Russia and Syria at a crossroads

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With top Kremlin aide Mikhail Margelov now saying Russia can do little more for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and with the Arab League tabling a “game changer” plan for Assad’s peaceable exit, two political analysts suggest in today’s Arab press the Syria crisis cards have been randomized.

Abdelbari Atwan, publisher/editor of the London-based pan-Arab daily al-Quds al-Arabi, believes “the noose has tightened around Assad’s neck.”

But in her daily column for Beirut’s an-Nahar, Rosanna Boumounsef says it’s Russia’s stance ultimately that will prove “pivotal in determining the regime’s fate.”

In the words of Abdelbari Atwan:

President Assad stands almost alone in the face of an Arab League where his country lost its clout, its decision-making sway and its seat. Above all, the Gulf heavyweights alongside whom his father fought to evict Iraq from Kuwait now want him out. They had earlier turned their back on Saddam Hussein after his role in defeating Iran and shielding their regimes drew to a close.

In saying Assad stands alone, I also refer to the latest Arab League vote on its Syria plan. Algeria abstained, and so did Iraq. Lebanon was the only state choosing to “shun” the ballot altogether.

The Russians, who supported Assad to the hilt in recent months, sending a naval task force to Tartus and blocking a Syria resolution at the UN Security Council, seem to be opening the door to a shift in their position. They sufficed so far to leak remarks by President Dmitry Medvedev's protégé Mikhail Margelov saying, “we can do no more” for Assad. The shift can be justified by the similitude between the new Arab plan and the three-month-old Russian proposals encouraging Assad to hand over power to his deputy, Farouk al-Sharaa, form a national unity government to oversee parliamentary and presidential elections and initiate serious political reform.

Syria’s rejection of the Arab League roadmap mirrors Ali Abdullah Saleh’s initial rejection of the GCC’s Yemen initiative. Saleh ended endorsing it and enplaning for Oman on his way to the United States. I can envisage a replay of the Yemen scenario in Syria… and maybe later in Algeria.

An added thorn in Assad’s flesh is Saudi Arabia deciding to take charge of the Syria file. The Saudi role to bring down Assad may be decisive. The massively oil-rich kingdom has a strong following in Lebanon and Syria, is the Islamic world’s powerhouse and America’s closest regional ally.

In the opinion of Rosanna Boumounsef:

The Russians used the “Yemen scenario” expression in recent months and appeared ready to embrace it to help find a peaceful solution to the Syrian crisis. Hence their 2011 invitation to Syrian Vice-President Farouk al-Sharaa to visit Moscow for talks. The visit did not take place, purportedly because the Syrian command prevented it.

The question at this point is if Russia, which has long favored the Arab League route to a solution in Syria over the Security Council’s, would eat from the new Arab League meal cooked in Cairo.

Russia’s decision is crucial for two reasons. One, it would break with Arab majority ranks if it shied away from the Arab League platter. Two, it would deal the Syrian command a body blow and restrict its room for maneuver to a hair’s breadth if it gobbled it down.

Russia’s comportment at the UN Security Council once the Arab League presents its Syria plan for endorsement is eagerly anticipated.

Dead duck in the Arab League house

English adaptation of today’s think piece by political analyst Sarkis Naoum for Lebanon’s an-Nahar 

When Qatar’s emir told U.S. broadcaster CBS Arab troops should be deployed to Syria to stop the killing there, many Lebanese, Syrians and Arabs questioned the credibility of his suggestion.

They wondered if he meant Arab military intervention to end the violence? If so, which violence? Violence by Assad’s regime against his opponents who, in the opinion of Qatar, the GCC, most Arab states and the West, make up most people in Syria, or violence by what the regime calls gangs of “terrorists and saboteurs,” or violence by the two sides?

Lebanese, Syrians and Arabs wonder if Arab states would want to deploy troops to Syria or can do so under their present circumstances. They also wonder if the Arab states would be agreeable to the move at the Arab League conference table or in two-sided consultations.

The Lebanese, the Syrians and most Arabs wonder if Syria’s Assad clan would accept Arab troops to either help it or help the rebels.

The regime’s rejection of any form of military intervention in its can lead to one of two consequences. Either the Arabs would refrain from intervening or intervene by force. The question here is if the Arab states are collectively or individually prepared, motivated or equipped for a military showdown with the regime. The answer is no.

Another question: Do the Arab countries have what it takes to intervene militarily? The answer is also negative.

Qatar, for instance, sent hundreds of troops to Libya but does not have thousands more to send to Syria.

Likewise Saudi Arabia, because: one, its long-standing policy is to shun military adventures and not to resort to force except when its security is challenged internally or externally or both at the same time. Two, it is worried about the threat from the Islamic Republic of Iran and looking to thwart that danger. Three, it is aware that security is vulnerable in its volatile Eastern Province where some Shiites there can be swayed by Iran.

The remaining four GCC partners simply lack the muscle.

Egypt, the Arab world’s military heavyweight, is busy with itself. It will remain so for a long time. After its disastrous military intervention in the Yemen war in the early 1960s, Egypt opted for nonmilitary involvement in Arab affairs. In 1976, for example, it refused to join the league’s Arab Deterrent Force (ADF) for Lebanon.

In turn, the Arab Maghreb countries are immersed in their own internal troubles. So are Sudan and Jordan, though the later is adept at active intervention.

To sum up, most Arab countries want to get rid of the Syrian regime but lack the needed capacity and power. That’s why they count on world powers, which so far refuse to use force to bring about regime change in Syria.

Only two countries -- alas both nonArab -- have the clout for change in Syria. They happen to represent the two main branches of Islam. Their military intervention could thus be palatable to Syrians and Arabs. But their visions, plans and objectives are at cross-purposes. Turkey backs Syria’s rebels while Iran stands by the regime. They won’t make up before Iran either jumps to bed, or goes to war, with America. Syria in the meantime will sink deeper in blood.