The unmaking of the Arab world

Fahmi Howeidi is a leading Egyptian political and social scholar and author, and one of the Arab world’s most prominent columnists. Following is my abridgment of his syndicated think piece this week:

There is a sort of overlap in tuning in on the revolution and the government in Egypt.

That’s caused either by incessant media campaigns denigrating the revolution in the public eye or by the torrent of government crises news, which make people lose sight of the revolution’s achievements.

In effect, the Egypt revolution ended a reign of corruption and tyranny and returned the country to its people. It brought a Pharaonic era to a close, restored civil liberties, ended minority rule and empowered the masses to have the final say on their government.

But why did Egypt’s post-revolution administration stumble?

One explanation is that decade-long tyranny not only destroyed Egypt’s political and economic present, but its future as well.

The other explanation is the preclusion of all and sundry from Egyptian politics save for a restricted group of loyalists handpicked by the former president.

As a result, the political class was neither coached in managing state affairs nor shown the ropes of state administration.

This political class was also shut out from any communal endeavor to promote the national interest through state institutions.

Egypt’s post-revolution administration crisis can thus be blamed on a host of factors, including:

• The classic tension that dawns each time a revolution brings down a regime and tries to replace it
• The heavy legacy left by the deposed regime, such as the ruination of politics, the economy, state institutions and society.
• Mismanagement of state affairs by President Mohamed Morsi and his team and their reneging of election promises.
• Immaturity of opposition figures
• The tug-of-war among some nationalist camp components
• Lawlessness, which also undermines economic activity
• External pressures.

Everyone in Egypt is now aware that although it made good progress over the years in running its own business, the Muslim Brotherhood did not make the grade in reigning over and managing society.

That is the root cause of the current crisis, which led to the political stalemate in Egypt.

Overcoming the political deadlock requires a lot of wisdom, courage and foresight, all of which seem lacking – at least for the foreseeable future.

(2)

In the case of all four or five Arab Spring countries, revolt proved much more profound and far-reaching than actual or prospective regime change.

The new manifestations that are kept in the public eye day and night by the media touch only the surface of the spirit of rebellion, which drove ordinary citizens to protest loudly against oppression, corruption and social injustice.

The discrepancy made me distinguish between what I call the “tumultuous spring” and the “silent” variety.

“Tumultuous spring” came out in the open and called for regime change in some countries.

By contrast, the “silent spring” chose to express itself calmly through the social media.

Its aim is regime reform, but not regime change. It falls in the category of “reformist spring” as opposed to “revolutionary spring.”

The open letter calling for reform, which Saudi cleric Salman al-Odah posted last month on Facebook and Twitter falls in the latter category. Odah specifically called for ending the practice of media control, information censorship and the release of political prisoners.

Other reformists made similar appeals elsewhere in the Gulf.

(3)

From this perspective, I believe the pan-Arab nation is meanwhile facing an existential impasse that needs addressing.

While historic change looms on the horizon, a vacuum hangs on the Arab arena.

Observers fail to spot a leader or a plan the Arabs can rally around or defend.

When focusing on the Arab arena, all they spot are three endeavors: the Turks are expanding economically, the Iranian politically and the Israelis through land grabs to build settlements.

Moreover, changes on the ground suggest the region’s maps are being reconfigured and a new Sykes-Picot Agreement is being contemplated.

The pointers:

• Iraq faces partition after having been steamrolled by the United States invasion. Iraqi Kurdistan has almost seceded, and nothing keeps the lid on its independence other than the absence of a public declaration of self-determination preceded by a ban on hoisting the Iraqi national flag on its territory. A forceful call is also being made to divide Iraq into three regions – one for Kurds, another for Shiites and the third for Sunnis.
• Syria is poised to follow suit, especially that its regime seems on its last legs so far. Should the Assad regime fall, contingency plans are already in place to declare an Alawite state along the country’s coastline. In anticipation, Syria’s central bank reserves have reportedly been moved to Latakia, whose seaport and airport are being upgraded.
• The side-effects of the Syrian regime’s collapse would allow for (a) a shift in the balance of power in Lebanon at Hezbollah’s expense (b) a shot in the arm to the Sunni uprising in Iraq (c) a rekindling of the Kurdish issue, which explains Turkey’s recent preemptive peace deal with PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, and (d) rethinking and re-planning in Tehran, particularly that a blitz by Israel on its nuclear facilities is not off the table yet.
• The Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza Strip remain in limbo and the risks of a third Intifada erupting mount.
• Sudan’s South has broken away from its North.
• In Yemen, calls are growing louder all the time for the secession of the South.
• Morocco is grappling with the Tamazight movement’s political demands shortly after recognizing the Tamazight language in its new constitution.
• Over and above the widening schism between its Sunnis and Shiites, the Arab world finds itself riven by rifts between the Salafi movement and Ennahda Movement in Tunisia, between Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and between Salafis and seculars in Algeria.

These are ample indicators of how the Arab world is liable to break up. The process of restructuring it is quietly moving ahead while it remains unfazed or unaware. 

Islamist movements keep seeking their own demise

From L. clockwise: King Abdulaziz, Saladin, Imadaddin Zengi and Abu Hamed al-Ghazali

This think piece was penned in Arabic for al-Hayat daily by Jamal Khashoggi, the Saudi journalist now heading Saudi billionaire Prince Walid bin Talal’s Arabic news channel Al Arab launching at year’s end:

Why do many present-day Islamist movements always seek their own demise?

Why do they consistently insist on “all or nothing”?

Salafist jihadism today matches India’s Deobandi movement.

Salafis today are not even one.

It was King Abdulaziz, founder of the Saudi state that celebrated its 82^nd National Day recently, who revived contemporary Salafism. He was a true Salafi, but he was also a politician who cajoled the big shots and cultivated the minnows but always came out on top.

Before the distortion of Salafism and jihad through abuse by ultraconservatives of these two noble traits of Muslims, every Muslim activist sought to reconcile Salafism, or faith advocacy, and jihad.

Salaheddin el-Ayyoubi, better known in the Western world as Saladin, and Imadaddin Zengi before him, were like that – Salafi jihadists. Both used beyond measure tactics of modern-day Islamist movements to mobilize the faithful for jihad.

They propagated jihad through preachers and orators -- not only in mosques on Fridays but at all times and on all occasions.

They built efficient local administrations in Damascus, Aleppo and Cairo. They were merciful to people and gracious in their sermons.

They were benign in their promotion of virtue and prevention of vice.

They were also ruthless when they needed to.

Imadaddin Zengi was hard-hearted when fighting local leaders.

Saladin was not, by today’s standards, a democrat or believer in freedom of opinion and expression. Once he prevailed in Egypt (after overthrowing the Shiite Fatamids), he restored Sunnite orthodoxy in the country and stamped out Shiite jurisprudence in al-Azhar. (That’s why Saladin is more of a hero in the Arab world than in Iran). His strategic move bore a resemblance to the Islamist movements of the day, particularly the line of theologian Abu Hamed al-Ghazali as expressed in his writings, specifically his book “The Revival of Religious Sciences.”

In the end, Imadeddin Zengi and Saladin succeeded in building two nation-states that outlived them by years.

They laid the foundations for an Islamic revival movement. In addition to introducing administrative reform, they handed down a plethora of schools, hospitals, markets, castles and public facilities that are still standing today. (Some of these are currently being pulverized by the Syrian regime’s tanks and warplanes).

In other words, Zengi and Saladin did not simply lead a fleeting protest movement such as al-Qaeda and the likes that always seek their own demise.

In modern history, Abdulaziz al-Saud emulated Zengi and Saladin.

He surrounded himself with local leaders who outmatched him in wealth, political maneuver and international connections.

He was fenced in by a Great Power when turning east, south, north or even west to look across the sea to Egypt.

He also had to put up with a group seeking it own demise. His valiant military commander Faisal al-Dwaish kept striving to challenge the British, who were then protectors of the Gulf, Iraq and Transjordan.

Dwaish ultimately defied his leader and ended up dying in jail with history remembering his insubordination more than his military heroics.

I remembered King Abdulaziz when hearing the leader of Somalia’s al-Shabab pledge that his militiamen won’t stop their advance before reaching Nairobi and Addis Ababa, having overcome Ethiopian forces in their country in 2006.

Al-Shabab could have instead focused on building Somalia and sinking their roots deeper at home. Had they done that, they would probably have been ruling a stable and secure Somalia. The leader in question might have been negotiating with the Dubai Port Authority to build a port in Kismayo followed by a franchise fishing deal with a Japanese company.

Instead, he said last week his Islamist militants were abandoning their last major bastion, Kismayo.

This makes me wonder again: Why do many modern-day Islamist groups always seek their own demise?

They antagonize everyone far and near as soon as they score a victory.

In Libya, they trumped their opponents by joining the revolution. They then proceeded to desecrate graves at (Commonwealth) war cemeteries and attack the U.S. embassy.

By so doing they turned people against them, eventually losing their reputation, their weapons and their camps.

In Tunisia, they were released from jail, had a taste of freedom and enjoyed it, then abused it and decided that Tunisians, as apprentices in modernity, needed guidance. Those were the same Tunisians who a month earlier had voted into power a moderate Islamist party. They ended antagonizing Tunisians and their government who subsequently demanded their eradication.

In Yemen, they absented themselves from the transition process that removed the tyrant they were fighting. They failed to appreciate that the sea change taking place in the country presented them with an opportunity to end their cocooning. Instead, they want their jihad to last for all eternity. Their latest reaction was a suicide bombing in Abyan.

In Egypt, they stand out as first class debaters. They joined the constitution-drafting body (otherwise known as the Constituent Assembly). Instead of leaving their imprint on a historic legacy, they focused on such trivialities, as “girls can be married as soon as they reach puberty.” They will surely pay the price of their idiocy at the next elections.

I can go on recounting innumerable telltales from Mali, Afghanistan, Iraq and my own homeland Saudi Arabia. The self-interest of present-day Islamist movements invariably takes priority over the interests of the public.

In truth, these militant movements mandate acts of suicide in combat but take their own life in politics.