 |
 |
| Waddah Khanfar |
Waddah
Khanfar, 45, is the president of Al Sharq Forum, an independent network dedicated to developing
long-term strategies for political development, social justice and economic
prosperity of the people of the Middle East. He previously served as the
Director General of the Aljazeera
Network. In 2011, Foreign Policy
Magazine ranked Khanfar first in “The FP Top 100 Global Thinkers.” In 2009,
Forbes Magazine named him one of the
most “Powerful People in the World.” He penned this think piece in
Arabic for aljazeera.net:
The
Syrian regime having turned to Scud missiles, and with Russia and Iran keeping
up their arms supplies to the Damascus government, the British and French
assume that providing some weapons to the rebels would somewhat level the
sides’ firepower and prod the regime to negotiate with the opposition.
The
idea by some in the West of working for a peace settlement by redressing the
military balance won’t work. It won’t help stop the violence.
It
would simply gain the regime more time and lay the first stone for greater and
more vengeful violence. The move would inflame the situation and broaden the
field of conflict to engulf the whole region.
Many
reasons are at work to expand the Syria crisis and give it a regional
dimension.
The
Arab Mashreq is one of the
world’s most diverse regions in terms of sects, ethnicities and religions.
The
Syria crisis is getting deeper and thornier because of gory terrorism by
Syria’s sectarian regime, Russia’s accolades and Iran’s giveaways to Assad, America
and Europe’s hesitation and the Arab states’ muddled disposition towards the
multiple Syrian revolution sides.
Regional
amplification of the crisis has thus become a matter of time. This is to say
the Syria crisis will become, in the course of its third year, an open-ended
trans-boundary conflict posing the biggest challenge yet to the stability of
the region since its current borders were mapped out a century ago in the
aftermath of the First World War.
Mushrooming
of the Syria crisis will first envelop Lebanon, which is closest to Syria.
The
strategic axis extending from Tehran to Baghdad, to Damascus, and on to
Hezbollah in Lebanon believes the Assad regime’s fall will reconfigure the
region’s strategic balances.
That’s
what drove Hezbollah to be the first Lebanese side to stick its nose in Syria
and give political and logistical support to Assad’s regime. That’s what
prompted other Lebanese sides to back the Syrian revolution.
Tension
and polarization peaked in Lebanon after its internal two-year rope war. The
country is now exposed to the fire and brimstone of the Syria crisis with all
its bloody violence and sectarian overtones.
Despite
the seriousness of an eruption of violence in Lebanon, a spread of hostilities in
the direction of Iraq is the more ominous development in the making.
The
preliminary signs are evident in the mounting political strains between the
Maliki government, which is prone to sectarianism and backs Bashar al-Assad, and
all the predominantly Sunni provinces on the one hand, and between Maliki and
Iraq’s Kurdistan Region on the other.
It
seems the three months of ceaseless protests in the Sunni areas have reached a
dead-end.
The
Maliki government did not meet the demonstrators’ demands for greater sectarian
evenhandedness in Baghdad. Instead, the government escalated its repression of
protesters and embraced violence.
This
risks opening the Iraqi arena to a new cycle of grisly violence that will find
its natural extension in the inflamed Syrian mainland.
Iraq,
which is yet to recover from a civil war that tore to pieces its national unity
between 2007 and 2009, is expected to take sectarian strife in the region to
unparalleled levels.
Iraq’s
neighbors – Iran, Turkey and the Arab Gulf countries – will find themselves
drawn into the inferno.
The
struggle over Iraq will not only be over its huge oil resources, but also over
the heart and soul of the upcoming Middle East. The latter will determine the weights
of the regional powers and chart the region’s new political map.
Is
such a bleak scenario preventable?
The
answer lies in what regional and international players do in the few months
ahead, starting with the United States precluding its past mistakes and making
removal of the Syrian regime its top priority.
Although
direct military intervention is not welcome, the prerequisite is to provide the
Syrian revolution with the necessary qualitative weapons without engaging
prematurely in side issues over the local balance of power post-Assad Syria.
The
U.S. administration was nonplussed and undecided on Syria in the past two
years. It blocked the flow of qualitative weapons to the rebels in Syria under
different pretexts. These included Washington’s apprehension of post-Assad
scenarios and of Islamists ruling in Damascus at Israel’s doorstep.
America
also did not want to see such weapons “fall into the wrong hands,” meaning
Jihadists and groups close to al-Qaeda.
Such
American hesitance proved disastrous. It failed to prioritize the removal of a
terrorist regime bent on killing, destroying and raping for fear of a potential
terrorism threat.
The
U.S. made the mistake when the Syrian revolution was miles away from the
influence of al-Qaeda and its offshoots.
This
emboldened the regime, allowing it to raise the level of its violence against
civilians to unprecedented heights.
Likewise,
the international community’s dawdling and indecision on supporting the Free
Syrian Army and the moderate rebel brigades allowed Jihadist groups to join the
fray.
It
is atypical not to see oppression victims turn to whoever can defend them. It
took Jihadist groups, including Jabhat al-Nusra, which the U.S. designated as
terrorist, more than a year to make their entry into the Syria scene.
The
U.S. decision was also misguided in that it shifted the international community
and regional forces’ priority from bringing down the regime to fighting
Jihadists.
Moreover,
U.S. blacklisting of al-Nusra empowered the group further after it proved to be
more disciplined than the other armed groups and refrained from antagonizing
Christian, Druze and Alawite minorities.
The
lack of a clear strategy vis-à-vis the Syrian revolution sent conflicting
signals to regional countries. Those fearful of the “Islamist threat” chose to
arm groups of no consequence in Syria, which served the regime well and
embittered the revolution’s mainstream.
The
most important thing the countries of the region need to do is formulate a
common position on the Syria priorities.
Downing
the regime posthaste is the imperative step liable to stop the slide towards
unbridled violence.
Focusing
on the attendant post-Assad fears and trying to meddle in the rebel groups’
political and military balance of power will work for the regime and for the
scenario of full-blown chaos and sectarian strife.
