The price of chasing a political solution in Syria

Following is my paraphrasing of a think piece posted this morning on Aljazeera’s portal and penned in Arabic by veteran political analyst and commentator Yasser Zaatera:

Talk of a political solution in Syria is mounting by the day, not only among those directly concerned, such as Russia, Iran and Special Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi, but in opposition circles as well.

The opposition includes the “Onshore” Coordination Committee and the “Offshore” National Coalition and National Council.

Likewise, the regime, which is striving at all levels to show a fair amount of internal cohesion and its ability to prevail militarily.

Leaks to Hezbollah’s mouthpiece al-Akhbar about the “First Lady” being pregnant, and President Bashar al-Assad being assertive about the successes of his army and his ability to come out on top, are simply attempts to expedite the solution.

Russia is arguably scurrying for a solution for fear of military setbacks it does not preclude and risk precipitating a loss of control.

Russia is absolutely convinced the regime can’t possibly prevail by military might and the longer the fighting drags out, the lower the chances of a face-saving settlement.

Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev’s recent remarks set the tone of Moscow’s occasional concerns, which dissipate once Sergei Lavrov, the hawk of Russia’s Syria policy, resumes talking tough.

Iran in turn seems in a rush. It aspires to do a deal with Washington inclusive of sanctions, its nuclear program and the Syria file in the few months left on the countdown clock to its June presidential elections, the most sensitive since the 1979 Khomeini revolution, according to Ali Akbar Velayati.

The leadership of Iran’s conservative camp believes the Syria situation and recent reversals in Iraq will have their say in the looming presidential ballot. The rationale is that the Iranian street will hold the conservative leadership accountable for failure of its regional project, which cost it an arm and a leg – not to mention the debilitating sanctions caused by its unconvincing nuclear ambitions.

Outside the realm of its narrow sectarian politics, Tehran is undoubtedly concerned about the political burden caused by the Syria file on its links with the Arab and Islamic worlds.

But instead of teaching Tehran a lesson, such a “concern” sees it escape forward without avoiding pitfalls, as against Mohamed Morsi in Egypt’s case.

This explains why Iran leaders don’t stop talking of a political solution in Syria, entreating the Syrian opposition (specifically the National Coalition) to a dialogue and leaking ceaseless news of their huddles with Coordination Committee representatives.

The U.S. and the West’s veto on a political solution seems to have evaporated too, particularly that the destruction (of Syria) demanded by Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu has peaked, raising the specter of chemical weapons and long-range ground and ground-to-air missiles.

Netanyahu expressed his worries by ordering Israel’s latest airstrike.

The raid, which Bashar said targeted a scientific research center, was apparently a chemical weapons storage site the Israelis feared might fall into rebel hands. Proof is that the army communiqué hinted at the failure of “terrorists” to seize it, despite trying.

The other account is that the airstrike was against a convoy ferrying ground-to-air missile to Hezbollah in Lebanon. The American line is that the bombed site was home to chemicals as well as long-range ground-to-ground and ground-to-air missiles.

Also shaping the West’s stance is the rise of the Jihadists’ clout on the Syria scene.

This is a cause of concern for the West after the attack on Algeria’s Amenas gas plant, France’s intervention in Mali, the earlier outrage in Benghazi, and the uncertainties of the Syria endgame.

In short, the West does not want to see the fighting go on to the point where Jihadists effectively rule the roost in Syria.

The regime is aware of this. And so are the Russians and the Iranians, who are now blowing out of proportion the Jihadist factor. Iran’s ambassador to Iraq, for instance, went on record claiming Jabhat al-Nusra members now make up 70 percent of rebel fighters in Syria.

Additionally, Bashar – as reported by al-Akhbar – suggested the U.S. “is not ready” for a solution yet, implying that the key to one remains in his and his allies’ hands.

Weighing most on the shoulders of the regime and its allies is unquestionably the economic factor.

Bashar’s coffers are quickly running dry and his treasury risks going bankrupt under the burdens of battle estimated by Western sources at $1 billion a month.

Correspondingly, the Syrian opposition feels the weight of the world on its shoulders due to: (1) The magnitude of the human suffering (2) Devastation of the country and its economy (3) The financial and military embargo clamped on the revolution.

The opposition’s biggest handicap is its failure to forge a single policy opinion – one that fuses together the initiative of Moaz al-Khatib and the Coordination Committee views endorsing Lakhdar Brahimi’s plan without a mention of Bashar.

Moaz al-Khatib has now offered talks with regime representatives outside Syria, subject to the release of 160,000 detainees and the renewal of all expired passports held by members of the Syrian diaspora.

And to regain the trust of the National Coalition and National Council, he later explained that his conditional offer was to begin talks for the regime’s departure.

The regime cannot possibly accept Moaz al-Khatib’s offer because it would be effectively acknowledging defeat.

A crucial problem relates to the side that can impose a settlement on the warring camps.

Bashar addressed this point indirectly in the leaks to al-Akhbar, saying if Turkey simply cut supply lines to the rebels, he could bring the “insurgency” to its knees inside two weeks – a sign of his arrogance and political blindness.

So what can the regime or its Russian and Iranian mainstays offer the opposition after its breakthrough with U.S. Vice President Joe Biden? And what trade-off would they propose to the U.S., knowing that the opposition won’t submit to any Washington diktat?

The outcome of the ongoing “political ping-pong” is hard to predict.

Surely though, prolongation of the battle will not only lead to more victims and ruin, but also make Bashar and his inner circles’ survival chances unimaginable.

Even if the battle lasted a few more years, the regime will fall.

Turkey for one, plus the revolution’s Arab backers, will not accept defeat by the regime and Iran.

One pointer is Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s whistle-stop visit to Qatar at the tail end of January. Together with Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Qatar get full play in the opposition camp.

Even assuming the political ping-pong led to a “Great Bargain” involving the Russians, the Americans and Iran, none of them can dictate anything to the rebels.

Plainly, any solution that keeps Assad in office can only mean the revolution’s defeat. That’s one thing Turkey specifically will not accept. Turkey cannot bear defeat by Iran, period.

Therein the good tidings lie before the opposition: the prospects of qualitative arms from Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia – plus the possibility of Jordan turning a blind eye to the smuggling of arms into Syria.

Once that happens, the situation on the ground would shift in favor of the revolution, possibly allowing it to concentrate on the battle for Damascus while popular protests continue almost everywhere else.

The implication is that military muscle would put political travails in the shade and eventually bring down the regime. The assumption is opposition leaders would by then have figured the endgame after consulting the revolution’s backers and shutting out U.S. wiles.

In short, the next few months will be decisive in shaping the final scene leaving out Assad, even if Russia – and more so Iran – kept digging in their heels.

Yemeni women continue to forge ahead

Modeling traditional women attire at last week's fashion show in Sana'a 

You always need that first woman to actually break the boundary, crack the generic typecast that will enthuse other girls.

Another Yemeni woman -- journalist and women's rights campaigner Balqees al-Ahmad -- did just that last week.

She had her newly founded NGO –namely, “The SHE Institution for Women’s Culture, Creativity and Development” -- organize Yemen’s first fashion show in the capital Sana’a.

Dr. Manahel Thabet

Her exploit is clearly dwarfed by the earlier achievements of two outstanding Yemeni women: world-renowned economist-cum-scientist Dr. Manahel Thabet and Nobel Peace Prize co-recipient Tawakkol Karman.

Dr. Manahel Thabet is the youngest and only Arab with a degree of PhD in Financial Engineering with magna cum laude "honor.” She is also the only Arab woman and one of the few in the world to enter into the discipline of science using metaphysics theories. Her biography is simply mind-boggling.

Tawakkol Karman, at age 32, was the youngest person ever to win the Nobel Peace Prize, which she shared with two other female activists in 2011.

Balqees al-Ahmad too can now add a “first” to her name for breaking a taboo in the quest for gender equity and women’s empowerment in Yemen.

Balqees al-Ahmad

She explained why camcorders and cameras were banned from last Thursday’s groundbreaking fashion show at the “Fursan Luxury Suites” hotel in Sana’a. Only a limited selection of stills was distributed to the media after the event.

“I think everyone understands our special circumstances,” she told alarabiya.net. “Given our social realities and tribal traditions, many women are denied access to education… Pictures, on screen or in print, of women parading on catwalks with make-up and without veil do not sit well with extremists…”

But the fashion show was a crowd-getter, drawing scores of government officials, political and cultural figures, diplomats, and women socialites and activists.

The parade of 2013 fashion and traditional Yemeni wear was interspersed with folk dance and music.

Most interestingly, the wives of eight foreign ambassadors showed up at the venue in a variety of Yemeni traditional attire.

From left, the wives of the ambassadors of Italy, Turkey, Indonesia, Algeria, Palestine, Iraq, India & Egypt

Iran’s space monkey, stealth fighter and Bashar

That's the wrong monkey with a mole over its right eye

Tehran was accused of monkey business this week when Iranian officials mistakenly released the wrong photo of their first simian space traveler.

Iranian space agency official Mohammad Ebrahimi yesterday told The Associated Press in Tehran one of two official packages of photos of Iran's first space monkey depicted the wrong creature, but a primate really did fly into space and return safely to Earth.

The two different monkeys shown in the photos released by Iran's state media caused some international observers to wonder whether the monkey had died in space or that the launch didn't go well.

One set of pictures showed a relatively dark-haired monkey. Another showed a different monkey — strapped in a pod — that had light gray hair and a distinctive red mole over its right eye.

Ebrahimi said the monkey who traveled in space was named "Pishgam," the Farsi word for pioneer. Initially, the Iranian media said "Pishgam" was the rocket that took him on a 20-minute journey into space last Monday.

Ebrahimi said one set of pictures showed an archive photo of one of the alternate monkeys. He said three to five monkeys are simultaneously tested for such a flight and two or three are chosen for the launch. Finally, the one that is best suited for the mission and isn't stressed is chosen for the voyage.

Satellite technology expert Pat Norris told BBC News Iran's claim to have sent a monkey into space was not a major advance on what its space program had already achieved.

The achievement was similar to launching a missile at 3,000mph and having its warhead survive the flight -- something Iran had done in several tests in recent years, he noted.

However, survival of the monkey, without incurring any injuries, would demonstrate that the acceleration and deceleration of the rocket were not too severe, Norris added.

In 2010, Iran successfully sent a rat, turtle and worms into space. But an attempt to send a monkey up in a rocket failed in 2011.

President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad announced in 2010 the country planned to send a man into space by 2019.

Photos and image grabs of Qaher-323 from RT and www.kaskus.co.id 

Homemade “Conqueror”

In related news, Ahmadinejad yesterday unveiled in a hangar in Tehran a homemade “stealth” fighter-bomber jet reportedly capable of engaging targets on the ground, as well as achieving air superiority in dogfights.

Codenamed Qaher-313 (“Conqueror”), the jet is an advanced single-seat single-engine warplane, RT (Russia Today) reports.

According to photos published by Iran’s Fars news agency, the jet boasts impressive technical specifications, with a stealth design similar to the American F-22 and Russian T-50. The large wingspan and inclined outward tail fins resembles the F-35, as well as the unusual-looking wings and modern seamless canopy. The jet may have been constructed using composite materials.

Iranian engineers claim the Qaher is capable of short takeoffs and landings, and can be repaired easily.

Video of the jet suggests it is already undergoing flight tests, and Iranian pilots have reportedly said they are fully satisfied with its performance.

Iranian Defense Minister Ahmad Vahidi said the Qaher is a “fully indigenous” aircraft, designed and constructed solely by Iranian aerospace experts.

"This advanced fighter jet with unique characteristics has a very low radar cross-section and therefore is capable of operating at low altitudes," Vahidi told Mehr.

Unveiling of the fighter jet coincided with Iran's “Ten-Day Dawn” celebrations marking the 39th anniversary of the end of the 1979 Islamic Revolution.

In his speech, Ahmadinejad said “Iran’s defense might does not serve purposes of expansionism and aggression against other countries.”

Targeted lorries in the air raid on Jaramana

Jaramana

Ahmadinejad’s opposite number and ally, Bashar al-Assad, told an Iranian official today, Sunday, that Israel was trying to “destabilize” Syria by attacking a military research center near Damascus last Wednesday.

In a meeting with Saeed Jalili, secretary of Iran's National Security Council, he said Syria was able to confront "current threats... and aggression.”

Syrian TV has shown images of the raid Damascus says Israeli jets carried out on a scientific research centre in Jaramana, northeast of Damascus, killing two and wounding five.

U.S. officials say lorries carrying weapons bound for Lebanon were the targets.

End of the Arab Spring… but no turning back

Jamal Khashoggi, the Saudi journalist and author now heading Al Arab News Channel, penned this think piece in Arabic  for today’s al-Hayat

Photo by totallycoolpix.com

Bashar confidently says his army has regained the initiative on the ground. His wife is reportedly pregnant.

Signs are multiplying regional states have grown weary of the Syria saga and the opposition stands alone.

Egypt is burning. Her opinion-shapers take note, bicker on all Egyptian and Arab TV channels and then make -- one after the other -- submissions to President Mohamed Morsi.

Meanwhile, TV subscreens show youths hurling out of windows the furniture of government offices or torching an army vehicle.

No one bothers to utter the magical sentence, “Guys, go home. We’ve lost control of the revolution.” The maximum you would hear from someone with a modicum of responsibility is a condemnation of violence “by all sides.” It’s as if that person got a whiff of victory and of Morsi’s exit, meaning he could maybe replace him.

The said person would then call for renewed protests Friday-week, knowing a few more youths would be killed that day aimlessly, save for piling token pressure on the regime.

Morsi himself has lost control. The curfew he ordered went unheeded.

Assassinations in Libya, suicide bombings in Yemen, rows over forming a new government in Tunisia… I seemingly listed Tunisia in this context, but it’s paradise compared to the rest.

So did the Arab Spring end?

Indeed, its warmth and romanticism have evaporated.

The Arab Spring has given way to the “World of Reality” with all the bitterness of economic meltdowns and of crumbling government agencies inherited by the new regimes.

Clearly, not one Egyptian is convinced when the incumbent transport minister blames the former regime for the high number of train accidents and fatalities, saying 85 percent of Egypt’s railway carriages need replacement.

Angry Egyptians don’t focus on the Mubarak regime anymore. For them, the responsibility falls on the incumbent minister, as well as on Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood. They would surely clamor for his resignation at the next train crash.

The fact a juvenile political environment lying in wait to capitalize on any mistake is pitted against a government catapulted to power short of experience and vision is bound to exacerbate the face-off.

The Arab Spring has ended, but the Arab Revolt keeps going in its ceaseless furies, retributions and swings.

On seeing an Egyptian repaint a Tahrir Square sidewalk, or a Libyan in tears hugging his brother, the optimistic analyst said Arabs would forge ahead with their newfound renaissance since they had taken stock of the mistakes of previous revolutions.

The cheerful analyst believed collective human experience was cumulative and Arab citizens and politicians are politically aware of past facts and events.

The pessimistic analyst, who chose to duck in the heydays of the Arab Spring, for fear of being branded a “leftover,” can now relax and pontificate about revolutions having lives of their own and evolving independently of revolutionary idealists and dreamers.

The cynical analyst would also say Egypt – the Arab Spring’s coveted prize – would need at least a decade to stabilize. He would also recount to his audience the French Revolution’s history – how it took a decade to settle and several other decades of mutations before culminating in a potent democracy.

I believe both analysts would agree there’s no turning back.

Morsi might fall or have to call for early presidential elections (a smart move, I dare say, by the Brotherhood).

But certainly:

(a) The Mubarak regime won’t be making anything akin to a comeback

(b) Even if the army assumed power, the move would be short-lived, pending a reordering of the democratic scene

(c) The Muslim Brothers won’t melt away and no one would be able to ban them

(d) Likewise, the liberal forces won’t pass from sight once they disband the Salvation Front they set up to bring down the Brotherhood regime.

Egyptians and all other Spring Arabs will twist and turn till they find a governance formula acceptable to all sides, especially the liberals who had difficulty digesting the rise of marginalized forces.

Political life could be deactivated for a year or two, but there is no escape from returning to the ballot box once political life resumes.

A handsome Egyptian military officer can no more rule or orate or pledge or dissolve political parties and set up a “national council” in the name of the “legitimacy of the revolution.”

The Egyptians have gone through all that before.

There is no place either for new “Socialist Unions” even in the name of religion.

The force of history is on the side of freedom and democracy.

No Syrian will accept a consensual sectarian arrangement whereby Alawites are apportioned a specific quota in the security services and then share power with the other sects.

Neither Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov’s view that the opposition forecloses a political solution by insisting on Bashar’s exit, nor Iranian presidential hopeful Ali Akbar Velayati’s warning that Bashar is a red line, nor remarks that the absence of a bargain with the regime suggests Syria’s partition can sway the Syrian people.

Syrians will uphold the territorial integrity of their country and carry on with their revolution as long as necessary.

The Syrian revolution might last for years after turning into a militia war. The regime itself is a militia equipped with airpower, long-range missiles and chemical weapons.

Bashar won’t rule the whole of Syria again. Even if the “Friends of Syria” abandoned the Syrian Revolution, Bashar’s fall is inevitable.

The Syrians might squabble after his exit and Jabhat al-Nusra might declare an Islamic emirate in Aleppo. But in the end, their choice will be between the ballot box and chaos.

Tunisians will bicker during the countdown to their elections in the summer, and so will Yemenis in the buildup to their first free vote for a president in February 2014. Yemen’s “Southern Movement” will keep protesting and al-Qaeda will continue its suicide operations. But the ballot box will be last and sole recourse for Yemenis, Libyans and Tunisians.

The central problems is the Arab world’s largest country, Egypt, whose political elites refused to accept the ballot box results and chose life and dialogue in the studios of Egyptian satellite TV channels, instead of in parliament. 

Leaked Brahimi report suggests Assad should go

Talks aimed at trying to end the civil war in Syria will today see international powers meet with the opposition to discuss a political transition.

Special Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi

Ahead of the meetings, peace envoy Lakhdar Brahimi suggested in his leaked January 29 briefing to the UN Security Council that President Bashar al-Assad must step down as part of the transition.

The briefing featured a six-point plan laid out by the envoy as he prepares to join U.S. Vice-President Joe Biden in Munich for the meetings today with Ahmed Moaz al-Khatib, head of the Syrian National Coalition.

UN Report posted this full text of Brahimi’s briefing to the Security Council, which suggests that Assad should go:

BRIEFING TO THE SECURITY COUNCIL

Joint Special Representative for Syria
, Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi

New York, 29 January 2013

Thank you very much indeed, Mr. President,

Mr. President,

Distinguished Members of the Council,

1. It is an honor to come to this Informal Consultations of the Council to discuss the Syrian situation, and it gives me particular pleasure to do so under your Chair, Mr. President. I believe it is not too late to express to you and to your Colleagues and Staff a happy 2013. I guess that the best wish one could express to the Security Council as a whole is that you have no work at all. Indeed no work at all for you would be what the people of the world would appreciate most.

2. In my opening remarks, I’ll address the disastrous consequences of the crisis on the people of Syria. I will speak after that about the political and military situation and how in my view, the conflict needs to be addressed. I hope to show that intervention of the Council is now necessary. Without your action, Mr. President, Syria runs the risk of sliding fast into Somalization.

3. Things in Syria are not any better today than they were when I last briefed the Council, on 29 November 2012: as we, and most observers keep repeating, things continue to get worse by the day. You were briefed ten days ago by High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay and by the Emergency Relief Coordinator Valerie Amos. Since then more Syrians have lost their lives, more Syrians have lost their limbs; and more Syrians have lost hope.

4. I thought that the sickening attack at the University of Aleppo earlier this month was the most revolting illustration of the immense suffering this conflict is inflicting on the people of Syria: the mass murder of nearly one hundred students and displaced persons living on the Campus, and the wounding of scores of others had no military value. It was killing for the purpose of terrorizing and inflicting harm on the civilian population and little else.

5. But then came those unbearable images brought back by Lyse Doucet of the BBC from the rural settlement of Haswaeyeh near the city of Homs; there, we saw that it was still possible to reach even worse levels of horror. In this rural, and until then rather peaceful part of Syria, God knows how many peaceful, helpless civilian men, women and children were literally slaughtered and burned by cruel, evil men.

6. But the tragedy simply does not have an end. Just before coming down, we read of yet another horror, in a suburb of Aleppo this time; sixty-five bodies discovered with their hands tied and shot in the head.

7. Or look also at the nearly 30 bakeries targeted in the course of 2012, often when long queues of people were waiting to buy a loaf of bread. After each of these and similar crimes, both sides were quick to claim innocence and accuse the other party of the crime. Due to a track record and, at times, circumstantial evidence, strong suspicion if not actual evidence often points the finger at Government Forces or their shadowy militia, the Shabiha as the perpetrator. It is however an established fact, that armed opposition groups have also been known to commit equally outrageous crimes against civilians.

8. These amount surely to crimes of war and crimes against humanity and it may be useful to initiate specific inquiries into crimes such as those committed earlier this month in Aleppo University, the village of Haswaeyeh or the Bakery attacks. It is of course difficult to undertake such tasks from a distance but I feel certain that, in many instances, it will be possible to establish responsibility. And that is worth doing; as it would be a useful complement to the serious work being done by the International Commission of Inquiry led by Professor Paulo Sergio Pinheiro.

9. Valerie Amos told you, Mr. Chairman, everything there is to say about the dire humanitarian situation. To further underline the magnitude of the problem, please listen to the following sentence I have taken one out of the large number of reports and articles we all see every day. I quote: “The U.N. refugee agency in Jordan says there has been a spike in the number of Syrians fleeing the civil war at home and crossing into Jordan. UNHCR's representative Andrew Harper says about 3,000 Syrians have entered Jordan every night for the past five days. Harper said Tuesday that the spike is due to intensified shelling, fighting and the "desperate situation" in Syria's southern villages. He says Jordan's Zaatari refugee camp is filling up quickly and UNHCR is running out of money to expand and set up other camps.”

10. Another illustration of the magnitude of the tragedy: talking to a visiting UN delegation a few days ago, a senior official of the Syrian Government said that the city of Daraya in the suburbs of Damascus has seen its population dwindle to seventy thousand – 70,000 – from an original total of more than 300,000; which means that more than two thirds – 2/3 – of the inhabitants of that city have left it.

11. Let us, for a minute or two play a game of guess work: should the military situation around Damascus take a turn for the worst, we will of course see a massive exodus of civilians fleeing the capital. Let us suppose that, not two thirds like Daraya, but one third only of them leave. You would then be speaking of more than one and a half million people getting out of Damascus. Let us further suppose that one third of the people on the move find refuge somewhere else inside Syria.

12. Where would the remaining one million people go? Obviously to the nearest borders, that is the Lebanese and Jordanian borders.

13. This is of course a worst-case scenario; but it would be totally wrong to assume that this is far fetched or only a very remote possibility. Someone who knows Syria much better than me speaks of another scenario far more gloomy and frightening: he sees Damascus being the theater of a long and bloody confrontation where the beautiful Old City will be completely destroyed.

14. But let us stay with our own scenario: I am sure you’ll agree with me that Lebanon would collapse under the weight of 500,000 additional people forcing their way into its territory and that Jordan will be equally critically destabilized by the flow of half a million new arrivals from Syria.

15. Do we need to add to this description the familiar figures of 60,000 people at the very least of those killed and probably five times maybe more that number of the wounded during this conflict. And the refugees already abroad 700,000 of them, predicted to go up to one million in a few months time. And the internally displaced: more than two million. And those who need help inside the country: four, perhaps already close to five million.

16. Let us also remember the detainees: I saw a nominal list of nearly 30,000. Their real number is certainly very, very much higher; some speak of 60,000 others of 100,000. It has been established, as you all know, that torture is routinely practiced in official and non-official detention centers. And there are also countless people who have disappeared and are said to have been detained or killed by the many security organizations of the State and the much feared, shadowy Shabiha.

17. And do I need to mention again the physical destruction of the country, those parts of some cities that look like Berlin in 1945? The priceless cultural heritage of Syria being destroyed or plundered? The bandits and traffickers doing what they do best? The hospitals and other health facilities destroyed completely, or closed, or used by security agents to arrest people suspected of being part of the opposition? Electricity being cut off for long hours every day? In some place lately there is no electricity at all. Shortages in almost everything? The galloping unemployment and punishingly high prices that continue to increase almost by the day: two very quick examples of how difficult life is for Syrians today: to get some gas it is necessary to queue with you car for up to 24 hours in front of a petrol station. And the price of a cooking gas canister has gone up – listen to this - from 350 to 5,000 liras.

18. Syrians themselves are helping one another to the best of their ability. For example, the small town of Salmya is home to 100,000 to 120,000 mainly Ismailis. They have received and are supporting 100,000 IDPs, with little help from outside. Some Kurdish villages have seen their population shoot up from 10,000 to 60,000 people.

19. Syria’s neighbors deserve everyone’s admiration and profound gratitude for their inspiring sense of international responsibility, their fraternal solidarity with their neighbors and their amazingly generous hospitality extended to those hundreds of thousands of refugees.

20. All UN Agencies are mobilized, as you know. Together with others, the ICRC chief among them, they are doing their best to come to the rescue of all these people, be they inside or outside Syria, in Government or opposition controlled territory. Theirs is not an easy task. They do not always succeed in reaching those who need them the most; and their work is not without risk for national and international staff alike. But it is indispensable to do this work and it is being done as well as conditions permit.

21. In addition to the physical difficulties faced on the ground, humanitarian aid is crippled by the lack of funding, so much so that food rations are now being curtailed. In addition to what Valerie Amos told you on the subject, let me quote from what the Secretary General said a few days ago in Davos. I quote: “The humanitarian community needs $1.5 billion for the next six months -- the largest-ever short-term appeal. However, our appeals to date have been woefully under-funded. That is why I am convening a pledging conference in Kuwait on January 30th. 
For many years, Syrians have shown great generosity and solidarity in hosting refugees from Palestine, Iraq and Somalia. The international community should come to Syria’s aid in its own time of need.”

Mr. President,

22. Of course humanitarian action is indispensable and urgent. It will address the needs created in and around Syria by the terrible crisis, which has been affecting the country and its people as well as their neighbors for close to two years now.

23. But humanitarian aid does not address the core of the problem; it addresses only the consequences. To go to the roots of the problem, a lasting solution has to be found for the crisis.

24. Two months ago, when I briefed the Council, many believed that the Syrian regime was crumbling and President Assad about to fall or flee the country in a matter of weeks perhaps even days. Today, the mood has shifted; President Assad is said to be doing well and his regime still strong. He will be there for the foreseeable future if not forever, we are told. To drive the point home some journalists in Damascus and Beirut write very optimistically articles about the progress being made every day. One went as far as to say total victory, for the regime of course, is not more than a few weeks away!

25. We were not convinced by the analysis, which prevailed two months ago, anymore than we are convinced by what is being said today. The truth is that the regime has been seriously shaken and it has not regained its balance. It was under stronger pressure two months ago than it is today, but Kissinger’s formula is as valid today as it was yesterday: “A conventional army loses if it doesn't win; the guerilla army wins if it doesn't loose”.

26. The regime is still strong enough to keep President Assad in power. But its legitimacy has been severely, probably irreparably damaged and many are those who have serious doubts that President Assad will be able to regain that legitimacy anytime soon, if at all. Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev of the Russian Federation has come closer to the truth than most when he said a few days ago in Davos and I quote: I think that every day, every week, every month the chances of him (meaning President Assad) surviving are becoming less and less. And Prime Minister Medevdev added “but I repeat, again, this must be decided by the Syrian people. Not Russia, not the USA not any other country.”

27. Much has been said in 2011 about the fact that in the countries of the so-called Arab spring “the wall of fear has come down.” In the course of the dramatic developments of these past months in the region, this may have been forgotten. But that is a fundamental reality and it is as valid in Syria as it is elsewhere. The regime in Damascus is still as repressive as it has been, if not more, and is engaging in a full scale war against entire segments of its population, but it is nevertheless still true that people are less afraid to speak out and many have taken arms to challenge the domination of the regime. Indeed, many, as you know, have deserted the ranks of the armed forces, the Police, the Government, the Baath party and the bureaucracy.

28. In this connection much nonsense has been written or said about what passed between President Assad and myself when we met on 24 December 2012. Our conversation was in fact perfectly “normal”, exactly what a conversation between a Head of State and a United Nations Envoy is and should be. Our exchange was easy, candid and mutually respectful. I invited the President to tell me how he saw the situation and what he intended to do, and he did tell me. I then told him honestly how I saw things and what, in my opinion, the reactions of Syrians and non-Syrians would be to what he had told me of his forthcoming initiative. And he listened to me with attention and patience.

29. I later spoke publicly about President Assad’s speech of 6 January 2013. I stand by everything I said except for the word “sectarian” which was not an accurate description of what was in the speech. A few days later, on 9 January I think, Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs Walid al-Muallem sent to the Secretary-General a memorandum, which tried to give an infinitely more positive reading of the speech than what had been actually said by the President. And yesterday, Syria’s Permanent Representative sent you another letter to inform you of how his country’s Government is trying to implement President Assad’s initiative.

30. The fact remains, however, Mr. President that the Syrian parties to the conflict are still very far apart. For President Bashar, the problem is almost exclusively, an external conspiracy implemented by terrorist organizations trained, armed and funded by external enemies of Syria. As for the opponents of the Government, they see a popular uprising against a repressive regime that has lost its legitimacy. It is important to note in this connection that this analysis of the opposition is shared by all of the components of the opposition, those who are working from abroad and those who are inside the country; those who have taken up arms and those who still believe in the possibility of peaceful protest and action.

31. One change that has taken place, however, deserves attention: the Government as well as opposition groups now speak timidly of “a political solution” even if neither appears to be ready to give up its fundamental preconditions.

For the government those preconditions are that the “external conspiracy has to come to an end first; funding and arming of the rebellion must be suspended and “the terrorists” as they call their opponents put down their weapons; and

For the opposition groups those preconditions are that President Assad abandons power, if not immediately, within a very short period of time.

32. But this very modest progress in no way means that things have changed enough for what I call the “inner circle” meaning the Syrian track to be the place where a peaceful process maybe initiated. The Syrians alas, are not really ready to talk to one another even through intermediaries. They need much help to reach that stage.

33. And, as I said in my previous briefing, at the regional level, the picture is not very promising either. It is in fact worrisome. The challenge of building a regional consensus for a peaceful settlement in Syria is made difficult by the clear alignment of most regional parties with one or the other of the parties in Syria.

34. Grave concern is expressed in many ways among Syria's immediate neighbors as to the present impact of the Syrian crisis and of its future implications if the crisis continues spiraling, as well, we all fear it could. There is, first and foremost, the problem of the wellbeing of hundreds of thousands of displaced Syrians rendered more serious by particularly harsh winter conditions. Public opinion in each of those countries is already divided on the Syrian issue with factions having expressed support for the government and others for the opposition. The flow of Syrian refugees is increasingly becoming a matter of controversy in those countries with some calling for an open borders policy to help alleviate the displaced people’s misery and others insisting on closing the borders before them. There are also strong indications that Syrian factions are getting material support from allies in neighboring countries and that citizens of those countries are fighting alongside their Syrian allies.

Hence the two big risks that are of serious concern to the international community:



35. The first is the transformation of Syria into a playground for competing regional forces, governments and non-state actors alike. This process is largely underway and can become acute in view of the high stakes embedded in the Syrian tragedy. As many have already observed, what we are presently witnessing in Syria is AT THE SAME TIME, and with the same intensity, a struggle INSIDE Syria and a struggle FOR Syria. The combination of these two processes substantially fuels the present conflict and complicates its settlement through diplomatic mediation.



36. The second, and no less serious concern, is the risk of a full-fledged regionalization of the Syrian civil war through the growing osmosis of that war with unresolved domestic issues within its immediate environment. No country, and certainly not Lebanon or Jordan, Iraq or Turkey, not to mention the Palestinians, is immune to the military and political fallout of the Syrian civil war. The Syrian civil war may well end up becoming contagious and affect the whole Levant where similar sectarian makeups and cleavages are to be found not to mention trans-state ideological and partisan movements. In other words, Mr. President, far from being in a position to help Syrians solve their present problem, the region is facing the risk of being itself contaminated by Syria’s difficulties and engulfed in its crisis.

37. We are still where we were two months ago: only the Security Council is in a position to help, if I may so Mr. President, and the time to act is now.

Mr. President,

38. As you and the other distinguished members of the Council are aware, since I last briefed the Council I had three meetings with representatives of the Russian Federation and the United States. The first meeting was in Dublin on 6 December and was attended by Secretary of State Hilary Clinton and Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, the second and third meetings took place in Geneva on 9 December 2012 and 11 January 2013 respectively, and were attended by the Personal Representative of the President of the Russian Federation for the Middle East and Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov and United States Deputy Secretary of State Mr. William Burns.

39. I am deeply grateful to Secretary Clinton and Foreign Minister Lavrov for meeting with me in Dublin and for agreeing to the two other meetings with their respective deputies. I will not be so presumptuous as to comment on those meetings in the presence of Ambassador Susan Rice and Ambassador Vitaly Churkin.

Mr. President,

40. I am sorry if I sound like an old, broken record. But I seriously don’t see where else one should start or end except in saying that, things are bad and getting worse, the country is breaking up before everyone’s eyes; there is no military solution to this conflict – at least not one that will not destroy Syria completely and destroy also the  nation of Syria; Syrians cannot themselves start a peace process, their neighbors are not able to help them; only the international community may help and is the international community is first and foremost the United Nations Security Council. And the Geneva Communiqué and Action Plan offer good bases to initiate the necessary action to provide that help.

41. There evidently is now a better assessment worldwide, of the tragic dimension of the crisis and its terrible consequences on the Syrian population and, no less important, of the huge disintegrating impact it is having on the social fabric of the country, of the rising influence of extremist groups on both sides and of the growing violent sectarian alignments.

42. Compared to the upheavals that have struck some countries in the Arab world, the Syrian conflict has indisputably proven to be the deadliest and most intractable, the most threatening for its neighbors and the most worrisome for the country’s future. Does international action measure up to this climatic peak in the so-called “Arab Spring”? Does the diplomatic management measure up to the dimensions of the tragedy and the stakes at play? Does the pressure from third parties on the belligerents to accept a negotiated settlement measure up to the violence and devastation? To all these questions, I am sure you will agree, distinguished members of the Council, the answer is, at best, a very polite “not enough.”

43. I think that public opinion the world over is now looking up to the Security Council to take a determined, strong lead.

44. The principles on which the Council’s actions might be based are explicitly or implicitly contained in the Geneva Communiqué:

a) Syria’s independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity must be preserved;

b) There must be clear recognition that the ultimate objective is to enable the Syrian people to exercise their legitimate rights to dignity and human rights and to have a full say in the manner in which they are governed;

c) An essential element in that process is the formation of a transitional Government with full executive powers. The meaning of “full executive powers” has to be clarified before the Syrian parties come together to discuss the formation of that transitional government. Leaving that definition, the definition of full executive powers, to the parties is fairly certain to lead to a dead end;

In this connection, the Geneva communiqué was elegant and creative in that it did not speak of President Bashar Al-Assad and his role in the transition and beyond. I think, however, it is largely understood that “governing body with full executive powers” clearly meant that the President would have no role in the transition;

Now, Mr. President,

And this is another point that needs to be taken into consideration,

d) The actual negotiation should take place between a strong, fully representative team on behalf of the opposition and a strong civilian- military delegation representing the Government. Of course both negotiating teams should be comprised of individuals capable of reaching a compromise agreement during a reasonable period of time;

e) These negotiations should start outside of Syria and take place according to an agreed timetable to enable the process to move – as fast as possible - towards the democratic process which would include the election, constitutional reform and referendum. From what I heard in Damascus and elsewhere, it will not be to difficult to secure agreement to move the country from the present Presidential system to a Parliamentary system of Government;

f) It is important that the Council unequivocally expresses support for the right of each citizen in Syria to enjoy full equality before the law irrespective of gender, religion, language or ethnicity.

Mr. President, Distinguished Members of the Council

45. I have put down a number of elements, which in my view could inform an initiative of the Security Council, which in turn would offer a base for negotiations between a team representing the opposition and another acting on behalf of the Government.

This, of course, not a draft resolution; I would not be so presumptuous as to submit such a draft to all the experts around this table.

Mr. President,

46. I have been blamed by many because I did not submit my plan for the resolution of the conflict soon enough.

I accept that criticism. In my defense, I will only say that I did not consider that presenting my own personal plan was the main objective of my mission.

I thought and still think that the main objective was and still is to ensure that there is a SYRIAN PLAN, a plan that the Syrians can accept and implement.

47. I believe that difficult as it is, reaching that stage is possible. But it is necessary to obtain, first, a strong, unequivocal support from the Security Council. And that is what I am asking you Mr. Chairman and honorable delegates today.