Egypt: Supreme Guide and Army General shadows

Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi (top) and the Brotherhood's Supreme Guide Mohamed Badie 

“The Muslims defeated the Islamists” in Egypt.

To my mind, these five words by Walid Abi-Mershed in his column today for Saudi Asharq Alawsat explain the army’s removal of Mohamed Morsi, Egypt’s first Islamist president, after millions of people protested over his leadership.

A scintillating account of the rise and fall of Morsi one year after assuming office comes in this think piece titled “Shadows of the Supreme Guide and Army General” and penned in Arabic by Ghassan Charbel, editor-in-chief of pan-Arab al-Hayat:

Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei went to al-Ittihadiya Palace to meet with Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi on the latter’s invitation.

The meeting was one-on-one, except that the visitor sensed the presence of others.

He saw behind the president the silhouettes of Mohamed Badie, Supreme Guide of the Muslim Brotherhood, and his second-in-command Khairat el-Shater.

Such shadows raise suspicions. The visitor worried about the president resorting to the supreme guide, not the constitution.

That’s why ElBaradei told this (al-Hayat) newspaper, “I met with the president, we had a conversation and I gave up on him.”

Hamdeen Sabahi went to al-Ittihadiya Palace.  The shadows’ insistence on attending the meeting reminded him of his conversation with presidential candidate Morsi during the countdown to the runoffs.

Hamdeen had won some five million votes in the first round and opted out of the presidential race.

Morsi was hoping to woo those voters to secure victory over Ahmed Shafiq in the runoff.

Hamdeen asked Morsi a difficult question: “If you won the presidency, would you be a president independent of the Muslim Brotherhood’s diktats?”

Morsi could not answer and chose instead to offer Hamdeen the post of vice president.

Hamdeen begged off.

Amr Moussa went to al-Ittihadiya Palace and met with Morsi and the two shadows.

Since he emerged from the meeting and monitored the president’s performance, he did not hide his disquiet about the future of Egypt, the native land of Taha Hussein and Naguib Mahfouz that has always been a beacon of hope for its people. Moussa got into such a sweat about Egypt’s spirit.

That was in the lead-up to June 30, which all three men consider to be a landmark day.

They believed early presidential elections were de rigueur to save the country from Morsi’s regime. Clearly, they meant to save it from the big shadow cast on the regime – the shadow of the supreme guide.

Standards and the code of ethics require professional journalists not to fall for the opposition. So we had to make our way to the headquarters of the Freedom and Justice Party, political arm of the Muslim Brotherhood.

I asked the party vice chairman Dr. Essam el-Erian if he ever-expected President Hosni Mubarak to fall and Egypt to choose a president from the Muslim Brotherhood.

I liked his answer: “I am confident this pipedream never crossed any Egyptian’s mind. Any Egyptian would be lying if he told you he expected the revolution to succeed or Hosni Mubarak to fall or Mohamed Morsi to become president. Had the era of miracles not been a thing of the past, I would have told you we are living in that era.”

Erian did not seem worried about June 30.

His self-assurance made him say he not only expected Morsi to complete his mandate but could also win a second term.

Erian sounded confident and relaxed and on completion of our conversation he invited my colleague Mohamed Salah and I to the office of party chairman Saad el-Katatni. The later was equally laid-back.

The “January 2011 revolution” took by surprise both the Brotherhood’s supreme guide and the armed forces’ top dog at the time, Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi. The two men reacted with aplomb.

Voters then eagerly opted to cast off the shadows of Mubarak and his generals. They ended up with Morsi’s regime and the supreme guide’s shadow.

Morsi failed to dispel the impression that “the supreme guide’s bureau is the president’s president.” His mistakes piled up and the media showed him no mercy.

Fear of “Brotherhood-ization” by millions of Egyptians turned “June 30” into a broad uprising against the president and the shadow lurking in the palace.

In January 2011, Tantawi felt the army had to connect with the public squares.

In June 2013, Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi felt the army had to reconcile with them and sponsor them.

The result was a full-blown intifada and a quasi-coup.

The “Brothers” refused to come to terms with the outcome.

They refused to reflect on the reasons that drove millions to public squares to jeer them.

They refused to recognize the implications of the millions of signatures on the Tamarrud petition.

The “Brothers” preferred to aim at Gen. Sisi’s shadow to portray the Brotherhood as the victim and the scapegoat.

When the head of the High Constitutional Court Adly Mansour was sworn in as interim president, they elected to see Gen. Sisi’s silhouette behind him.

Yesterday’s sight of two Egypts facing off in the shadows of the supreme guide and army general was traumatic.

The “Brothers” ventured to take the supreme guide’s shadow into the palace.

Removal of an elected president in a quasi-revolution and quasi-coup is a gamble as well.

There is no solution other than to quickly exit this tunnel and sail into an Egypt in the shadows of a constitution compatible with its spirit and an elected president unbound in his palace by the silhouettes of a supreme guide and an army general. 

Egypt’s Brotherhood, wristwatch and volcano

Gen, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi

The head of Egypt's armed forces gave politicians 48 hours this late afternoon to answer demands made by the Egyptian people or the military would offer its own "roadmap for the future."

In a statement read on state television, General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi called mass protests on Sunday, which called for Islamist President Mohamed Mursi to resign, an "unprecedented" expression of the popular will.

Earlier this morning, the mass circulation newspaper al-Hayat published this think piece on Egypt penned in Arabic by its editor-in-chief Ghassan Charbel:

President Mohamed Morsi is entitled to say:

• He is the first civilian to be elected president in Egypt
• He entered the presidential palace on the strength of a popular vote rather than riding a tank
• With the exception of Ahmad Shafiq, opposition leaders Mohamed ElBaradei, Amr Moussa and Hamdeen Sabahi visited him at the Ittihadiya Palace
• The world recognized his legitimacy and welcomed him as president
• Egyptian voters mandated him for a full [four-year] term and it is improper to cut it short under street pressure.
• He is eligible to say all this, but his duty is also to check his watch.

Mohamed Morsi can say:

• He is not an isolated president
• The group he comes from has deep roots in Egyptian society
• Islamists won’t accept the removal of Egypt’s first Islamist president
• He is capable of mobilizing millions of loyalists in face of the opposition’s millions and he can get Brotherhood minders to guard the palace should the army equivocate on his protection.

Despite this, it’s the president’s duty to check his watch.

At the same time, the president can’t accuse the crowds gathered yesterday at Tahrir Square and opposite his palace of being remnants and thugs yearning for the former regime.

This gimmick has been so overused that it just doesn’t hold water today.

He can’t say the millions who signed the Tamarrud petition [demanding his resignation] are liberals involved in a Zionist-American plot to abort the revival plan he carried to the palace.

The president cannot deny his first year in office was marred by terrible chaos and growing splits at street level and by discontent among non-partisans who voted for him lest Shafiq’s victory led to the old regime’s restitution.

Likewise, the president cannot contest the figures of economic meltdown, soaring unemployment and poverty and declining services and security.

Nor can he disprove the impression that the Brotherhood’s first year in power unmasked its dearth of experience and qualified cadres and its incapacity to manage state affairs.

Two weeks ago my journalistic inquisitiveness took me on a visit to Egypt. I did not want to write about the big showdown there from afar.

The showdown concerns the Brothers in Egypt and everywhere else. It also relates to political Islam and the Arab Spring’s outcome.

I met with both opposition and Brotherhood leaders.

I sounded out media people and ordinary citizens who imagined the (25 January 2011) revolution would throw open the doors of hope, make bread more readily available, and revitalize Egypt so she can recoup her identity, spirit and soul.

On leaving Cairo in the evening, I was very concerned about the days ahead.

I felt millions of Egyptians were deeply perturbed, fearful as never before and primed to burst in anger.

One is nervous about Egypt going bankrupt.

Another is anxious about someone tampering with Egypt’s spirit.

A third says the Brotherhood regime is the “Mubarak regime but with Islamist features.”

A fourth suggests the state is eroding, that “Brotherhood-ization” will lead to internecine strife over “retrieving the revolution from those who stole it.”

A fifth suggests the army should make a move before the volcano erupts.

I also felt:

• Hosni Mubarak stunned Egyptians by his speedy downfall, catching political forces by surprise and unprepared
• The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) acted like someone grasping a hot coal but eager to pass it to someone else. As a result, SCAF took a rash decision and erred
• The Brothers -- rather than make a “big sacrifice” – chose to put their fate and Egypt’s on the line by contesting the presidential elections on the urging of a few of their careerist politicians.

Morsi misread the revolution’s messages and the mandate’s constrains. Mistakes piled up with mishandlings of the constitution, of the judiciary and of Egypt’s spirit and identity components.

The accumulation of mistakes rekindled the revolution’s hot ambers. The flowing lava presages a volcanic eruption.

The Brothers entered the presidential palace before their time, and their precipitous entry awakened the volcano.

It’s hard to see the Brothers cave in to Tamarrud’s protests.

What is certain though is that Morsi’s stay at the palace will prove exhausting to the Brotherhood and the country. There is nothing worse than sitting on the fringes of a volcano.