How Putin rolled Kerry on a
plan to save Syria
The following think piece is by
Michael Weiss and appears in Foreign Policy:
BY MICHAEL
WEISS | MAY 9, 2013
The
photographs showing U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry smiling and slapping palms
with Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov are being circulated by many
Syrians opposed to the Bashar al-Assad's regime as visual obituaries of their
cause. Weren't these men supposed to be on opposite sides of the Syrian
conflict? And why does the Herman Munster-ish Lavrov look happier than his
American counterpart?
Perhaps because the
atmospherics of Kerry's recent visit to Moscow were meant to show that his
hosts were under no illusions as to who was the more desperate and bowed party.
First, Kerry's motorcade sat in Moscow traffic for a half hour because of a
military parade rehearsal for Victory Day, which celebrates the Soviet defeat
of the Nazis in World War II. Then Russian President Vladimir Putin kept Kerry
waiting for three hours before granting him an audience, upon which he fiddled with his
pen and more resembled a man indulging a long-ago scheduled
visit from the cultural attaché of Papua New Guinea than participating in an
urgent summit with America's top diplomat.
The pro-Kremlin
newspaper Izvestia claimed
that Kerry had been "counting on convincing Moscow not to block sanctions
against Damascus. It didn't work." Even if false, the framing of the story
provides good insight into how the Russian government viewed these talks. And
in the end, Kerry gave Putin exactly what he wanted: Washington's assent to a
renewed push for negotiations to end the geopolitical catastrophe in Syria.
Sometime before May is
behind us, the United States and Russia will host a conference based on the
parameters of the Geneva Protocol, which was agreed to late June 2012 under the
auspices of the United Nations. The communiqué calls for
a "Syrian-led political process leading to a transition that meets the
legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people." To pave the way such an
agreement, the document demands the end to armed violence by both sides, the
release of political prisoners, granting journalists freedom of movement
throughout the country, and the "[c]onsolidation of full calm and
stability." Since this would-be roadmap was cobbled together almost a year
ago, more than 50,000 Syrians have died in the Assad regime's desperate attempt
to crush the uprising.
The underlying
assumptions are that Russia can "produce" Assad or his
representatives, pressuring them to attend this confab, and that the United
States can produce both the political and military wings of the Syrian
opposition with which it has chosen to partner, namely the Syrian National
Coalition and the Free Syrian Army's Supreme Military Command, headed by Gen.
Salim Idris. Neither of the latter bodies existed when the Geneva Protocol was
first introduced, and Idris now finds himself forced to do what Russia's
clients in this conflict never have to do -- beg.
Indeed, while Assad
imports long-range missiles from Iran and allows
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commander Maj. Gen. Qasem Soleimani to build
a 150,000-strong sectarian militia to inherit the responsibilities of the
Syrian military, Idriss is writing open letters
to his patron asking for more help. The U.S. response is to ask
Idriss men to kill al Qaeda-linked Jabhat al-Nusra fighters first, and only
then turn their attention back to President Bashar al-Assad's forces.
Syria has allegedly
been subjected
to sarin gas attacks, seen the deaths of more than 70,000 people and the
displacement of nearly a quarter of its entire population, and become a haven
for a growing and ambitious al Qaeda franchise. Now Kerry wants the world to
believe that it can travel back in time and revive a diplomatic initiative that
was stillborn even at the time. It's not going to work.
As the Russians like to
remind the world, nowhere in the Geneva Protocol is there a demand that Assad
must resign or even promise not to take power again in future. John Kerry
appears to agree: In a joint press conference in Moscow with Russian Foreign
Minister Sergei Lavrov, the secretary of state offered
this stark reappraisal of President Barack Obama's repeated insistence that
Assad quit the scene. "[I]t's impossible for me as an individual to
understand how Syria could possibly be governed in the future by the man who
has committed the things that we know have taken place," he said.
"But ... I'm not going to decide that tonight, and I'm not going to decide
that in the end."
Kerry was forced to
hastily repudiate his wishy-washiness in Rome by reminding reporters of the original U.S.
stance. But his initial response may convince the Russians that
the U.S. position on Assad's departure is negotiable.
Kerry's comment about
Assad's future mirrored Obama's now-notorious "red line" on the use
or mobilization of chemical weapons. After the White House admitted that Assad
likely used chemical weapons against his own people -- a step that Obama once said
would be a "grave mistake" -- America's next diplomatic move on Syria
was this effort to revive moribund peace talks.
All this is taking
place against more caffeinated legislative efforts to assist the opposition.
Sen. Robert Menendez (R-NJ) introduced
a bill on May 6 that would provide U.S. arms and military training to vetted
rebels, and Sen. John McCain (R-AZ) and Sen. Carl Levin (D-MI) took to the
floor today calling for precision air strikes using stand-off
systems on Assad's aircraft and missile launchers. What the Kremlin correctly
gleans from such schizophrenic shifts in U.S. policy and rhetoric is that
Washington hasn't got a coherent strategy to speak of. And the Putinists surely
won't have missed this tucked-away
quote from an unnamed U.S. official: "If [Assad] drops
sarin gas on his own people, what's that got to do with us?"
Russian security
officials will read that as an open invitation to Russia to assist the White
House in putting off intervention in Syria. Already, they've been all too happy
to oblige: A day after Kerry left Moscow, the Wall Street Journal reported
on an "imminent" deal between Russia and Syria to furnish Assad with
S-300 missiles -- the same high-tech, anti-aircraft system that Washington
pressured Russia not to sell to Iran. The supposed package will include
"six launchers and 144 missiles, each with a range of 125 miles," and
the first delivery is scheduled to occur within the next three months. Such
weapons would no doubt boost the argument of non-interventionists in Washington
who contend that Syria's air defenses are too formidable to impose a no-fly
zone.
Putin's mind lies open
like a drawer of knives, yet the United States -- and even some members of the
Syrian opposition -- persist in the illusion that the Russian leader can
change. But why should he, when it's the West's position on Syria that's proven
eminently mutable? Lavrov wasn't being glib or unscripted himself when, in an interview
with Foreign Policy, he said that he was "gratified to note some
positive change which occurred on the part of those who have been denying any
possibility for a dialogue as long as President Assad is in Syria."
Lavrov then reiterated
Russia's right to sell arms and anti-aircraft weaponry to Assad, and noted that
it was the Americans, not the Russians, who were backing down on their demands.
Fyodor Lukyanov was similarly correct
in his assessment in al-Monitor on Thursday: "Russia's position is
certainly not changing.... Rather, it is the US that is refining its point of
view -- not due to Russia, but as enthusiasm wanes regarding what Syria
might look like after Syrian President Bashar al-Assad leaves."
From the beginning, the
Russian strategy has tracked well with that of the Assad regime's: prolong the
conflict to the point where jihadists are the most visible presence on the
other side, then frame it in the grammar of the global war on terror. Taking a
page from Assad's book, Russia has characterized all of Syria's rebels --
including recent military defectors from the regime -- as
"terrorists." It has tried to lay the blame for the Houla massacre --
in which 108 civilians, including many women and children, were butchered by
pro-regime shabiha -- on the opposition. It has facilitated the regime's
propaganda about the rebels' use of chemical weapons by insisting that the
United Nations restrict its forensic investigation to just one area in Aleppo,
rather than allowing the U.N. team to launch a full investigation across the
country. Russia is also aware that the United Nations cannot access Syrian
territory without Assad's permission, which is as unforthcoming as it is
convenient for those who believe that no amount of credible or
"concrete" U.S. intelligence on weapons of mass destruction will be
taken seriously after Iraq.
Lavrov was certainly
right to say that Russia's position has been "consistent."
Now compare this to the White House, which first established a policy of regime
change when Obama said that Assad had to "step aside" in August 2011
-- only to then quietly rescind that policy by backing former U.N. Syria envoy
Kofi Annan's failed six-point peace plan in March 2012.
One
almost envies the Kremlin at this late hour. After much intransigence at Turtle
Bay and a steady stream of arms shipments and military advisers to the Assad
regime, Putin finds that his expectations for restoring Russia's great power
status have actually been exceeded. He wanted to be equal to the United States
in foreign affairs, but on Syria, he's clearly now the man to see. Happy
Victory Day.
