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Showing posts with label George Solage. Show all posts
Showing posts with label George Solage. Show all posts

Tuesday, 22 May 2012

“Difficult days ahead for Lebanon”


(Photo from al-Joumhouria)

By George Solage*
The situation in Lebanon becomes all the more dangerous as the Lebanese sides increase their meddling in the Syrian crisis.
Successive security incidents also show the struggle in and over Syria has started creeping into the brittle Lebanese interior, which is prone to blow up instantly at any time.
The controls have all but evaporated as sectarian compulsions get the better of national logic and external agendas take precedence over internal priorities.
The release of Shadi Mawlawi won’t pacify the Tripoli streets. Nor will holding to account the killers of sheikhs Ahmed Abdul-Wahed and Mohammed Hussein Merheb calm the volcanic anger of the people of Akkar, whose social and economic development rights have long been overlooked.
The people of the North feel targeted and hunted. They feel their youths are trailed. They feel accused of being Takfeeris. Weapons are seized from their hands but permitted in the hands of others. They are dubbed terrorist suspects liable to be penalized. They are banned from sympathizing with their Sunnite brethren in Syria. They are threatened with a return of the Syrian army to their region to supposedly prevent Akkar from becoming a sanctuary for the Syrian regime’s opponents and a buffer zone and launching pad for military operations inside Syria.
In light of this perception, which raised tension to unforeseen levels, chances of a political solution sponsored by Lebanese officialdom receded. Some branches of government floated the idea of a security solution on the ground, which effectively translates into pitting the Lebanese army against its own people in Tripoli and Akkar.
The security situation did not work in Syria and can’t succeed in Lebanon because the problem is not a question of security, but of politics. The problem needs to be addressed politically.
Even though some people point the finger at the army, the issue is not between the army and the political forces or the denizens of the region.
Talk about a likely return of the Syrian army to Lebanon is pure scaremongering. The Syrian army now is in no position to undertake such an adventure. Also, there’s no international decision to that effect. On the contrary, such a move would trigger an international outcry of which Syria is aware and can ill afford.
A high-ranking security source confirms this and does not anticipate security turmoil in Beirut at this stage, despite the incidents of the past couple of days. He is surprised by the amplification of reports about al-Qaeda cadres being in Beirut and heading to Syria. He is also confident the Lebanese army and the internal security forces are in control.
But good intentions alone are not enough and warnings are futile so long as “self-distancing” (from Syria) remains a (government) policy slogan, which the political authorities either don’t wish to uphold or don’t dare to respect.
Proof is that the “virtual (parliamentary) majority” still does not see the need to replace the present government with a salvation government in order to safeguard Lebanon from the high-risk challenges threatening its security, unity, sovereignty and future.
What lies in store (for Lebanon) is onerous and extremely intricate.
It will become more menacing if the past fortnight’s realities on the ground – the realities of coupling Lebanon’s north and the Syrian interior – take hold.
The directives by Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain to their citizens to avoid travel to Lebanon is one of many prices the Lebanese would have to pay should they choose to poke their nose further into the Syrian crisis and ignore the pressing need for a salvation government in anticipation of arms proliferating and the situation flaring up on a wider scale.
*This think piece by George Solage appears in Arabic today in the independent Beirut daily al-Joumhouria. Solage is a longtime media aide to Lebanon’s former defense minister Elias el-Murr. 

Tuesday, 13 March 2012

Will Putin replace Lavrov with Margelov in May?


Clockwise, from left: Lavrov, Putin and Margelov

Will the Syria crisis drive Vladimir Putin to change horses in midstream and name Mikhail Margelov, current chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Federation Council of Russia, to replace Sergei Lavrov as foreign minister when he names a new government on his inauguration as president on May 7?
There is a chance Putin might, according to political analyst George Solage, a longtime media aide to Lebanon’s former defense minister Elias el-Murr writing today for the Beirut daily al-Joumhouria.
Solage says a behind-the-scenes power struggle is underway in Putin circles over the foreign ministry portfolio responsible, among other things, for management of the Syria file.
“Lavrov is striving for some sort of a Syria breakthrough in the interim to boost his chances of being named in the new government,” writes Solage, adding: “At the same time Margelov, who is close to Putin, is leading a lobby for change that accuses Lavrov of undermining Russian interests in much of the Arab world because of his defense of the Syrian regime.”
This, in Solage’s opinion, “explains Lavrov’s recent overture to Arab foreign ministers meeting in Cairo and the five-point understanding he reached with them, in anticipation of Russian-Arab cooperation at the United Nations and in the Security Council.”
Quoting an unnamed senior diplomat in Moscow, Solage says the Kremlin concluded that President Bashar al-Assad “can’t prevail and the opposition can’t bring him down. At the same time, Gulf Arabs erred in ignoring Russian interests…”
Before Lavrov’s meeting with Arab foreign ministers in Cairo, Solage notes, Putin sent a positive signal to the six-member Gulf Cooperation Council by dismissing the Russian ambassador in Doha (Vladimir Titorenko) for having caused a diplomatic tiff with Qatar.
Solage quotes the senior diplomat in Moscow as saying changes in the government lineup planned by Putin “would definitely reflect on the Kremlin’s foreign policy, which is currently influenced by diplomats and intelligence bigwigs who built strong personal ties with Syrian figures and security services and with the Israeli lobby in Moscow led by Yevgeny Primakov, who is pushing hard against elbowing out the Syrian regime.”

Tuesday, 21 February 2012

Civil war could trigger Syria’s three-way breakup


(Syria map from The World Factbook)

Events in Syria are regrettably moving towards a civil war. The uncertainty is if a full-blown civil war would keep Syria whole.
Political analyst George Solage, a longtime media aide to Lebanon’s former defense minister Elias Murr writing today for the Beirut daily al-Joumhouria, suspects internecine strife might eventually lead to the country’s breakup into three statelets, namely,
(1) A Sunnite statelet chiefly run by the Muslim Brotherhood and covering about two-thirds of Syria’s total area of 185,180 square kilometers. It would stretch from Deraa and Suwayda to Aleppo and al-Bukamal and include Damascus.
(2) An Alawite statelet roughly the size of Lebanon’s 10,452 kilometers and run along the Mediterranean coast from Lebanon’s northern border to Tartus, Latakia and up to the frontier with Hatay province in southern Turkey. The Alawites would thus be building on the autonomy given to them by the French mandatory authorities between 1920 and 1936.  (“Building upon sectarian and regional consciousness, the French set about formalizing Alawite particularism in political and military forms. In 1922, an Alawite state was constituted, albeit in federation with Damascus and Aleppo, yet in 1925 it was separated and became an independent governmental entity. It had a local council with a majority of Alawite members, others being Christian, Sunni and Ismaili. In the spirit of the times, Sunni tribunals were precluded from judging Alawite cases. While Alawite primacy was irrefutable in what was called L'État des Alaouites, the French nonetheless chose to modify its singular communal image. In 1930 the state was renamed Le Gouvernement de Lattaquié. It was in this period that Syrian Arab nationalism gained momentum in Damascus and other key urban centers, and its leadership aspired to reintegrate the outlying provinces of the Druzes and Alawites into the political fabric of national life. In 1936, this was achieved with the annexation by Syria of the Latakia entity, which, though subsequently reconstituted in 1939, disappeared wholly as a distinct political or administrative unit in 1942. When Syria became an independent state in 1946, nothing remained of the French devise of an Alawite État...”  -- Quotation from http://books.google…).
Ibrahim Hananu (photo from Wikipedia)
(3) A Kurdish statelet running from ar-Raqqah to al-Hasakah and al-Qamishli in northeast Syria on the border with Turkey and close to Iraq. Syria’s estimated two million Kurds have an affinity for the Kurdish movements in Turkey, Iraq and Iran and are already demanding recognition of their right to self-determination. This is despite the fact that Syrian Kurd Ibrahim Hananu is considered one of the most celebrated warriors and heroes of the resistance against the French Mandate. Two Syrian Kurds have also assumed the presidency since Syria’s independence from France in April 1946. They are Husni al-Za’im in 1949 and Fawzi Selu between December 1951 and July 1953.
According to Solage, “Turkey will be first to reject such a partition. A Kurdish statelet on its border is a red line. And an Alawite statelet would create an expanse for its own Alawites and problems it does not need.”