The
top US military officer has outlined the costs, risks and benefits of possible
American military involvement in the Syrian conflict.
Joint Chiefs of Staff
chairman Gen. Martin Dempsey offered five military options, including limited
strikes and establishing a no-fly zone.
In an open letter to
senators, he analyzed five military options the U.S. military could potentially
undertake in Syria.
Gen. Dempsey's letter was
in response to questions by two members of the Senate Armed Services Committee,
which is considering re-appointing him for a second two-year term as chairman
of the joint chiefs.
The full
text of the letter:
CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
The Honorable Carl
Levin
Chairman
Committee on Armed
Services
United States Senate
Washington, DC 20510
Dear Mr. Chairman:
On 18 July 2013, you asked me to provide
an unclassified assessment of options for the potential use of U.S. military
force in the Syrian conflict. It offers my independent judgment with as much
openness as this classification allows. I am mindful that deliberations are
ongoing within our government over the further role of the United States in
this complex sectarian war. The decision over whether to introduce
military force is a political one that our Nation entrusts to its civilian
leaders. I also understand that you deserve my best military advice on how
military force could be used in order to decide whether it should be used.
At this time, the military’s role is
limited to helping deliver humanitarian assistance, providing security
assistance to Syria’s neighbors, and providing nonlethal assistance to the
opposition. Patriot batteries are deployed to Turkey and Jordan for their
defense against missile attack. An operational headquarters and additional
capabilities, including F-16s, are positioned to defend Jordan. We are also
prepared for the options described below:
Train, Advise, and Assist the Opposition.
This option uses nonlethal forces to train and advise the opposition on tasks
ranging from weapons employment to tactical planning. We could also offer
assistance in the form of intelligence and logistics. The scale could range
from several hundred to several thousand troops with the costs varying
accordingly, but estimated at $500 million per year initially. The option
requires safe areas outside Syria as well as support from our regional
partners. Over time, the impact would be the improvement in opposition
capabilities. Risks include extremists gaining access to additional
capabilities, retaliatory crossborder attacks, and insider attacks or
inadvertent association with war crimes due to vetting difficulties.
Conduct Limited Stand-off Strikes.
This option uses lethal force to strike targets that enable the regime to conduct
military operations, proliferate advanced weapons, and defend itself. Potential
targets include high-value regime air defense, air, ground, missile, and naval
forces as well as the supporting military facilities and command nodes.
Stand-off air and missile systems could be used to strike hundreds of targets
at a tempo of our choosing. Force requirements would include hundreds of
aircraft, ships, submarines, and other enablers. Depending on duration, the
costs would be in the billions. Over time, the impact would be the significant
degradation of regime capabilities and an increase in regime desertions. There
is a risk that the regime could withstand limited strikes by dispersing its
assets. Retaliatory attacks are also possible, and there is a probability for
collateral damage impacting civilians and foreigners inside the country.
Establish a No-Fly Zone.
This option uses lethal force to prevent the regime from using its military
aircraft to bomb and resupply. It would extend air superiority over Syria by
neutralizing the regime’s advanced, defense integrated air defense system. It
would also shoot down adversary aircraft and strike airfields, aircraft on the
ground, and supporting infrastructure. We would require hundreds of ground and
sea-based aircraft, intelligence and electronic warfare support, and enablers
for refueling and communications. Estimated costs are $500 million initially,
averaging as much as a billion dollars per month over the course of a
year. Impacts would likely include the near total elimination of the
regime’s ability to bomb opposition strongholds and sustain its forces by air.
Risks include the loss of U.S. aircraft, which would require us to insert
personnel recovery forces. It may also fail to reduce the violence or shift the
momentum because the regime relies overwhelmingly on surface fires—mortars,
artillery, and missiles.
Establish Buffer Zones.
This option uses lethal and nonlethal force to protect specific geographic
areas, most likely across the borders with Turkey or Jordan.
The opposition could use these zones to organize and train. They could
also serve as safe areas for the distribution of humanitarian assistance.
Lethal force would be required to defend the zones against air, missile, and
ground attacks. This would necessitate the establishment of a limited no-fly
zone, with its associated resource requirements. Thousands of U.S. ground
forces would be needed, even if positioned outside Syria, to support those
physically defending the zones. A limited no-fly zone coupled with U.S. ground
forces would push the costs over one billion dollars per month. Over time, the
impact would be an improvement in opposition capabilities. Human suffering
could also be reduced, and some pressure could be lifted off Jordan and Turkey.
Risks are similar to the no-fly zone with the added problem of regime surface
fires into the zones, killing more refugees due to their concentration. The
zones could also become operational bases for extremists.
Control Chemical Weapons.
This option uses lethal force to prevent the use or proliferation of chemical
weapons. We do this by destroying portions of Syria’s massive stockpile,
interdicting its movement and delivery, or by seizing and securing program
components. At a minimum, this option would call for a no-fly zone as well as
air and missile strikes involving hundreds of aircraft, ships, submarines, and
other enablers. Thousands of special operations forces and other ground forces
would be needed to assault and secure critical sites. Costs could also average
well over one billion dollars per month. The impact would be the control of
some, but not all chemical weapons. It would also help prevent their further
proliferation into the hands of extremist groups. Our inability to fully
control Syria’s storage and delivery systems could allow extremists to gain
better access. Risks are similar to the no-fly zone with the added risk of U.S.
boots on the ground.
Too often, these options are considered in
isolation. It would be better if they were assessed and discussed in the
context of an overall whole-of-government strategy for achieving our policy
objectives in coordination with our allies and partners. To this end, I have
supported a regional approach that would isolate the conflict to prevent
regional destabilization and weapons proliferation. At the same time, we should
help develop a moderate opposition -- including their military capabilities -- while
maintaining pressure on the Assad regime.
All of these options would likely further
the narrow military objective of helping the opposition and placing more
pressure on the regime. We have learned from the past 10 years; however, that
it is not enough to simply alter the balance of military power without careful
consideration of what is necessary in order to preserve a functioning state. We
must anticipate and be prepared for the unintended consequences of our action.
Should the regime’s institutions collapse in the absence of a viable
opposition, we could inadvertently empower extremists or unleash the very chemical
weapons we seek to control.
I know that the decision to use force is
not one that any of us takes lightly. It is no less than an act of war. As we
weigh our options, we should be able to conclude with some confidence that the
use of force will move us toward the intended outcome. We must also understand
risk -- not just to our forces, but to our other global responsibilities.
This is especially critical as we lose readiness due to budget cuts and fiscal
uncertainty. Some options may not be feasible in time or cost without
compromising our security elsewhere. Once we take action, we should be prepared
for what comes next. Deeper involvement is hard to avoid. We should also act in
accordance with the law, and to the extent possible, in concert with our allies
and partners to share the burden and solidify the outcome.
Thank you for this opportunity to share my
assessment. The classified versions of all the options described here have been
presented to the National Security Staff for consideration by the Principals
and the President. They have also been presented to the Congress in several
briefs, including one recently provided by the Vice Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff.
Sincerely,
Martin E. Dempsey
General, U.S. Army
