The unmaking of the Arab world

Fahmi Howeidi is a leading Egyptian political and social scholar and author, and one of the Arab world’s most prominent columnists. Following is my abridgment of his syndicated think piece this week:

There is a sort of overlap in tuning in on the revolution and the government in Egypt.

That’s caused either by incessant media campaigns denigrating the revolution in the public eye or by the torrent of government crises news, which make people lose sight of the revolution’s achievements.

In effect, the Egypt revolution ended a reign of corruption and tyranny and returned the country to its people. It brought a Pharaonic era to a close, restored civil liberties, ended minority rule and empowered the masses to have the final say on their government.

But why did Egypt’s post-revolution administration stumble?

One explanation is that decade-long tyranny not only destroyed Egypt’s political and economic present, but its future as well.

The other explanation is the preclusion of all and sundry from Egyptian politics save for a restricted group of loyalists handpicked by the former president.

As a result, the political class was neither coached in managing state affairs nor shown the ropes of state administration.

This political class was also shut out from any communal endeavor to promote the national interest through state institutions.

Egypt’s post-revolution administration crisis can thus be blamed on a host of factors, including:

• The classic tension that dawns each time a revolution brings down a regime and tries to replace it
• The heavy legacy left by the deposed regime, such as the ruination of politics, the economy, state institutions and society.
• Mismanagement of state affairs by President Mohamed Morsi and his team and their reneging of election promises.
• Immaturity of opposition figures
• The tug-of-war among some nationalist camp components
• Lawlessness, which also undermines economic activity
• External pressures.

Everyone in Egypt is now aware that although it made good progress over the years in running its own business, the Muslim Brotherhood did not make the grade in reigning over and managing society.

That is the root cause of the current crisis, which led to the political stalemate in Egypt.

Overcoming the political deadlock requires a lot of wisdom, courage and foresight, all of which seem lacking – at least for the foreseeable future.

(2)

In the case of all four or five Arab Spring countries, revolt proved much more profound and far-reaching than actual or prospective regime change.

The new manifestations that are kept in the public eye day and night by the media touch only the surface of the spirit of rebellion, which drove ordinary citizens to protest loudly against oppression, corruption and social injustice.

The discrepancy made me distinguish between what I call the “tumultuous spring” and the “silent” variety.

“Tumultuous spring” came out in the open and called for regime change in some countries.

By contrast, the “silent spring” chose to express itself calmly through the social media.

Its aim is regime reform, but not regime change. It falls in the category of “reformist spring” as opposed to “revolutionary spring.”

The open letter calling for reform, which Saudi cleric Salman al-Odah posted last month on Facebook and Twitter falls in the latter category. Odah specifically called for ending the practice of media control, information censorship and the release of political prisoners.

Other reformists made similar appeals elsewhere in the Gulf.

(3)

From this perspective, I believe the pan-Arab nation is meanwhile facing an existential impasse that needs addressing.

While historic change looms on the horizon, a vacuum hangs on the Arab arena.

Observers fail to spot a leader or a plan the Arabs can rally around or defend.

When focusing on the Arab arena, all they spot are three endeavors: the Turks are expanding economically, the Iranian politically and the Israelis through land grabs to build settlements.

Moreover, changes on the ground suggest the region’s maps are being reconfigured and a new Sykes-Picot Agreement is being contemplated.

The pointers:

• Iraq faces partition after having been steamrolled by the United States invasion. Iraqi Kurdistan has almost seceded, and nothing keeps the lid on its independence other than the absence of a public declaration of self-determination preceded by a ban on hoisting the Iraqi national flag on its territory. A forceful call is also being made to divide Iraq into three regions – one for Kurds, another for Shiites and the third for Sunnis.
• Syria is poised to follow suit, especially that its regime seems on its last legs so far. Should the Assad regime fall, contingency plans are already in place to declare an Alawite state along the country’s coastline. In anticipation, Syria’s central bank reserves have reportedly been moved to Latakia, whose seaport and airport are being upgraded.
• The side-effects of the Syrian regime’s collapse would allow for (a) a shift in the balance of power in Lebanon at Hezbollah’s expense (b) a shot in the arm to the Sunni uprising in Iraq (c) a rekindling of the Kurdish issue, which explains Turkey’s recent preemptive peace deal with PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, and (d) rethinking and re-planning in Tehran, particularly that a blitz by Israel on its nuclear facilities is not off the table yet.
• The Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza Strip remain in limbo and the risks of a third Intifada erupting mount.
• Sudan’s South has broken away from its North.
• In Yemen, calls are growing louder all the time for the secession of the South.
• Morocco is grappling with the Tamazight movement’s political demands shortly after recognizing the Tamazight language in its new constitution.
• Over and above the widening schism between its Sunnis and Shiites, the Arab world finds itself riven by rifts between the Salafi movement and Ennahda Movement in Tunisia, between Salafis and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, and between Salafis and seculars in Algeria.

These are ample indicators of how the Arab world is liable to break up. The process of restructuring it is quietly moving ahead while it remains unfazed or unaware. 

Cement and wheat at the Doha summit

By Jamal Khashoggi, Saudi Arabia’s analyst, author and kingpin of the impending Al Arab TV news channel writing today for pan-Arab al-Hayat

Obviously, the Doha summit did not discuss cement price rises or production shortages in the Arab world.

Nor did it dwell on the Arabs’ growing demand for wheat that their vast arable lands -- including the water-rich ones -- fail to meet.

The summit, as usual, considered the pan-Arab nation’s “fateful issues at this critical juncture,” chiefly the current Syria crisis.

It would have been useful if someone had wondered out loud, “Who will rebuild Syria?

“Can the output of Arab cement factories meet demand?

“And how can we make available tons of wheat to feed the hungry mouths in the currently critical political turmoil?”

Therein lies the importance of discussing the subject of cement and wheat in the Arab world.

It might sound odd to ask, “Who will build the New Syria?” when the Arabs have yet to find a way of stopping the destruction of Old Syria and the killings in it.

Equally odd is to ask, “Who will provide the daily 250 million bread loafs Egyptians need under their Second Republic when their politicians keep quarrelling over the Attorney General’s legitimacy?”

We better wise up, harden our hearts, ponder unemotionally and set up committees to address these issues.

A group of about 45 Syrians representing all hues of the Syrian opposition, including former officials who deserted the regime, last year set up “The Day After” workshop in Berlin in association with two institutes – one German (SWP) and another American (USIP).

They did wonderful work in planning what to do in post-Assad Syria.

They outlined the roadmap to a peaceful transition to democracy, the rule of law and security, constitution making, economic recovery and reconstruction (see Syria and “The Day After” Project for full details).

But of course “The Day After” workshop did not discuss the issue of cement, of which Old Syria produced not more than six million tons annually.

Only God knows how many months it would take Syria’s cement plants to resume production.

The Arab world’s top cement producer is Egypt, with an annual output of 48 million tons.

Saudi Arabia comes next with 42 million tons a year.

Although both countries try to expand their respective production capacities, their cement prices keep cropping up because of increasing demand for housing units in each.

Most probably local demand for Saudi cement will heat up after the Kingdom issued final regulations on real estate financing, leasing and the supervision of financial companies as it tries to ease a housing shortage by opening up its mortgage market and enacting the first home-loans law.

So who will supply cement for the Syrians if the Saudis ban exporting their cement and the Egyptians need every bit of theirs? And who will finance Syria’s reconstruction in the first place?

Syria, after all, is unlike Libya, which was also ravaged by war. But oil-rich Libya has the cash. Syria’s oil production is wanting, save for 300,000 barrels per day, part of which is exported with the revenue going to the coffers of President Bashar al-Assad and his relatives.

Moreover, destruction in Libya pales in comparison to Syria’s devastation.

Will Turkish and Saudi concerns rush to invest in the New Syria, or will the huge offshore funds held by Syrians solve the problem?

And before wondering about Syria’s prospective cement suppliers, Syrians need much time to rebuild their state institutions, draft a constitution and organize elections.

Wheat is another Arab collective concern.

Saudi Arabia, for instance, will scrap wheat growing in 2015 after absurd consumption exhausted its future generations’ non-renewable groundwater resources.

The Kingdom does not need more than three million tons of wheat a year and has all the cash to import it from Russia or Australia. But Egypt produces only half of its annual consumption of 19 million tons at a time when its net foreign currency reserves are down to $13.5 billion, barely enough to cover three months of its imports of essential goods and oil.

Also, unlike Saudi Arabia, Egypt did not build grain silos, which means storage costs are added on to its wheat prices.

Theoretically, the solution for all Arabs is in their fertile lands in Iraq, Syria, Sudan and Algeria.

Politics, however, prompted Saudi Arabia to try leasing Russian farmland to grow wheat through private companies it controls. The kingdom overlooked Algeria, whose military are far from being amenable to negotiations.

After its revolution, Egypt discovered Sudan to its south, where it plans cultivating about one million feddan (or 420,000 hectares) in the long term, once its politicians stop squabbling over the country’s Attorney General and other petty issues.

I used the metaphor of “cement and wheat” to highlight the interconnection of Arabs. Despite borders keeping us apart, our disparate customs duties, one country like Saudi Arabia supporting the cement industry and another like Egypt choosing not to, the Saudis having the experience and money to grow wheat and the Sudanese having the land, water and workforce… we are all prone to be affected by economic changes elsewhere.

The reference is chiefly to changes affecting essential commodities, such as iron, cement, wheat and fertilizers – all of which have internationally-quoted prices.

We ought to accelerate Arab economic unity plans, bring down trade barriers and focus on the economy and quality of life, which are the mainstays of the Arab Spring.

Had we helped Egypt tackle the economy before plunging into politics head on, Egypt would not have been suffocating in a seemingly open-ended political crisis.

Egypt could have done without its ridiculous cycle of protests and counter-protests, charges and counter-charges, and blows and counter-blows – all leading to the erosion of all human values, including the Egyptian citizen’s dignity.

Syria, where the revolution has yet to triumph, is also in the throes of accusations and counter-accusations with the media already evoking the strife in Egypt in order to guard against a replay of the Muslim Brotherhood’s role in the Syrian revolution.

Better wait for the Syrian revolution to prevail before taking on the Muslim Brotherhood.

Any cause for optimism in all this?

Yes, when “cement and wheat” top the Arab politician’s priorities.

Six reasons why Syria’s rebellion is into Year 3

“With respect to Syria,” President Barack Obama said yesterday at his joint press conference with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in Jerusalem, “the United States continues to work with allies and friends and the Syrian opposition to hasten the end of Assad’s rule, to stop the violence against the Syrian people, and begin the transition towards a new government that respects the rights of all its people. Assad has lost his legitimacy to lead by attacking the Syrian people with almost every conventional weapon in his arsenal, including Scud missiles…”

Mauritania's Muhammad bin Mukhtar al-Shinqiti

But with the start this week of Syria’s third year of rebellion, the question remains: Why is ending Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s rule taking so long?

The overriding reasons are six, according to an outstanding scholar, analyst and author from Mauritania, Muhammad bin Mukhtar al-Shinqiti, writing for the “Viewpoint” section of Aljazeera.net.

Shinqiti has a bachelor's degree in Sharia law, a master’s in business administration from Columbia Southern University in Orange Beach, Alabama, and a PhD in the history of religions from the University of Texas at Austin.

In his think piece for Aljazeera, Shinqiti explains the six impediments to ending Assad’s rule at a gallop:

One:

Unlike in Tunisia, Egypt and Yemen, the makeup of the army in Syria is sectarian. Ninety percent of its commanding officers and key battalions are Alawite. Breaking its cohesion is time-consuming and costly.

Giving added strength to Assad’s regime is the mobilization for its defense of the region’s Shiite infrastructure – all the way from Lebanon to Iran. The enlistment takes in most Arab Shiite elites in the region.

Two:

The second impediment is Russia’s support of Assad’s savagery, a stand that can be explained culturally and strategically.

Culturally, French political thinker and historian Alexis de Tocqueville envisaged in the 19^th century two great nations – America and Russia – advancing toward world supremacy in the 20^th century.

“All other peoples seem to have nearly reached their natural limits and to need nothing but to preserve them; but these two are growing,” he wrote, adding:

“The American fights against natural obstacles; the Russian is at grips with men. The former combats the wilderness and barbarism; the latter, civilization with all its arms. America’s conquests are made with the plowshare, Russia’s with the sword. To attain their aims, the former relies on personal interest and gives free scope to the unguided strength and common sense of individuals. The latter in a sense concentrates the whole power of society in one man. One has freedom as the principal means of action; the other has servitude.”

You can blame Moscow’s stance vis-à-vis the Syrian revolution on the culture of “servitude” that is still prevailing in Russia. The largest country in Europe continues to be ruled by a KGB officer, Vladimir Putin, whose administration frowns at the Syrian revolution’s victory prospects for fear of its template resurfacing elsewhere.

Strategically, the Putin administration’s politics on Mediterranean shores are a Cold War throwback.

The culture of “servitude” is equally dominant in China, a single-party state.

Three:

Halfhearted backing from Arab governments is the third factor taxing the Syrian people’s rebellion. Libya and Qatar have been the only two Arab states to stand solidly behind the Syrian revolution. Most of the others sufficed with lukewarm diplomatic support. Some stand by Assad either openly or covertly. Algerian army generals oppose any serious step against the regime lest the Arab Spring reaches their country’s borders. Iraq backs Assad to the hilt for shocking sectarian reasons. Lebanon is two sectarian halves.

There is no better indicator of the Arab state’s halfhearted backing of the Syrian people than their choice of two Arab envoys to Syria – namely, Sudan’s Gen. Mohammed al-Dabi and Algeria’s Lakhdar Brahimi. Both Sudan and Algeria are ruled by the military that simply abhor the Arab Spring.

Compare such official Arab apathy with Iran’s unwavering support of Assad financially, politically and militarily at a time when Iran’s defeat in Syria is now a key Arab strategic priority.

Four:

The fourth hurdle is Turkey’s hesitancy in arming the Syrian rebels. Turkey made available to the Syrian people two lung transplants, one for humanitarian aid and the other for political breathing. Without them, the Syrian people’s suffering would have been intolerable and the chances of their revolution’s success little.

As a strategic bridge between East and West, Turkey is a regional heavyweight, except that it seems unwilling to take strategic risks and remains committed to the West’s ban on arming Syrian rebels.

Short of this changing, Syria will remain an open wound on Turkish borders and Turkey will likely loose its sympathetic Arab street as well as prospective strategic interests in Arab Spring countries.

Five:

The fifth hurdle standing in the way of a dash to victory in Syria is the duplicity of America and Europe’s political elites. They are deliberately starving the Syrian revolution of weapons in order to pooh-pooh and lay siege to the Arab Spring.

Despite the deep chasm between the American and Russian positions on the revolt, for instance, both sides agree on wrecking Syria. America wants Syria destroyed to see Assad out while Russia wants Syria destroyed to keep Assad in.

The West’s embargo on arming the Syrian people is nothing more than a license to the regime to keep killing. It is a replay of the West imposing the embargo on arming Bosnian Muslims once it ascertained the Serbs had secured arms supply lines from Russia.

Six:

The sixth cause of the stalemate after two years is the Israeli position and the weight the position carries in American and European decision-making circles.  

A (May 2011 Tel Aviv-datelined) report in the Christian Science Monitor said Assad’s downfall would remove a key player in the Iran-led alliance threatening the Jewish state, but Assad’s Syria has been a stable neighbor and maintained a regional balance that Israeli officials and analysts fear could crumble.

The report quoted Giora Eilan, a former national security adviser under former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, as saying Sharon once slammed an Israeli who suggested that regime change in Syria. “Sharon said, ‘Are you crazy?’” he recalls. “The best for the time being, is having a Bashar Assad who is fighting for his legitimacy.’”

Kerry told to sit with Assad first

From top clockwise: The Kerrys and Assads at Naranj restaurant in Damascus in 2009 and Kerry with Lavrov and Moaz 

A Syrian journalist today tells U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry to first sit with his chum Bashar al-Assad to test the water before asking the Syrian opposition to come to the table to negotiate a transition.

Kerry told reporters Tuesday, “The world wants to stop the killing (in Syria). And we want to be able to see Assad and the Syrian opposition come to the table for the creation of a transitional government according to the framework that was created in Geneva, the Geneva Protocol, which requires mutual consent on both sides to the formation of that transitional government. That’s what we’re pushing for…” (See yesterday’s post, “Big Powers seeking table partners for Moaz”)

His remarks shocked much of the regional press.

Syria’s state-run media senses an American volte-face in Assad’s favor. Champress, for instance, declares ecstatically, “American body blow to the Turkish-Gulfite alliance: Kerry wants President Assad and the opposition to sit at the negotiation table.”

Likewise, Lebanese Hezbollah’s news portal, al-Manar, which reproduces the leader comment of pan-Arab daily al-Quds al-Arabi titled, “America retracts the call on Assad to step down.”

The Beirut daily al-Akhbar, which speaks for both Assad and Hezbollah, shouts from the rooftops, “Washington follows Moscow: A solution with Assad staying put.”

On the other side of the political divide, the Saudi newspaper of records Asharq Alawsat sounds downbeat, with its front-page banner announcing, “American position veers towards a ‘dialogue’ between the opposition and Assad.”

Editorially, eminent Syrian author and journalist Ghassan al-Mufleh writes in an op-ed for Elaph that Kerry – not the opposition -- should be the one to open the discourse with Assad.

Mufleh’s argument:

The U.S. secretary of state’s personal connection with the Assad family goes back more than two decades. It strengthened after the Syrian army’s exit from Lebanon in 2005.

Sen. Kerry was the main driving force in talks (1) to extricate the Assad clique from the clutches of the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) mandated to identify and try those responsible for the assassination of Rafik Hariri, and (2) to then rehabilitate the clique.

I wrote about this at the time.

And when John Kerry was first nominated to the position of secretary of state, I wrote that the central reason for handing him the job is his familiarity with the Syria File and his personal relationship with the Assad clique. I also warned against the clique’s international exoneration as it still enjoyed a measure of international cover.

I also cited the Sudanese example, and how Omar al-Bashir is walking free after the International Criminal Court issued a warrant for his arrest on charges of crimes against humanity. The price for his reprieve was the creation of the Republic of South Sudan and the South Sudan’s Chinese oil puzzle.

John Kerry did not take long to avow his wish to tackle the Syria File as the principal representative of the Israel-condoned Assad clique.

Incidentally, Kerry is also in favor of rehabilitating the Iranian regime and preserving its Mullahs at the helm. The Iranian opposition can thus expect to come under U.S. pressure as well.

The aforesaid is in keeping with the strategy of President Barack Obama’s inner circle. (Remember how the White House vetoed last year’s plan -- backed by Panetta-Dempsey-Clinton-Petraeus -- to arm carefully vetted Syrian rebels).

Bypassing the Obama-Kerry plan taking shape is the responsibility of the Syrian opposition and revolutionary forces.

But not to sound totally negative, the U.S. secretary of state can head to Damascus for a dialogue with the Assad clique before implicating the Syrian opposition in the game of the clique’s rehabilitation.

The follow-on would be a UN Security Council resolution, based on the Geneva framework, ordering the Assad clique to stop the killings. The opposition can follow suit. If the U.S. and Russia are in tune, what can prevent the UN Security Council passing a resolution calling for dialogue and a peaceful political transition following the cessation of violence as demanded in Geneva?”

Let Kerry kickoff a firsthand dialogue.

Should he fail, he would bear sole responsibility for the step without the Syrian Revolution bearing its consequences.

Iran: Syria being on its deathbed, long live Hamas

Billboards in Gaza City thank Iran for its support in last month's flare-up with Israel

“Tehran opens weapons highway to Hamas,” reads a screamer on Lebanese Hezbollah’s al-Manar portal this morning.

Significantly, the article bylined Qassem Qassem says Tehran has opened an artery of “weapons and cash” to the Hamas Islamic Movement in Gaza “despite the Movement’s break with Syria.”

Qassem says Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah has communicated Iran’s decision to his senior aides. He told them Tehran would be supplying a “substantial stockpile of quality weapons” to Hamas and ignoring the latter’s fallout with Syria.

Iran, Syria and Hezbollah make up the so-called “Axis of Resistance.”

Nasrallah briefed his top lieutenants in the wake of a recent visit to Tehran by Hamas politburo member Imad el-Alami.

Qassem says Alami and Iranian leaders agreed during the visit “to sidestep all political discourse” concerning Syria.

Lebanese Hezbollah has since issued a circular banning all members from criticizing Hamas in the print, audio or social media over its Syria stance.

Alami was born in the Gaza Strip in 1956. He holds a Bachelor's degree in civil engineering from Egypt’s Alexandria University. He was held by Israel for two years before his deportation to Lebanon in January 1991 with three other Hamas members. He then settled in Damascus before moving back to Gaza.

In a statement published November 7 on its official website Hamas reported that Syrian security forces raided the office and apartment of Hamas political chief Khaled Meshaal on November 5, emptying them of their contents. The forces then proceeded to confiscate Meshaal’s cars and lock the offices.

On November 6, Syrian regime forces repeated that raid on Alami’s office.

Hamas leaders abandoned the Damascus headquarters in January 2012, citing the regime’s brutal crackdown on the Syrian people.

Meshaal is now visiting Gaza for the first time after crossing the border from Egypt on Friday to celebrate Hamas’ 25th anniversary.

He was the target of a botched Israeli assassination attempt in Amman 15 years ago during Benjamin Netanyahu's first term as Israel’s prime minister.

Meshaal’s visit to Gaza comes two weeks after Hamas reached a cease-fire with Israel brokered by Egypt.

Six Israelis and more than 160 Gazans were killed during the flare-up in which Gaza militants fired about 1,300 Iranian-made rockets and missiles at Israeli targets, while Israeli warplanes launched approximately the same number of air strikes on the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip.

Gaza watchers believe Iran proved to be a key player in the Gaza battle. “Her Fajr-5 missile was the star of the face-off.”

The Fajr-5, developed by Iran and also supplied to Hezbollah, has a range of up to 75 kilometers, which means it can hit central Israel from Gaza.

Iranian missile components are reportedly smuggled via Lebanon and Sudan to Egypt’s Sinai and on to the Gaza Strip, where the missiles are assembled locally. 

How I got to know the world’s most beautiful woman and richest man

Portraits of Soraya and Adnan Khashoggi

The time is early February 1974. I am at work in Monday Morning, the nonpolitical English-language weekly magazine I founded and started publishing in Beirut 18 months earlier. The tabloid-size periodical is thriving and its offices in the Wadi’ Beshara Building on Rue Maamari, just off Hamra, is a magnet for reporters, writers and photojournalists.

My receptionist Huda Asmar, who comes from Damour, walks in one day and says a foreign female photographer wants to show you her portfolio.   

Enter a stunning doe-eyed woman with plenty of je ne sais quoi whom the late Norman Parkinson at one time described as “the most naturally beautiful woman I have ever photographed.” She introduces herself by her first name, Soraya, and shows me an impressive sample of her photographs and color slides for sale.

I ask if I could keep some on consignment and whether she would accept occasional freelance assignments. She answers yes to both questions, gives me a telephone number to reach her and takes leave.

Within the week, I ask Huda to ring Soraya and request photos to illustrate a feature on around 30 food-and-drink establishments in Beirut that a reporter has already evaluated.

Next morning, a man delivers an envelope from Soraya containing not contact prints for the feature, but some 60 black and white photographs. They were all taken and developed overnight.

I am deeply impressed.

The lady photographer with the dazzling looks passes by my office hours later to say she will shortly be flying to Cairo, where she can do some work for the magazine.

ALI AMIN

Within days, she sends me a message on the teleprinter of Egypt’s official Middle East News Agency (MENA).  She asks if Monday Morning would be interested in an exclusive interview with Ali Amin.

Soraya interviewing Ali Amin at al-Ahram in Cairo

The press baron had just been named editor-in-chief of the authoritative daily al-Ahram, replacing the deposed monarch of the Arab press, Mohamed Hassanein Heikal.

Ali Amin was stepping into Heikal's shoes after nine years of self-exile following the release from jail of his twin brother Mustafa on President Anwar Sadat’s orders.

I quickly wire Soraya my go-ahead for the interview.

Inside 48 hours, I receive six photographs and a transcribed text of the taped interview – signed “Soraya Khashoggi” – again, courtesy of MENA in Beirut.

When I show the text and pictures to my co-editor Imad Shehadeh, he looks at me and asks, “Which Soraya Khashoggi? Do you know her?”

-- “I know Soraya. I don’t know her surname.”

-- “Strange, because the wife of Adnan Khashoggi is called Soraya. Can it be her?”

-- “No idea, but who’s Adnan Khashoggi anyway?”

Imad briefs me on the man in a few sentences and we agree on a byline: “Text and Photographs by Monday Morning’s Special Correspondent Soraya Khashoggi.”

With Soraya away in Cairo and the “Khashoggi” riddle still unsolved, we decide to make the four-page interview with Ali Amin the cover story of the 25 February 1974 edition.

Key questions and answers from the interview:

Soraya: What’s your opinion of the new freedom allowed in the Egyptian press? Did you have any part in this new policy?

Ali Amin: No. I did not have any part in it. But to say Anwar Sadat gave us back the freedom of the press is the wrong way of putting it. I do not accept the idea that the ruler gives freedom to us. We took back our freedom, of course with the approval of the President – and we feel that this is good for us, the people, and also better for the President himself. Before this, al-Ahram was a newspaper in which the ruler said what he wanted to his people; now it is the other way round – it is a newspaper through which the people will say what they want to their ruler. I feel strongly that had we had the freedom of press, we would never have had the defeat of June 5 (1967)…

S.: What, in your view, has the reaction of the people been since you took over as editor in chief?

A.A.: Well, the circulation of the newspaper is the real mirror, and the circulation has increased.

S.: How much?

A.A.: I think it has increased about 70,000 in our weekly issue and by 20,000 to 25,000 in our daily issue…

S.: How do you feel being back in Egypt after so many years (in self-exile)? Did you ever feel that would never happen?

A.A.: No. I always believed this would happen. I always knew the day would follow the night -- and it was a long, long night. I always believed the sun would rise again, and it did.

S.: Did you ever fear that you would never again see your twin brother Mustafa, who spent so many years in prison, alive?

A.A.: No. I always knew I would see him. I was never afraid of that.

S.: What is your opinion of the forthcoming Islamic Summit? (The summit started in Pakistan two days after the interview was conducted.)

A.A.: The Islamic conference will show the unity of the Islamic countries, but I want to tell you something: We Egyptians are many Muslims and many Christians. In the (1973) October War the only General who died was a Christian, Gen. Shafik Mitri Serdak. And there were two Marshals who fought in the battle and crossed the Suez Canal; one of them is a Christian.

…I want to tell you that when I was a boy, I witnessed the 1919 Revolution, and one of the greatest successes of this Revolution against the British was that its leader Saad Zaghloul – my great-uncle -- united the Moslems and the Christians, and for the first time in our history, we fought together…

S.: What did you do in all the (nine) years you spent outside Egypt?

A.A.: I wrote. I wrote a column in (Beirut’s daily) al-Anwar. I wrote many articles for other papers, I followed all the Egyptian and Arab press and I worked in the (Lebanese) As-Sayyad publishing house.

S.: You chose England to spend most of your exile in, why?

A.A.: Because I spent all my youth in England and studied five years in Sheffield University.

GAAFAR NIMEIRY

The first question I ask Soraya on her return to Beirut from Cairo is: Now that you have identified yourself as Soraya Khashoggi, are you related to Adnan Khashoggi? Is he your husband by any chance?”

“Yes he is,” she answers with a disarming smile, “and we are the proud parents of five children: Nabila, Mohamed, Khaled, Hussein and Omar. Do you want to meet Adnan by any chance -- or interview him?”

-- “I do, of course.”

-- “Adnan and I will travel this week and I could interview Sudanese President Gaafar Nimeiry  at one point during our trip. Are you interested?”

“Indeed I am!”

The interview with Nimeiry  -- titled “Sudan will be garden of the world” -- appears as a cover story under Soraya’s full name in April 1974. Among the subtitles:

-- “The national-unity problems of Sudan and Lebanon are similar: they are artificial”

-- “We will be one of the world’s four major food suppliers before the year 2000”

-- “We have some promise of future oil and gas discoveries”

ADNAN KHASHOGGI

In mid-May 1974, Soraya sets up my appointment to interview her husband, who is said to be the richest man in the world. He receives me warmly and courteously at his luxurious offices in the Gefinor building in Ras Beirut on a day sandwiched between two of his business trips.

I interviewed Adnan at his HQ in Beirut's Gefinor

I ask him how he managed to build up one small Saudi company into a business colossus that is wrapping its arms around the globe.

“My success? I was lucky enough to be in the right place at the right time,” he tells me before expounding on his Triad Holding Company.

He describes it as a multinational mammoth chiefly engaged in (1) commercial and investment banking and venture capital (2) industrial and commercial development, and (3) worldwide trade – with operating companies in Indonesia, Brazil, the United States, Europe and the Middle East.

Why “Triad”?

The name springs from the involvement in Adnan’s giant business enterprise of his two brothers, Adel and Issam.

“Q.: There have been rumors in the media about your involvement in arms deals. Would you care to comment on them?

“A.: We don’t deal in arms. I certainly don’t have a shop that sells guns and bombs. Our marketing company does represent large American and European industries that manufacture both civilian and military equipment. One example is Lockheed, which builds the Tri-Star, a commercial plane, and the F104, which is a fighter. We market both products, and our customers for this kind of equipment are usually governments or airlines.”

The interview with the courteous Adnan, which Soraya did not attend, makes the cover story of the May 20, 1974 edition of my magazine.

With the buildup towards Lebanon’s civil war quickening, Soraya rings me shortly after to say she was moving with the children out of Beirut for safety reasons but will stay in touch.

Shirley Bassey (Photo from Wikipedia)

Indeed she did stay in touch by telephone and even sent me an interview for Monday Morning with Shirley Bassey. “The greatest singer in the world today” talks in it about Um Kulthoum, Lebanese audiences, her career, her personality, her fans and her future. The interview appeared February 10, 1975.

It was the last time I heard from either Soraya or Adnan save for one telephone conversation later in the month. They are at Beirut airport, probably waiting for to refueling of their private plane. Soraya asks me about the political tension gripping the country. When I start moaning about the difficulty of publishing an apolitical magazine in a politicized atmosphere, she tells me, “Wait, Adnan wants to have a word.”

Adnan comes on the line and says, “Hi, I overheard Soraya mention ‘problem’ -- what problem are you facing?”

I say turning the magazine political is vital for its survival in this politically charged atmosphere. The exclusiveness that governs issuing political licenses to Lebanese newspapers and magazines (allowing them to cover politics) means I have to buy an existing political publishing license.

Adnan: “Why don’t you do that?”

-- “I can do that. But to put the newly acquired political publishing license to use, I first need to join the Lebanese Publishers’ Union, which is a protracted procedure.  Alternatively, I need to set up a shareholding company with a minimum capital of half-a-million Lebanese liras.”

Adnan: “Okay, go the shorter route. Don’t worry about raising the capital. I’ll fund it in full...”

Soraya's June 1999 write-up for The Mail on Sunday 

A few weeks after our conversation, I choose to take the longer route. I buy an existing political publishing license -- weekly ash-Shiraa -- from Monsignor Antoine Cortbawi, join the Lebanese Publishers’ Union as sole owner of a political publishing license and turn Monday Morning socio-political starting May 1975. (See my post “The cost of gagging Beirut -- Part IV”)

I must say here, at least for the record, that Soraya never accepted a penny for any work she did for me, nor did I ever take up Adnan’s unqualified and openhanded funding offer.

I was saddened by their divorce but have had no contact with either over the past 35 years.

Jonathan and Petrina

And I was bemused on June 20,1999 when I read “Byline: SORAYA KHASHOGGI” on an article in The Mail on Sunday (London). In it, Soraya recounts her extraordinary love affair with Jonathan Aitken, the former Cabinet Minister and the father or her daughter Petrina.

Soraya writes in her opening paragraphs:  

“I FIRST met Jonathan Aitken when Harpers magazine sent me to photograph him for an article.

“He was working in his rooms in Holland Park and he laughed when the photographer sent to take his picture turned up in a blue Rolls-Royce convertible.

“I was living in both London and Saudi Arabia at the time and a few weeks later in Beirut, Fawaz Najia, my editor on Monday Morning - an English-language Lebanese magazine that I worked for first as a photographer then as a writer/photographer - asked me to interview an English Tory MP on his way to the Gulf who was in town for the night. It turned out to be Jonathan…”