Homs, like Qusayr, gets a mean Russian blow

Map by the Institute for the Study of War

Russia five weeks ago blocked the draft text of a UN Security Council declaration of alarm over the blockade of Qusayr (see my June 2 post).

Within days, the town close to the Syrian-Lebanese border fell to the combined forces of the Syrian regime and Iran’s Lebanese Hezbollah.

This week, Russia blocked the draft text of a UN Security Council declaration of grave concern about the civilians trapped in the besieged city of Homs.

This probably means Moscow expects regime and Hezbollah forces to imminently route opposition rebels from Syria’s third largest city, which they have been pummeling for nearly 10 days.

Regime and Hezbollah forces control parts of Homs, while several neighborhoods in the center are opposition strongholds.

Council statements must be agreed unanimously.

Australia and Luxembourg circulated in the council last Wednesday this draft statement on Homs, which Moscow obstructed the next day:

The members of the Security Council express their grave concern about the estimated 2,500 civilians trapped in Homs as a result of the recent heavy fighting.

The members of the Security Council call upon the Syrian Government to facilitate immediate, safe and unhindered access, in accordance with the United Nations guiding principles of humanitarian assistance, for relevant humanitarian, including UN, actors, to reach civilians in Homs, in urgent need of assistance, in particular, medical assistance.

The members of the Security Council call upon all parties in Syria to do their utmost to protect civilians, including allowing them to leave Homs and avoid civilian casualties, recalling the primary responsibility of the Syrian Government in this regard.  They emphasize that those responsible for violations of applicable international law will be held accountable.

Russia’s UN Mission said it proposed an alternative statement, which called for immediate access to Homs as well as the predominantly Shiite government-controlled towns of Nubul and Zahra that opposition fighters are seeking to take.

An eye-opener on the regime’s renewed offensive in Homs is a news analysis by the Institute for the Study of War authored by Elizabeth O’Bagy, which you can read in full here.

It states in part:

Although the opposition is thoroughly entrenched in parts of Homs city, much of the countryside has been cleared of rebel presence and the frequency of government checkpoints has grown…

Activists in Homs city said all cellular lines were cut early on June 29 before airplanes pounded rebel-held districts in the city. Before government troops could advance, intense shelling with artillery, mortars, and tanks followed the two-day-long air campaign.

Throughout the week, rebel forces have engaged in intense clashes with government troops in Khalidiya, Hamidiya and the Old City. Government forces are attempting to push into rebel-held districts from all sides, and are choking rebel supply lines into the city…

"This is the worst campaign against the city since the revolution began," said an activist in the rebel-held old quarter of the city. Rebel commanders reinforced this message, adding that the regime has significantly accelerated its operations in Homs province in the past week, and has brought substantial forces to bear, aided by both air superiority and Iranian, Hezbollah, and Iraqi irregular forces.

Although rebel fighters are sufficiently entrenched in Homs to ensure a prolonged fight for the city, the opposition currently lacks the requisite arms and supplies to hold off the offensive for an extended period of time.

The delaying action in Homs is strategically significant because it gains the opposition time in Aleppo, but if the regime is able to consolidate its hold in Homs city and the countryside, it may be able to secure its lines of communication in ways that make its ultimate offensive in Aleppo more effective.

The factor that will most limit the regime’s ability to redeploy assets from Homs to Aleppo will be holding cleared terrain, which can be time consuming and troop intensive.

In addition to ongoing operations, the Syrian government has also been attempting to shore up its military success in Homs province by repopulating the towns and villages that come under regime control with Alawites.

In al-Qusayr, citizens from the 23 neighboring Alawi villages have been encouraged to relocate in al-Qusayr into the homes of those who fled during the fighting. This has also been seen in other predominantly Sunni towns…

By resettling Alawites into formerly Sunni villages and towns, the Syrian government is attempting to create new demographic realities that help ensure that the countryside does not fall again into rebel hands. Moreover, surrounding key cities with supportive communities allows the Syrian government to use these villages as a base for staging operations against remaining rebel strongholds and helps create conditions more conducive to regime victory in Homs city itself…

Overall, the Syrian government’s campaign in Homs sheds light on two important markers of overall regime capability: its difficulty with launching sequential campaigns without an operational pause, as well as the challenges it faces from launching multiple, simultaneous offensives in Aleppo, Homs, and Damascus in ways that protract each fight… 

With the battle for Homs raging on, the Syrian National Coalition yesterday elected Ahmad Jarba, 44, as its new president after a close runoff vote held in Istanbul.

Jarba, who represents the faction of veteran secular dissident Michel Kilo and has Saudi connections, obtained 55 votes – three more than defeated businessman Mustafa Sabbagh, Qatar’s pointman in the opposition.

The 114 members of the coalition also elected three vice presidents -- Suhair Atassi, Farouk Tayfur and Salem Muslit.

Badr Jamous was voted secretary general of the umbrella organization officially recognized by the Arab League and dozens of states and organizations as the legitimate representative of the Syrian people.

Egypt: Supreme Guide and Army General shadows

Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi (top) and the Brotherhood's Supreme Guide Mohamed Badie 

“The Muslims defeated the Islamists” in Egypt.

To my mind, these five words by Walid Abi-Mershed in his column today for Saudi Asharq Alawsat explain the army’s removal of Mohamed Morsi, Egypt’s first Islamist president, after millions of people protested over his leadership.

A scintillating account of the rise and fall of Morsi one year after assuming office comes in this think piece titled “Shadows of the Supreme Guide and Army General” and penned in Arabic by Ghassan Charbel, editor-in-chief of pan-Arab al-Hayat:

Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei went to al-Ittihadiya Palace to meet with Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi on the latter’s invitation.

The meeting was one-on-one, except that the visitor sensed the presence of others.

He saw behind the president the silhouettes of Mohamed Badie, Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, and his second-in-command Khairat el-Shater.

Such shadows raise suspicions. The visitor worried about the president resorting to the supreme guide, not the constitution.

That’s why ElBaradei told this (al-Hayat) newspaper, “I met with the president, we had a conversation and I gave up on him.”

Hamdeen Sabahi went to al-Ittihadiya Palace.  The shadows’ insistence on attending the meeting reminded him of his conversation with presidential candidate Morsi during the countdown to the runoffs.

Hamdeen had won some five million votes in the first round and opted out of the presidential race.

Morsi was hoping to woo those voters to secure victory over Ahmed Shafiq in the runoff.

Hamdeen asked Morsi a difficult question: “If you won the presidency, would you be a president independent of the Muslim Brotherhood’s diktats?”

Morsi could not answer and chose instead to offer Hamdeen the post of vice president.

Hamdeen begged off.

Amr Moussa went to al-Ittihadiya Palace and met with Morsi and the two shadows.

Since he emerged from the meeting and monitored the president’s performance, he did not hide his disquiet about the future of Egypt, the native land of Taha Hussein and Naguib Mahfouz that has always been a beacon of hope for its people. Moussa got into such a sweat about Egypt’s spirit.

That was in the lead-up to June 30, which all three men consider to be a landmark day.

They believed early presidential elections were de rigueur to save the country from Morsi’s regime. Clearly, they meant to save it from the big shadow cast on the regime – the shadow of the supreme guide.

Standards and the code of ethics require professional journalists not to fall for the opposition. So we had to make our way to the headquarters of the Freedom and Justice Party, political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood.

I asked the party vice chairman Dr. Essam el-Erian if he ever-expected President Hosni Mubarak to fall and Egypt to choose a president from the Muslim Brotherhood.

I liked his answer: “I am confident this pipedream never crossed any Egyptian’s mind. Any Egyptian would be lying if he told you he expected the revolution to succeed or Hosni Mubarak to fall or Mohamed Morsi to become president. Had the era of miracles not been a thing of the past, I would have told you we are living in that era.”

Erian did not seem worried about June 30.

His self-assurance made him say he not only expected Morsi to complete his mandate but could also win a second term.

Erian sounded confident and relaxed and on completion of our conversation he invited my colleague Mohamed Salah and I to the office of party chairman Saad el-Katatni. The later was equally laid-back.

The “January 2011 revolution” took by surprise both the Brotherhood’s supreme guide and the armed forces’ top dog at the time, Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi. The two men reacted with aplomb.

Voters then eagerly opted to cast off the shadows of Mubarak and his generals. They ended up with Morsi’s regime and the supreme guide’s shadow.

Morsi failed to dispel the impression that “the supreme guide’s bureau is the president’s president.” His mistakes piled up and the media showed him no mercy.

Fear of “Brotherhood-ization” by millions of Egyptians turned “June 30” into a broad uprising against the president and the shadow lurking in the palace.

In January 2011, Tantawi felt the army had to connect with the public squares.

In June 2013, Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi felt the army had to reconcile with them and sponsor them.

The result was a full-blown intifada and a quasi-coup.

The “Brothers” refused to come to terms with the outcome.

They refused to reflect on the reasons that drove millions to public squares to jeer them.

They refused to recognize the implications of the millions of signatures on the Tamarrud petition.

The “Brothers” preferred to aim at Gen. Sisi’s shadow to portray the Brotherhood as the victim and the scapegoat.

When the head of the High Constitutional Court Adly Mansour was sworn in as interim president, they elected to see Gen. Sisi’s silhouette behind him.

Yesterday’s sight of two Egypts facing off in the shadows of the supreme guide and army general was traumatic.

The “Brothers” ventured to take the supreme guide’s shadow into the palace.

Removal of an elected president in a quasi-revolution and quasi-coup is a gamble as well.

There is no solution other than to quickly exit this tunnel and sail into an Egypt in the shadows of a constitution compatible with its spirit and an elected president unbound in his palace by the silhouettes of a supreme guide and an army general. 

Political Islam and change in Egypt and Syria

"Islam is the solution"

Arab revolutions breaking out since late 2010 were not expected to sail through as soon as power changed hands, says Lebanese affairs bureau chief of pan-Arab al-Hayat Walid Choucair.

Commenting on turbulent political change in Egypt and Syria, he writes in part:

Forsaking authoritarian regimes that spent decades stamping out the popular will and domesticating political life is always fraught with difficulties and pitfalls.

Uprisings against underdevelopment, marginalization, oppression, humiliation, the plunder of national wealth and the taming of state institutions are invariably harrowing.

Egypt’s Muslim Brothers were not the only ones to fail in worming their way to a new regime. Their kinfolk in Tunisia and Morocco and their ilk in Libya did not fair any better.

Their counterparts in Syria have yet to close ranks as they wrestle with the regime.

Egypt’s Muslim Brothers failed to seize the opportunity they got to address their country’s political, economic and social ills. Hence the alliances that ousted them, which brought together the military, religious and cultural establishments, opposition parties and the Tamarrud mass movement.

The irony is: (1) In Egypt, voters gave political Islam the opportunity to rule and then held it to account on public squares for its failures (2) In Syria, President Bashar al-Assad’s forces bombed the squares and the masses crowding them under the guise of fighting political Islam.

In his weekly column for the independent Beirut daily an-Nahar, senior analyst Jihad el-Zein reflects on the quick breakdown of domineering political Islam.

In el-Zein’s opinion:

Ushered on by Iran’s Islamic Revolution in 1979, it took fundamentalist Islam about 35 years to rise to power before starting to lose its shine. It noticeably went downhill with the outbreak of internecine strife between Shiite fundamentalism and its Sunni counterpart followed by its post-Arab Spring self-destruct in Tunisia and Egypt.

The slogan “Islam is the solution” championed in Egypt by the Muslim Brotherhood and its Islamist allies evaporated posthaste.

The second Egyptian revolution now underway killed off all political hope that Islamist political movements in the Arab world are capable of managing successfully the tough and complex issues facing a nation-state in the contemporary world.

“Islam is the solution” hit a brick wall when millions of Muslims – most of them devout – avowed in different ways in Egypt, Tunisia, Turkey, Iran and elsewhere that they do not want a “religious state” and differentiate between the fate of fundamentalist Islamic movements and Islam as the religion of 1.6 billion people on the planet.

“Globalization” gave rise to the strongest and most violent forms of political Islam.

In his essay “The Spirit of Terrorism,” the late French sociologist, philosopher and cultural theorist Jean Baudrillard characterized the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers in New York as a reaction to the technological and political expansion of capitalist globalization rather than a clash between Islam and America.

The same globalization that instigated the rise of Islamic fundamentalism in the first place is now knocking it down by various ways and means.

After overhearing some Cairo news coming from the radio in my car, an Egyptian worker at a gas station in [the Beirut district of] Ashrafiyeh, turned to me saying, “The Muslim Brothers strove for 80 years to take over in Egypt… They won’t give up easily.”

True, but the fact is the Brothers failed in their first year at the helm in Egypt because of the intricacies of running state affairs in modern times, especially when issues of state-building and development – including the economy, social welfare, public transport, gas prices and the environment – are for the most part independent of Islam.

Whereas Islam is prospering socially and culturally as a religion across the world, political Islam is in crisis and being challenged in Iran since 2009, Turkey this month and now Egypt.

The death bell is indeed tolling for the “religious state.”

Egypt’s chief justice sworn in as interim president

Interim President Mansour (top & center below) was sworn in at the High Constitutional Court

Adly Mansour, head of Egypt’s High Constitutional Court, was sworn in as interim president today after the army ousted and detained Mohamed Morsi, ending the Islamist president’s first year in office.

"I swear by Almighty God that I will uphold the republican system, respect the constitution and the law, uphold the interests of the people, protect the nation’s independence and the safety of its land," the oath said.

Judge Mansour took the oath of office at a ceremony in the High Constitutional Court (HCC), which was broadcast live on national television.

The swearing-in came after armed forces chief Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi announced Morsi’s overthrow on state television late on Wednesday, citing his inability to end the country’s deepening political crisis.

In his speech, Gen. Sisi laid out details of the roadmap for a political transition, chiefly:

• Temporary suspension of the current [Islamist-drafted] constitution
• Setting up a committee to amend controversial articles in the provisionally suspended constitution
• Appointment of the head of Egypt's HCC as interim president, pending early presidential elections
• Formation of a new government of technocrats
• Mandating the HCC to hasten the passing of electoral law to allow for parliamentary elections
• Laying down a media code of ethics to guarantee the media's professionalism
• Draw up a committee to foster "national reconciliation."

The security forces meantime began rounding up senior members of the Muslim Brotherhood to which Morsi belongs.

These include the Brotherhood Supreme Guide Mohamed Badie and his deputy Khairat El-Shater, Saad al-Katatni, head of the ousted president’s Freedom and Justice Party, and Rashad al-Bayoumi, another Brotherhood deputy leader.

But army spokesperson Ahmed Ali warned Thursday, “The armed forces will not allow anyone to insult, provoke or abuse those belonging to the Islamist current. They are all Egypt’s sons. The armed forces have the same amount of esteem, respect and love for them as the rest.”

Morsi’s administration unraveled last night after defying the army’s 48-hour ultimatum to come to terms with the opposition.

Morsi’s opponents had accused him of failing the 2011 revolution that toppled Hosni Mubarak by concentrating power in the hands of his Muslim Brotherhood.

His supporters say he inherited many problems from a corrupt regime, and that he should have been allowed to complete his term, which was to have run until 2016.

The Cairo stock market gained LE20 billion ($2.85 billion) in the first hours of trading today as Egyptian investors reacted euphorically to news of Morsi's ouster overnight.

U.S. President Barack Obama said he was "deeply concerned" over Morsi’s ouster and urged a swift return to democratic rule.

Syria’s embattled President Bashar al-Assad, fighting to crush a 27-month-old revolt against four decades of rule by him and his late father, said the upheaval in Egypt was a defeat for political Islam.

"Whoever brings religion to use in politics or in favour of one group at the expense of another will fall anywhere in the world," Assad told his state-run al-Thawra newspaper.

"The summary of what is happening in Egypt is the fall of what is called political Islam."

The Syrian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood became one of the most powerful factions behind the mostly Sunni Muslim uprising against Assad, who belongs to the Alawite sect, an offshoot of Shiite Islam, and is being helped by Lebanon's Shiite Hezbollah militia.

Rosana Boumounsef, in her column today for the independent Beirut daily an-Nahar, says Egypt’s second revolution pulls the plug on using the governance of political Islam as a scarecrow.

She writes:

Ironically, in justifying the course of the latest Arab revolutions, the West expected the upheavals to convulse for many years before producing results that fully meet peoples’ aspirations.

Experience and history prove a revolution does not begin and then cool off before ending with parliamentary or presidential elections – especially when such ballots do not fulfill the people’s expectations.

Many diplomats recognize they were thunderstruck when they saw millions of Egyptians take to the streets to get rid of Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi and challenge Muslim Brotherhood rule.

The diplomats were equally stunned by Egypt’s first [25 January 2011] revolution against President Hosni Mubarak despite international empathy for Egypt’s mounting economic and financial woes.

It is therefore imperative -- in light of Egypt’s second [30 June 2013] revolution -- that the West and its analysts and researchers rethink to the hilt their theories about the region going down the road of militant political Islam.

They fantasized about the Brotherhood’s rise to power in Egypt being replicated in Tunisia, Syria and all eventual Arab Spring countries.

It wasn’t long before they were proven wrong.

Liberals are still a cut above the rest in devout and Muslim Egypt.

The Muslim Brotherhood did not know how to address Egypt’s multifaceted problems, which are fundamentally economic and administrative. The Brotherhood was caught up in fake successes by laying hands on the seats of power.

The Western powers and Russia will find it difficult from now on to invoke worries that militant or fundamentalist Islamic rule, by the likes of al-Qaeda and its followers, could replace the Syrian regime once agreement is reached on its removal.

Egypt’s second revolution was not only against the Muslim Brotherhood.

It was also a slap in the face of the Obama Administration, which backed and lobbied for the Brotherhood to uphold America and Israel’s interests. 

Morsi to quit or be removed today – al-Ahram

AhramOnline photo by Mai Shaheen

Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi will either resign by the end of the day or be removed from office by the Egyptian Armed Forces.

Abdel-Nasser Salama, editor-in-chief of Egypt’s newspaper of records al-Ahram, writes this morning:

In the hours following 4.30 local time (3.30 GMT) deadline set by the Armed Forces, one of two things will happen:

1. The president stands down of his own volition, or
2. He is removed from office, in keeping with the roadmap set by the Armed Forces.

The said roadmap also provides for:

• Annulment of the Constitution and the appointment of constitutional experts to draft a new constitution that takes into consideration the demands of the broadest spectrum of public opinion. The constitution will be put to a referendum after its endorsement by al-Azhar
• Formation of a three-member Presidential Council -- chaired by the head of the High Constitutional Court and two other members yet to be named -- to manage the affairs of state during a transition period of between nine months and a year
• Formation of an interim government rid of all political currents and headed by one of the military leaders for the duration of the transition
• Preparations for presidential and parliamentary elections. The new Constitution shall determine which of the two ballots comes first.
• Throughout the transition period, the Army shall oversee these measures – set out in the “Roadmap for the Future” – to ensure their impartial implementation.

Al-Ahram says all Muslim Brotherhood key players are kept in check, all Brotherhood sites stocking arms are being monitored, a number of Brotherhood leaders have been placed under house arrest and the Brotherhood’s funds have been frozen. 

Kerry: Geneva-2 on Syria in September possibly

Kerry trying a shawarma sandwich at an eatery in al-Bireh...

... followed by Nabulsi kenafeh (Photos are by AFP)

Geneva-2 on Syria – inshallah

Israel-Palestine peace talks – in a bit

Shawarma – yummy

U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said today both the U.S. and Russia are seriously committed to having an international conference on Syria and setting up a transitional government to end the bloodshed.

But he acknowledged the conference might not be possible until August or later.

Kerry spoke outside the U.S. Embassy in Brunei after a 90-minute-plus meeting with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on the sidelines of an Asian security summit.

The proposed conference, which Kerry and Lavrov had planned for end-May, is known as "Geneva-2" because it follows a Syria meeting in the Swiss city in June 2012.

The secretary of state flew in for the ASEAN summit in Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, after failing to achieve a breakthrough in setting up peace talks between Israeli and Palestinian leaders despite an intense four-day round of shuttle diplomacy. Yet he left Tel Aviv at the weekend with a lot of optimism and promised that he is close to progress.

He met separately a total of three times with Benyamin Netanyahu and Mahmoud Abbas, spending a total of 13 hours talking to the Israeli prime minister and around seven to the Palestinian president.

Following one of his meetings with Abbas at the latter’s office in Ramallah, Kerry wandered the streets of the central West Bank city of al-Bireh, where he ate a shawarma sandwich and Nabulsi kenafeh at a local eatery.

Following are his remarks after meeting with Lavrov in Brunei today:

Hi, everybody. I thought the meeting I had with Secretary Lavrov merited saying a few words because I think it was constructive and very useful, and I think we both agreed with that. We discussed a wide range of issues, but we obviously focused mostly on the issue of Syria.

I did raise the issue of, obviously, [National Security Agency leaker Edward] Snowden, but that is not his portfolio. It’s being handled – nor is it mine directly because it’s being handled within the Justice Department. So it is fair to say that we didn’t discuss any substantive progress, but I certainly raised, from our point of view, how it fits within the context of our relationship. But again, not his portfolio, and so it wasn’t discussed in a way that he would be able to take any action on it, though I hope he will communicate the views that I expressed.

On Syria, we had a very in-depth conversation, and I thought it was important to note that Foreign Minister Lavrov believes, as I do, and as I think President Obama and President Putin believe, that there are two countries that can have the most significant difference on this question, and they are Russia and the United States. We agreed that we are both serious, more than serious – committed to the Geneva process, and we both agreed that our countries have an ability to be able to make a difference if we can pull together in that effort.

We made progress in talking through and building on some of the issues that were discussed in Geneva on June 25^th by our Under Secretary Wendy Sherman and by their deputy, Mr. Bogdanov, as well as Lakhdar Brahimi. We narrowed down some of the options with respect to the potential of that conference. We both agreed that that conference should happen sooner rather than later, though we have a 2+2 meeting between Russia and the United States in July, and obviously August is very difficult for Europeans and for others, so it may be somewhere thereafter, but that’s being talked about.

What is clear to me coming out of this meeting and what we both wanted to really ascertain from each other is the level of seriousness and the capacity to be able to do this. Geneva relies on – the next Geneva relies on the work of the first Geneva, which calls for a transitional government with a neutral environment, by mutual consent, with the full transfer of power.

Whether the Assad regime is doing better or whether the opposition is doing better is frankly not determinative of that outcome because the outcome requires a transition government. And that’s why it is valuable to try to get to Geneva.

So we will continue to push. There are still things that have to be worked out over the course of these next days, but Foreign Minister Lavrov and I felt that this meeting was a very useful meeting. It was constructive, it was conducted in a constructive way, and our objective remains the same; that is, to recognize the notion that there really isn’t a military victory per se in Syria that keeps Syria as a country, and number two that we have an obligation to try to work towards a peaceful resolution because a peaceful settlement is the best way to save the state of Syria and to minimize the destruction. That commitment remains a solid one between both of us.

So I’m not going to take questions now because I’ve got a group of people waiting and we have a very, very tight schedule to move out of here.

Egypt’s Brotherhood, wristwatch and volcano

Gen, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi

The head of Egypt's armed forces gave politicians 48 hours this late afternoon to answer demands made by the Egyptian people or the military would offer its own "roadmap for the future."

In a statement read on state television, General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi called mass protests on Sunday, which called for Islamist President Mohamed Mursi to resign, an "unprecedented" expression of the popular will.

Earlier this morning, the mass circulation newspaper al-Hayat published this think piece on Egypt penned in Arabic by its editor-in-chief Ghassan Charbel:

President Mohamed Morsi is entitled to say:

• He is the first civilian to be elected president in Egypt
• He entered the presidential palace on the strength of a popular vote rather than riding a tank
• With the exception of Ahmad Shafiq, opposition leaders Mohamed ElBaradei, Amr Moussa and Hamdeen Sabahi visited him at the Ittihadiya Palace
• The world recognized his legitimacy and welcomed him as president
• Egyptian voters mandated him for a full [four-year] term and it is improper to cut it short under street pressure.
• He is eligible to say all this, but his duty is also to check his watch.

Mohamed Morsi can say:

• He is not an isolated president
• The group he comes from has deep roots in Egyptian society
• Islamists won’t accept the removal of Egypt’s first Islamist president
• He is capable of mobilizing millions of loyalists in face of the opposition’s millions and he can get Brotherhood minders to guard the palace should the army equivocate on his protection.

Despite this, it’s the president’s duty to check his watch.

At the same time, the president can’t accuse the crowds gathered yesterday at Tahrir Square and opposite his palace of being remnants and thugs yearning for the former regime.

This gimmick has been so overused that it just doesn’t hold water today.

He can’t say the millions who signed the Tamarrud petition [demanding his resignation] are liberals involved in a Zionist-American plot to abort the revival plan he carried to the palace.

The president cannot deny his first year in office was marred by terrible chaos and growing splits at street level and by discontent among non-partisans who voted for him lest Shafiq’s victory led to the old regime’s restitution.

Likewise, the president cannot contest the figures of economic meltdown, soaring unemployment and poverty and declining services and security.

Nor can he disprove the impression that the Brotherhood’s first year in power unmasked its dearth of experience and qualified cadres and its incapacity to manage state affairs.

Two weeks ago my journalistic inquisitiveness took me on a visit to Egypt. I did not want to write about the big showdown there from afar.

The showdown concerns the Brothers in Egypt and everywhere else. It also relates to political Islam and the Arab Spring’s outcome.

I met with both opposition and Brotherhood leaders.

I sounded out media people and ordinary citizens who imagined the (25 January 2011) revolution would throw open the doors of hope, make bread more readily available, and revitalize Egypt so she can recoup her identity, spirit and soul.

On leaving Cairo in the evening, I was very concerned about the days ahead.

I felt millions of Egyptians were deeply perturbed, fearful as never before and primed to burst in anger.

One is nervous about Egypt going bankrupt.

Another is anxious about someone tampering with Egypt’s spirit.

A third says the Brotherhood regime is the “Mubarak regime but with Islamist features.”

A fourth suggests the state is eroding, that “Brotherhood-ization” will lead to internecine strife over “retrieving the revolution from those who stole it.”

A fifth suggests the army should make a move before the volcano erupts.

I also felt:

• Hosni Mubarak stunned Egyptians by his speedy downfall, catching political forces by surprise and unprepared
• The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) acted like someone grasping a hot coal but eager to pass it to someone else. As a result, SCAF took a rash decision and erred
• The Brothers -- rather than make a “big sacrifice” – chose to put their fate and Egypt’s on the line by contesting the presidential elections on the urging of a few of their careerist politicians.

Morsi misread the revolution’s messages and the mandate’s constrains. Mistakes piled up with mishandlings of the constitution, of the judiciary and of Egypt’s spirit and identity components.

The accumulation of mistakes rekindled the revolution’s hot ambers. The flowing lava presages a volcanic eruption.

The Brothers entered the presidential palace before their time, and their precipitous entry awakened the volcano.

It’s hard to see the Brothers cave in to Tamarrud’s protests.

What is certain though is that Morsi’s stay at the palace will prove exhausting to the Brotherhood and the country. There is nothing worse than sitting on the fringes of a volcano.