and about Syria is necessary and important. I think it is fairly certain the regional dimension of the conflict in Syria is growing: features of a proxy war are more and more apparent but the conflict remains essentially a savage civil war between Syrians, and the sectarian dimensions of the crisis are perhaps more important to watch and understand than the participation of foreigners in the struggle. As for extremism, Syrians and international partners have every reason to be concerned over its effects on the present situation and on its possible long-term influence. The way to contain extremisms and reduce its influence is to more actively act to end the conflict.
27. Going forward, the choice for Syrian parties and for the international community has not changed and will not change: Is it going to be a deadly, destructive fight to the finish because each party and its supporters are convinced that total victory is not only possible but certain for them, or are these parties and their supporters going to agree, at long last, that there is no military solution to this conflict and that a serious negotiation is urgently needed to work out a political solution?
28. Many worthy ideas are floated around and discussed in many quarters on how to move forward. From the Quartet set up at the initiative of President Mohamed Morsi of Egypt, to Russia, to China, to the Friends of Syria and to many learned academics and journalists. All have in common a demand for an urgent end to the violence and a negotiated process, mediated by a qualified and accepted party.
Mr. President,
29. Antonio Guterres spoke to you yesterday with the authority of his office and the intimate knowledge he has of the present situation in Syria. His speech also drew on his experience as a former political leader in his country, Portugal. Permit me to remind you of a few of his words. I quote:  “helping Syria’s neighbors deal with the human fallout of this terrible conflict is crucial for preserving the stability of the entire region. This is not just another refugee crisis -- what happens in Syria and in the neighboring countries potentially has much wider, even global, implications... Failure to give these countries [Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey and others] the support they need to continue providing sanctuary to so many suffering Syrians would not only mean to abandon a people, and a whole region. It would be the world blindness to its own best interest” End of quote.
30. Antonio Guterres also said and I quote again: “There is no humanitarian solution for the Syrian crisis. That is why it is so dramatic that we are not even seeing an inch of progress towards a political solution.” And he asks: “Isn’t there any way to stop this fighting to open the door for a political solution?”
31. That last question was addressed to you, Mr. President, and to your colleagues, the members of the Security Council. Are you not the court of last appeal when peace and security are at risk? And where are peace and security more at risk today than in Syria, a country that is literally drowning and taking down an entire region down with it?
32. Yes, the problem is difficult, the situation becomes more complex by the day, the regime is not quite ready to listen, the opposition not as united as it should be around an established leadership and a credible, constructive political program. Yes, this situation appears to be totally hopeless, with no light to be seen at the end of a long tunnel Syria is lost in.
33. In an article written with Sarah Birke and published only three days ago, Peter Harling of ICG, a very perceptive observer of the Syria and the Middle East scene, says and I quote: “Given a chance, (Syrian) society may pull through; it might fare better still of the conflict draws to a close and the aftermath is skillfully handled. With each day of the conflict – today is day 763 – those chances become slimmer, diminishing Syrians’ sense of national identity and their pride in their society… With incremental indecisive interference from all sides, further escalation is almost inevitable. Syria’s all-out civil war, if it comes to that, will no doubt go down in conventional wisdom as an outburst of communal hatred, inevitable within a mixed society. Nothing could be further from the truth. It is product of an international standoff. However Syrians suffer, the war in their country is not in their hands: it is conflict that disfigures Syrian society more than reflects it” End of quote.
34. Might it be said -- Mr. President -- that the solution of that war is in your hands, members of the Security Council?
35. That does not mean, of course that Syrians have no role to play in the search for a solution to the crisis in their country. Important developments need to take place before a decisive shift away from the existing violence towards a political process can be credibly initiated. In particular, on the side of the opposition, a more consistent and sustained effort to reinforce and expand unity and discipline in their ranks inside and outside the country, among civilians, among armed groups, and between civilians and the military.
36. Also on the side of the opposition and some – not all – of their supporters, an understanding that external military intervention is neither likely or desirable; nor can such an intervention be provoked. Furthermore, it is perfectly legitimate for them to demand that President Bashar al-Assad leave office and his regime be dismantled. But, these are objectives, and processes needed to be elaborated to achieve them. Every conflict needs at a certain stage to be politically addressed. It is high time, after two long years, to start working, with others on such a political process for Syria. Moaz al-Khatib’s initiative in February should be further developed not discarded.
37. On the side of the regime, it is equally urgent to give up the dream of a military victory. That is not going to happen. Nor is it realistic to expect that somehow, because of the perceived growing importance of al-Nusra, a spectacular shift is to going to push the regime and the West into an unholy alliance to fight Islamic terrorism. President Assad, two days ago, said very clearly that what is taking place in his country is war. He does not agree that this is a civil war (nor does the opposition, in fact). But surely, a war cannot be brought to an end through a vague dialogue with mainly the supporters of one’s own side. It needs a negotiation between the warring parties. Nor should the dialogue be expected to lead to limited or cosmetic reforms. That has been tried and did not work.
38. In this context, I will venture to add this: President Assad consistently insisted that, as a Syrian citizen, it was his right to run for election if he wished. As far as I know, he does not say that he shall run after the end of his current mandate. Could an appeal be made him to voluntarily forego that right and undertake not to run? This would not be a defeat for him but a huge constructive and honorable contribution to save Syria.
39. Much debate has taken place about the flow of arms and how it can be checked. Two years on this conflict, it is unrealistic to expect that the flow of arms can be stopped to one side but not to the other. The way to go is to respond to the repeated pleas of the Secretary-General that the flow of arms be stopped to all sides in Syria.
40. Nor would it be reasonable to expect a total embargo on the delivery of arms to be effective for any length of time if a political process that includes a viable and verifiable ceasefire is not crafted and accepted by all shortly thereafter.
Mr. President,
41. May I finally remind the Council of the suggestions I made during my last briefing on 29 January. I believe these suggestions remain valid and there is even more urgency today for the Council to consider acting on them.