“You’re not helping me cast out sectarian bigotry”

Saudi national flag (top) and a Shiite banner 

By Jamal Khashoggi, Saudi Arabia’s authoritative political analyst, author and kingpin of the impending Al Arab TV news channel, writing in Arabic today for the mass circulation newspaper al-Hayat

If we were to map out Syrian regime supporters, we would regrettably find them mirroring the minority Shiite population’s distribution in the Muslim world.

In this, we are excepting a few voices heard here and there.

Among them, for instance, are Shiite intellectuals in Lebanon issuing a statement, or Hezbollah defectors going live on Arab TV networks, to declare the party does not represent them.

Or to express concern their community is being dragged into a sectarian conflict for which they would have to pay in a predominantly Sunni environment representing most of the Ummah.

The aforesaid exceptions prove, rather than undermine, the premise.

On the fringes of this Shiite landmass stretching from Iran to Iraq and Lebanon, there are in Arab capitals tiny and hardly discernible patches of nationalist intellectuals, Nasserite politicians, or Baathists rooting for Bashar al-Assad.

They also parrot the theory of an American-Zionist conspiracy aimed at undermining the bastion of contrariety and resistance and the ultimate Arab army.

Like the Shiite fundamentalists shepherding the Shiite general public to back Syria’s regime, they do not see the limpid, unobstructed and good-sized “banner of freedom” the Syrian people have been raising for more than two years.

But they clearly notice the Takfiris, the eaters of human organs and the suicides.

They make these out to be the Syrian Revolution, which at heart is nationalist, Islamist, moderate, broad-based and genuinely representative of all spectrums of the Syrian population.

Yes, there are Takfiris linked to al-Qaeda and to hardline Salafist currents fighting in Syria.

True, they are motivated by their hatred of Shiism, modernism and all “The Other.”

They don’t strive for democracy or a modern civil state in which all Syrians are equal.

They can’t be part of a Syrian national body politic, whether headed by a turbaned sheikh or its current leader George Sabra.

They are the same underground movements Syrian Intelligence used to send to Iraq, prompting Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki (in 2009) to press for the trial of Syria-based terrorists by a UN tribunal.

That was two or three years before the outbreak of Syria’s uprising.

The uprising saw Maliki bury old differences, switch sides, and become Bashar’s partner – a bizarre turnaround that can only be explained by sectarian motives.

Thieves, highway bandits and opportunists joined the mavericks infiltrating the Syrian revolution since revolutions don’t attract honorable people only.

But to put those in the spotlight is sheer escapism, which Bashar cheerleaders use in order to justify turning their back on a bona fide revolution against a tyrant and a repressive regime that people have been itching to bring down for decades.

Bashar’s non-Shiite disciples, on the other hand, can find an excuse for their evildoing.

For example, Lebanon’s Maronite Marada Movement thrived on the Syrian regime’s protection and was able to challenge Lebanese Maronite parties hostile to Bashar. The Marada in other words has a political, albeit contemptible, motive.

That is also the case of Lebanese Gen. Michel Aoun’s Free Patriotic Movement, except that Aoun will be the first to jump ship when Hezbollah and Bashar lose out.

There are also politicians and journalists endorsing Bashar simply for cash.

In South Lebanon’s port city of Sidon, there is the Popular Nasserite Organization, which suffices with its Nasserite credentials to account for its stance.

The organization’s icon in Cairo is former presidential candidate Hamdeen Sabahi who doesn’t hide his affinity for Bashar.

Other than those, you hardly find in Arab capitals any Bashar partisans, except perhaps the habitués of state-run Syrian TV.

They are what I would call “Speakers’ Corner forces” or “political megaphones” with no presence on the streets or in national assemblies.

One exception perhaps is in Jordan, specifically in its al-Karak city, which is home to some members of the pan-Arab Command of the Syrian Baath Party who are now lying low in view of the circumstances.

All the tiny pockets cited above are swamped by an Arab torrent sympathetic to the Syrian people.

Taking a second look at the Shiite landmass in our midst, we come up against a cohesive bloc ready to fight and die on Bashar’s side.

That’s what Hassan Nasrallah did in Qusayr and is still doing elsewhere in Syria.

Likewise, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki is propping up the Syrian regime with arms and oil and allowing Iraqi Shiite volunteers to stream into Damascus. He is very familiar with the regime they will be fighting for.

These volunteers include politicians and clerics entrusted with the task of exonerating crimes committed by Shiites against their Sunni brothers.

A Kuwaiti parliamentarian has also openly defended and backed the interventions.

The sectarian commitment we are seeing is both unparalleled and alarming.

Even the Marjas (or highest authority on religious laws in Shiite Islam) who regularly issue fatwas and opinions have fallen silent.

They neither spoke in the revolution’s favor nor denounced the Shiites’ intervention in favor of the offender.

In my country, Saudi Arabia, the Shiite religious scholars and dignitaries kept mum on happenings in Syria.

They seem perturbed when asked, “What’s your position on the affront of the century that has seen the death so far of 100,000 Syrian Muslims?”

One cleric mouthed off: “Are we supposed to issue a statement on each occurrence? It’s a sedition and we’re distancing ourselves from it.”

My Shiite friend wanted to be amiable. He wrote to me saying, “I sympathize with the Syrian people. They deserve better than the regime killing them. But they also merit other than the Free Syrian Army.”

He probably believes he made me a big concession by saying what he did.

My answer is this: “My friend, I don’t want to be sectarian. I hate my growing sectarian penchant. But you’re not helping me.”

“U.S. spooks and Lebanon’s Tripoli clashes”

Tripoli gunmen in action (Photo from Lebanon's daily an-Nahar) 

The Beirut daily al-Akhbar, which is a leading mouthpiece for Syria in Lebanon, claims a tipoff from U.S. intelligence is what brought about the arrest by Lebanon’s General Security Department of Syrian opposition supporter Shadi al-Mawlawi in Tripoli.

The arrest -- linked to unrest in neighboring Syria -- sparked off three days of clashes between Lebanese Alawites and Sunnites in Lebanon’s second largest city that has recently become home to thousands of Syrian refugees fleeing the violence in Syria.

The faceoff since Saturday between Tripoli's two adjacent districts -- the predominantly Sunnite ‘Bab al-Tebbaneh’ and the overwhelmingly Alawite ‘Jabal Mohsen’ -- has left eight people dead and about 80 injured.

The General Security Department arrested Mawlawi, a Lebanese Sunnite Islamist opposed to the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, after luring him to a government minister’s welfare association office to supposedly receive healthcare assistance.

Lebanese security separately arrested other men, including one Jordanian and one Qatari.

A military prosecutor has now charged Mawlawi “of belonging to an armed terrorist organization.”

According to al-Akhbar, “several (Lebanese) security officials say U.S. security agencies informed the General Security Department that a Jordanian by the name of Abdelmalek Abdessalam had crossed into Lebanon from Syria and is about to leave the country.

“The Americans said Abdessalam coordinates al-Qaeda activities in several countries, among them Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Syria, Lebanon and Jordan. The General Security Department having alerted the border crossings, Abdessalam was held at Beirut International Airport when trying to board a flight to Amman.

“Abdessalam confirmed the suspicions against him during interrogation… He admitted receiving funds from a Qatari citizen, Abdelaziz al-Atiyah, who was also seized at his hotel (in a Beirut suburb), where he was recovering from surgery. He has now been moved to a hospital in Mount Lebanon.

“Abdessalam gave interrogators the nom de guerre of his Lebanese contact as ‘Adam’… A phone number tracked down ‘Adam,’ who turned out to be Mawlawi.”

Lebanese army regulars and police forces are today patrolling Tripoli and seem to have restored calm.

The army said in a statement its units finished deploying in the violence-stricken areas of the city, including Bab al-Tebbaneh, Jabal Mohsen and the Syria Street separating the two neighborhoods bitterly split over loyalties linked to the Syrian uprising.

The number of Lebanon’s Alawites is undetermined, varying between a high of 120,000 and a low of 70,000. About 60 percent of them reside in Jabal Mohsen. Most of the rest live in the north Lebanese governorate of Akkar.

No Alawite has ever been named government minister in the Republic of Lebanon’s history. And it was only three years after the 1989 Taef Agreement that Alawites were able to fill their two allocated seats in the 128-member Lebanese parliament.

Both Alawite legislators in the current parliament – Khodr Habib and Badr Wannous – were elected on a (anti-Assad) Future Movement ticket.

But the uncontested overlords of Lebanon’s Alawites are Ali Eid and his son Rifaat, both diehard supporters of Syria’s Assad dynasty. Rifaat was once quoted saying, “Our special links to Syria, of which we are proud, are no different than the Shiites’ to Iran, the Sunnites to Saudi Arabia, or the Maronites’ to France.”

Lebanese political analyst Rosanna Boumounsef today notes in her daily column for Beirut’s independent daily an-Nahar the Syria crisis has left the government of Prime Minister Najib Mikati in a quandary.

“Whereas the stands of the premier, his ministers of interior and of finance and parliamentarian Walid Jumblatt were critical of the security agency’s malapropos arrest that caused the turmoil in Tripoli, government ministers and legislators belonging to the (pro-Assad) ‘March 8’ coalition defended it… The split can only add fuel to the fire.”

Progressive Socialist Party leader Jumblatt says in remarks for his PSP weekly al-Anbaa published today:

“It is not the first time tension and acts of violence grip Tripoli…

“You cannot dissociate events there from the diligence of some security agencies – apparently motivated by Syria – in deeming Salafism an absolute evil. I wish one of these agencies’ bigwigs would come forward to define to us Salafism.

“Why this dogged insistence on magnifying the Salafist threat? How pervasive is it in Lebanon? Is it restricted to Sunni Muslims? Why is it constantly linked to terrorism…?

“Aren’t we being led to believe Lebanon has become a Salafist hub so we cutoff help and humanitarian assistance to Syrian refugees in Lebanon and (acquiesce) to the arrest of activists among them who would then be handed over to the authorities in Syria to face execution?

“And why this determination to ‘import’ al-Qaeda to Lebanon at all costs? Will al-Qaeda also be used as a scarecrow to gag Lebanese support for the Syrian revolution and the Syrian people who are facing the systematic and daily crimes being committed by the regime in Syria?

“…Why the lack of full coordination among all Lebanese security agencies? Is it because each has it own political patron?

“…Does this explain why telecom date was not released to a security branch trying to uncover the persons behind the attempt on the life of Lebanese Forces chief Samir Geagea?

“…Better we calmed things down and opted for reconciliation to clear the atmosphere in Tripoli… Better we devised a wide-ranging economic development plan to tackle Tripoli’s misery and resumed the national dialogue on a comprehensive national defense strategy under state authority…”