"Lebanese and Syrians: Good riddance, Sarkozy"

Sarkozy and Assad in Paris (top) and in Damascus (below)

Should French voters boot out French President Nicolas Sarkozy from the Elysée in two weeks’ time “most Lebanese and Syrians would feel somehow vindicated,” according to Eyad Abu Shakra, a veteran political analyst writing today for the Saudi daily Asharq Alawsat.

Sarkozy faces an uphill struggle in the May 6 second round of the presidential election, after coming second in Sunday's first ballot.

He won 27.1% of the vote, while his Socialist rival François Hollande took 28.6%, the first time a sitting president lost in the first round.

Hollande's narrow victory on Sunday gives him the upper hand in the May 6 runoff.

Surely, Abu Shakra writes, the choice of French president belongs to the French voter, adding:

“No one in genuine democracies chooses a government or president based on external wishes or directives. But in a world of interlocked interests and grandiloquence about human rights and democratic choices… victims are entitled to rejoice when free voters pass a fair verdict against someone who undermined their interests.

“‘Sarkozy’s France’ talked and acted adequately as concerns the now-stumbling Arab Spring. But its words and deeds won’t erase from the memory of the Lebanese firstly and the Syrians secondly that Nicolas Sarkozy, more than any other leader, undercut the Lebanese people’s March 2005 uprising and rehabilitated the Syrian regime” of President Bashar al-Assad.

Sarkozy, who assumed office in May 2007, quickly chose to stage a grand entry into the slippery politics of the Middle East by reversing Jacques Chirac's policy of isolating Syria.

In 2008, he invited Assad to the July 14 Bastille Day military parade, the high point of the French national calendar.

Two months later, in September 2008, Sarkozy became the first western head of state to visit Damascus, thereby cutting Assad slack in his effort to ward off being seriously investigated for the 2005 murder of former Lebanese prime minister Rafik Hariri and other Lebanese leaders, which Chirac blamed on Syria.

Claude Guéant with Assad (top) and Sarkozy (below)

Assad paid two working visits to Paris in November 2009 and December 2010 to consolidate bilateral ties.

In Abu Shakra’s opinion,  “Sarkozy is the man who, after Hariri’s assassination on 14 February 2005, wasted the biggest opportunity to alleviate the suffering of the Lebanese and Syrians…

“A strange combination of personal reasons (such as Sarkozy’s hatred of Jacques Chirac and all he stands for) and political motives (such as his special links to the Israeli lobby in France) drove Sarkozy and his key aides, mainly Claude Guéant, to turn French policy on its head and rehabilitate Assad…

“Yesterday, the French decided they’ve seen enough of Sarkozy and have had their fill of his chicanery…”

Saudi female artists got talent too

By Raeda Ashour (left) and Ayman Mahawi

By Wafa Karsha (left) and Wafa al-Mihdar

By Hanaa Koshaim (left) and Samiah Khashoggi

By Ibtissam Rufae (left) and Reem Nazir

A group of nine Saudi female artists better known as "Saudiaat" last week held their 4th exhibition dubbed “Directions” at the Rochan Gallery in Jeddah.

Artist Samiah Mohammed Khashoggi, an assistant professor at Dar Al Hekma College (DAH), founded the group in 2006.

Khashoggi started as a representational artist and gradually steered her way toward stylized and abstract art.

“My journey with art has been long but inconsistent, often interrupted, but art has to be authentic and genuine. It has to be an experience worth reflecting and this process takes time,” Khashoggi told Saudi Gazette's Doha Ghouth this week.

The group's other eight members alongside Khashoggi are Raeda Ashour, Effat Fadaq, Wafa Karsha, Ayman Mahawi, Maha Mufti, Wafa al-Mihdar, Reem Nazir and Ibtissam Rufae.

Their avowed objective is mutual support in their artistic careers and putting Saudi women's art on public view. A set of burgeoning Saudi female artists, known as “Friends of Saudiaat,” seconds them.

Saudiaat showcased Saudi women works of art under various labels on four occasions: "Identities Unveiled" followed by "Expressions" in 2006, "Dialogues" in 2008, and "Directions" from the 7^th to the 17^th of this month.

The works of eight Saudiaat artists illustrated here were on display in “Directions” 2012.

UNSC votes 15-0 for Syria monitors

As expected in my earlier post, the UN security Council has just unanimously approved the "resolution in blue" for Syria monitors. I published its text in full this morning (see my earlier post below).

“Air assets” deal clears way to Syria monitors

The 15-member UN Security Council is scheduled to vote at 1500 GMT on a single compromise resolution  that has been "put in blue" -- a UN parlance, which means it is  ready for a vote.

The resolution put in blue (reproduced in full hereunder)  combines the Russian and European drafts. It is expected to pass by a unanimous vote.

It authorizes the deployment of 300 unarmed observers for an initial period of three months and underlines "the need for the Syrian government and the UN to agree rapidly on appropriate air transportation assets" for the observer mission.

The European text had underlined "the need for the Syrian government to agree rapidly with the United Nations the independent use of air assets" by the observer mission. The Russian draft had made no mention of air assets.

Damascus had dismissed any need for UN aircraft. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon had said the monitors would need helicopters and other military hardware.

Syria said it is willing to allow UN observers to use its helicopters when necessary to evacuate wounded people. Foreign Minister Walid al-Muallem said Beijing earlier in the week, “Syria is ready to make its air force available for the use of this (UN) mission. Helicopters are needed to evacuate the injured. If that is the issue, then we have the capabilities in our air force to carry this out.”

A researcher close to Syria wrote Friday, “Those helicopters Ban Ki-moon is dreaming of would be military helicopters from EU countries with military pilots and NATO standard encrypted radios. The U.S. having pledged ‘communication equipment’ to the insurgents, the helicopter pilots could direct them around military concentrations and roadblocks towards their targets. The Syrian government would be crazy to agree to such a scheme of transport for UN monitors.”

****

Text of the draft resolution as put in blue:

The Security Council,

Recalling its Resolution 2042 (2012), as well as its Presidential Statements of 3 August 2011, 21 March 2012 and 5 April 2012, and also recalling all relevant resolutions of the General Assembly,

Reaffirming its support to the Joint Special Envoy for the United Nations and the League of Arab States, Kofi Annan, and his work, following General Assembly resolution A/RES/66/253 of 16 February 2012 and relevant resolutions of the League of Arab States,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Syria, and to the purposes and principles of the Charter,

Condemning the widespread violations of human rights by the Syrian authorities, as well as any human rights abuses by armed groups, recalling that those responsible shall be held accountable, and expressing its profound regret at the death of many thousands of people in Syria,

Expressing its appreciation of the significant efforts that have been made by the States bordering Syria to assist Syrians who have fled Syria’s borders as a consequence of the violence, and requesting UNHCR to provide assistance as requested by Member States receiving these displaced persons,

Expressing also its appreciation of the humanitarian assistance that has been provided to Syria by other States,

Noting the Syrian government's commitment on 25 March 2012 to implement the six-point proposal of the Joint Special Envoy of the United Nations and the League of Arab States, and to implement urgently and visibly its commitments, as it agreed to do in its communication to the Envoy of 1 April 2012, to (a) cease troop movements towards population centers, (b) cease all use of heavy weapons in such centers, and (c) begin pullback of military concentrations in and around population centers, and to implement these in their entirety by no later than 10 April 2012, and noting also the Syrian opposition's expressed commitment to respect the cessation of violence, provided the government does so,

Expressing concern over ongoing violence and reports of casualties which have escalated again in recent days, following the Envoy’s assessment of 12 April 2012 that the parties appeared to be observing a cessation of fire and that the Syrian government had started to implement its commitments, and noting that the cessation of armed violence in all its forms is therefore clearly incomplete,

Supporting the Envoy’s call for an immediate and visible implementation by the Syrian government of all elements of the Envoy’s six-point proposal in their entirety to achieve a sustained cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties,

Taking note of the assessment by the Secretary-General that a United Nations monitoring mission deployed quickly when the conditions are conducive with a clear mandate, the requisite capacities, and the appropriate conditions of operation would greatly contribute to observing and upholding the commitment of the parties to a cessation of armed violence in all its forms and to supporting the implementation of the six-point plan,

Noting the 19 April 2012 Preliminary Understanding (S/2012/250) agreed between the Syrian Arab Republic and the United Nations which provides a basis for a protocol governing the Advance Team and, upon its deployment, the UN supervision mechanism,

Having considered the Secretary-General’s letter addressed to the President of Security Council (S/2012/238),

1. Reaffirms its full support for and calls for the urgent, comprehensive, and immediate implementation of all elements of the Envoy's six-point proposal as annexed to resolution 2042 (2012) aimed at bringing an immediate end to all violence and human rights violations, securing humanitarian access and facilitating a Syrian-led political transition leading to a democratic, plural political system, in which citizens are equal regardless of their affiliations, ethnicities or beliefs, including through commencing a comprehensive political dialogue between the Syrian government and the whole spectrum of the Syrian opposition;
2. Calls upon the Syrian government to implement visibly its commitments in their entirety, as it agreed to do in the Preliminary Understanding and as stipulated in Resolution 2042 (2012), to (a) cease troop movements towards population centers, (b) cease all use of heavy weapons in such centers, and (c) complete pullback of military concentrations in and around population centers, as well as to withdraw its troops and heavy weapons from population centers to their barracks or temporary deployment places to facilitate a sustained cessation of violence;
3. Calls upon all parties in Syria, including the opposition, immediately to cease all armed violence in all its forms;
4. Calls upon the Syrian armed opposition groups and relevant elements to respect relevant provisions of the Preliminary Understanding;
5. Decides to establish immediately for an initial period of 90 days a United Nations supervision mission in Syria (UNSMIS) under the command of a Chief Military Observer, comprising an initial deployment of up to 300 unarmed military observers as well as an appropriate civilian component as required by the Mission to fulfill its mandate, and decides further that the Mission shall be deployed expeditiously subject to assessment by the Secretary-General of relevant developments on the ground, including the consolidation of the cessation of violence;
6. Decides also that the mandate of the Mission shall be to monitor a cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties and to monitor and support the full implementation of the Envoy’s six-point proposal;
7. Requests that the Secretary-General and the Syrian government without delay conclude a Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA), taking into consideration General Assembly resolution 58/82 on the scope of legal protection under the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, and notes the agreement between the Syrian government and the United Nations that, pending the conclusion of such an agreement, the model SOFA agreement of 9 October 1990 (A/45/594) shall apply provisionally;
8. Calls upon the Syrian government to ensure the effective operation of UNSMIS by: facilitating the expeditious and unhindered deployment of its personnel and capabilities as required to fulfill its mandate; ensuring its full, unimpeded, and immediate freedom of movement and access as necessary to fulfill its mandate, underlining in this regard the need for the Syrian government and the United Nations to agree rapidly on appropriate air transportation assets for UNSMIS; allowing its unobstructed communications; and allowing it to freely and privately communicate with individuals throughout Syria without retaliation against any person as a result of interaction with UNSMIS;
9. Calls upon the parties to guarantee the safety of the UNSMIS personnel without prejudice to its freedom of movement and access, and stresses that the primary responsibility in this regard lies with the Syrian authorities;
10. Requests the Secretary-General to report immediately to the Security Council any obstructions to the effective operation of UNSMIS by any party;
11. Reiterates its call for the Syrian authorities to allow immediate, full and unimpeded access of humanitarian personnel to all populations in need of assistance, in accordance with international law and guiding principles of humanitarian assistance and calls upon all parties in Syria, in particular the Syrian authorities, to cooperate fully with the United Nations and relevant humanitarian organizations to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance;
12. Invites all Member States to consider making appropriate contributions to UNSMIS as requested by the Secretary-General;
13. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the implementation of this resolution within 15 days of its adoption and every 15 days thereafter, and also to submit, as necessary, to the Council proposals for possible adjustments to the UNSMIS mandate;
14. Expresses its intention to assess the implementation of this resolution and to consider further steps as appropriate;
15. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

UN lines of battle drawn on Syria monitors

Russia on one hand and the United States, Britain, and France on the other have just circulated rival draft UN Security Council resolutions to authorize the deployment to Syria of up to 300 more ceasefire monitors.

The main difference is the West’s text threatens sanctions against Syria if it fails to fully comply with UN ceasefire commitments. Moscow's competing resolution makes no mention of the threat.

Another key difference is the US-EU text "underlines the need for the Syrian government to agree rapidly with the United Nations the independent use of air assets" by the observer mission. The Russian draft resolution makes no mention of air assets.

Syria has dismissed any need for UN aircraft, though UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon has said helicopters and other military hardware would be necessary.

Here are the two texts:

West’s draft

The United States, Britain, and France tabled this draft U.N. Security Resolution calling for the creation of a full-fledged U.N. monitoring mission in Syria, and threatening unspecified sanctions against Syria if it fails to comply with its commitments:

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolution 2042 of 14 April 2012, its Presidential Statements of 5 April 2012, 21 March 2012 and 3 August 2011, and all relevant resolutions of the General Assembly,

Reaffirming its support to the Joint Special Envoy for the United Nations and the League of Arab States, Kofi Annan, and his work, following General Assembly resolution A/RES/66/253 of 16 February 2012 and relevant resolutions of the League of Arab States,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Syria, and to the purposes and principles of the Charter,

Condemning the widespread violations of human rights by the Syrian authorities, including torture, arbitrary detentions, abductions, sexual violence and other abuses against women, children and minorities, as well as any human rights abuses by armed groups, recalling that those responsible shall be held accountable, and expressing its profound regret at the death of many thousands of people in Syria,

Expressing its appreciation to states bordering Syria that have made significant efforts to assist Syrians who have fled across Syria's borders as a consequence of the violence, and requesting UNHCR to provide assistance as requested by member states receiving these displaced persons,

Reiterating its call in its resolution 2042 (2012) for the Syrian authorities to allow immediate, full and unimpeded access of humanitarian personnel to all populations in need of assistance,

Noting the Syrian government's commitment on 25 March 2012 to implement the six-point proposal of the Joint Special Envoy of the United Nations and the League of Arab States, and to implement urgently and visibly its commitments, as it agreed to do in its communication to the Envoy of 1 April 2012, to (a) cease troop movements towards population centers, (b) cease all use of heavy weapons in such centers, and (c) begin pullback of military concentrations in and around population centers, and to implement these in their entirety by no later than 10 April 2012, and noting also the Syrian opposition's expressed commitment to respect the cessation of violence, provided the government does so,

Expressing grave concern at the ongoing violence, and, in particular, the continued use of heavy weapons by the Syrian government in population centers in continued violation of its commitments, the failure of the Syrian government to fulfill its commitments (a), (b) and (c) above or to implement the Envoy's six-point proposal,

Taking note of the assessment in the Secretary-General's 18 April letter that a United Nations monitoring mission deployed quickly when the conditions are conducive with a clear mandate, the requisite capacities, and the appropriate conditions of operation could contribute to observing and upholding the commitment of the parties to a cessation of armed violence in all its forms and to supporting the implementation of the six-point plan,

1. Reaffirms its full support for and calls for the urgent, comprehensive, and immediate implementation of all elements of the Envoy's six-point proposal aimed at bringing an immediate end to all violence and human rights violations, securing humanitarian access and facilitating a Syrian-led political transition leading to a democratic, plural political system, in which citizens are equal regardless of their affiliations, ethnicities or beliefs, including through commencing a comprehensive political dialogue between the Syrian government and the whole spectrum of the Syrian opposition;
2. Calls upon the Syrian government to implement visibly its commitments in their entirety, as it agreed to do in its communication to the Envoy of 1 April 2012, and as stipulated in resolution 2042 (2012) to (a) cease troop movements towards population centers, (b) cease all use of heavy weapons in such centers, and (c) begin pullback of military concentrations in and around population centers, and also calls upon the Syrian government to withdraw its troops and heavy weapons from population centers to their barracks to facilitate a sustained cessation of violence;
3. Calls upon all parties in Syria, including the opposition, immediately to cease all armed violence in all its forms;
4. Decides to authorize a United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) under the command of a Chief Military Observer for an initial period of three months, comprising an initial deployment of up to 300 unarmed military observers as well as additional civilian personnel as required by the Mission with a range of skills, including political, human rights, civil affairs, public information, public security, gender and other expertise, and decides further that the Mission shall be deployed expeditiously subject to assessment by the Secretary-General of implementation of paragraph 2 above to his satisfaction;
5. Decides also that the mandate of the Mission shall be to monitor a cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties and the withdrawal of Syrian troops and heavy weapons from inside and around population centers to their barracks, and to monitor and support the full implementation of the six-point proposal, as well as any other tasks agreed with the parties;
6. Requests that the Secretary-General and the Syrian government conclude a Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) within 30 days of adoption of this resolution, taking into consideration General Assembly resolution 58/82 on the scope of legal protection under the Convention on the Safety of United Nations and Associated Personnel, and notes the agreement set out in the "Preliminary understanding", that, pending the conclusion of such an agreement, the model SOMA agreement of 9 October 1990 (A/45/594) shall apply provisionally;
7. Calls upon the Syrian government to ensure the effective operation of the mission by fulfilling the commitments set out in its 19 April "Preliminary Understanding" [(annex)] with the United Nations, including by: facilitating the expeditious and unhindered deployment of its personnel and capabilities as required to fulfil its mandate; ensuring its full, unimpeded, and immediate freedom of movement and access as necessary to fulfill its mandate; allowing its unobstructed communications; and allowing it to freely and confidentially interact with any individual, group of individuals, body or institution in Syria without threat of harassment or reprisal against any person as a result of interaction with the mission;
8. Underlines the need for the Syrian government to agree rapidly with the United Nations the independent use of air assets by UNSMIS;
9. Calls upon the parties to guarantee the safety of UNSMIS without prejudice to its freedom of movement and access, and stresses that the primary responsibility in this regard lies with the Syrian authorities;
10. Requests the Secretary-General to report immediately to the Security Council any obstructions to the effective operation of the Mission by any party, including any incidents of non-compliance with paragraph 6 above;
11. Urges all Member States to consider making appropriate contributions to UNSMIS and to respond positively to requests for assistance from the Mission;
12. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the implementation of this resolution within 15 days of its adoption and regularly thereafter, but no less frequently than every 15 days;
13. Underlines the critical importance of full implementation of paragraph 2 above for a sustained cessation of violence, and in order to generate a conducive environment for the effective operation of UNSMIS, and therefore expresses its intention, in the event of non-compliance with paragraph 2 above, to adopt measures under article 41 of the Charter;
14. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

Russian draft

The Security Council,

Recalling its Resolution 2042 (2012), as well as its Presidential Statements of 3 August 2011, 21 March 2012 and 5 April 2012, and also recalling all relevant resolutions of the General Assembly,

Reaffirming its support to the Joint Special Envoy for the United Nations and the League of Arab States, Kofi Annan, and his work, following General Assembly resolution A/RES/66/253 of 16 February 2012 and relevant resolutions of the League of Arab States,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, unity and territorial integrity of Syria, and to the purposes and principles of the Charter,

Condemning the widespread violations of human rights by the Syrian authorities, as well as any human rights abuses by armed groups, recalling that those responsible shall be held accountable, and expressing its profound regret at the death of many thousands of people in Syria,

Noting the Syrian government's commitment on 25 March 2012 to implement the six-point proposal of the Joint Special Envoy of the United Nations and the League of Arab States, and to implement urgently and visibly its commitments, as it agreed to do in its communication to the Envoy of 1 April 2012, to (a) cease troop movements towards population centers, (b) cease all use of heavy weapons in such centers, and (c) begin pullback of military concentrations in and around population centers, and to implement these in their entirety by no later than 10 April 2012, and noting also the Syrian opposition's expressed commitment to respect the cessation of violence, provided the government does so,

Noting the Envoy's assessment that, as of 12 April 2012, the parties appeared to be observing a cessation of fire and that the Syrian government had started to implement its commitments, and supporting the Envoy's call for an immediate and visible implementation by the Syrian government of all elements of the Envoy's six-point proposal in their entirety to achieve a sustained cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties,

Expressing concern over violent incidents and reports of casualties, which have escalated again in recent days, and noting that the cessation of the armed violence in all its forms is therefore clearly incomplete,

Taking note of the view expressed by the Secretary-General that a United Nations monitoring mission would greatly contribute to observing and upholding the commitment of the parties to a cessation of armed violence in all its forms and to supporting the implementation of the six-point plan,

Noting the signing on 19 April 2012 of the Preliminary Understanding between the Syrian Arab Republic and the United Nation to provide a basis for a protocol governing the Advance Team and, upon its deployment, the UN supervision mechanism,

Having considered the Secretary-General's letter addressed to the President of Security Council, and its enclosure (S/2012/238),

1. Reaffirms its full support for and calls for the urgent, comprehensive, and immediate implementation of all elements of the Envoy's six-point proposal as annexed to resolution 2042 (2012) aimed at bringing an immediate end to all violence and human rights violations, securing humanitarian access and facilitating a Syrian-led political transition leading to a democratic, plural political system, in which citizens are equal regardless of their affiliations, ethnicities or beliefs, including through commencing a comprehensive political dialogue between the Syrian government and the whole spectrum of the Syrian opposition;
2. Calls upon the Syrian government to implement visibly its commitments in their entirety, as it agreed to do in its communication to the Envoy of 1 April 2012, to (a) cease troop movements towards population centers, (b) cease all use of heavy weapons in such centers, and (c) begin pullback of military concentrations in and around population centers, and as it further agreed to do in the Preliminary Understanding signed on 19 April 2012;
3. Underlines the importance attached by the Envoy to the withdrawal of all Syrian government troops and heavy weapons from population centers to their barracks to facilitate a sustained cessation of violence;
4. Calls upon all parties in Syria, including the opposition, immediately to cease all armed violence in all its forms;
5. Decides to establish immediately for an initial period of 90 days a United Nations supervision mission in Syria (UNSMIS) to monitor a cessation of armed violence in all its forms by all parties and relevant aspects of the Envoy's six-point proposal, on the basis of the Preliminary Understanding signed on 19 April 2012 and the model status-of-forces agreement dated 9 October 1990 (A/45/594) which shall apply provisionally pending the timely conclusion of a status-of-mission agreement concerning the status of UNSMIS between the United Nations and the Syrian government;
6. Decides that UNSMIS will comprise an initial deployment of up to 300 United Nations Military Observers supported by a limited and appropriate substantive civilian component to be agreed in consultations with the Syrian government and the Security Council, pursuant to the Secretary-General's proposal contained in his letter addressed to the President of Security Council (S/2012/238);
7. Calls upon the Syrian government to ensure the effective operation of UNSMIS by: facilitating the expeditious and unhindered deployment of its personnel and capabilities as required to fulfill its mandate; ensuring its full, unimpeded, and immediate freedom of movement and access as necessary to fulfil its mandate; allowing its unobstructed communications; and allowing it to freely and privately communicate with individuals throughout Syria without retaliation against any person as a result of interaction with UNSMIS;
8. Calls upon the parties to guarantee the safety of the UNSMIS personnel without prejudice to its freedom of movement and access, and stresses that the primary responsibility in this regard lies with the Syrian authorities;
9. Requests the Secretary-General to report immediately to the Security Council any obstructions to the effective operation of UNSMIS by any party;
10. Reiterates its call for the Syrian authorities to allow immediate, full and unimpeded access of humanitarian personnel to all populations in need of assistance, in accordance with international law and guiding principles of humanitarian assistance and calls upon all parties in Syria, in particular the Syrian authorities, to cooperate fully with the United Nations and relevant humanitarian organizations to facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance;
11. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Council on the implementation of this resolution within 30 days of its adoption and every 30 days thereafter, and also to submit, if necessary, to the Council his proposals with regard to UNSMIS mandate, scope and methods of work in advance of the expiration of the current mandate;
12. Decides to remain seized of the matter.

“Syria is fragmenting, says American facilitator”

Syria map from www.bbc.co.uk

In May 2008, both Israel under Ehud Olmert and Syria under Bashar al-Assad acknowledged they were holding indirect talks to reach a comprehensive peace agreement. The talks were suspended seven months later.

An American facilitator of these and of earlier negotiations between the two sides, talking to Lebanese daily an-Nahar’s authoritative political analyst Sarkis Naoum, gives this assessment of the Syria crisis:

****

Yes, the Syrian civil war is in progress. It will continue and expand. The regime is down but now out.

Much blood will be shed in Syria. If political agreement were not reached, Syria would fragment. The regime and its people would decamp to the Alawite Mountains and hold on to the cities along the coastal plain and maybe other places. An Alawite state, canton or the like could emerge. From there on, God knows what!

The 1982 crackdown on Hama and events preceding it alarmed Hafez al-Assad. He was afraid he wouldn’t come out on top. He opened a main branch for the Syrian Central Bank in the Alawite region, where he also built universities and vital infrastructures. He wanted the area all set in case he needed to relocate there. At the time, he transferred all the Central Bank’s foreign currency reserves to the (regional) branch. What can prevent this, or something similar, happening today?

I know the Syrian regime well. I was in contact with the late president and then with his son, the current president. We worked together on peace with Israel.

Some 7,000 people have been killed in Syria so far. Blood is being shed. Bashar can’t carry on. But he can’t walk away either. He has blood on his hands. He is not in charge. Those around him are in charge.

Assad and Powell in May 2003

When he received Colin Powell a few years back (in May 2003), he promised him many things that were never implemented. The people around him wouldn’t let him. They told him: you are the president, but don’t take decisions and don’t make promises because you can’t see them through.

The interview he gave Barbara Walters (last December) proves he controls nothing.

Sarkis Naoum: Does his inner circle, especially its Alawites, support him?

Some Alawite top brass might desert him. They could join the revolution if it takes them in. Or they could simply stay home, now that the uprising/revolution has taken a sectarian character. Maybe a significant proportion of Alawites don’t approve of Bashar’s policy. Some possibly hate him. But they cling on for fear of Sunnite factionalism, chiefly the Muslim Brothers and Salafists.

Imagine that sectarianism has now engulfed Syrian expatriates in France.  Medical staff at a French hospital included 13 Syrian doctors – 12 Sunnites and one Alawite. They were friends and worked together. Since the revolution, the 12 wouldn’t talk to the 13th. Here, in my country, the United States, resident Alawites are not invited to Syrian opposition meetings.

The U.S. and the West have to find a solution to the Syrian crisis so as to spare Syrian blood and preempt Syria fragmenting. But that’s not their priority. They won’t intervene militarily. They could be supplying or allowing the supply of arms and funds (to the Syrian opposition).

America was unequivocal when it urged Assad to stand down, ruling out dialogue with him. Had he been ready for a settlement in the first months of the crisis he could have saved his skin.

Naoum: Does the Syrian regime still reach out to you? What does it ask of the United States?

There is contact. He wants America to lay off his back. Is such a request plausible? Assad makes no sensible request and proposes nothing practical.

Naoum: Is Assad Iran’s ally or its captive?

He was Iran’s ally. He is now its captive. His father was an ally and a full partner (of Iran). He (Bashar) is a small partner. He can refuse Iran nothing because of its comprehensive cash, arms and training assistance.

The Russians, who support his war on people seeking to oust him, neither ask him to step down nor facilitate his choice of compromise should he make one.

The Syrian National Council (SNC) is not fully representative. Many of its members reside in the West. Some are in Turkey. Others are in Arab capitals. Some emigrated overseas a long time ago. Others were forced into exile lately. And they have differences of opinion on their role and eminence.

The true representatives of the insurgent Syrian people are the Local Coordination Committees and the Free Syrian Army.

France would stay the course on Syria post-Sarkozy

From R.: Sarkozy, Le Pen, Hollande, Mélenchon and Bayrou (AFP image from www.bbc.co.uk)

France’s tough line on Syria won’t butter up with the anticipated exit of President Nicolas Sarkozy from the Elysée.

Nor would France’s Arab Spring policy change much, writes Ms Randa Takieddine, Paris bureau chief for the Saudi-owned daily al-Hayat who is into her fourth coverage of French presidential campaigns.

The first round of the 2012 presidential election will take place on Sunday, with a most likely second round runoff being held on May 6.

French Socialist presidential candidate François Hollande is projected by opinion polls to beat Sarkozy in the runoff to become France’s first Socialist president for 17 years.

Takieddine says Hollande is all but assured of victory in the second round, because he would get votes transferred from Jean-Luc Mélenchon and Eva Joly, respectively the Left Party and Green Party candidates. But she says the votes for rightist and centrist candidates, Marine Le Pen and François Bayrou, are unlikely to be moved to Sarkozy in the runoff.

With first round voting 72 hours away, Takieddine writes, “the question is whether a new president would change France’s Middle East policy. The answer is that French interests require France’s Arab policy to remain unchanged, irrespective of the choice of foreign minister. Certainly the style or approach might change, depending on the person in charge.

“On the Arab-Israeli issue, every new French administration has aspired to play a peacemaking role, albeit through the European Union. There is no doubt Hollande would continue to support the Arab Spring.

“As for Syria, Hollande has explicitly condemned the practices of Bashar al-Assad’s regime.

“Readying the Middle East files for a new president would be career diplomats from all political hues. Denis Pietton, the former French ambassador to Lebanon who is known for his Left-leaning views, was recently appointed head of the Middle East and North Africa desk at the Quai d'Orsay because he is one of France’s best Orientalists.

“True, most Arab governments know little about Hollande and would rather see Sarkozy win a second term. But French foreign policy remains a constant. It was far from being a contentious issue in the campaign.

“Nonetheless, should Hollande win the presidency, he would be well-advised to opt for an adept foreign minister -- someone like Hubert Védrine, one of France’s best ministers of foreign affairs (from 1997 to 2002).

“But Védrine’s name is not in the hat for foreign minister as yet. Names that are include:

-- Laurent Fabius (prime minister from July 1984 to March 1986)

-- Jean-Louis Bianco (Elysée secretary-general for nine years under François Mitterrand)

-- Élisabeth Guigou (a former minister of European affairs)

-- Or maybe Martine Aubry, First Secretary of the Socialist Party. That’s if Hollande did not name her prime minister.