Credit to Nabil Abi Saab’s “UN Report” for releasing
this April 19 briefing to the Security Council by Lakhdar Brahimi, the joint
special representative of the United Nations and League of Arab States for Syria:
Mr. President, Distinguished Members of the Security Council,
1. I thank you Mr.
President for giving me the opportunity to brief the Council once again on
Syria. This is an honor indeed and I am very much aware that I’ll be speaking
under the Chair of the Distinguished Ambassador of Rwanda, a country where
people know a thing or two about repression, injustice and suffering, all
things we shall be saying much about during our conversation this morning.
2. Yesterday, the
Council held an open session and heard from Valerie Amos, Antonio Gueterres,
Zainab Bangura and Leila Zerrougui, who described the dire humanitarian
situation in all its manifestations. They spoke with the authority of their
respective high positions and the intimate knowledge they have acquired of the
situation. They spoke with eloquence and emotion about the sufferings of
millions of Syrians inside and outside their country. They highlighted for you
in particular the unbearable conditions under which children live and die and
the many humiliations women and girls have to endure.
3. To what you heard
yesterday, there is nothing I can add – except perhaps the following remarks:
a) Let us spare a thought for the tens of
thousands of prisoners and detainees held in official prisons and secret
detention centers, most of who are routinely subjected to torture and
humiliating and degrading treatment. And let us once again call for their
immediate release.
b) Let us remember that even when they still
have a roof over their head, and some income, practically every man, woman and
child in Syria, except the very privileged few, live in constant fear; fear
that the next car bomb may go off in front of their home; fear that their workplace
may be blown up or forced to close; fear that the bakery of the neighborhood will
be destroyed; fear of being arrested by one of the many security branches; fear
that one’s child will be kidnapped. In short, everyone in Syria today lives
with terror in their hearts that a catastrophe is waiting to affect their
shattered lives.
c) Let me express once again my
appreciation of, and my gratitude for the generosity of those governments,
organizations and individuals who have given so much to help needy Syrians at
home and abroad. The same appreciation and gratitude go to tireless workers --
Syrians and foreigners -- who, at considerable risk some of the time, work around
the clock to try to bring aid and comfort to those same, needy Syrians.
d) And last but not least, let me
underline the important point made yesterday to the effect that we cannot
expect the generosity of donors and the dedication of aid workers to solve
Syria’s problem: you all know better than I do that the generosity of donors
and the dedication of aid workers is not the solution.
Mr. President, Distinguished Members of the Council,
4. All in this room are
aware that efforts to bring the violence to an end and to restore peace have
not been successful so far. I am personally, profoundly sorry that that my own
efforts have produced so little. I apologize to the Syrian people for having,
in the end, done so little for them during these past eight months and to you,
in this Council, for having had only sad news to report to you, each of the
four times I have addressed the Council.
Mr. President,
5. It may be useful,
for our purpose today, to rapidly look back at the past efforts to tackle the
Syrian conflict. There may be a lesson or two that can be usefully learned for
the future.
6. It is generally
agreed by all, including in circles that are very close to the heart of power
in Damascus, that the crisis could have been solved in its prime infancy --
indeed in its first few days, when those kids wrote graffiti on some Walls in
the Southern city of Deraa. It is said that President Bashar al-Assad was
advised to travel to Deraa, apologize to the victims and their families, offer
generous compensation, dismiss the governor and those who were responsible with
him for the brutality and hold them to account, announce there and then a
comprehensive package of reforms that would be diligently and honestly
implemented. That did not happen. In his long TV interview two days ago,
President Bashar al-Assad made a reference to this episode and said “he was
right NOT to
have followed that advice”!!
7. The Arab League then
tried to help. Its efforts culminated in the Arab observer mission led by Gen.
Al-Dabi from the Sudan. It is said that the mission was doing reasonably well
but the cooperation from the parties was not apparently meeting the
expectations of Arab States; the conflict was expanding much faster than the
efforts to end it.
8. Kofi Annan was then
brought on as Joint Special Envoy of the Secretaries-General of the United
Nations and the League of Arab States. The Security Council immediately
endorsed his 6-point plan and the necessary UN observer mission, UNSMIS, was
deployed to monitor implementation.
9. Kofi Annan then
brought together the now famous Action Group of Countries whose Foreign
Ministers met in Geneva and produced another remarkable document: the
Declaration of 30 June, followed by its Action Plan. Unfortunately, Kofi’s
creativity and diligence also fell short: the steps needed to implement the
plan were not taken.
10. Kofi’s admirable
and creative ideas were defeated by the determination and confidence of each
party to the conflict that they can win on the ground and, as Kofi himself
said, by the lack of unity in the international community, and especially
inside this Council to give his plan the necessary support to overcome the
strong resistance he was encountering on the ground.
11. When I arrived on
the scene, I thought I should try to overcome the difficulties Kofi encountered
by concentrating my efforts in two directions: (i) talk to the parties to the
conflict inside and outside Syria, as well as to their respective regional and
international backers and; (ii) see if the Security Council would unite again
to effectively support the Geneva communiqué and Action Plan and my own work
aimed at creating the conditions conducive to its implementation.
12. I was constantly
asked to produce a Brahimi plan. But what l was working on was how to help
produce a Syrian plan to
implement Geneva, which specifically said that what was needed was a Syrian-led process. Unfortunately,
progress at the local and regional levels was almost nil and, at the
international level, progress was both far too slow and too modest.
13. Then, on 30
January, came the surprising initiative of Moaz al-Khatib, the president of the
National Coalition of Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces (NCSROF), the
opposition organization set up in November 2012. As you will recall this
initiative came soon after my previous briefing to this Council on 29 January
2013. In that briefing, l had said, amongst other things, that there were no
prospects that Syrians could accept to talk to one another to put an end to the
violence and agree on a process for a political, peaceful solution.
14. Moaz al-Khatib’s
initiative seemed to prove me wrong on that particular point. Indeed, that
initiative, in its simple, almost naïve form, was a breath of fresh air and a
ray of hope in a profoundly bleak situation. It was, as a French expression
puts it: “un coup de pied dans la fourmilière”, a
stir in the pot, a stone thrown in dormant waters, a vigorous shout to all
concerned that said, “Yes, peace is possible. Let us make it happen.”
15. Sheikh Moaz asked
nothing more of the government than to deliver passports to Syrian expatriates
who needed them and to release the tens of thousands of political prisoners. He
later lowered his demand to the immediate release of women prisoners only.
These were not really preconditions: a simple reminder of purely humanitarian
problems and demands that were unanimously made by Syrians of all walks of life
and political and religious persuasion as well as by people the world over.
16. The government in
Damascus was surprised and embarrassed; its reaction was slow and confused.
After some contradictory declarations and a Visit by Foreign Minister Walid Muallem
to Moscow, the government at long last, declared it was ready to meet with a
delegation representing the opposition in what they called a “pre-dialogue” in
Moscow, Geneva or Vienna. Meanwhile, Moaz alKhatib’s own colleagues in the
Coalition took a different direction. Meeting in Cairo, in February, they
rejected their chairman’s proposal and decided that, in the future, no
initiative would come out from their organization except from the general assembly
-- all 70 or so members of them.
17. The next step came
from the League of Arab States, whose Council of Ministers adopted a resolution
on 6 March 2013 inviting the Coalition to form what they called an Executive Body,
to attend the Arab Summit on 26 and 27 March and represent Syria in all the
agencies of the League of Arab States system, until elections are held in Syria. The ministerial resolution
was endorsed by the Arab Summit.
18. If the language of
that resolution is to be taken literally, this means that, for the League of Arab
States, the Geneva process is to be considered obsolete; no dialogue or
negotiations are possible or necessary.
19. If in this
depressing environment, we want to nonetheless find some hopeful signs, l would
point out to the acceptance by the Coalition, for the first time that, under
some conditions, they would consider a political process. And also the fact
that the government has at long last moved from the position that the vague
dialogue they were promoting would have to take place in Damascus and agreed to
meet the other side outside of the country.
20. Even these meager,
positive elements were soon put in question by Mr. (Ghassan) Hitto, the premier-designate
of the government that the Coalition is trying to form, when he solemnly
declared that his side wouldn’t participate in any dialogue with Damascus. On
his part, President Bashar al-Assad in his long television interview two days
ago again spoke of the opposition and of his understanding of dialogue in terms
that are hardly encouraging.
21. On the ground,
fighting has intensified, causing more victims, more destruction and more
dislocation of society. That is why Valerie Amos told you yesterday there are
now 6.8 million people who need aid inside Syria and Antonio Gueterres that the
number of refugees will go up to 3.5 million by the end of the year. If you add
to those already staggering numbers, that of hundreds of thousands of Syrians who
left their country but are not officially registered as refugees, we would be
saying that almost 50% of the Syrian population is being gravely affected by
the conflict. I wonder if this is not a depressing record in the history of
conflict, reminiscent perhaps of the exodus of Palestinians from their land in
1948 and 1967.
Mr. President,
22. Over the last few Weeks,
a great deal of attention has been focused on al-Qaeda, Jabhat Al-Nusra and
other similar groups fighting the regime in Syria. Dr. Ayman al-Zawahiri, the
leader of al-Qaeda International, and Jabhat Al-Nusra itself have confirmed
what was already common knowledge and that is that Jabhat Al-Nusra and other
like-minded groups were formally affiliated to al-Qaeda or shared in its
ideology and practices.
23. Equally confirmed
is the fact that al-Nusra and its sister organizations were more important than
originally thought. The Financial Times
yesterday seemed to know that they represent only 10% of those who are engaged
in the armed struggle against the regime. There also is more talk than ever
about non-Syrians participating in the fighting in Syria, mostly Arabs but also
other nationalities from Asia and Europe, East and West. Are all these foreign
volunteers fighting in the ranks of al-Nusra and its sisters or are they spread
more or less evenly among various armed groups? I don’t know. Nor do l know how
credible are the numbers of those foreign fighters that vary considerably from
one source to another. Four months ago, a reliable source close to the regime
estimated the number of foreign fighters at a few hundred men and Jabhat al-Nusra
at 3,000 to 5,000. Another source, now speaks of no less than 30,000 to 40,000
foreign fighters.
24. Foreign presence on
the side of the government is also a reality. Both Sayyed Hassan Nasrallah, the
secretary-general of Hezbollah, and an official spokesperson in Tehran have
confirmed that they were militarily present in Syria. How many; where; and
doing what? There again, I do not know for certain. And again, these numbers
vary widely from one source to the other; with some saying Hezbollah is only
protecting religious Shiite shrines and the Iranians providing a few military
advisors, and others claiming that the well-coordinated Hezbollah-lran presence
counts thousands of fighters actively engaged alongside Government
forces, plus advisers
helping the regime form what they call the “People’s Army”, a decentralized
militia force acting locally to replace or support the shadowy and much feared
Shabiha gangs.
Mr. President
25. Until recently, the
debate was moving back and forth from prediction of imminent fall of the regime
to claims that the armed opposition was loosing momentum. I fear the debate may
now shift to arguments about the importance of al-Qaeda and associated groups
and how that will, or should, affect the attitude of regional and international
players.
26. I hope the tree is
not going to hide the wood. To learn who is who in the confrontation in and
about Syria is necessary and important. I think it is fairly certain the
regional dimension of the conflict in Syria is growing: features of a proxy war
are more and more apparent but the conflict remains essentially a savage civil war
between Syrians, and the sectarian dimensions of the crisis are perhaps more
important to watch and understand than the participation of foreigners in the
struggle. As for extremism, Syrians and international partners have every
reason to be concerned over its effects on the present situation and on its
possible long-term influence. The way to contain extremisms and reduce its
influence is to more actively act to end the conflict.
27. Going forward, the
choice for Syrian parties and for the international community has not changed
and will not change: Is it going to be a deadly, destructive fight to the
finish because each party and its supporters are convinced that total victory
is not only possible but certain for them, or are these parties and their
supporters going to agree, at long last, that there is no military solution to
this conflict and that a serious negotiation is urgently needed to work out a
political solution?
28. Many worthy ideas
are floated around and discussed in many quarters on how to move forward. From
the Quartet set up at the initiative of President Mohamed Morsi of Egypt, to
Russia, to China, to the Friends of Syria and to many learned academics and journalists.
All have in common a demand for an urgent end to the violence and a negotiated
process, mediated by a qualified and accepted party.
Mr. President,
29. Antonio Guterres
spoke to you yesterday with the authority of his office and the intimate
knowledge he has of the present situation in Syria. His speech also drew on his
experience as a former political leader in his country, Portugal. Permit me to
remind you of a few of his words. I quote: “helping Syria’s neighbors
deal with the human fallout of this terrible conflict is crucial for preserving
the stability of the entire region. This is not just another refugee crisis --
what happens in Syria and in the neighboring countries potentially has much
wider, even global, implications... Failure to give these countries [Jordan,
Lebanon, Turkey and others] the support they need to continue providing
sanctuary to so many suffering Syrians would not only mean to abandon a people,
and a whole region. It would be the world blindness to its own best interest”
End of quote.
30. Antonio Guterres
also said and I quote again: “There is no humanitarian solution for the Syrian
crisis. That is why it is so dramatic that we are not even seeing an inch of
progress towards a political solution.” And he asks: “Isn’t there any way to stop
this fighting to open the door for a political solution?”
31. That last question
was addressed to you, Mr. President, and to your colleagues, the members
of the Security Council. Are you not the court of last appeal when peace and
security are at risk? And where are peace and security more at risk today than
in Syria, a country that is literally drowning and taking down an entire region
down with it?
32. Yes, the problem is
difficult, the situation becomes more complex by the day, the regime is not
quite ready to listen, the opposition not as united as it should be around an
established leadership and a credible, constructive political program. Yes,
this situation appears to be totally hopeless, with no light to be seen at the
end of a long tunnel Syria is lost in.
33. In an article
written with Sarah Birke and published only three days ago, Peter Harling of
ICG, a very perceptive observer of the Syria and the Middle East scene, says
and I quote: “Given a chance, (Syrian) society may pull through; it might fare
better still of the conflict draws to a close and the aftermath is skillfully
handled. With each day of the conflict – today is day 763 – those chances
become slimmer, diminishing Syrians’ sense of national identity and their pride
in their society… With incremental indecisive interference from all sides,
further escalation is almost inevitable. Syria’s all-out civil war, if it comes
to that, will no doubt go down in conventional wisdom as an outburst of
communal hatred, inevitable within a mixed society. Nothing could be further
from the truth. It is product of an international standoff. However Syrians
suffer, the war in their country is not in their hands: it is conflict that
disfigures Syrian society more than reflects it” End of quote.
34. Might it be said --
Mr. President -- that the solution of
that war is in your hands, members of the Security Council?
35. That does not mean,
of course that Syrians have no role to play in the search for a solution to the
crisis in their country. Important developments need to take place before a decisive
shift away from the existing violence towards a political process can be
credibly initiated. In particular, on the side of the opposition, a more
consistent and sustained effort to reinforce and expand unity and discipline in
their ranks inside and outside the country, among civilians, among armed
groups, and between civilians and the military.
36. Also on the side of
the opposition and some – not all – of their supporters, an understanding that
external military intervention is neither likely or desirable; nor can such an
intervention be provoked. Furthermore, it is perfectly legitimate for them to
demand that President Bashar al-Assad leave office and his regime be dismantled.
But, these are objectives, and processes needed to be elaborated to achieve
them. Every conflict needs at a certain stage to be politically addressed.
It is high time, after two long years, to start working, with others on such a
political process for Syria. Moaz al-Khatib’s initiative in February should be
further developed not discarded.
37. On the side of the
regime, it is equally urgent to give up the dream of a military victory. That
is not going to happen. Nor is it realistic to expect that somehow, because of
the perceived growing importance of al-Nusra, a spectacular shift is to going
to push the regime and the West into an unholy alliance to fight Islamic
terrorism. President Assad, two days ago, said very clearly that what is taking
place in his country is war. He does not agree that this is a civil war (nor
does the opposition, in fact). But surely, a war cannot be brought to an end
through a vague dialogue with mainly the supporters of one’s own side. It needs
a negotiation between the warring parties. Nor should the dialogue be expected
to lead to limited or cosmetic reforms. That has been tried and did not work.
38. In this context, I
will venture to add this: President Assad consistently insisted that, as a
Syrian citizen, it was his right to run for election if he wished. As far as I
know, he does not say that he shall run after the end of his current mandate.
Could an appeal be made him to voluntarily forego that right and undertake not
to run? This would not be a defeat for him but a huge constructive and honorable
contribution to save Syria.
39. Much debate has
taken place about the flow of arms and how it can be checked. Two years on this
conflict, it is unrealistic to expect that the flow of arms can be stopped to
one side but not to the other. The way to go is to respond to the repeated
pleas of the Secretary-General that the flow of arms be stopped to all sides in
Syria.
40. Nor would it be
reasonable to expect a total embargo on the delivery of arms to be effective
for any length of time if a political process that includes a viable and
verifiable ceasefire is not crafted and accepted by all shortly thereafter.
Mr. President,
41.
May I finally remind the Council of the suggestions I made during my
last briefing on 29 January. I believe these suggestions remain valid
and there is even more urgency today for the Council to consider acting on
them.
