Rohani, the guardian jurist and Iran’s key

Two days before winning Iran's presidential vote earlier this week, reformist-backed cleric Hassan Rohani gave a glimpse of his plans if elected.

He was answering questions emailed to him by the Saudi daily Asharq Alawsat.

Here are some of his salient remarks:

• Decisions on major foreign policy issues constitutionally require the support of the supreme leader... If elected, I expect to receive the same support and trust from the supreme leader on initiatives and measures I adopt to advance our foreign policy agenda.
• Nuclear weapons have no role in Iran’s national security doctrine, and therefore Iran has nothing to conceal. But in order to move towards the resolution of Iran’s nuclear dossier, we need to build both domestic consensus and global convergence and understanding through dialogue… The P5+1 can be one channel for such negotiations, provided that they are prepared to be a vehicle for understanding and resolution of the issue rather than a tool for procrastination and political blackmail.
• In my view, and in order to find a fair and generally agreed solution, Iran can play a mediatory role between the Syrian government and those in the opposition who strive for democracy and good governance… The year 2014 is very important, as President Assad’s term of office expires. A genuine election, free from foreign intervention and subversion, and the establishment of an elected government could restore stability and security in Syria.
• If elected, improving and expanding relations with neighboring countries at all levels is a major priority in my future administration. Iran shares borders with fifteen countries over land and sea. All of them are important for us. On your question regarding Saudi Arabia, I plan to reverse the recently exacerbated [and] unfortunate rivalry between the two countries into mutual respect and mutually beneficial arrangements and cooperation to enhance security and restore stability in the region.
• If elected, I will do my best to secure the release of those who have been incarcerated following the regrettable events of 2009. I know that the constitutional powers of the president in Iran do not extend to the areas outside the realm of the executive branch of the system. However, I am quite optimistic that I can muster the necessary domestic consensus to improve the present situation of Hossein Mousavi and Mehdi Karrubi.
• The Iran–US relationship is a complex and difficult issue. A bitter history, filled with mistrust and animosity, marks this relationship. It has become a chronic wound whose healing is difficult but possible, provided that good faith and mutual respect prevail…

Ghassan Charbel, editor-in-chief of pan-Arab al-Hayat, writes in Arabic today of “Rohani, the Guardian Jurist and the Key.” In his view:

Hassan Rohani did well to have chosen the image of a key to symbolize his presidential campaign. The doors are shut and the horizon is blocked.

He perhaps wanted the symbol to rekindle the optimism of the generation of young Iranians who no more suffice with blowing the coals of the Islamic Revolution and denouncing Great Satan.

Caution – and lots of it -- is imperative when writing about Iran.

The Persian carpet of democracy was diligently woven under the cloak of the Guardian Jurist. The carpet knots are so fine that they block out yarns and threads. Islamic Revolution institutions tolerate differences in detail, not in substance.

Suppression of the Green Movement was emphatic. Iran’s spring was nipped in the bud before spring winds uprooted others.

Hassan Rohani is a legitimate son of the Iranian revolution.

He joined Khomeini as he prepared his homecoming to overthrown the Shah’s regime.

He explored the Islamic Republic’s corridors of power in parliament, in councils and in the army, information and national security dossiers.

He knitted a strong relationship with Hashemi Rafsanjani and won the confidence of Mohammad Khatami who chose him as his chief nuclear negotiator with the West.

Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s two terms of office were long and taxing.

True, they secured Iran “conquests” in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.

Equally true, they ended as they did, with economic sanctions squeezing Iran financially, the national currency falling to record lows, unemployment soaring to new highs, confrontations escalating and isolation mounting.

Rohani, as the regime’s scion, is aware the president is not the policy-maker on nuclear and foreign policy matters.

The tenet is unambiguous: the key sits in the Guardian Jurist’s drawer.

There is no point describing the economic situation. The Internet is replete with figures of losses. Tension with the West is evident. Iran has to pump huge amounts of cash to allow its ally in Damascus to soldier on with the war. The fact Hezbollah joined the fray adds to the political and economic burdens.

Iran looks like having rushed into a life-or-death battle, risking all its credit.

None of the aforesaid is blown out of proportion. Iran’s isolation is blatant.

The Sunni-Shiite rift risks cordoning off Iran with walls and fences. Some believe Iran expanded more than its economy could afford, mirroring the mistake committed by the now-defunct Soviet Union.

The triumph at the ballot box of a president with the attributes of rationality, realism and moderation undoubtedly polished the regime’s image, which was badly tarnished by its plunge into the Syria war.

Rohani knows this and is aware of what the regime did to Khatami, and to Rafsanjani before him.

But the situation today is more intricate and threatening.

Iran was never as cut off as it is today. Continuing to tread the current path is fraught with security, political and economic risks. And reneging previous commitments could mean drinking a second poisoned chalice, if not more.

Faced with this grim reality, Hassan Rohani chose the image of a key to symbolize his presidential campaign. He fought the presidential battle and came out on top in the first round. The remarks he made to Iranian TV after his victory confirm his intentions; “It was the triumph of wisdom, moderation, growth and awareness over extremism and fanaticism.”

He dwelt on hope and new openings, except that the test won’t be long in coming.

Can the Iranian president use the key or is he simply the senior employee in the Guardian Jurist’s office?

Did the Guardian Jurist admit the regime needs to open a window or will the hardliners quickly remind Rohani doors can’t be opened except with the Guardian Jurist’s key?

We have to wait to witness Rohani’s style, the key’s fate and the new demarcation lines between the hardliners and the temple guards.

But the dark clouds gathering over the region might not afford Rohani the luxury of a calm search for the key and the opportunity to use his mandate.

We could awaken one day to the heat of a major wildfire.

The West’s appeasement of Iran

This is an edited translation of excerpts from the weekly think piece of leading American-Lebanese journalist Raghida Dergham for this morning’s edition of the pan-Arab daily al-Hayat:

The West’s ambiguous attitudes towards the Islamic Republic of Iran raise many questions.

For instance, is the collective objective of the United States, Britain and France to allow Iran to thwart a Syrian Opposition victory in Syria?

Or, is their shared aim to push Iran and Hezbollah deeper into the Syria quagmire?

The West is also out to lunch in the run-up to next month’s presidential election in Iran. It chose to get some shuteye when it was supposed to be exposing the establishment’s increasing dogmatism. That’s what the West did in Iran’s 10^th presidential election in 2009, before the reformist movement was crushed.

Unlike in 2009, when it encouraged Iran’s reformist movement, the West made nothing this week when the Guardian Council, a body of theologians and jurists, disqualified reformist ex-President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani from running and approved only eight conservative candidates to stand for president.

In their on-off nuclear negotiations for a decade, the West continues to give Iran elbowroom to press ahead with its most contentious nuclear work. Here too, the West comes across as appeasing the Mullahs.

As to the regional role to which Tehran lays claim, the West seems content to play a double role. On the one hand, the West appears to give Iran free rein in the Arab countries it covets, chiefly Iraq, Syria and Lebanon.

At the same time, Washington, London and Paris give the impression of being pleased to see Sunnis and Shiites crossing swords in Syria’s war of attrition, thus keeping both sides at bay from their cities.

Public acknowledgement of the presence of Iranian forces in Syria leaves the West in a quandary. A UN Security Council resolution (Resolution 1747 of 24 March 2007) bars arms exports by Iran under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.

In paragraph 5 of the said resolution, the UN Security Council “Decides that Iran shall not supply, sell or transfer directly or indirectly from its territory or by its nationals or using its flag vessels or aircraft any arms or related materiel…”

Would the West be invoking the breach anytime soon?

The West explicitly warned Hezbollah recently against intervening militarily in Syria. And as a response to the group’s joining the war on the side of Assad’s regime, Europe is hinting it “might” designate Hezbollah’s military wing as a terrorist entity.

The U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee voted this week to pass a bill that will be highly unpopular in Moscow, let alone Damascus.

The “Syrian Transition Support Act” would provide arms to Syrian rebels in support of a regime change.

The bill heads first to the Senate, then to the House and finally to the president.

If the bill is passed, will President Barack Obama sign it?

So far, his policy has been to prevent a victory in Syria either by the armed opposition, which includes not more than five or 10 percent from Jabhat al-Nusra, or by the Iran-Hezbollah-Russia triumvirate.

As usual, Britain and France continue to warn on Syria, only to backtrack later. Both have been talking for months about arming the opposition, even at the cost of busting the European Union arms embargo, only to put their moves on hold afterward.

Are Britain and France acquiescing to the war of exhaustion and attrition in Syria, to help their intelligence services -- and the West generally – gather invaluable information on Sunni extremists belonging to al-Qaeda, Jabhat al-Nusra and the likes?

By flying to Amman this week for the “Friends of Syria” core group meeting, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry looked more like Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s Geneva-2 salesman.

Whereas Washington was previously calling on Assad to stand down, the Amman closing statement simply said Assad “cannot play a role in the future of Syria.”

Russia wants Iran to be in Geneva-2. And the United States has yet to say no. All Washington said this week in a background briefing on Kerry’s trip to Amman was, “We’ll certainly have to talk to the Russians more, and we’ll have to talk also to the United Nations because they very well will have a big role. So the final attendance list is still under discussion.”

The now-defunct Soviet Union spent decades trying to reach the warm waters of the Mediterranean. Russia reached them via Tartus. Iran is already there via Hezbollah in Lebanon.

All these intertwined elements warrant a rethink. Talk of the Syria war being a quagmire or a Vietnam hemorrhaging Iran and Hezbollah is offset by whispers of a behind-the-scenes grand bargain whereby West and East hand Iran victory in her Vietnam war against Sunni extremists in Syria, plus a say in the regional balance of forces.

Iran presidential hopefuls’ window closing

Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei

On June 14, exactly five weeks from today, Iranians will flock to the polls to elect a new president to succeed Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.

Candidate registration started Tuesday and ends tomorrow, Saturday.

Iran’s Mehr news agency put the number of hopefuls who had already registered by Thursday night at 243.

An adviser to Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei was one candidate who joined them earlier today. By registering to run, lawmaker and former parliament speaker Gholam-Ali Haddad-Adel becomes the first of a trio of Khamenei loyalists to do so.

Allied with Haddad-Adel, 68, are former Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati, 67, and Tehran mayor Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf, 51. Iranian media say two of them will step aside later in favor of whoever appears to have the best chance of winning the election.

Velayati is another top adviser to Khamenei on international affairs. He served as foreign minister during the 1980-88 war with Iraq and into the 1990s. He is a physician and runs a hospital in north Tehran.

Charismatic Tehran Mayor Ghalibaf is a former commander of the Revolutionary Guards during the Iran-Iraq War.

Among other candidates who registered on Friday was reformist Mohammad-Reza Aref, who served as vice-president under former moderate President Mohammad Khatami.

Khatami, who was elected in landslide victories in 1997 and 2001, has not made clear whether he will run this time.

Another prominent figure Hassan Rowhani, Iran's former nuclear negotiator and confidant to ex-President Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, also put forward his name.

Rowhani's allies say he will withdraw his application if Rafsanjani decides to run for president.

Both Rafsanjani and Khatami, whose moderate candidacies would radically alter the contest, appear reluctant to stand unless given the nod from Khamenei but neither have ruled themselves out.

"I will not enter the field without his consent," Rafsanjani said this week, according to the Mehr news agency. "If circumstances are such that there will be conflicts and disputes between me and the leader, we will all lose."

More conservatives than reformists have put themselves forward as candidates, reports say.

The Guardian Council decides who can stand.

In 2009, 475 hopefuls registered as candidates, but the Guardian Council, whose 12 members are either directly or indirectly appointed by Khamenei, only gave its approval to four.

The final list of candidates will be unveiled later this month, around May 23.

"The rules set for the election excludes many who might have been able to stand under normal circumstances. The entire opposition, ranging from Communists to monarchists and passing by nationalists and liberals, are branded as 'enemies' and excluded," Amir Taheri writes today in his weekly column for the Saudi daily Asharq Alawsat.

Taheri, who was executive editor-in-chief of Kayhan daily in Tehran from 1972 to 1979, authored 11 books and was named International Journalist of the Year by the British Society of Editors and the Foreign Press Association in the annual 2102 British Media Awards, writes in part:

Half of the population -- women -- is barred from running. Only men can register as candidates.

Although legally recognized as religious minorities, Christians, Jews, and Zoroastrians -- altogether numbering around one million altogether -- are also excluded. So are 300,000 from the Baha’i Faith, on grounds of belonging to an  "illegal" religious minority.

Being Muslim is not enough to make you eligible to run for president. Iranian Sunni Muslims, believed to number around 12 million, are barred from running.

“The would-be candidates must be Shiite Muslims,” the Interior Ministry declares.

Not all Shiite denominations are accepted. The “Seveners” or Ismailis are excluded, as are Zaidis, not to mention smaller esoteric offshoots of Shiism.

However, being a “Twelver” (Ithna’ashari) is not enough either. The candidate must be a political or religious figure and believe in the core tenets of the Islamic Republic. This means, for instance, a businessman, an opera singer or a taxi driver, cannot seek the presidency.

Clearly, such conditions would give the authorities ample opportunity to block the candidacy of figures considered a threat to Khamenei.

This is not about electing a president in the normal sense of the term. It is about choosing a “yes-man” for the “Supreme Guide...”